Gen Rao’s place in the history of Kashmir

Kashmir Times, 5 February 2016

http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=49353

The second of two back-to-back obituaries of military leaders lately, with that of ‘Jake’ Jacob being the first, has been of Gen Krishna Rao. Clearly, obituaries of both were effusive and with good reason. The military careers of both registered a high watermark in the liberation of Bangladesh and both went on to serve the country further in uniform and when out of it in a gubernatorial capacity.

Of the two, interest of readers of this publication is in Gen Krishna Rao’s significant presence in the recent history of Kashmir. What is well known is his tenure at the Raj Bhawan and its continuing ramifications. What is less well known is how the situation came to such as pass in Kashmir in first place.

But first, what is rather well known. Rao was there at the beginning. The political situation resulting from then Governor Jagmohan’s handling of the political impasse in the mid-eighties culminated in the late eighties. The election in the interim in 1987 yielded up a rich harvest of disaffected youth, promptly capitalized on by Pakistani intelligence agencies. A spiral in initially low level anti-India violence started, including the selective killings of Kashmiri Pandits. Governor Jagmohan’s tenure ending led to appointment of Rao in his place for his first tenure in J&K. Rao having served a five year stint in the North East was a figure with experience in handling restive states. Portents of the situation worsening had perhaps led to the choice of an army man for the job.

In the event, his was a turbulent first term. Pakistan’s low intensity war continued, unacknowledged by either side, with Tika Lal Taploo being killed that September, among the first of about 220 Kashmiri Pandits who have died since in the conflict. It witnessed the turning out on the streets of large numbers of people in the last December of the eighties during the Rubaiya Sayeed crisis. The final straw was the announcement by the government of the return of Jagmohan as Governor. Jagmohan was a tough administrator and having just finished a five year stint in Srinagar was thought to be the best bet. Perhaps Rao was seen as too close to Abdullah.

Not only did Rao resign, so did Farooq Abdullah miffed that his political rival Mufti Sayeed had foisted his nemesis Jagmohan on him once again. This resulted in a vacuum in Srinagar at a crucial time, in the run up to Republic Day. Even as Jagmohan hastened to Srinagar for what turned out his ‘frozen turbulence in Kashmir’, the Valley was astir. On 19 January, the police took action under uncertain authority, setting-off agitated crowds on Srinagar streets the next day and setting up the Gowkadal incident. The rumour was that Kashmir was building up to a boiling point culminating on 26 January in a unilateral declaration of independence. In the following weeks, many of the 24000 Kashmiri Pandit families that have left Kashmir exited.  

Jagmohan left in a hail of bullets that not only accounted for Mirwaiz Farooq but also for some 60 members of his cortege. At a time when some are returning state awards, he recently collected a Padma Vibhushan for his stewardship of Kashmir at the outbreak of the troubles. His successor ‘Gary’ Saxena is credited with holding firm, but only to pass on the baton to Rao. The dynamics between Rao, his home minister Chavan and Chavan’s deputy, Rajesh Pilot, and the relations (later even familial) of the latter with Kashmir’s most prominent politician Farooq Abdullah, led to Rao’s second chance at the helm.

In retrospect, it appears that Krishna Rao had a single mandate from Prime Minister Narasimha Rao: conduct elections. The aim was legitimate, a return to democracy rather than rule from Delhi. India’s newly liberalising economy needed investment and in the post Cold War climate, the sole superpower, the US, needed to be placated. India’s human rights record was under question and Narasimha Rao had to dispatch both Kashmir’s lead politician Abdullah and opposition leader Vajpayee to Geneva to retrieve lost ground. The economy could not do with another round of war with Pakistan. India’s military might had to be turned inwards.

Creating the conditions for elections and the timing of it was left to General Rao. He began well in his handling of the vacation of Hazratbal shrine. However, General Rao, a former army chief to boot, ended up relying solely on the army to deliver. For its part, the army had a full job on its hands. It had recovered weaponry enough to equip two divisions worth of troops. The insurgency was now more of proxy war with the indigenous face, the JKLF, being eclipsed by the ISI supported Hizb and the foreign fighter dominated Harkat. Apprehending a long term engagement in Kashmir, the army determined that it should not detract from its ability to hit back at Pakistan. It raised the Rashtriya Rifles and pumped these troops into Kashmir in the mid-nineties. It also turned to turn coat militants by creating the Ikhwan.

The Unified Headquarters set up by Rao himself was however not a link between him and the army. This came to a head in the Charar-e-Sharif episode which witnessed Rao quarrelling with his tools and scapegoating the UHQ head, his adviser Home and fellow general, MA Zaki. The event led to elections postponed to the following year, giving Seshan, the election czar, time to conduct a reckonable election. Elections helped India’s case in Kashmir, even if some of the glitter was lost in the tough line India was forced to adopt in face of Pakistan’s continuing challenge. Thus Gen Rao delivered on the aim set by his prime minister. Rao handed the baton back to Saxena, who had two eruptions - the Kargil War and the legislative assembly/parliament attack aftermath – to deal with.

