vested interest in kashmir

Opinion

The expansionist agenda An unacknowledged vested interest in a disturbed Kashmir By Firdaus Ahmed http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=24632 That Kashmir remains disturbed suits several otherwise competing interests. Counter intuitively then, there is cooperation between these forces with stakes in Kashmir for keeping it simmering. While vested interests in the conflict are well known in certain quarters, such as for instance in the ISI and Jihad, Inc. across the border, this article deals with the less easy to find that are unfortunately much closer home and on that account are probably more significant. The thesis here is that north Indian ethnic groupshave developed an economic stake in the military's expansion, which makes them unwittingly amenable to continuing military commitment in Kashmir, mirroring in a manner the better known Punjabi-military nexus in Pakistan and its well recognised stake in a disturbed Kashmir.  In the popular narrative, much furthered by army veterans, the army is merely doing a distasteful piece of work foisted on it by a hapless administration. It would much rather be in its cantonments in training for its primary task of guarding frontiers rather than manning an unforgiving Line of Control (LoC) and chasing down foreign jihadists and assorted Kashmiri nationalists. The inability of the diplomats of the two states to arrive at an agreement, minimally on a peaceable LoC and maximally on turning it into an IB, results in a military necessity of guarding it all along its often hostile length. Internally, the politicians and bureaucrats having messed up and unable to clean up thereafter results in the army's retaining of its hold despite in its view having created the security conditions enabling a political resolution. Therefore, it is not a 'vested interest' but is instead merely fulfilling its obligation.  There is little to argue over the fact that the LoC continues to defy final settlement despite the passing of over half a century. It is also true that the security situation has been under enough control for most part of the preceding quarter century - not necessarily due to military means alone but also due to diplomatic and political measures - for India to have hammered out a political resolution. That it has not done so is not only due to a deficit in political strength, with Delhi perceiving, largely mistakenly, an inability to sell any 'solution' internally to the rest of the country. It also owes in part to the interests at play in Kashmir that have little to do with the conflict configuration but with dynamics elsewhere, including within the social composition of the security forces in general.  The Kashmir problem has served as a windfall for uninhibited expansion of security forces. The momentary Khalistani insurgency of the eighties has brought home that changes in the social composition of the army, in particular, was necessary. Even as this was being proceeded with discreetly in terms of reduction of Sikh percentages within the military, there was an expansion in the army owing to its multiple counter insurgency commitments in the nineties ranging from the North East to Kashmir. Since the conventional deterrent needed to remain in place lest the proxy wars escalate inordinately, troop strength needed expanding. This necessity gave birth to the Rashtriya Rifles. With Pakistan becoming more venturesome under its overt nuclear capability by its mounting of the Kargil misadventure and the parliament attack, further expansion was needed to be able to deliver it a quick, but not lethal, blow through what was termed the 'Cold Start' doctrine. The LoC fence that came up in the same timeframe also required more regular troops to man. Thus, another round of expansion took place of the army over last decade. China, and the latest 'two front' 'threat', provide a limitless rationale for expansion into the future, limited by the economics of it.  While the army, a professional force that it is, can be expected to be cognisant of the strategic dimension informing, and in its view necessitating, its expansion, the issue is anchored not in the strategic coordinates as the army prefers to believe and the popular narrative would have it, but in the wider societal factors. In particular, the ethnic groups that have stood to be advantaged by such expansion are the ones propelling it. In the absence of statistics, these groups can be said to reside within a 100 km from the Jaipur-Delhi-Chandigarh-Jammu line. In the case of Kashmir, the advantaged groups are rather easy to spot. It is no wonder then that given a choice security force members would prefer postings in Kashmir rather than in the North East, positioned as they would be within a night's journey from their leave destinations. Therefore, a restive Kashmir as now - but not with a full blown insurgency as earlier - is not such a bad proposition.  In the straitened times of liberalisation, the only sector that has expanded continuously is the security sector not only in terms of employment but also the monies devoted to it. These groups do not have the advantage of certain other Indian nationalities, such as those on the western sea board who can look towards the Gulf and certain others on the Deccan plateau and southwards who have leap-frogged on the back of the IT sector. Therefore, the security sector's expansion has enabled these groups to keep up. Additionally, the largesse of the Sixth Pay Commission has channelled a majority of army's revenue budget into their 'pinds and mohallas'.  These groups are the ones that keep New Delhi frightened of its own shadow when it deals with Pakistan. With a collective memory marred by Partition, suffering a hangover of the martial race theory and influenced by cultural nationalism, these groups have a stake in continuation of an unacknowledged subcontinental civil war. This keeps them wary of Pakistan and at odds the liberal conception of security in which the alternative security approaches, such as prospects of economic engagement in diluting animosities and creating new power centres, are based. Therefore, even if India succeeds in forcing a penalty corner, for instance in entering into a dialogue with Pakistan, it is, quite like its hockey team, unable to convert it, in this case into a substantial and meaningful round of talks.  Given this, it can in summation be said that the army is right in saying that it not yet another 'vested interest' in Kashmir; but only by its lights. As pointed out here, these lights are both narrow and dim. Expanding the theoretical template from military sociology to the 'military and society' plane helps identify more consequential vested interests that lie elsewhere.  Identifying this is merely the first step. It begs the question: What's to be done?  The national security question needs revisiting afresh. Challenging the popular trope, hung out to dry by veterans with Goebbelesian regularity in op-eds in the 'nationalist' press, is useful. But the intellectual battle also needs taking into the academia, the government's policy rooms and back rooms of political parties. Security has for too long been held hostage to 'strategic' thinking, fixated without. It requires instead a lens more sensitive to social and political forces within society. That way China and Pakistan would fall behind as 'threats' and instead forces, closer home, that unwittingly masquerade as 'answers' to security problems, would rise to claim their space. A redefinition of security will help India's peripheral population groups overthrow what in their perception might amount to an internal colonial yoke attributable as hypothesised here to its 'heartland' groups.  (The author is a blogger at www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in)

