http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=61802

COAS selection and the doctrine of ‘relative ease of working’ with

In wake of the selection of the next army chief, the notion that an abundance of operational experience is an indicator of strategic good sense has been debunked competently elsewhere. Some have argued that seniority is also not the best guarantee of enabling the best hand at the military helm. One argument that has been bandied about in favour of the double supersession, that of ‘relative ease of working’ with.

This has surfaced in two prominent publications, no doubt discreetly put out by the information warfare machinery at the ruling party’s command, both governmental and through its army of trolls. The underlying assumption is quite akin to selling demonetization, which in Amit Shah’s words needs being repeated a hundred times to become the logical thing to do to tackle black money, corruption, terrorism and to make India a cashless economy. Before it becomes a doctrine that will inform subsequent selections, it needs debunking.

A retired major general writes in The Wire:

A decision is more likely to be based on the ‘relative ease of working’ rather than just seniority. Relative ease implies certain qualities which are essential at that level, especially when, for example, the government is following a pro-active policy against India’s immediate neighbours… In simple terms, it is mutual understanding and commonality on thought and operational issues.

Josy Joseph writing for the once-credible The Hindu, lets on that, ‘Those close to the present government also argue that a factor taken into consideration was the ease of doing business with the new chief.’ He suggests that sources in-the-know have given out why the Modi government has gone in for its latest Tughlakian maneuver. This might just be the real reason why the army chief designate made it past two equally competent generals. 

A long-time military and intelligence watcher Saikat Dutta, writing for the scroll.in, informs that the army chief designate caught the eye of the national security adviser at a previous interaction between the two during the planning and conduct of the supposedly trans-border operation in Myanmar against Naga rebels who had ambushed an army convoy. As the former army man, the information minister, had indicated then, it was the precursor to the more touted ‘surgical strikes’ of late.

Dutta writes: ‘Discussions at Army headquarters during the planning of this operation saw a close interaction between Rawat and Doval. Though the two men are years apart in age, the fact that both are Garhwalis helped them cement a working relationship.’ In hindsight, it can be said that this led up to Bipin Rawat’s move to South Block as Vice Chief and his subsequent elevation over the heads of his former boss at Eastern Command and his successor at Southern Command.

It appears that this is the most likely reason for the supersession and therefore calls out for like scrutiny by commentators as attended the other plausible reason touted, namely, operational experience. 

At the outset it bears mention that it was not Bipin Rawat who invited the national security adviser over to his operational area. Mr. Doval accompanied the Army Chief who landed up there to oversee a tactical level operation that perhaps directly involved at best two companies that could have well be overseen by a brigadier. More accurately put, it would be vice versa, with the army chief accompanying the super sleuth. Observers, noticing his omni-presence, had pointed to such hyper-activity not translating into strategic acumen. At the operational briefing, and perhaps when the operations were underway, there is no reason for Bipin Rawat to exercise self-censorship when sharing his views with Mr. Doval. That Mr. Doval found these palatable is now apparent.

The point that ‘sources’ in government and/or from the cultural nationalist front have put out is that the government required a chief who was amenable to its strategic shift, from strategic restraint to strategic proactivism. This they have now managed to get. What are the implications?

There is potential for politicization. An aspiring general can read the tea leaves. He can align his world view with that of the government. He can project himself as being ‘easy’ to work with. This obviously is not the case with Bipin Rawat, but those who follow would be keyed into this new-fangled principle of selection of apex military brass.

The famous case of BM Kaul, an officer of the service corps, being placed in charge to implement Nehru’s forward policy is rather well known. The officer who was against this policy, General Thorat, was shunted out. The supersession of General Sinha has a similar story attending it. He was reluctant to get the army involved cleaning up the Sikh unrest. His successor at Western Command, Sundarji, and the general who pipped him at the post, General Vaidya, were more willing to align with the government. A different angle to aligning with the government’s views or otherwise is from the episode in April 1971 when the army was asked to go into East Pakistan. General Manekshaw rightly demurred and gained control over the timing of the invasion. The results of the three examples are rather well known.

There is also one on potential possibilities. Take for instance the briefing by the then military operations and air operations heads to the BJP national executive at its party headquarters during the Kargil War. They were possibly corralled into it by the defence minister, a party ally of the BJP. Imagine a scenario in which General Vij, the then DGMO, declining the duty in light of its political repercussions. He would unlikely have made it to chief in his turn. On the other hand, his turning up for the briefing makes him out as pliable. That he succeeded Doval as head of the think tank, the Vivekananda International Foundation, suggests a likemindedness that well preceded his retirement.

The doctrine of ‘ease of doing business with’ therefore fraught. In the current case, the government wishes to have at the helm someone it believes shares its strategic orientation. This has the underside of giving rise to group think. The expectation of the army is that it would willingly say ‘Yes Sir’ on receiving its marching orders; that the army will be less process driven in terms of providing its input and feedback on the directions it receives. The ‘ease of doing business with’ formulation suggests a like-mindedness that is detrimental to national security decision making in that it deprives the government of unpalatable alternatives and diversity in options.

This is the practical manifestation of what in theory passes for subjective civilian control in which the government appoints a military brass that shares its views, rather than for professionalism that will enable it to receive a corporate view from the military that might be at variance with its own view or clash with the other inputs it receives such as from the foreign policy bureaucracy or intelligence agencies. Subjective civilian control was to the originator of the concept of military professionalism, Samuel Huntington, abusive of professionalism. It compromises the advisory role an apex military leader is to perform.