When Kashmir’s history gets to be written dispassionately sometime in the future, it will be said that there were missed opportunities aplenty in Kashmir. The first was when Jagmohan applied the military template, which according to his adviser, Ved Marwah, was not quite necessary when policing action and investigation of firings resulting in uncalled for deaths  could have served the situation. The second was in wake of Hazratbal when Rao at the helm could have exploited the effect of the mature handling of the situation, that  included the soft touch of negotiated end to the crisis by Habibullah and even serving of ‘biryani’ to militants. Habibullah in his account soto voce suggests that there was more to his removal from the scene in an accident than meets the eye. That the militants got a hiding on surrendering suggests there were forces for the alternate way of handling militancy. It is clear that they won out under Rao’s tutelage.

That said, now for the less visible and indirect influence of Rao on Kashmir. Kashmir erupted at the turn of the decade when the Berlin Wall had just come down and freedom and liberation (‘azadi’) were in the air. India was relatively cowed after its economy coughed and its politics tumbled; its main supporter, the Soviet Union, went into a fright; and its adversary Pakistan became triumpalist over its success in laying out the ‘bear trap’ in Afghanistan. Whereas the semi-fictional scenario Operation Topac was exaggerated, the ISI was itself surprised by the windfall it received in early 1990. So much so that Benazir Bhutto’s fiery jumping into the act in early February after the birth of her child was almost inevitable.  Pakistan could not but grab the chance it had only partially created and which India had done more to hand over.

Pakistan needed this since it was long looking for an opportunity to tie down India’s military power. India’s military power had received a fillip in the eighties. The military upgrade that in the event made India’s economy dive, was a brainchild of the Rao-Sundarji combine. It is here that Rao’s indirect role kicks in. After India’s military victory in 1971 that made it a regional power, India in the mid-seventies set up a study group under Rao to chart out its military’s turn towards mechanization. This was firmed in under Rao when as Chief he conducted the first memorable large scale exercise, Ex Digvijay. Pakistan, worrying that this time its mainland would be shred by Indian pincers, sought to under-cut India’s power by first fostering insurgency in its launch pads in Punjab and then extended it into J&K, when India offered the border state as a fertile ground a platter through the rigging of elections in 1987 under Abdullah’s and Jagmohan’s watch. In effect, Rao’s success carried forward by Sundarji resulted in the insurgency in Kashmir that then required Rao’s direct attention.

There was one other manner in which Rao tangentially influenced Kashmir. As Chief he was said  to have been close to the Congress. When his time came to hang up his uniform, he pitched for Gen Vaidya to succeed him over the prior claim on seniority of Gen Sinha. Gen Vaidya was winner of two gallantry awards. Gen Sinha on his part left the service, only to follow Gen Rao, if not as Chief, then two decades on as Governor J&K, appointed by the earlier NDA government. While Rao tilted to the Congress, Sinha tilted to the opposition. While both can be credited with setting the stage for political generals of today, Sinha’s has been a baleful cultural nationalist, if not communal, legacy in Kashmir. He completely reversed the healing touch of early this century, so much so that today Kashmiri youth express interest in the ISIS even while that organization has only rhetorical interest in Kashmir.

Rao, as with the other governors in the nineties, bore a great brunt. He had the wide shoulders necessary. It must be said that if Pakistan had its way then things would have been much worse.

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Kashmir: Not the moment for a tryst

kashmirtimes.com 1 August 2015

In an article ‘Resentful Kashmiris’, Kuldip Nayar writes of Kashmiris becoming more anti-Indian, both in form and substance. This may be useful in many ways than one. However, one way Kashmiris are better warned not to go down is to challenge the Indian state yet again, not at this juncture at any rate.

Kuldip Nayar forthrightly writes of an exchange in which he warns that Kashmiri cessation could have repercussions on India’s Muslim minority elsewhere in India, to which his Kashmiri interlocutor counter argues, ‘Your  Muslims are your problem.’

This reveals the extent of interface with their Kashmiri brethren of India’s Muslims south of the Pir Panjal. Since the mainstream Indian Muslim opinion was largely coincident with that of liberal Indian opinion on Kashmir, it was generally disapproving of the military template operational in the Valley for the past quarter century and supportive of a solution through dialogue with both Pakistan and with Kashmiris themselves.

Working through, with and within the liberal perspective was useful in that the Kashmir issue remained largely a territorial one in relation to Pakistan and not a religious one entangled in the vexed minority management issues in the rest of India. To recall, majority-minority strains came to fore coincident in time with the outbreak of the troubles in Kashmir in the late eighties, peaking together in the early nineties. That the two issues remained separate was altogether a good thing, since both had the potential to, if taken together, mutually complicate each other.

In the main liberal opinion was not quite an underdog in the years that followed. The element of restraint, such as there was, in the military template in Kashmir was on its account; so much so, that a modicum of normalcy could be said to have returned to the Valley, beginning with the NDA years under the stewardship of Vajpayee.