Opinion

The expansionist agenda An unacknowledged vested interest in a disturbed Kashmir By Firdaus Ahmed That Kashmir remains disturbed suits several otherwise competing interests. Counter intuitively then, there is cooperation between these forces with stakes in Kashmir for keeping it simmering. While vested interests in the conflict are well known in certain quarters, such as for instance in the ISI and Jihad, Inc. across the border, this article deals with the less easy to find that are unfortunately much closer home and on that account are probably more significant. The thesis here is that north Indian ethnic groupshave developed an economic stake in the military's expansion, which makes them unwittingly amenable to continuing military commitment in Kashmir, mirroring in a manner the better known Punjabi-military nexus in Pakistan and its well recognised stake in a disturbed Kashmir.  In the popular narrative, much furthered by army veterans, the army is merely doing a distasteful piece of work foisted on it by a hapless administration. It would much rather be in its cantonments in training for its primary task of guarding frontiers rather than manning an unforgiving Line of Control (LoC) and chasing down foreign jihadists and assorted Kashmiri nationalists. The inability of the diplomats of the two states to arrive at an agreement, minimally on a peaceable LoC and maximally on turning it into an IB, results in a military necessity of guarding it all along its often hostile length. Internally, the politicians and bureaucrats having messed up and unable to clean up thereafter results in the army's retaining of its hold despite in its view having created the security conditions enabling a political resolution. Therefore, it is not a 'vested interest' but is instead merely fulfilling its obligation.  There is little to argue over the fact that the LoC continues to defy final settlement despite the passing of over half a century. It is also true that the security situation has been under enough control for most part of the preceding quarter century - not necessarily due to military means alone but also due to diplomatic and political measures - for India to have hammered out a political resolution. That it has not done so is not only due to a deficit in political strength, with Delhi perceiving, largely mistakenly, an inability to sell any 'solution' internally to the rest of the country. It also owes in part to the interests at play in Kashmir that have little to do with the conflict configuration but with dynamics elsewhere, including within the social composition of the security forces in general.  The Kashmir problem has served as a windfall for uninhibited expansion of security forces. The momentary Khalistani insurgency of the eighties has brought home that changes in the social composition of the army, in particular, was necessary. Even as this was being proceeded with discreetly in terms of reduction of Sikh percentages within the military, there was an expansion in the army owing to its multiple counter insurgency commitments in the nineties ranging from the North East to Kashmir. Since the conventional deterrent needed to remain in place lest the proxy wars escalate inordinately, troop strength needed expanding. This necessity gave birth to the Rashtriya Rifles. With Pakistan becoming more venturesome under its overt nuclear capability by its mounting of the Kargil misadventure and the parliament attack, further expansion was needed to be able to deliver it a quick, but not lethal, blow through what was termed the 'Cold Start' doctrine. The LoC fence that came up in the same timeframe also required more regular troops to man. Thus, another round of expansion took place of the army over last decade. China, and the latest 'two front' 'threat', provide a limitless rationale for expansion into the future, limited by the economics of it.  While the army, a professional force that it is, can be expected to be cognisant of the strategic dimension informing, and in its view necessitating, its expansion, the issue is anchored not in the strategic coordinates as the army prefers to believe and the popular narrative would have it, but in the wider societal factors. In particular, the ethnic groups that have stood to be advantaged by such expansion are the ones propelling it. In the absence of statistics, these groups can be said to reside within a 100 km from the Jaipur-Delhi-Chandigarh-Jammu line. In the case of Kashmir, the advantaged groups are rather easy to spot. It is no wonder then that given a choice security force members would prefer postings in Kashmir rather than in the North East, positioned as they would be within a night's journey from their leave destinations. Therefore, a restive Kashmir as now - but not with a full blown insurgency as earlier - is not such a bad proposition.  In the straitened times of liberalisation, the only sector that has expanded continuously is the security sector not only in terms of employment but also the monies devoted to it. These groups do not have the advantage of certain other Indian nationalities, such as those on the western sea board who can look towards the Gulf and certain others on the Deccan plateau and southwards who have leap-frogged on the back of the IT sector. Therefore, the security sector's expansion has enabled these groups to keep up. Additionally, the largesse of the Sixth Pay Commission has channelled a majority of army's revenue budget into their 'pinds and mohallas'.  These groups are the ones that keep New Delhi frightened of its own shadow when it deals with Pakistan. With a collective memory marred by Partition, suffering a hangover of the martial race theory and influenced by cultural nationalism, these groups have a stake in continuation of an unacknowledged subcontinental civil war. This keeps them wary of Pakistan and at odds the liberal conception of security in which the alternative security approaches, such as prospects of economic engagement in diluting animosities and creating new power centres, are based. Therefore, even if India succeeds in forcing a penalty corner, for instance in entering into a dialogue with Pakistan, it is, quite like its hockey team, unable to convert it, in this case into a substantial and meaningful round of talks.  Given this, it can in summation be said that the army is right in saying that it not yet another 'vested interest' in Kashmir; but only by its lights. As pointed out here, these lights are both narrow and dim. Expanding the theoretical template from military sociology to the 'military and society' plane helps identify more consequential vested interests that lie elsewhere.  Identifying this is merely the first step. It begs the question: What's to be done?  The national security question needs revisiting afresh. Challenging the popular trope, hung out to dry by veterans with Goebbelesian regularity in op-eds in the 'nationalist' press, is useful. But the intellectual battle also needs taking into the academia, the government's policy rooms and back rooms of political parties. Security has for too long been held hostage to 'strategic' thinking, fixated without. It requires instead a lens more sensitive to social and political forces within society. That way China and Pakistan would fall behind as 'threats' and instead forces, closer home, that unwittingly masquerade as 'answers' to security problems, would rise to claim their space. A redefinition of security will help India's peripheral population groups overthrow what in their perception might amount to an internal colonial yoke attributable as hypothesised here to its 'heartland' groups.  (The author is a blogger at www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in)