An example of the ‘ease of doing business with’, albeit one somewhat stretched, is from the last time round India wished to show its muscles. In the mid-eighties, Rajiv Gandhi and his whiz kids, that included Arjun Singh, were inclined to take India to a regional power status. This included moving from a brown water to blue water navy, upgrading its air force with the latest planes such as Jaguars, and allowing the army the run of the deserts to instill fear into Zia’s Pakistan. They had a visionary general in command who likewise liked painting on a wider canvas. By Rajiv Gandhi’s own admission, Exercise Brasstacks that Sundarji organized, took Indian an untimely a whisker away from war. Sundarji, tamed by the experience, was thereafter willing to fall in line with India’s viceroy in Colombo, JN Dixit, and the R&AW line that the Tamil Tigers were ‘our boys’.

The upshot is that there is no place for individual heroes in the national security pantheon. Neither Mr. Doval’s by now rather well-known intelligence exploits nor General Rawat’s operational experience can serve to substitute for robust institutional strength. This can only be obtained from institutions in national security performing as constitutionally and traditionally mandated. It cannot be through a measure of placing seemingly likeminded individuals at the helm.

In fact, the demonetization debacle suggests India direly needs leaders who can stand their ground. In the military sphere this is even more so since they have nuclear weapons and strike corps in their custody that the Modi-Doval duo may like to employ to embellish their 56 inch image, not necessarily the best and right use of these national assets.

The deep selection of heads was done earlier with the foreign service bureaucracy and now with the army. In both cases, the credibility of the individuals in question is not in question. Indeed, that India’s foreign policy is in doldrums owes perhaps to a pushback of the foreign policy bureaucracy led by redoubtable S. Jaishankar, to dictation from the national security bureaucracy. Bipin Rawat is by that yardstick equally credible as a military leader. His test is how he does not allow his supposed buy-in to a ‘nationalist’ world view – or so spin doctors are rationalizing his elevation - get in way of his professionally arrived at input in and follow through with decisions involving Indian use of force. 

The military musical chairs

http://indiatogether.org/military-musical-chairs-op-ed

With the Bihar elections hogging all the attention in the news, an interesting development noted by military watchers is liable to be missed. A former military secretary informs that an unprecedented number of army appointments are currently vacant, including two very sensitive posts - Director General Military Operations, and Military Secretary.

What does this imply?

A positive answer to this could be that the government may be looking to create the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or permanent Chairman of the Chiefs’ of Staff Committee (COSC), as the case may be. This could entail a wider reshuffle and this may be holding up the filling in of vacancies.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/military-musical-chairs-op-ed

In addition to the joint commands, Andaman and Nicobar Command and the Strategic Forces Command, and the HQs Integrated Defence Staff, there are a host of joint commands in the offing that would require single-point oversight: special operations command, cyber and space commands etc.

This government is reportedly mulling the creation of a CDS. Implementing this may require elevating one of the chiefs or deeper selection. If from the army, then this opens up the possibility of a wider shake up. The possibility of this puts a positive spin on the deliberateness seemingly accompanying the current holdup.

However, if this was the plausible reason there would likely have been a corroborating media report or leak to this effect. The converse is also possible that such news would have attracted the usual fight back by political parties not interested in the military acquiring such salience, and by the bureaucracy that has been dead set against such a move. This might explain why the move, if impending, is under wraps.

This column has consistently pointed to the risk of politicization of the military under an ideological regime. It is not in the form as usually assumed and well studied, of a politicized military out to seize power spurred by its institutional interests. Instead, it is the reverse, a neutralization of the military as a politically significant actor so that the ideological agenda of the regime is furthered without checks and balances.

The pre-WWII German government, for example, neutered the General Staff of the military as part of their totalitarian scheme. The tactics included implicating one leading general for marrying a prostitute and another for homosexuality.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE -http://indiatogether.org/military-musical-chairs-op-ed

It is well recognized that the appointment of the Chief is a political one, not only procedurally so with the Appointments Committee clearing it, but also substantively. While the senior most in line between the vice chiefs and the army commanders is usually made the Chief designate, allegations of the proverbial ‘line of succession’ being manipulated have often attended such successions, particularly in the more recent past.

The most infamous one was brought to fore by General V K Singh’s insinuations that  General J J Singh, the first Chief of Sikh faith, worked the succession line up to favour the chances of V K Singh’s successor, Bikram Singh, another Sikh, to take over. That VK Singh employed considerable energy and invested his reputation to undo this was evident from his ‘date of birth’ controversy.

V K Singh however hit himself in the foot when it emerged that his attempt at deflecting Bikram Singh from his destiny, may have been to ensure that Bikram Singh’s successor was not the current Chief Gen Dalbir Singh, but another general, Lt Gen Ashok Singh, who is the father-in-law of his daughter! Ashok Singh had organized the troop movementin the vicinity of Delhi when V K Singh’s court hearing had come up in January 2012.

What this look-back suggests is that higher echelon appointments have a political angle. However, since the professionalism of the various candidates is seldom in doubt, this has not been very controversial thus far. So why should it be different this time round?

Firstly, this government, unlike previous governments, has not stopped after reshuffling gubernatorial appointments in its first foray into an ideological takeover of institutions. It has moved into education and culture. This suggests the military cannot expect to remain unscathed; some anticipatory concern is warranted.