In effect, Kashmiris owe the rest of India much, including its Muslim minority. To be sure India could have and should have done much more to meet them more than halfway. Indeed, much of the resentment Nayar detects can be laid at India’s door, in the inability of the UPA to convert a position of advantage to sustainable peace.

Nayar hints at a possible reason for this inability and unwillingness. Liberal opinion has been cognizant of its relative strength in respect of the right wing that watched over its shoulder. It therefore confined itself to conflict management rather than resolution. That this apprehension of the right wing stealing a march in case it did otherwise was valid is borne out by the manner the right wing wrested the electoral upper hand last year.

A consideration has always been the possible repercussions of ‘concessions’ towards Kashmiris on the larger national minority. Howsoever unfair, it would have given the right wing another stick to beat not only the minorities, but the liberals as well. Therefore, that the UPA did not chance it was politically sensible. In the event, they were eclipsed anyway.

However, under the current circumstance ‘concessions’ are certainly possible. The right wing is comfortably ensconced in Delhi. It never has had to look over its shoulder. It has over the past year engaged in boundary setting and creating the conditions that enable potential concessions. In Kashmir these include getting itself into the coalition in Srinagar, telling Pakistan where to get off, staring it down at the LC, reducing infiltration to zero, and propping up its Jammu constituency to balance, and potentially cancel out, Srinagar. Outside of Kashmir, Mr. Modi is readying to have the military constituency eat out of its hand by holding on to the OROP declaration till the final moment when perhaps as early as at the 1965 fiftieth anniversary commemoration he grandly hands out the goodies.

If Kashmiris prove patient, they can prove themselves deserving of political ‘concessions’, such as progressing pushing back of the AFSPA to begin with. Mr. Modi can then grandly – as is his wont – bestow them when he builds up the tempo and is sure of pocketing the political dividend. Kashmiris would have got what they need. India’s minority would not bear any fallout. Mr. Modi would have the peace he needs to work his Gujarat model on the rest of India. This is a ‘Win-win’ situation for all, other than Pakistan’s right wingers.   

They may instigate Kashmiris to an untimely and possibly futile Round II. The army commander has in his Kargil Day interaction with the press let on that there is concern with educated youth signing up with militancy. Whereas this figure is still in the two digits, it reinforces Nayar’s observation of continuing disaffection.

In case this disaffection translates into confrontation then Mr. Modi’s hands will be as tied as any preceding Indian government’s. Just as with any other government, the suppressive template would be operational once again.

The legitimacy for this will be easy to create. Already there is disinformation abroad on the proximity of the Daeash to South Asia. A report has an opportune discovery of a Daesh plan to attack India and trigger an India-Pak Armageddon.  This will expectedly prove handy, even if time were to prove that it is a transparently motivated report put out by organizations and media outlets with right wing sympathies in the US. Mr. Modi’s foreign travels will ensure that his interlocutors there will give him the benefit of doubt. India will project itself as containing the Islamist threat, a cause that attracts the big three: US, Russia and China.

Thus, there is little that Kashmiris going militant at this stage can hope to wrest. Besides, Kashmiris can only expect to hurt to the extent they are ‘successful’ in inconveniencing India. As Nayar warns, the repercussions for India’s Muslims will be immediate and direct. They are now also hostage to Kashmiri good behavior.

The past year of Hindutvavadis running riot with state culpability hints as much. Alongside, the home ministry’s intent to busy itself with a counter radicalization program suggests they are already identified as Pakistan’s potential fifth column and an attractive constituency for the latest bogeyman, Daesh.

It appears that the earlier distance between Kashmir and India’s other minority question has eroded. Further convergence between the two can come about were Kashmir to improbably ignite yet again. That would create conditions for the perfect storm, benefiting the right wing on both sides of the erstwhile Radcliffe line and with no benefit sighted for Kashmiris. This analysis suggests that while flirting with black flags and green flags is romantic, expressive and cathartic, that is where the matter should end.

‘Concessions’ appear to be Mr. Modi’s Plan A. The somewhat limp Dinanagar attack and zero-infiltration this year indicates that Pakistan’s cards are down. It is yet to receive India’s retribution by proxy. That will likely be timed with the forthcoming NSAs meet, intended as a reading out by India of the Riot Act to Pakistan. If it fails, Plan B has been in place in Kashmir incongruous with its improved security indices for a decade in any case.

It’s therefore better to let Mr. Modi have his cake and await the outcome.  

 

 

a quarter century since the start of troubles in Kashmir

Looking Back a Quarter Century On

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=40625

The night of 19-20 January is traditionally taken as the beginning of the uprising in Kashmir. However, it can also be dated to the earlier release of the militants in exchange for safety of the daughter of the then Indian home minister and current chief ministerial candidate, Mufti Sayeed. In the run up to the Republic Day, the fear was that there could be a unilateral declaration of independence either in the assembly or on the streets. To pre-empt this, the police launched what was perhaps the first crack down, of innumerable to follow in the decade. 