affray in the ranks

ARMY CULTURE 
Soldiers, not servants 

http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/oct/fah-soldiers.htm
The army would like to point to low morale and push for higher pay. But as far as the troops are concerned, morale may have more to do with the way they are treated by officers, and this is what needs changing, writes Firdaus Ahmed. 
 

17 October 2013 - The last decade witnessed a spate of suicides and fratricides within the military. The pressures from counter insurgency over the preceding decade and a half were taking their toll. Measures put in place for prevention and response such as the suggestions of the Defence Institute for Psychological Research on the dignity of the soldier, and administrative measures as sending soldiers on their full leave entitlement three times a year, have reduced such incidents.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/oct/fah-soldiers.htm

Six cases have been reported in the press of fisticuffs between officers and other ranks. The latest is the Meerut incident, involving a Delhi-based unit of a fighting regiment. Earlier incidents too involved combat units - an artillery unit in Nyoma and the armoured unit in Samba.

With the Seventh Pay Commission having been announced recently, the army can be expected to use its problem strategically to influence the outcome. 

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/oct/fah-soldiers.htm

The service will likely make the case that the 'root cause' of the cases of indiscipline is lack of officers in the frontlines. While other measures such as bettering leadership training, by introduction of a leadership course, and using the cadre of 91,000 junior commissioned officers optimally are reportedly in hand, the army will press for the Seventh Pay Commission to deliver not only for the personnel below officer ranks, but more so for officers.

The upshot of the organization using the issue of indiscipline in the ranks for feathering its institutional nest will be the continuing decline of professionalism in the service. Given the prospects of politicization currently staring the military in the face as the right wing forces vie for its tacit endorsement, mediated through the veterans' community, the two coincident and intertwined facets will ensure a degraded military capability by decade end, notwithstanding the armament acquisitions and higher technological thresholds in the pipeline.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/oct/fah-soldiers.htm

The fact that the notable instances of indiscipline have been in fighting arms suggest that this is because the army attempts to maintain feudal privileges of the officer ranks by using troops to furnish the same. It is apparent that this is increasingly being resented by troops. The same problem has not been reported in technical and supporting arms and services, and this suggests that the relationship between officers and men in these is more work-oriented. This prevents any arbitrary behaviour on the part of officers, no doubt deterred in part by the higher standards of education of those in the other ranks. This is the case also in the air force and the navy, where work relations are work centric and not patriarchal.

Therefore, increasing the number of officers will only compound the problem since the weight of the officer class will increase. It can be argued that a higher remuneration to increase attractiveness of the service for youth will enhance quality of life, making the officer rely less on the service for privileges. This could reduce the pressure on the service to compensate officers for lack of remuneration with privileges.

The fact is that the Sixth Pay Commission did increase the pay and emoluments. Yet, the pressure on the army to compensate through provision of privileges for its officers has apparently not reduced appreciably. Even if it potentially could have, since the numbers of officers has gone up and inflation in the ranks due to a cadre review has made the army top-heavy over the past decade, those gains have been wiped out.

A cultural change is needed. This is clearly easier said than done since the military does not see itself any more in isolation from society, as a professional island in its cantonments and at remote fronts.