Secondly, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) and Military Secretary (MS) posts are critical for keeping a check on and control of the military. The criticality of the DGMO post is obvious from V K Singh’s moving of military formations in the vicinity of New Delhi, without the then DGMO being in the loop.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE -http://indiatogether.org/military-musical-chairs-op-ed

The MS post is even more critical from an ideological regime’s point of view. The MS is in charge of promotions and postings of the officer corps. The apprehension is that the ongoing saffronisation of India will engulf the military leadership eventually. Having a known entity controlling this process, in the form of a hand-picked MS perhaps sharing its world view, would be better from such a government’s perspective.

Hopefully, the cautionary word here will be proven false, and officers with impeccable spoken reputations for professionalism and integrity are appointed to the coveted posts. The continuing spate of divisiveness in the country’s politics, however, is bad enough that such apprehensions must be plausibly raised.

Look who’s doing yoga now!

05 August 2015 -

http://indiatogether.org/government-military-relationship-op-ed

Normally, it is only at the Republic Day celebrations that one would expect to find India’s three military chiefs (along with troops) at the centre of the national capital’s Rajpath, the main road that witnesses the annual march past. However, when last spotted on the Rajpath the three chiefs were with a brigade worth of troops arrayed behind their prime minister in breaking the world record for the highest number of participants at a Yoga event.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/government-military-relationship-op-ed

The army’s association with such initiatives of the government illustrates a deepening proximity between the government and its army. This is a departure from the earlier practice of a dignified distance between the two that has served India well enough so far.

Such association with government ‘events’ is easy to spot, since the military has publicised such participation. The Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India campaign) too witnessed cadets at the Officers Training Academy, being duly photographed cleaning up Elliot beach in Chennai on World Environment Day, when they really ought to have been at training.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/government-military-relationship-op-ed

Other such ‘events’ include commemoration of the sixteenth anniversary of Kargil War in New Delhi this month, when army bands reportedly regaled mall-visitors in Delhi to military music.

Earlier, local army formations would observe such anniversaries, some involving locals who helped win the war, with a modest celebration at the regimental level meant to be motivational for units that had taken part in the operations.

Where a mere sixteenth anniversary of a small border war is being marked in such a manner, it is easy to understand month-long celebrations for the 1965 War on its fiftieth anniversary. This is largely an attempt by majoritarian political formations to militarise Indian society, seen in their world view as relatively placid and inert. Unfortunately, the event places the military at the centre and therefore can been seen as a potential avenue of politicizing it.

From a narrow political perspective, it is perhaps to form the backdrop for a grand announcement by the prime minister of his government acceding to the One Rank One Pension demand, a raging current controversy in India in which military pensions are set for a hike.  A narrow political perspective also perhaps explains participants of the first operation that was carried reportedly inside Myanmar against Naga rebels who ambushed a military convoy being hosted to tea by Mr. Modi in early June. This is surely overkill in exultation over a controversial raid with questionable provenance and results. 

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/government-military-relationship-op-ed

There also appears to be a change in the government-military relationship. The military has been favouring this for long, resentful of the insertion of what it saw as a bureaucratic layer between it and the political master. The ruling party however is apparently using the defence as yet another prop in its refashioning of India.

Increasing incidence of instances raises the question: Is there a movement in Indian civil-military relations in which civilian control of the military is shifting from objective military control to subjective military control?

Otherwise notorious, Samuel Huntington was most credible in his first foray into theorising. He had it that military professionalism was expertise in the management of violence. Since the military was a profession, they were best left to manage themselves but under civilian oversight.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/government-military-relationship-op-ed

It is clear that thus far objective civilian control has been at play in India, even if partially so, in so far as the military has remained outside the decision-making structure by unnecessary insertion of a bureaucratic layer between it and the political level.

However, since the BJP’s coming to power there appears to be a putative shift away from what the military called bureaucratic control towards subjective civilian control. Leveraging its defence initiatives for political mileage and the government’s use of its military muscle to embellish the 56’’ chest of its head is unexceptionable. However, the incipient tendency worth cautioning against is the proximity emerging between the government and the military.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/government-military-relationship-op-ed

However, this joint subscription to an otherwise worthy political tradition, conservatism, increases the likelihood of the military going further down the route of cultural nationalism alongside. Amartya Sen has blown the whistle on the manner in which institutions, in particular academic ones, are facing the full weight of government interference as part of the long term reset of India. Can it be that the army will be eventually spared similar attention?

It would not do for the military to be bought off by governmental largesse such as the seventh pay commission in lending itself to governmental jamborees. Late realisation of the fact that subjective civilian control is here to stay will not augur well either for military professionalism or for national securit

http://indiatogether.org/anti-muslim-prejudice-bias-in-society-and-military-op-ed

How deep does our prejudice run?

29 May 2015 

In his new book, Looking Away: Inequality, Prejudice And Indifference In New India,Harsh Mander writes how commonplace anti-Muslim prejudice is in middle class households these days: 

Since my father-in-law served in many senior positions in the armed forces, several of his friends who visit our home are senior defence officers. Without over-generalizing — and there are, indeed, thankfully, some wonderful exceptions — I find among them a high degree of anti-Muslim prejudice, converging seamlessly in their minds and hearts with a nationalist-militarist hostility towards Pakistan. I recall one particular discussion with a senior naval officer. ‘All Muslims are anti-national, you have to accept this,’ he declared with conviction. I had to ask, ‘Sir, what is the empirical basis of your belief?’ ‘They created Pakistan,’ he thundered, ‘what more proof do you require?’ For a while, I was stunned into silence. 