Some claim that the police was ordered in to herald the arrival of 'no nonsense' Jagmohan back into Kashmir. His autobiography of the period records that he was himself at the time in Jammu, preparing for moving to Srinagar. Others insinuate that the inexperienced DGP, recently back from a longish stint in Delhi, wanted to please his new boss, Jagmohan, due to arrive the next day in the vacuum created by Farooq Abdullah's resignation. In the event, the culmination of the events was in the killings at Gaw Kadal. 

The twenty fifth anniversary of the event finds that the situation in Kashmir, though much improved security wise, continues to be fragile. This is best indicated by the lack of return of Kashmiri Pandits to their homes in Kashmir. Discussion revolving around events of the period have centered on the departure of the Pandits. This has been variously attributed to their own sense of vulnerability brought on by prior killings of about 200 Pandits. The atmosphere of intimidation and anarchy prompted many to leave. 

There has been a view that Jagmohan facilitated this exit in order in this perspective to have a free hand to crack down on the militancy. Their presence would have diverted security forces into protective operations, besides making them vulnerable to backlash. Jagmohan himself has not taken responsibility for their departure, though it is possible that once the choice was made to upstake, the administration would have pitched in with assistance. This makes possible the impression to onlookers that the government hastened the departure as it prepared for the long haul of recusing Kashmir from militancy.

From a strategic point of view, it makes sense for removing the vulnerable minority in order to come to grips with a situation virtually out of control. Jagmohan records the atmosphere of gloom as he arrived in Raj Bhawan. In the presence of his adviser, Ved Marwah, he requested the be-medelled corps commander who came to welcome him from Badami Bagh to retrieve the situation. On being handed over the situation, the corps commander, General Zaki, proceeded to change into his combat uniform and marched off with a column of troops into the city. An army column had already deployed in the city earlier as part of aid to civil authority, but the major force was police and CRPF. After a few hours of fearlessly circuiting the city in his open jeep with his escort, he reported back to Jagmohan that the city was secure. 

The situation had deteriorated to this pass since the needlessly rigged elections that kept the MUF out. Pakistan's ISI, suitably enabled by its operation, the Bear Trap in Afghanistan, was ready to divert resources and expertise received from the Americans to it favourite hobby horse, Kashmir. The timing of departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan was just right for the ISI. Therefore, while it did not forge the subsequent insurgency, it did fuel it. The insurgency was primarily an Indian creation. Not to expect Pakistan to profit from the gross misstep would be to take a naïve view of international relations. 

While the Kashmiris went across largely due to India's doing, an equally surprised Pakistan's army and ISI took care to arm and hastily train them. It is doubtful Pakistan's government itself was much aware of what was afoot since it was relatively quiet through the period, in part because the pact that enabled return of civil government to power was that it forswore control of Pakistan's India policy, as much as the fact that its head, Mohtarma Bhutto was pregnant. It was only in early February, using the opportunity of marking of Maqbool Butt's handing, that Ms. Bhutto lent her fiery voice in support of the movement that had quite broken out by then. 

The 'uprising' caught India on the backfoot, resulting in it turning into a 'movement'. National elections had placed a minority coalition in power, marking the beginning of the coalition era that persisted through the decade. The government was greeted in its very first month by the Rubaiya Sayeed crisis. International relations were in the vortex of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the outbreak of the spirit of liberation. India's army had been exhausted by its foray into Sri Lanka and had yet to pull out of that island completely. India did not readily have the political and military resources necessary to over awe the movement carried equally on the backs of common people in Kashmir as much as by militants. 

The army did not have the formations to spare for Kashmir. It was not quite out of Sri Lanka, even as it prioritised stabilising Punjab, critical from a strategic point of view. Therefore, it continued for a time in 'aid to civil authority' mode and it was only in mid year, after incidents such as the killings at the funeral procession of the Mirwaiz in May, that the government imposed the Armed Forces Special Power's Act. To keep Pakistan from being any more venturesome than it was already, the army shifted formations from the eastern front. Their movement prompted the crisis of 1990 with Pakistan, taken in strategic literature as the second crisis of the nuclear era in South Asia (the first being Exercise Brasstacks/Operation Trident of 1987). This was to prevent the long anticipated scenario in which Pakistan, under cover of nuclear asymmetry would exploit unsettled conditions in Kashmir by sending in regulars. 

Clearly, given this bleak picture, India did well to keep a hold of Kashmir and to progressively recapture the political high ground. A panicked Indian state could have done worse by presenting the 'international community' with a handle to interfere in South Asia such as occurred in the Balkans and later in East Timor. While India's record is not impeccable, in light of dark examples elsewhere in the world, including from the region for instance in Sri Lanka, it has managed both politically and military, credibly and, indeed, creditably. 