Firstly, the army would not likely reduce its officer privileges since it sees its peer group as the IAS and IPS. A statistic has it that in Maharashtra, 2600 cops work in the homes of the 280 IPS officers in the state. There are seven to ten constables, three to four orderlies, one cook and two or three telephone runners and two drivers each deployed at homes of superintendents and commissioners. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the case with army officers is not very different in kind even if the numbers involved are less odious. Not only are troops present in officer accommodation in cantonments but, more questionably, are also in their homes with officers' families when the officers are out on field postings.

Secondly, the feudal profile of fighting arms owes to the hangover of the martial race theory that has carried on into this century since its birth two centuries back through the regimental system. The recruiting continues to be caste based. For instance, the soldiers in the Sikh Light Infantry unit in question are from the lower castes in Punjab, while those from the Sikh Regiment are from higher castes. Such a recruiting profile leads to preponderance in representation of north Indian communities in the fighting arms. As a result their subcultures are imported into the army along with certain negative features as feudal, non-modern, relationships between those in power and authority and those in the ranks.

The army has closed its ranks against any change to this, even fighting off access to statistics involved, such as in the case of Sachar Committee inquiring after the numbers of the Muslims in the service. It can be expected that the advantaged communities, specifically those within a circle with a 300 km radius from Delhi, and their legions of veterans, will strengthen the army in its reactionary foot dragging. Increasing officer numbers will compound this problem, since the army will target these communities to deliver up more sons. These communities will in turn be more than forthcoming, making a vicious circle.

The problem in the ranks is deeper than the current assessments make it out to be. Cosmetic changes, taken with an eye to impress the Seventh Pay Commission, are in the offing, whereas a more proactive and holistic approach is required.
⊕

Firdaus Ahmed 
17 Oct 2013

muslim underrepresentation in the military

Doing more with the military

Milligazette

1-15 September 2013

A leading military school in the country recently compiled the list of cadets that had entered its portals ever since it was founded pre-Independence. Of 2896 cadets that have entered its precincts since Independence, only 28 had Muslim names. You can do your maths; but the statistic bespeaks of several things. One is certainly that the odds appear to be stacked against our young boys for they perhaps not only do not know of such opportunities, but are also sloven in contesting for them and finally are unable to clear the admission tests. There are several reasons that can explain this away: poor if improving economic and literacy levels, low standards of schooling that prevents their being competitive and perhaps  opp

ortunities elsewhere such as in the Gulf, that keeps them away from chasing down such vacancies. However, the statistic also suggests the levels of engagement of the Muslim community with the security sector in the country.

In light of this it was heartening to read that 10 young lads from AMU have cleared the National Defence Academy test. This can be attributed in part to the leadership team in AMU comprising former military men: the VC and Registrar. It remains to be seen if this becomes a trend. If so it would increase the number of Muslim names on the merit lists that are usually scrutinised by some organisations with religious affiliation, including sometimes this publication (Milligazette), for the presence (and absence) of Muslims. While there is much ‘halla bulloo’ over Muslims cracking the civil services, such as the inspiring Kashmiri doctor topping the exam recently, those entering into the military and the security services, such as the paramilitary, receive less accolade. There is a case for a concerted attempt by the community to redress this under-representation.

The earlier explanations for lack of Muslim representation in the security services including the military, cannot work forever. Some of these such as the invidious suggestion that Muslims are ‘kept out’ due to some unacknowledged policy of covert discrimination does not merit serious attention. A fact needs acknowledging that the community has neglected this avenue of social mobility, economic opportunity and service to the wider nation. At Independence and soon thereafter, there was an exodus of the Muslim elite and middle classes for the ‘land of the pure’ and further westwards to the extent that curiously the largest community of South Asian language speakers in the US today comprises those speaking Urdu. Even if a proportion of these exited from Pakistan, a good number are former Indian Muslims, no doubt largely of ‘Ashraf’ lineage, who have abandoned their larger community that includes the ‘underclass’ of ‘Arzal’ and ‘Ajlaf’, for better climes. The next destination soon thereafter has been the Middle East, to which Indian Muslims have headed but only to be treated with mildly condescending tolerance. In effect, Indian Muslims have not focussed on opportunities that have been theirs for the taking in their neighbourhood – the ‘low hanging fruit’. Therefore, ‘Muslims keeping away’ better explains the speculative figure, not officially acknowledged, that there are about 29000 Muslims in the million-strong Indian Army.

Being frank about this can help redress the scale of underrepresentation. The onus is on the community to sign up for a life in uniform. There are several advantages in doing so. The foremost is that some of the largesse, that is indeed the defence budget amounting to over Rs 250 crores, will get channelled into Muslim homes. This has potential to lift economic indices of the community. An example is the density of Muslim servicemen and ex-servicemen in Jhunjhunu district of Rajasthan. They are considerably better off than most other Muslim communities. The advantages that  certain other communities, such as the Sikhs and mountain folk, that have lent their shoulder to the national security enterprise can then be shared more widely across the land.

Second, there is benefit for the security sector in that a greater representativeness is made possible by entry of Muslims in greater numbers. Knowledge and understanding occurs that translates as operation gains. This can be useful when, say, the Army is deployed in Kashmir or the paramilitary is deployed in Muslim majority areas. That ignorance fuels apprehension is well appreciated. With Muslim compatriots in their midst dispelling any negative ‘Muslim’ stereotype, the paramilitary and military would be more mature, restrained, in their response to violence.