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/anti-muslim-prejudice-bias-in-society-and-military-op-ed

However, since one popular narrative on Partition says that it was brought on by Muslim intransigence, at least some defence officers of that generation cannot but be expected to carry their personal - and incidentally very human - reservations against Muslims. Since Muslims were earlier a minuscule percentage of the military, there would have been little positive interaction with peers to help dispel these images. However, the army is categorical that as a professional force it is thoroughly secular.

Is the army immune to society?

There is no obvious reason to probe the army’s self-image further. A quarter century or thereabouts since the permeation of prejudiceinto drawing room conversations, as Mander brings out, is time to take stock. Especially so, since the extent of the bigotry is such today that a Muslim MBA job aspirant has been denied a job in a leading jewellery company in Gujarat on account of his religious affiliation.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/anti-muslim-prejudice-bias-in-society-and-military-op-ed

Outlook magazine recently revealed a military link to the Hashimpura massacre of 1987 by the Provincial Armed Constabulary. This nebulous link perhaps led to the perpetrators being let off by the courts. In the late nineties, a Rear Admiral, while complaining against his Chief over a promotion-related issue, referred to the Chief’s ‘half-Muslim’ wife. Admiral Bhagwat was later sacked over his defiance of the Ministry over the case. The 2000s has its Major Purohit episode in which the military intelligence officer had reportedly indulged in an intelligence overreach, keeping tabs in a domain usually left to the Intelligence Bureau.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/anti-muslim-prejudice-bias-in-society-and-military-op-ed

It is perhaps the deepening of its involvement in counter insurgency in J&K in the nineties that could potentially have had a graver impact on the army. However, the proxy war angle meliorated this somewhat since there was a territorial aspect to the dispute with Pakistan. The army also prevailed over terrorism with the help of Kashmiris working in proxy groups controlled by it and the largely Kashmiri police.

Nevertheless, the levels of revivalism in larger society, that took political form in the emergence of a right wing government at the Centre by the end of the nineties, did find expression. The idiom for military motivation acquired cultural roots. The introduction of Yoga and Art of Living discourses for stress busting, ornate decors to increasingly visible temples in cantonments, and acceptability of religious markers such as vermillion on foreheads, rings and wrist threads even in uniform are examples of the gradual permeation of religious practices into a secular space. The latest instance is of a report of the Chief leading a Bhumi Poojan for an officer’s institute in a retiree community.

It is apparent that these changes do not constitute evidence of anti-Muslim prejudice. They are merely instances of the more visible religiosity in society creeping into the military. More fitting perhaps would be the army’s refusal to part with its figures for Muslim representation for the Sachar Committee’s use. However, that too would appear to be more to hide its abysmal record as an equal opportunity employer. It was not so much an act of commission as of omission in that there were no prior calls for minority representation orallegations of its recruiting policies benefittingonly a set of ethnic groups advantaged by its regimental system.

A season for caution

In the broader context of the discourse in society, the army would do well to keep watch. This century has witnessed a rise in Islamophobia. Increased military interaction with the US and Israel, exposure to virulence on the Internet, and conditioning by media-fanned stories of Muslim-perpetrated terrorism indicate continuing dangers. It is good that militancy in Jammu and Kashmir had subsided considerably by the time Islamism was getting to be a force to reckon with – around the mid 2000s.

It must also be noted that there has been a steady expansion of the officer cadre. This is of largely lower middle class origin and from north India, where Hindutva has had a vociferous presence. It is more than likely that products of ‘nationalism’-oriented schools and colleges – Shishu Mandirs and DAV Colleges – could be more inclined towards a career in the army.

Moreover, if the current government’s policies in the educational sphere are any guide, the military will not remain outside its long term agenda for a socio-cultural transformation of India. This is not in itself problematic since militaries are conservative-realist institutions. But with a change in the definition of India, of the very ‘idea of India’, this may have implications that the army needs being alive to.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/anti-muslim-prejudice-bias-in-society-and-military-op-ed

Nevertheless, the military’s doctrinal wares suggest a greater offensive-coercive content. The impetus behind this could come from several quarters. A higher defence budget, greater self-assurance as a regional power and a raised geopolitical and economic profile make India’s incline towards proactive shaping of its security problematic. However, realism requires sensitivity to the context, the most salient factor being the nuclear age.

The set of exercises this year witnessed a strike corps exercising together with a pivot corps. This suggests an intention to prevail rather than merely to deter. While strategy as distinct from doctrine can be expected to be different and indeed there are many exit points on the escalatory ladder, if religion driven hyper-nationalism penetrates into the military, it would not know when to stop. 

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/anti-muslim-prejudice-bias-in-society-and-military-op-ed

Harsh Mander’s observation, therefore, needs to be taken seriously. Anti-Muslim prejudice may yet manifest itself internally, for instance when the sensitive ‘Bangladeshi immigrant’ thesis acquires security overtones in the North East. In any case, however, it is already manifest in the military’s approach to Pakistan. 

Firdaus Ahmed

Veterans refuse to fade away

Where veterans refuse to give up, what does the future hold?

http://indiatogether.org/influence-and-politics-of-veterans-in-the-indian-army-op-ed

A former army vice chief exasperatedly writes of the ‘loose cannons’ among the ‘highly active group of veterans’ who add their own experience-based ‘mirch-masala’ to events unfolding that involve the army, thereby distorting the picture. In the aftermath of the two recent incidents in Kashmir – the Chattargam killing of two youth at a check point and the terror attack at an army base in Uri - these ‘e-mail warriors’ are urged to ‘hold their horses’ instead. (http://www.thecitizen.in/NewsDetail.aspx?Id=1709).