However, whether it has managed to retake the moral high ground is an open question. That the Kashmiri Pandits have not returned to their homes and hearths in the Valley testifies to the deficit in India's control over Kashmir. The ultimate barometer of return of normalcy would be the voluntary return of Pandits, incentivised by an irreversible security situation. This has not happened. The key question therefore at this observation of the twenty fifth anniversary of outbreak of the troubles in Kashmir is less belabouring the fact of their continuing internal exile, but as to why this is so. 

It would be too easy to attribute this to Pakistani chicanery and to leave it at that. Kashmir has enabled the military there to retain control despite the return of democracy in the nineties and in the subsequent decade to return to center stage by displacing it altogether post Kargil War. That said, introspection in India is equally in order. 

There are far too many gainers in unsettled security conditions in Kashmir, not least of which are political formations of the right which have continually prevented the political and moral reaching out necessary to win over the Kashmiris and to interface with Pakistan, recurrently acknowledged in all treaties with it as a legitimate party to the conflict, for a viable solution. Centrist governments too profited by using Kashmir to show they are not soft on security. Security forces have expanded incessantly using Kashmir as excuse. Ethnic groups advantaged by this expansion, including those in the Jammu region and immediately southwards till Delhi, have no complaints. India's great power claims have had a military boost, including from a nuclear capability, furnished by credible recourse to an uncertain regional security situation anchored on the hardy perennial, the Kashmir problem. 

The imposition on the people in Kashmir, including its minority Pandits, has therefore proven a windfall for many political, ethnic and institutional actors and groups, making for several vested interests in the troubles in Kashmir. By this yardstick, the unfortunate Pandits are in quite the same boat as the benighted Kashmiris.

Chattargam incident in Kashmir

Hooda Walks The Talk

Kashmir Times, 10 November 14

http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=38295

Lt Gen Hooda as a colonel attending the higher command course for upwardly mobile officers won the best dissertation prize. His abridged thesis, published in the journal of the College of Combat in January 2001, was titled, 'Ethics and Morality in the Military'. That when it came to the crunch in his command tenure of all troops in J&K, he has measured up to what he wrote must be applauded. In his accepting the responsibility for the killings of two youngsters at a check point in Chattargam, Kashmir, he has set the bar higher for an army that prides itself for its professionalism and integrity. 

His elevation to high rank and his appointment as commander in chief in J&K bespeaks well of the army and its systems and processes. It is comforting to know that the army has within its ranks the likes of Hooda and also of the commanding general in the Valley, Saha, since it is no doubt that Hooda would be acting in consultation with the latter. These are not exceptions. They are among several thousand officers who over the years have rendered a signal contribution to Kashmir and Kashmiris, and at one remove to the nation. 

That said, there is also a subset of officers who are differently moulded. They are also in sufficient numbers to qualify as a subculture able on occasion to set the army's moral compass. The film Haider bears testimony on that count. That they are not absent in the Valley is clear from the Chattargam episode in which apparently the lower rungs of the hierarchy attempted to paper over the killings citing a pre-existing terror alert of terrorists in a 'white car'. The police acting courageously, has debunked that. This subculture was inclined to sweep the blatant killings under the carpet. In earlier periods in Kashmir, they might well have succeeded owing to the sway of the negative subculture in the conducive environment of insurgency and counter insurgency.

As for the soldiers on duty at the check point, it would be unfair to make them scapegoats, even if the preliminary inquiry that prompted Hooda to take a stand points out that they made a 'mistake'. They did indeed make a fatal mistake, but there are mitigating facts. A car screech at a check point can trigger unpremeditated action with unforeseen consequence. Had the check point not been there, the tragedy would not have happened. The check point is there owing to the protracted conflict situation, exemplified by the AFSPA. Therefore, while not ruling out individual culpability, those responsible for inability to shift the situation from one of conflict to one of post conflict must be held equally accountable. 

While fair to expect rules of engagement to hold since the situation is relatively stable and the army reportedly better trained, it also needs factoring in that the soldiers have no doubt been fed with the staple intelligence fare of dastardly terrorist actions imminent. ISIS related reports have surely permeated down the hierarchy and so has the need for greater alertness in light of upcoming elections. Also, they would likely have been told that the increased firing on the LC and rain wrought havoc on the LC fence has led to an increased induction of terrorists out to wreck the elections. Therefore, if the soldiers fired off their weapons in haste and fear, it is not quite a willful violation of rules of engagement, but due to a situation only 'waiting to happen'. 

The fact that it is not otherwise - a Kashmir without AFSPA - is to be blamed on those in power over the past decade, both in Delhi and Srinagar. So even if the soldiers fired off the shots and Hooda is taking responsibility for this, the Congress and the NC respectively are not above blame. The parameters for removal of AFSPA have been there for most part for about a decade. Mr. Manmohan Singh, and the powers behind the chair, the two Gandhis, proved unmindful owing to improved security indices making it politically unnecessary to go further. Mr. Omar Abdullah preferred making noises against it rather than offering his resignation. In so far as the army's input has been against its removal, decision on AFSPA is a political prerogative. Therefore, it would not do to blame the jawans on the check point alone, even if they end up serving as unfortunate 'fall guys'.