Finally, the school list had the pre Independence era entries. The first 28 Muslim names on that list were among the first 100, implying that close to one third of the cadets were Muslims. From the number cadets with ‘Khan’ as surname it can be surmised that these belonged to the erstwhile ‘martial races’ in which the Pathan and Punjabi Musalman communities, now in Pakistan, were prominent. The fact is that today the figure has fallen to less than one-fiftieth of that. The martial race theory having been jettisoned along with colonialism, it is time that Muslims came out of the shadows of Partition. The fact remains that for some thousand years Muslims had a say in the security of the subcontinent. They have to gain a seat at the national security high table by dint of placing their sons in harm’s way. On a lighter note, from the over-representation of the community in prisons – reportedly at 19 per cent – for reasons not gone into here, it is clear that there is sufficient energy, initiative and courage in youngsters that can potentially be channelled into martial pursuit to the betterment of all – the individual, community and nation. 

military at the high table?

The Military At The High Table?

The military needs to be taken on board and its sense of alienation needs to be allayed to avoid its politicisation

FIRDAUS AHMED

October 2, 2013

http://www.tehelka.com/the-military-at-the-high-table/?singlepage=1

General VK Singh, now retired for over a year, is fully within his rights to share the dais with a political personality of his choice. That he is energised by a grouse against the incumbent government for not granting him an extension is plausible. Additionally, it has been reckoned by watchful security commentators that this has come to pass as yet another episode in the sorry civil war on in South Block between the brass and the bureaucrats.

The perception is that national security structures are so awry that the security prescription of the military is not taken on board. Further, military veterans have been kept from receiving their due in the form of ‘one rank one pay’ by a heartless bureaucracy. Given their perceived marginalisation, veterans are courting the opposition that in turn wants their endorsement to best the ruling party at the forthcoming polls. This could lead to politicisation of the military due to an existing beltway of intellectual and cultural traffic between the veteran community and themilitary.

The argument begs the question: Is the military really outside the defence policy loop? From the army’s stonewalling on the issue of AFSPA in the Northeast and in J&K and on Siachen, it would appear that not only does it have a voice, but also a veto. A defence budget of over Rs 250 thousand crores spells that the military has the outlay it could possibly bid for. This suggests that even if the military is not sitting on the table, its position has not been ignored; perhaps because it cannot be ignored. So what more can the military really want?

The military’s acquisitions suggest that all that is demanded by its doctrine is being met. All it can possibly ask for additionally is a chance at working the doctrine in practice when terrorist push comes to conventional shove. This is a policy decision that the government keeps the military out of, reserving the policy choice and decision space for itself.

This is unexceptionable since the military is only a tool and the government is the one empowered to use it or not as per its rationale. At best the military can input such a decision but it cannot arrogate the decision for itself or demand that it be as per its lights. The government fears that it may be stampeded into decisions it could come to regret, overawed by the argument and stature of the military professional. It may require arguing its case against that of the military, which in the circumstance of a conflict, would put it in a less favourable position. The upshot could well be a decision based on military logic rather than the overriding political logic.

While in theory the political coordinates of a conflict situation must supersede themilitary perspective, in practice this may not happen. Firstly, a government would be shy of going against professional advice. Any government would hate to have a national security decision labelled as politically motivated out of parochial ends. The usual scepticism with which political actions are greeted in the country, it would be difficult for a government to persuade the people that it was acting on the political compulsions of the situation rather than thinking of its own longevity.

Secondly, the military’s input need not always be professional. While the military is apolitical, it has corporate interests that influence its input. It does exert for having its perspective heard, sometimes using indirect pressure on decision makers by manipulating public opinion. For this purpose it has a two-star headed public information cell and is increasingly resorting to the military intelligence directorate.

General VK Singh’s revelations on the army making payments to politicians in J&K must be seen in this light. The leaked on the internal inquiry of the doings of the now defunct military intelligence outfit, the Technical Support Division, during VK Singh’s tenure allege that a bid to topple the J&K government was also on the cards during the troubles in 2010.

It is for these reasons that the military is only invited to participate in militaryrelevant decisions, rather than figuring in the National Security Council organogram. The service chiefs though part of the strategic planning group along with the secretaries of relevant ministries, feel that, due to this clubbing with bureaucrats, their input is stifled.

They also perhaps have reservations on retired three star officers as advisers in the secretariat. This arrangement harks back to the Curzon-Kitchener controversy, with Kitchener objecting to his security input being second guessed by a serving major general in the viceroy’s council. As a result, the military is wary of ending up implementing decisions it is not party to.

There is danger in neglecting this structural deficit further. Yet a bigger problem is in the political moves of the veteran community that can be read as another indirect attempt by the uniformed fraternity to press for change. Such moves prove the point that the military is a political player that can skew decisions that are essentially political. The military at the high table is a greater danger, especially one that is a political player.