The general’s concern is apparently also shared by the senior army general in Jammu & Kashmir who reportedly wrote to all his commanders explaining certain uncharacteristic army decisions that the veteran community had taken umbrage to. These were the verdicts of the courts martial in the Machhal case in which three innocents depicted as infiltrating terrorists were killed by the army in 2010 and, second, the apology made by the general in response to the army’s use of overwhelming force at the checkpoint in which the two youth in the car died.

FOR FULL  ARTICLE SEE http://indiatogether.org/influence-and-politics-of-veterans-in-the-indian-army-op-ed 

The growing visibility, if not power, of the veterans was not lost on the BJP that used it to good effect in its election campaign. Narendra Modi shared the dais with a group of veterans including former chief, VK Singh, to depict a strong-on-defence image during his campaign. This helped create the ‘wave’ that brought him from Ahmedabad to Delhi. In return, he cleared the long-cherished desire of the veteran and service communities for a national war memorial.

Modi has also crafted his national security policies according to the hardline blueprint, staple of the strategic writings of veterans. He has energised the defence production sector and has a $40-billion defence equipment shopping list. Environmental concerns have been summarily set aside as India embarks on strategic road building in the Himalayas.

While all this keeps the veteran community largely appreciative, its media savvy members and would-be strategists also project these as inevitable and desirable advances for national security, initiatives that awaited Modi’s displacement of the previous moribund regime.

FOR FULL  ARTICLE SEE http://indiatogether.org/influence-and-politics-of-veterans-in-the-indian-army-op-ed 

Since universally militaries vote conservative, the service community and veterans have had a soft corner for the right wing party currently in power. The nationalism that the regime espouses is also attractive to the patriotic vein in former military men. Also, being a part of the upper middle class that widely, and perhaps wildly, favours the BJP, the veterans form a reliable support base.

As with the rest of the middle class, they are swayed by the economic dividend they hope to achieve through Modi’s hitching of corporate power and politics. They are also vicarious recipients of the redeemed national glory that comes with the ascent of an unrepentant Hindu nationalist to power for the first time after, in their reading of history, a millennium.  This makes them, as it does the wider middle class, blind to the seamier side of current day Indian politics, brought to fore and respectability by the ascent of the BJP to unchecked national power.

By no means do these elements have the power to shape policy. For instance, their limits can be seen in the ascent of the current army chief to the post was in face of bitter opposition by the V K Singh camp, even though V K Singh was in the government as a junior minister. Yet, they certainly serve as foot-soldiers for justifying policies, particularly on prime time from which, in any case, reasoned discourse has fled in fear of crusading television hosts.

A case in point is the ballast lent by veterans in outshouting their Pakistani counterparts to sell the new - harsh and arguably dangerous - turn to India’s Pakistan policy.

FOR FULL  ARTICLE SEE http://indiatogether.org/influence-and-politics-of-veterans-in-the-indian-army-op-ed 

The problem is when veterans, armed as they are with a cultural transmission belt into the serving uniformed fraternity, transmit their politics alongside. This was mildly observable in the previous stint of the NDA regime in government when less-than-secular strategists made their first appearance writing for both in-service publications and journals of institutions patronised by veterans. The Vivekananda International Foundation, made famous by Doval’s move from its directorship to national security adviser position, took root then.

This time round, there is not merely greater acceptability for cultural nationalism, it is the dominant discourse. Anecdotal evidence indicates that e-bullying of secular voices on the Internet from the military fraternity started with the onset of campaigning in the last elections. The military has over the past decade also extended its domain of benign interest to cover veterans, deemed to be neglected by the ministry department that is mandated to look after them, Department of Ex Servicemen Welfare, thereby increasing the inter-permeation.

FOR FULL  ARTICLE SEE http://indiatogether.org/influence-and-politics-of-veterans-in-the-indian-army-op-ed 

The potential dangers are already evident. News from the two passing out parades, from IMA and OTA, suggest that about three quarters of officers are from the North Indian belt, within a half-day reach from Delhi by train. Also, most are wards of servicemen, mostly of those from the ranks. This area is also the heartland of veteran political activism, symbolised by the ex-servicemen political rally at Rewari that really mainstreamed Modi at the outset of his campaign.

Veterans appear to be at the centre of much more going on in military affairs than catches the eye. The missive from the general in Kashmir to his men is warning of more to come. 

Chattargam incident in Kashmir

Hooda Walks The Talk

Kashmir Times, 10 November 14

http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=38295

Lt Gen Hooda as a colonel attending the higher command course for upwardly mobile officers won the best dissertation prize. His abridged thesis, published in the journal of the College of Combat in January 2001, was titled, 'Ethics and Morality in the Military'. That when it came to the crunch in his command tenure of all troops in J&K, he has measured up to what he wrote must be applauded. In his accepting the responsibility for the killings of two youngsters at a check point in Chattargam, Kashmir, he has set the bar higher for an army that prides itself for its professionalism and integrity. 

His elevation to high rank and his appointment as commander in chief in J&K bespeaks well of the army and its systems and processes. It is comforting to know that the army has within its ranks the likes of Hooda and also of the commanding general in the Valley, Saha, since it is no doubt that Hooda would be acting in consultation with the latter. These are not exceptions. They are among several thousand officers who over the years have rendered a signal contribution to Kashmir and Kashmiris, and at one remove to the nation. 