Admittedly, the UPA was disadvantaged by the BJP on its flanks ever ready to call any thought of AFSPA removal as anti-national and typically 'soft' national security thinking on the Congress' part. Mr. Abdullah would also be right in claiming in his defence that his resignation would not have made a difference. 

However, with the BJP in power in Delhi and set to take Srinagar in the reckoning of its chief Mr. Shah, is not impossible for AFSPA to get a relook. There are good political reasons for this. It can always be lifted over most places and can be reinstated when and where necessary. Internally, the BJP can profit by such a promise in the run up to elections as also from the fallout of lifting it if and when in power. It will mark out the BJP in Delhi, if not in Srinagar, as different from its predecessor. It will fulfill the promise embedded in Mr. Modi's Diwali foray into Kashmir. Externally, it will help prevent Kashmir serving as a continued attraction to jihadists from AfPak. It will set the stage for renewed engagement with Pakistan, one put off temporarily in August. 

The military's input would likely have had a strategic logic. With the US departing Afghanistan, it needed the AFSPA as cover while it 'waited and watched' the outcome. To its credit, it appears from the Chattargam episode that it put in place rules of engagement suited for a restrained military, even if one empowered with AFSPA. The episode proves that 'zero collateral damage' is a fallacy. Therefore, it too can reappraise AFSPA that makes such incidents inevitable. 

While strategic reasons determine the army's input, sociological considerations cannot be discounted altogether. The Chattargam episode makes it apparent that there are two subcultures within the army: one based on the professional military ethic and the other on a nationalist ethic. The latter could yet again dominate in case the Kashmir engagement continues under AFSPA and worsens among other reasons on that count. In such a case, Hooda's action could prove the last gasp of a rational military considering that a right wing dispensation is set for a long innings in Delhi. 

the military in kashmir

The debate between the generals By Firdaus Ahmed

http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=26382 A piece in the column by Shekhar Gupta, National Interest, has prompted a rebuttal from Ata Hasnain. Gupta referred to a senior 'soldierly' general with five tenures in Kashmir telling him that with 'victory' over the Lashkar achieved, the military had little to do. Hasnain, who was commanding general in Srinagar a little while back, disputes this. He opines that 'victory' needs to be measured against politico-military aims.  Absent government action, the military had to unilaterally set for itself this yardstick: "integrate Jammu and Kashmir with mainstream India, politically, economically, socially and psychologically". He lets on that the aim has not been achieved and it 'would take years of committed campaigning' before it is. Since the army is the only agency with 'the capability to strategise, plan and stay committed to such a campaign', he argues against overturning the gains made over the past quarter century in getting the army step back.  He invites his fellow former member of the brass - Shekhar Gupta's informant - and other 'arm-chair strategists' - presumably a tongue-in-cheek reference to Shekhar Gupta himself - to visit the many guest rooms the army has prepared all over the state to get a better vantage on the situation in Kashmir. The elements in this situation, to him, include a separatist-radical nexus; a body of surrendered militants who could revert to militancy due to non-materialisation of what has been promised them; and the precedence of Pakistani effort to get people to rise along with their conventional attacks may find resonance, since 'finally' what matters is what 'people think'. These, together with the expected geopolitical changes in the vicinity, suggest that the 'context' is not right for 'declaring victory prematurely'.  To the general, 'victory' is 'not against the people of Kashmir but for them, and against the intent of Pakistan, the separatists and terror groups.' Therefore it is 'for' the people of Kashmir that the Rashtriya Rifles needs to remain in place, with the AFSPA for cover. Furthermore, he reminds that the RR cannot be moved off to Chattisgarh since it would be required to defend strategic arteries. After all, there are more surrendered militants who have not received their promised recompense as a 'potential source of home terror' in Kashmir than those waiting in staging camps across. More importantly, he reveals that the RR is an 'add on force for conventional operations' in order to balance the 110 Wings of the Frontier Corps that Pakistan has reequipped for similar ends. Therefore, it is a misunderstanding at the tactical level if 'to neutralise just a handful of terrorists each year' is mistaken as the RR's task; it is instead to 'cement the separatist population with the mainstream' as befits a counterinsurgency force.  In admitting to a wish that 'Gupta had faulted the army for not demanding the articulation of a politico-military aim', the general reinforces the well-known secret that India does not have a strategy. As a result of this, the army has arrived at a strategy of its own. This has been articulated candidly by the general in his rebuttal of Gupta's argument that the army having done its job militarily, must now vacate the hinterland and concentrate on the Line of Control. The army's position therefore seems to be that the populace is potentially restive and the neighbor can yet take advantage of the situation. Therefore, the army needs to stay on, but with a better understood and implemented purpose of cementing the population with the 'mainstream'.  Gupta makes the point that Kashmiris could do with sharing the 'peace dividend' by a 'disarming' of Kashmir, referring to statistics on the return of peace. To Hasnain that is an illusion. Since the general ends on a note exhorting the reader - and perhaps Gupta - to 'learn to trust the army' since 'it is your (the reader's) army', it would be too much to expect the general to dwell on how much the army is itself causing the alienation that the general admits to exists in Kashmir. There is little doubt that army presence in their midst and the continuance of AFSPA are disliked by many in Kashmir. These are then red rags that feed into a situation in which 'separatism and radicalism run hand in hand in the Valley'. In other words, the Hasnain's solution is part of the problem. The advantages for the army are many. Guest rooms at 'Keran, Machel, Gurez, Uri, Sopore, Tral and Shopian' for one; even if Hasnain's refutation that new golf courses have come up is taken. Second, the RR gets to stay on in the cool climes of J&K rather than clear Bastar's jungles. Third, this would be for an indefinite duration since as Hasnain deems it there are no 'agencies who can take it (Kashmir) forward to "peace".'  Hasnain's praiseworthy plain-speak must be taken seriously. It is clear that Kashmir remains potentially unstable. Also the dreaded '2014' - bandied about since the advent of Obama on the world stage - is barely round the corner. However, it is equally clear that unresponsiveness to Kashmiri demands on AFSPA and military presence, referred to by Gupta as the army's 'veto', is part of the problem in Kashmir. Hasnain's solution is that since the army is going to be part of the scenery in Kashmir, it should be put to better use as befits a counter insurgency force. Gupta's view and that of his general informant, is that the military must step back. Hasnain thinks that would be premature. To Gupta, the time is ripe to trust people to hold back the separatist-radical-terrorist tide. Whichever side of the debate one is, the debate is academic.  What is clear is that the status quo will prevail over the near term. With the national and state elections close at hand, experimentation with the security grid is most unlikely. From the results of the recent state elections it is clear that the next dispensation in Delhi is very likely to be different from the present one. The current government in its lame-duck year is unlikely to make any changes. The next one if of the saffron hue has already declared its intent obliquely: to review Article 370. When it is so engaged it would be equally unlikely to make any changes, particularly since as it goes about debating Article 370, all of Hasnain's fears would likely be a reality on the ground.  Therefore, it is not, as Hasnain seems to suggest, the reality in the Valley that will end up precipitating matters and also not what happens across the border, but what happens in Delhi and how it (mis)manages Srinagar. News Updated at : Friday, December 13, 2013