On this count, there is a case for keeping the military alongside in the room, rather than outside it or on the high table. If General VK Singh’s latest controversy is to have something positive come of it, then innovation on these lines is it.

letters@tehelka.com

Modi And The Military: Not Quite An Innocent Beginning

By Firdaus Ahmed

http://www.ummid.com/news/2013/September/21.09.2013/modi-and-military.html

21 September, 2013

Countercurrents.org

Mr. Modi’s political sense was on display at the very first rally on his nomination as the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate. Addressing ex-servicemen at Rewari he laid out his security agenda that would no doubt have been music to the ears of the gathering. Declaring an intent to make Pakistan behave, China back off, the civilian defence sector deliver and have the coffers cough up ‘one rank one pension’, he suggested that since all this would require a ‘strong’ leader, he was the best man for the job. Missed in the deconstruction of his speech has been the more significant aspect: that of politicisation of the military.

Flanked by General VK Singh of the DoB (‘date of birth’) fame, a score of retired generals and an Olympic silver medallist to boot, Modi was not merely playing to the gallery. He was instead attempting to gain the military’s endorsement on two counts. The more obvious one is that it would be useful to have the military alongside as he goes about resetting India in the Hindu nationalist image. With their longed for goodies, both in terms of military toys and seventh pay commission largesse, close at hand, the military can be expected to go about their business with redoubled intensity since the security environment would simultaneously be vitiated by worried neighbours reacting to Hindu India flexing its muscles.

But more important and urgent for Modi is that politicisation timely may prove useful if his past was to catch up with him in the Gujarat related cases that are yet unspooling in various courts. If judicial push comes to policing shove, he could ‘Cry foul!’, citing Congress chicanery, and, having the military’s weight behind him, deter any deflection from 7 Race Course Road.

Given the apolitical image of the army, it does appear counter intuitive that a dais heavy with the brass as witnessed at Rewari could amount to this. However, that conservative parties universally carry the military’s vote is a verity in military sociology. The BJP therefore has the advantage and doubly so, on account of the uninspiring defence minister the Congress, fearing another Bofors, has foisted on the army over two terms. As a senior minister, his political engagements meant the hijack of the policy agenda by the bureaucrats. A resentful military can be expected to take its civil war with bureaucrats in South Block into the political arena.

The military, no monolith, is internally differentiated. It has subcultures, some of which are at variance with its public image that can make a bid for dominance. While the majority in the military is apolitical, secular and professional, it could in this circumstance end up as the silent majority. It would be the politically alive element that would set the military’s position on what promises to be a momentous run up to elections over the coming year. Evidence of its existence and of precedence is in the manner this segment had dominated the military’s counter insurgency campaign, leaving the Valley littered with unmarked graves.

This politicised segment could firstly perform the function of keeping the military inert to the goings on in politics brought on by the right wing’s philosophy of ends justifying the means. The cover of being apolitical will sit easy in such a circumstance as the right wing attempts steal the election with its communalisation of the political and discursive space. Muzaffarnagar is a mere trailer.

Secondly, it could even prompt an intervention in case Modi falters at the last hurdle, even as the majority looks on nonplussed. There is precedence in which General VK Singh is alleged to have moved mechanised formations in the dead of the night ostensibly to check if they can react to contingencies in the midst of Delhi’s winter fog, but, to some, to influence any government decision to sack him for taking the government to court over his date of birth controversy. Such innocuous movements can be resorted to by formations with commanders subscribing to the reactionary political subculture as messaging to the government against any moves to permit the judicial noose from tightening around Modi’s neck.

The fact that the government vets the military’s chain of succession very carefully was very obvious from the accusations and counter accusations during VK Singh’s ‘date of birth’ episode. This suggests that apprehension of the military going political is not as far-fetched as the popular image of the military suggests. Predisposed to conservatism and desiring a turn to realist foreign and security policies, this segment could delude itself into believing it is acting in national interest. Absolving itself thus, it could seek to install Modi to power irrespective of the election verdict and perhaps because of the returning to power of a dynastic order revolting to the segment’s sense of self-worth.
The military’s views are set by its officer cadre that increasingly identifies with the middle class. The reactionary discourse of late in the middle class is well known and finds resonance in officers’ messes. Ex-servicemen serving as a right wing catchment and their increasing beltway into the consciousness of the military through cyber space, defence periodicals and presence in cantonments, strengthens the politicised subculture.

The BJP had attracted several generals, including respected ones such as Jacob and Sinha, in its earlier foray. The difference then was that Vajpayee was at its helm. This time round not only are the generals on the BJP bandwagon of dubious standing, but the BJP is led by a figure no stranger to controversy. Therefore, the relationship is no longer an innocent one but is one pregnant with forebodings not only till the elections but also beyond them.