That said, there is also a subset of officers who are differently moulded. They are also in sufficient numbers to qualify as a subculture able on occasion to set the army's moral compass. The film Haider bears testimony on that count. That they are not absent in the Valley is clear from the Chattargam episode in which apparently the lower rungs of the hierarchy attempted to paper over the killings citing a pre-existing terror alert of terrorists in a 'white car'. The police acting courageously, has debunked that. This subculture was inclined to sweep the blatant killings under the carpet. In earlier periods in Kashmir, they might well have succeeded owing to the sway of the negative subculture in the conducive environment of insurgency and counter insurgency.

As for the soldiers on duty at the check point, it would be unfair to make them scapegoats, even if the preliminary inquiry that prompted Hooda to take a stand points out that they made a 'mistake'. They did indeed make a fatal mistake, but there are mitigating facts. A car screech at a check point can trigger unpremeditated action with unforeseen consequence. Had the check point not been there, the tragedy would not have happened. The check point is there owing to the protracted conflict situation, exemplified by the AFSPA. Therefore, while not ruling out individual culpability, those responsible for inability to shift the situation from one of conflict to one of post conflict must be held equally accountable. 

While fair to expect rules of engagement to hold since the situation is relatively stable and the army reportedly better trained, it also needs factoring in that the soldiers have no doubt been fed with the staple intelligence fare of dastardly terrorist actions imminent. ISIS related reports have surely permeated down the hierarchy and so has the need for greater alertness in light of upcoming elections. Also, they would likely have been told that the increased firing on the LC and rain wrought havoc on the LC fence has led to an increased induction of terrorists out to wreck the elections. Therefore, if the soldiers fired off their weapons in haste and fear, it is not quite a willful violation of rules of engagement, but due to a situation only 'waiting to happen'. 

The fact that it is not otherwise - a Kashmir without AFSPA - is to be blamed on those in power over the past decade, both in Delhi and Srinagar. So even if the soldiers fired off the shots and Hooda is taking responsibility for this, the Congress and the NC respectively are not above blame. The parameters for removal of AFSPA have been there for most part for about a decade. Mr. Manmohan Singh, and the powers behind the chair, the two Gandhis, proved unmindful owing to improved security indices making it politically unnecessary to go further. Mr. Omar Abdullah preferred making noises against it rather than offering his resignation. In so far as the army's input has been against its removal, decision on AFSPA is a political prerogative. Therefore, it would not do to blame the jawans on the check point alone, even if they end up serving as unfortunate 'fall guys'.

Admittedly, the UPA was disadvantaged by the BJP on its flanks ever ready to call any thought of AFSPA removal as anti-national and typically 'soft' national security thinking on the Congress' part. Mr. Abdullah would also be right in claiming in his defence that his resignation would not have made a difference. 

However, with the BJP in power in Delhi and set to take Srinagar in the reckoning of its chief Mr. Shah, is not impossible for AFSPA to get a relook. There are good political reasons for this. It can always be lifted over most places and can be reinstated when and where necessary. Internally, the BJP can profit by such a promise in the run up to elections as also from the fallout of lifting it if and when in power. It will mark out the BJP in Delhi, if not in Srinagar, as different from its predecessor. It will fulfill the promise embedded in Mr. Modi's Diwali foray into Kashmir. Externally, it will help prevent Kashmir serving as a continued attraction to jihadists from AfPak. It will set the stage for renewed engagement with Pakistan, one put off temporarily in August. 

The military's input would likely have had a strategic logic. With the US departing Afghanistan, it needed the AFSPA as cover while it 'waited and watched' the outcome. To its credit, it appears from the Chattargam episode that it put in place rules of engagement suited for a restrained military, even if one empowered with AFSPA. The episode proves that 'zero collateral damage' is a fallacy. Therefore, it too can reappraise AFSPA that makes such incidents inevitable. 

While strategic reasons determine the army's input, sociological considerations cannot be discounted altogether. The Chattargam episode makes it apparent that there are two subcultures within the army: one based on the professional military ethic and the other on a nationalist ethic. The latter could yet again dominate in case the Kashmir engagement continues under AFSPA and worsens among other reasons on that count. In such a case, Hooda's action could prove the last gasp of a rational military considering that a right wing dispensation is set for a long innings in Delhi. 

politicisation of security

Politicisation of security and its consequences http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=37620