Countering insurgency and sexual violence

By Firdaus Ahmed

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=16237 The Indian Army's powers under Armed Forces Special Powers Act have rightly figured in the debate surrounding sexual violence particularly since the barbaric rape in New Delhi early this year. To the pro-army side, the army is self-regulating and any incidents that do take place are 'aberrations'. To the activists, the army is high on testosterone all the while in counterinsurgency and therefore requires its powers clipped. The army's own position when faced with allegations of sexual transgressions in operational areas by its members is that it takes action where warranted but notes that most accusations are propaganda of anti-national forces. The truth is, as is usually the case, somewhere in between. The debate understandably was taken on board by the Justice Verma Committee and the outcome has figured in its speedily arrived at recommendations. Justice JS Verma requires that the infamous provision of the AFSPA that calls for sanction by the central government for initiating prosecution against armed forces personnel be removed where a sexual offence is alleged. This has something for both supporters of the army and its critics. It does not degrade the powers the military thinks it needs in such areas. But it does remove the cover of impunity that critics of the military argue allows the military to get away. However, the army's view that it would open the army up to false allegations needs to be taken on board. The counter insurgency environment is considerably complex. The insurgents have an active body of over ground workers who can be deployed as a dirty tricks department. Once in the dragnet of the Indian court system, particularly one subject to militant intimidation, well meaning soldiers acting in good faith could find themselves on the firing line. Truth will be the first casualty and morale the second. Vindication, after the better part of youth has been expended fighting off the allegation, is hardly the fate a nation would want for those who have signed up to defend it to the peril of their lives. If soldiers are sent into such environments by a government, all they ask is a fair cover. Such cover from military excesses no doubt must be afforded citizens in the affected areas also. Justice Verma's second point on 'command responsibility', a senior's duty to prevent and take action in such cases, is pertinent here. If the senior leadership sets a command climate that encourages juniors to take an unfair advantage of additional powers, the central government must demand of the military hierarchy the reason why it has not proceeded with prosecution on its own under the Army Act. Tactical level commanders such as the infamous Major Avatar Singh are as much a product of the command climate set by their seniors as they are subject to their inner psychological pathologies. Where explanation offered by the army is found wanting, it must be entered into confidential records of culpable commanders under supervision of the ministry and where necessary administrative, and depending on the gravity, criminal proceedings be launched against erring commanders. Merely shifting them out to other assignments as was the case with the division commander in the Pathribal incident is not enough. That this was done in the case suggests that the state had much to hide and could not risk having its officials prosecuted, lest they spill the beans. Command climate, the degree of permissiveness (or otherwise) of violations in conducting counter insurgency operations, is perhaps the most significant variable that either promotes or deters violations. A command climate is permissive when it allows greater leeway to tactical commanders in pursuit of quantifiable 'results' such as militants killed. The tacit bargain is in the commander overlooking cutting of corners in such pursuit so long as 'results' in terms of statistics of militants killed keep rolling in. Such commanders end up having to look the other way in cases of transgressions since they would be implicated for abetting short cuts in means and methods in case they quarrel with their tools. The infamous Manorama Devi case is apt example. Why did the army defend the indefensible? The popular narrative of the case holds water. Believing Manorama Devi to be an explosives expert, the army had ordered her elimination in custody, lest she be let off by the courts. Obviously, those the army ordered to carry out the killing took advantage of the situation. Fearing that the officer would spill the beans if tried for rape and custodial death, the hierarchy had to protect him and the troops involved. The logic in higher command echelons was perhaps that the image of the army was more important than justice. The government for its part, equally privy to the facts of the case, and unwilling to face down the army or face uproar in the North East, played for time by ordering a committee on AFSPA, the BP Jeevan Reddy