Firdaus Ahmed is a freelance writer on security affairs. His blog is Think South Asia:http://www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in/

This article was filed before news reports emerged that "Ex-Indian Army chief VK Singh accused of masterminding coup to topple J&K state govt"

Vanzara gets it right: The meaning for J&K http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=22738

By Firdaus Ahmed

Vanzara has blown the lid on the fallacious argument usually put out to explain away encounter cases. The killers are taken to be afflicted with a Rambo mentality and seekers of medals, out of turn promotions and bounty. The problem gets reduced to the individuallevel at the expense of the systemic. This enables exaction of a price, when and if ever the push of accountability comes to the shove of action, by incarceration of the culpable individuals to the legal system, quite like Vanzara. Attention gets deflected from the culpability at higher levels and the subversion of law and institutions that makes encounters possible. The lesson for J&K is that it needs redefining normalcy away from violence indicators but in the retrieving of ground lost to departures from the straight and narrow. But, the critical Vanzara message, liable to be missed, is that it is not enough to blame the tools alone. Take the recent killings by BSF troopers at Shopian, reminiscent of those at Gool earlier this year. The killings can only partially be attributed to a trigger-happy outfit or a scared set of isolated paramilitary men holding out against a mob. An investigation will only establish individual culpability, screening out the larger picture. The people died because they were part of an agitated crowd. The crowd gathered because the presence of the picket enabled them to vent their anger at an egregious provocation of having a misconceived concert for the elite in Srinagar to advertise the return of 'normalcy'. The problem therefore was not entirely in triggers being pressed in hate or panic, but more in the non-removal of operating bases in the midst of people despite removal being the best indicator of normalcy. To this inability to recognise what needs doing in returning normalcy must be attributed the deaths of protesting civilians. The onus is not at the door of soldiers in camouflage reacting in situations they have little control over, but to those who have allowed the environment of insecurity to persist. Vanzara has got it right: those in control owe a greater responsibility and need being arraigned, at a maximum in the court of law under the doctrine of responsibility of the chain of command, and at a minimum in the court of public opinion. By no means does this exonerate the troopers who have belittled themselves, for it is in crunch situations and not on the parade ground where discipline and self control are to count. If fire discipline is absent then they are undeserving of their uniform. That said, their officers cannot be exonerated. They are largely happy with feudal services their men furnish in order that a happy relationship develops in which they in return do not hold men responsible for occupational standards. This is a particular malady in the central police forces, which to begin with are of questionable quality and secondly are officered at the upper echelons with the IPS, who have acquired the trappings of power too early in life and service. However, if the deaths are to have a meaning for India outside of Kashmir, then the Neros in Srinagar and Delhi need questioning alongside. The chief minister has mastered the fine art of passing the buck on to Delhi. It is apparent that concentrating as he is on delivery of routine governance, rocking the boat by tendering his resignation does not figure in his sight. Awaiting a worse day implies that the chief minister expects worse, a prospect none too appetising. Srinagar also has Delhi's representative, a Governor into his second tenure. Clearly, he too has exhausted his breath on Delhi. He was the right man to do spring cleaning after the previous NDA appointee leaving his ideological debris behind. Had Delhi had not lost its nerve after 26/11 on the road to patching up with Islamabad, he could have well have delivered Kashmir to normalcy as part of the internal dimension of repair. Now it is apparent that his utility is in his success in keeping the lid on the Valley, a feat he can be credited with over the past four years. As for Delhi, the Kashmiri saying 'Delhi is distant' captures it all. How so ever much it might remonstrate that Kashmir is an internal issue of India, it is unable to unravel the internal from the external. Vajpayee had created the conditions for doing so that UPA I had taken further, only to be derailed as mentioned at Mumbai 26/11: so much for the relative power of Delhi and the Jihad Inc., across. Internally, UPA II has been a lost tenure, with the output of the last committee of interlocutors being trashed. With sights set further than Srinagar on Kabul and a national elections looming, movement on Kashmir awaits the next incumbent of 7 Race Course Road. That Kashmir does not count is thus self-evident. Consequently, the message for people is that agitating for an end to insecurity is the only way they can be heard. Recognising that it has left people with no other recourse, Delhi has left armed minders in place, empowered with AFSPA and similar laws covering the paramilitary and the police. Responsibility for what then transpires on the barbed wire and concertina is clearly not only of those facing each other on the frontline, but those who have contrived thus to put them in such a position. So if there is an accounting, as Vanzara seeks to remind us if only to save his own skin, he has got it right in saying that powers higher than his level, the supervisory one, should also be in the dock, if not in cells; for inaction, if not for mala-fide action. The upshot of the analysis is that there is more to come. Delhi has indicated that Islamabad has upped the infiltration this year. This is no doubt to set the stage for next year. While earlier in the nineties the period of mass action preceded that of insurgency, which in turn was displaced by proxy war, this time round the worst case could be simultaneity of the three. The last time round the downing of the Berlin Wall set the context for Kashmir. This time there is the untidy aftermath of Arab Spring supplying the spark for the tinder. Pakistan's excuse will be that it gave peace a chance and India squandered the opportunity by its inability and unwillingness to make a distinction between the state and its bearded proxies. The time for political action having past, regrettably violence appears the lone recourse for all sides. Perversely, the bright side is that thereafter it would be very difficult to play Nero. (The author is a blogger at Think South Asia: http://www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in/) 17 Sep 13

lc ambush at indiatogether.org

LINE OF CONTROL 
An ambush loaded with meaning

http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/aug/fah-ambush.htm

The assault at the Line of Control appears to be a well-planned ambush. It comes at a time when India and Pakistan are tentatively inching closer. It is a message not only to India but also to the Pakistani civilians keen on better relations with India, writes Firdaus Ahmed. 
 