Politicisation of security has figured in the electoral rhetoric between the BJP and its opponents with both blaming the other side. In the run-up to state elections in important states and in J&K soon thereafter, that political use of security issues will be made is axiomatic. While the linkage between security and politics is easily comprehended in respect of Pakistan, it is less so in case of India. This article makes the case that India's central government has indeed politicised security. It is but one step away from politicising the military. In Pakistan, politicisation refers to political intervention by the military; most visible recently in the manner it has sponsored the hold-up of the Nawaz Sharif government. Whereas in Pakistan, politicisation of the military is furtherance of institutional interest of the military disguised as national interest; in India, politicisation of security is the use of security issues and its instruments for the political purposes of the ruling party. It shall be demonstrated ahead that this can culminate in development of symbiotic relations between the ruling party, one mediated by its leader, and the military. Both profit from a certain direction in security, and therefore can forge a sustainable, invisible bond. The ruling party's defining of national security through its ideological lens can over time infiltrate the military, making for loss in professionalism i.e., the politicisation of the military. This is reverse of the Pakistan case in which the military interferes with politics. The army's upping-the-ante on the border cannot be taken amiss. It was in response to increasing ceasefire violations and on provocative action in which it lost a soldier to an IED attack in early October. The last army chief had already made it clear that he expects vigorous tactical action on the Line of Control (LoC0. The current army chief on taking over made a pledge not to have a repeat of the beheading incident of January last year. With the new right wing government having given the go-ahead for a robust response, the army is only following through on what has been long advertised. Would the case have been different in case there had been any other government at Delhi? The military's tactical level reaction to provocation has unlikely been in question. The previous  government broke off the talks owing to the LoC incident and did not resume them due to policy paralysis thereafter suggests it would have been amenable to a vigourous response. In the event, it was not tested. Certainly, the state of talks with Pakistan would have impacted the firing on the LoC, in that not only would Pakistan have likely not been provocative, but India may have been more restrained. However, the last government had given the go-ahead for tactical trading of ordnance as the army thought fit, but with the caveat that this should not impact the strategic level moves. Therefore, there would have been no lack in a 'befitting reply' at the tactical level, even if escalation would have been ruled out. This time escalation has been ruled in. In so far as this can be strategically rationalised, it makes sense. Firstly, India having broken off talks abruptly needed a fig leaf. The border incidents provided the alibi and its recent escalation enable India to blame Pakistan for continuing to be difficult. Secondly, that the escalation was soon after return of the PM and NSA from the US suggests an AfPak angle alongside. The messaging to Pakistan, with tacit US imprimatur, is that India be a minder in the region in case Pakistan does not play ball in the unfolding US strategy in Afghanistan. Lastly, Pakistan's military by unsettling Sharif made it amply clear that it calls the shots on the India policy. With Mr. Modi's opening gambit coming to naught, the escalation is India's reply. However the timing of the escalation in relation to internal politics cannot be ignored. The ruling party had received a warning of a waning Modi wave in the bye-elections across the country. With significant states going to the polls, its internal political mobilisation strategy of using the internal 'Other', India's minority, as bogeyman was not enough, the 'love jihad' trope notwithstanding. Mr. Modi to facilitate his US trip had made placatory statements including acknowledging Muslims are ready to die for their country. The external 'Other' lent itself better for internal political use. This explains the manner Mr. Modi has used the army's response on the LoC to project his image as strongman. Questioning security policy is a duty for the opposition. By no means is questioning security policy casting of aspersion on the military. It is an absurd notion to have a consensus on security policy in a democratic society. There are multiple ways to achieve security. The government's manner of doing so is not necessarily the only or right one. Therefore, the charge made by the BJP that questioning by the opposition amounts to demoralising the force is itself politicisation. This amounts to the politicisation of security and one done by the ruling party for its short term political ends. What are the consequences for knock-on politicisation of the military? In so far that the military is currently carrying out faithfully the order of the government, its action is unexceptionable. To call for the targeting to have taken into account collateral damage as a factor is trite in light of the manner collateral damage is increasingly being interpreted in light of operations in the Middle East, including the Israeli one in Gaza. However, of consequence is in case the military develops the notion that here is a government that delivers, that does not keep it on leash and one that allows the military strategic space otherwise constricted by diplomatic dynamics. This has to be read alongside the manner defence ministry is being left without a minister. The nominal oversight by the finance minister has been subject to his good health. The military's key grouse, that it is second guessed by the bureaucrats, is likely much eased. There is considerable largesse coming its way in terms of armament infusion with major initiatives by the  government such as opening up the defence sector further to foreign investment and its proximity  to the US as an arms source. The political use of the military enhances its profile, both in relation  to the ruling party and in the voting public. All this can tend to inflate the military's self perception,  thereby increasing political propensity, latent in any military.  Weak indicators are already on offer on the way the wind blows. The military has unnecessarily offered its services for cleaning the Ganga, visualising 40 officers under a retired general assisting the minister, Uma Bharati. It was needlessly on the front pages in the Swach Bharat campaign in cleaning up its cantonments. Even if the contrast in the response of the army and the administration in J&K to the floods has been stark, the army's placing of the spotlight on itself was at the expense of the administration. With the BJP making a strong bid for J&K, if Mr. Amit Shah is to be believed, this was unfortunate in terms of timing in that the army has albeit coincidentally improved the chances of the BJP. It could have moderated such an outcome by keeping the focus on the state government and projecting itself as in support to the state government, which is the correct legal position and is normally the case. The PM promised the situation will soon subside. The timing is also suggestive of internal politics. With the harvest from the forthcoming elections behind him, the PM can be expected to revert to his grandstanding on the regional stage, with the SAARC gathering in Kathmandu providing an opportunity. He will project that he and the army have 'shut up' the Pakistani military. The potential for identification of the military with the PM, and at one remove his party, therefore exists. This is the knock-on consequence of the politicisation of security that bears watching. (Firdaus Ahmed's commentaries are available as a free ebook Think South Asia: A Stand for Peace, for download at www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in.)