Committee, and having outlasted the agitations, dispensed with the committee's recommendations. Even where the command climate is strictly professional, as was the case in Kashmir in the early nineties, a Kunan Poshpora can yet occur. At the time the commanding general in the Valley was MA Zaki, described by Manoj Joshi in his book Lost Rebellion as: 'fortunately for India the man commanding the Indian Army's 15th Corps was a cool professional soldier, a Hyderabadi Muslim who had served the Army with distinction. The courageous and deeply religious officer was fated to play a major role in the affairs of the state.' MA Zaki later led Jamia Millia Islamia out of troubled times in the late nineties. That Kunan Poshpora dates to his tenure suggests that there is more to the case than the cult status the case has through its retelling become as one of a mass rape. Reputed bureaucrat, Wajahat Habibullah, divisional commissioner in the Valley when the incident occurred, refers to it in his book on Kashmir, Kashmir: The Dying of the Light, informing that he had recommended an inquiry in his preliminary inquiry report. The government instead had the then chairperson of the Press Trust of India, BG Verghese, look into the incident as part of his remit that had wider terms of reference. That the press was exploited by the over ground militants to replicate their narrative of Kunan Poshpora was one reason why BG Verghese headed to Kashmir. In his autobiography, First Draft, Verghese recounts that he was provided with the fullest access by Zaki to all relevant actors including officers and soldiers of the offending infantry unit. He was unable to find evidence either of the act or of an attempted cover up. In the event, the brigade commander had ordered search operations at night against explicit orders in the corps zone, thereby creating conditions in which sexual assault could occur. The opportunity was seized on by the militant sympathisers irrespective of the facts of the case and the long term implications for the lives of the women of the village. Blowing the case out of proportion in an information war campaign, truth was lost and so was justice. Had Wajahat Habibullah been more assertive then or not moved out of the Valley to a post in Delhi, a separate inquiry could have established the truth. The army was open to this. Tavleen Singh in her book, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, recounts how Zaki reacted to her critical questioning of an incident of army high handedness in early 1990 resulting in civilian deaths. Zaki had admitted to it being 'unfortunate'. There was no attempt to underplay or avoid it. This indicates that an incident of the proportions of Kunan Poshpora could not have escaped Zaki's professional eye, particularly due to his renown as a commander leading from the front. Incidentally, he suffered a graze to his head in a fire fight with militants in one such encounter as head of the army in the Valley. Given such a record of integrity and grit, insinuations as attend the Kunan Poshpora now need revisiting. Stridency does not alone make for truth. It instead has the effect of the army's case becoming more plausible in their pointing out the perils of ambush by litigation. Siddharth Varadarajan has suggested an improvement to deter the government from sitting on decisions or denying clearances altogether, while preserving the provision of prior governmental permission. The government must be required, by an amendment to the Act, to furnish reasons for refusal for prosecution. Its reason must also be subject to judicial review. In case the court decides that the evidence outweighs the reason given, it can either override the government or, where reasons of national security and state are furnished, it could order the army to exercise military justice. This has precedence in the Pathribal killings case in which the army has been asked by the court to proceed with the court martial of those who killed innocent civilians to pass off the killings as those of militants involved in the Chittisingpora incident. That in its judgment the court has upheld the cover from prosecution in the Act implies that the provision is here to stay. Therefore, ensuring accountability of the ministry in its power to withhold or grant sanctions for prosecution must be built into the Act through amendment. Justice Verma's third point on review of the AFSPA in areas where it is applicable adds to the weighty voices against AFSPA. Yet, despite the solid case against the law and the credentials of those, such as late Justice Verma, arrayed against is, it appears set to stay on. Clearly, India is not out of the woods yet in terms of armed challenges to the state that require an armed response. What Justice Verma's report succeeds in doing is to push the argument past the tipping point that the law must be amended. Even then the law by itself is not enough. The command climate in the theatre of operations must - and can be - such as to make the law's existence irrelevant.