13 August 2013 - The Border Action Team of the Pakistan Army's Mujahid Battalion deployed across Indian defences on the Line of Control probably picked the time to strike quite tactically. News reports suggest that the casualties were soldiers from the Bihar and Maratha Light Infantry regiments. Usually such a mix of troops is seen only when one battalion is handing over defences to another, prior to leaving for its next place of posting. At such junctures, troops are most vulnerable since the new ones do not know the terrain and procedures, and the old ones are looking forward to some well earned rest. Also, in such a situation, the two units do not know each other well enough to mount a cohesive counter.

The forces opposite can discern such change-overs from preceding activity, and use the opportunity for an ambush. Therefore, it is not so much Pakistani prowess but Indian vulnerability that resulted in the tragic loss of lives.

FOR FULL VERSION SEE indiatogether.org

Contrary to the now popular position, the ambush was a precise one carried out, as successful ambushes usually are on the LoC, by a few well-prepared members of a cohesive ambush party. Their cohesion in action implies they were of one body of troops and not an assortment as we are now being led to believe.

They could well have been Pakistani special forces, but then they would not need to number up to 20. Therefore, the two 'facts' put in the public domain by the army are contradictory, calling into question the credibility of its reporting. The ambush appears a typical one on the LoC, and part of the series of tit-for-tat exchanges that have been going on since last year, including the beheading incident of January. Therefore, for the government to have initially wanted to continue on its path of resetting relations with Pakistan was entirely plausible. However, the manner in which it has been deflected from this intent suggests that the ambush has had a consequential strategic impact.

The ambush comes at a time when India and Pakistan are tentatively inching closer. Nawaz Sharif had became the first third-time prime minister in Pakistan after its first democratic change-over. He has been associated with bids to rein in the military in his earlier terms; the last such attempt leading to his displacement by Musharraf in a military coup. With Musharraf currently behind bars, it seemed a portentous moment for India to rework its Pakistan strategy.

For full article see indiatogether.org

The last time Nawaz Sharif attempted to reach out by inviting Vajpayee to Lahore, the Pakistani army spiked the initiative by its Kargil intrusion. This time round they appear to be sensitising Sharif once again to going slow on relations with India.

Alongside, the message to India is that the mending of relations cannot be India's way, in which the Kashmir issue is sidelined in favour of other more promising issues as economic opening up. Perhaps more important and urgent for the Pakistani military is the timing of the ambush to coincide with the Taliban's attack on India's Jalalabad Consulate. The message is that India must let up on any veto over Pakistan's Taliban-mediated ambitions in Afghanistan once the US departs in 2014.

India is aware that such a reversion is possible in Kashmir. The recent interception and killing of 19 infiltrators in Kashmir signifies the upswing in attempts by 80 per cent over last year. It continues to hold Kashmir in the grip of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, despite periodic assertions against it by the chief minister in Srinagar. That this keeps Kashmiri resentment simmering is evident from the spontaneous challenge to the highhandedness of a BSF search party in Gool that resulted in killings of six civilians.

India is in a 'wait and watch' mode in the geopolitical theatre, waiting for the 2014 denouement in Afghanistan to play out. While refusing to arm Karzai, India is attempting to strengthen the Afghan National Army that is to take on the expected Taliban onslaught once the American's draw down.

Politically, the opposition has come into high gear to roundly sound off the government on its Pakistan policy. Since its champion prefers a 'strong man' image, strained relations with Pakistan would serve the opposition's campaign better in order to present its prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, as the appropriate choice. The government, aware of the nuisance value of these lobbies and unwilling to hand over yet another election year stick to the opposition to beat it with, has promptly revised its intent to proceed further on the Pakistan front. Its interlocutor, Nawaz Sharif, is also ambiguously positioned since his support base in Pakistan comprises assorted fundamentalists who he cannot take on, leave alone tame.

India's decision to wait out Sharif's lame duck predecessor is proving costly. While waiting for the polls in Pakistan to throw up a new leadership, the Indian government has run out of time for reshaping relations with Pakistan, since it is itself looking at polls in less than a year's time.

The call for an early resumption of meaningful engagement between the two states by the co-chairs of the India-Pakistan Track II Chaophraya dialogue, Sherry Rehman and Amitabh Mattoo, in their joint article in The Hindu, "Seizing the Opportunity" (see this link, appears premature. While it may be worth doing, expecting this government to run the gauntlet, beset as it is on multiple fronts commanding more immediacy such as Telangana, is wishful. The best the government can do under the circumstances is to ensure that the status quo does not degenerate further, either with Pakistan over Afghanistan or in Kashmir. In this it is unlikely to find its own institutions, including the army, any more helpful than the Pakistanis.

- See more at: http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/aug/fah-ambush.htm#sthash.LqDSvg79.dpuf