vested interest in kashmir

Opinion

The expansionist agenda An unacknowledged vested interest in a disturbed Kashmir By Firdaus Ahmed http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=24632 That Kashmir remains disturbed suits several otherwise competing interests. Counter intuitively then, there is cooperation between these forces with stakes in Kashmir for keeping it simmering. While vested interests in the conflict are well known in certain quarters, such as for instance in the ISI and Jihad, Inc. across the border, this article deals with the less easy to find that are unfortunately much closer home and on that account are probably more significant. The thesis here is that north Indian ethnic groupshave developed an economic stake in the military's expansion, which makes them unwittingly amenable to continuing military commitment in Kashmir, mirroring in a manner the better known Punjabi-military nexus in Pakistan and its well recognised stake in a disturbed Kashmir.  In the popular narrative, much furthered by army veterans, the army is merely doing a distasteful piece of work foisted on it by a hapless administration. It would much rather be in its cantonments in training for its primary task of guarding frontiers rather than manning an unforgiving Line of Control (LoC) and chasing down foreign jihadists and assorted Kashmiri nationalists. The inability of the diplomats of the two states to arrive at an agreement, minimally on a peaceable LoC and maximally on turning it into an IB, results in a military necessity of guarding it all along its often hostile length. Internally, the politicians and bureaucrats having messed up and unable to clean up thereafter results in the army's retaining of its hold despite in its view having created the security conditions enabling a political resolution. Therefore, it is not a 'vested interest' but is instead merely fulfilling its obligation.  There is little to argue over the fact that the LoC continues to defy final settlement despite the passing of over half a century. It is also true that the security situation has been under enough control for most part of the preceding quarter century - not necessarily due to military means alone but also due to diplomatic and political measures - for India to have hammered out a political resolution. That it has not done so is not only due to a deficit in political strength, with Delhi perceiving, largely mistakenly, an inability to sell any 'solution' internally to the rest of the country. It also owes in part to the interests at play in Kashmir that have little to do with the conflict configuration but with dynamics elsewhere, including within the social composition of the security forces in general.  The Kashmir problem has served as a windfall for uninhibited expansion of security forces. The momentary Khalistani insurgency of the eighties has brought home that changes in the social composition of the army, in particular, was necessary. Even as this was being proceeded with discreetly in terms of reduction of Sikh percentages within the military, there was an expansion in the army owing to its multiple counter insurgency commitments in the nineties ranging from the North East to Kashmir. Since the conventional deterrent needed to remain in place lest the proxy wars escalate inordinately, troop strength needed expanding. This necessity gave birth to the Rashtriya Rifles. With Pakistan becoming more venturesome under its overt nuclear capability by its mounting of the Kargil misadventure and the parliament attack, further expansion was needed to be able to deliver it a quick, but not lethal, blow through what was termed the 'Cold Start' doctrine. The LoC fence that came up in the same timeframe also required more regular troops to man. Thus, another round of expansion took place of the army over last decade. China, and the latest 'two front' 'threat', provide a limitless rationale for expansion into the future, limited by the economics of it.  While the army, a professional force that it is, can be expected to be cognisant of the strategic dimension informing, and in its view necessitating, its expansion, the issue is anchored not in the strategic coordinates as the army prefers to believe and the popular narrative would have it, but in the wider societal factors. In particular, the ethnic groups that have stood to be advantaged by such expansion are the ones propelling it. In the absence of statistics, these groups can be said to reside within a 100 km from the Jaipur-Delhi-Chandigarh-Jammu line. In the case of Kashmir, the advantaged groups are rather easy to spot. It is no wonder then that given a choice security force members would prefer postings in Kashmir rather than in the North East, positioned as they would be within a night's journey from their leave destinations. Therefore, a restive Kashmir as now - but not with a full blown insurgency as earlier - is not such a bad proposition.  In the straitened times of liberalisation, the only sector that has expanded continuously is the security sector not only in terms of employment but also the monies devoted to it. These groups do not have the advantage of certain other Indian nationalities, such as those on the western sea board who can look towards the Gulf and certain others on the Deccan plateau and southwards who have leap-frogged on the back of the IT sector. Therefore, the security sector's expansion has enabled these groups to keep up. Additionally, the largesse of the Sixth Pay Commission has channelled a majority of army's revenue budget into their 'pinds and mohallas'.  These groups are the ones that keep New Delhi frightened of its own shadow when it deals with Pakistan. With a collective memory marred by Partition, suffering a hangover of the martial race theory and influenced by cultural nationalism, these groups have a stake in continuation of an unacknowledged subcontinental civil war. This keeps them wary of Pakistan and at odds the liberal conception of security in which the alternative security approaches, such as prospects of economic engagement in diluting animosities and creating new power centres, are based. Therefore, even if India succeeds in forcing a penalty corner, for instance in entering into a dialogue with Pakistan, it is, quite like its hockey team, unable to convert it, in this case into a substantial and meaningful round of talks.  Given this, it can in summation be said that the army is right in saying that it not yet another 'vested interest' in Kashmir; but only by its lights. As pointed out here, these lights are both narrow and dim. Expanding the theoretical template from military sociology to the 'military and society' plane helps identify more consequential vested interests that lie elsewhere.  Identifying this is merely the first step. It begs the question: What's to be done?  The national security question needs revisiting afresh. Challenging the popular trope, hung out to dry by veterans with Goebbelesian regularity in op-eds in the 'nationalist' press, is useful. But the intellectual battle also needs taking into the academia, the government's policy rooms and back rooms of political parties. Security has for too long been held hostage to 'strategic' thinking, fixated without. It requires instead a lens more sensitive to social and political forces within society. That way China and Pakistan would fall behind as 'threats' and instead forces, closer home, that unwittingly masquerade as 'answers' to security problems, would rise to claim their space. A redefinition of security will help India's peripheral population groups overthrow what in their perception might amount to an internal colonial yoke attributable as hypothesised here to its 'heartland' groups.  (The author is a blogger at www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in)