SECURITY POLICY 
Reaching beyond its brief 
Outsourcing the policy-making function is bad enough, but the government should certainly not have allowed trespass on its domain by the Naresh Chandra Task Force, writes Firdaus Ahmed. 
 

10 September 2012 - Set up in July last year, the Naresh Chandra Task Force submitted its report to the prime minister in May this year. According to the PMO website, "The Task Force was mandated to review existing processes, procedures and practices in the national security system and to suggest measures to strengthen the national security apparatus."

Such wording allows for a very expansive reading of the mandate; that may be why the PMO also tells us that the "Task Force has made an assessment of the security scenario facing the country and made recommendations to the Government." Reviewing a system is quite different from giving advice on today's geopolitics and internal conflicts. Moreover, the policy domain is that of the government. If it wanted recommendations on this score, it would have mandated the task force. Such outsourcing of the policy-making function would itself be breathtaking, but permitting trespass on its domain by the task force is much worse.

Second, as a practical matter, mixing up the two is unwise. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that the redesign of security proposed by the task force is in line with its policy recommendations. But what happens if the government is not in agreement with the policy plank? In such case, it cannot reasonably redesign security systems that are geared towards such a plank.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/sep/fah-task.htm

In the rest of this article, I want to focus on the task force's recommendation on peace talks with Maoists - which confirms my suspicion that not only has government money been wasted on the task force, but so has the opportunity to make headway in defence reform.

The recommendation, as reported in the press, makes four points. One is that the talks must be so as to divide the Maoists into two camps: those in favour of talks and those against talks. This is to have a strategic benefit in weakening them. The second is that the precondition of Maoists to cease operations is not necessary for talks to be initiated and progressed. This makes sense if the intent is to divide the movement - why wait? Third, is that military operations must continue, lest the Maoists use the opportunity to recoup. The latter is insight the task force draws from the example in Andhra Pradesh. Lastly, the task force has advised on increasing the army's presence in the area through a number of mechanisms, such as setting up training facilities.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

Secondly, the idea that operations need not cease in order to talk makes sense. After all, talks are a way to get operations to cease from both sides. This was a missing link in the policy under the previous home minister, P Chidambaram. He had insisted that the Maoists demonstrate good faith through a ceasefire, even if a temporary one, before the government agreed to talk. This was suggestive of arrogance on the government's part. Being responsible for the people inconvenienced by operations from both sides, it is incumbent on it to proactively pursue every option, including that of talks, to end the predicament of its people.

In the event, the task force's reminder is timely, but discredited by its motive of 'divide-and-rule'. Yet, it is fairly evident that the government is not averse to such advice, since it had used the talks process earlier to expose and decapitate the Maoist leadership. The killing of 'Azad' is a case in point. Such instrumental use of talks eventually destroys the strategic options, and leave military action as the only choice, even though its limitations as a conflict resolution tool have been consistently demonstrated in all of India's many and manifold conflicts. A government's contract with its people involves concentrating on conflict resolution, not conflict management.

The third point - urging that military operations should continue while talks are on is another irresponsible recommendation. If the government were to take this up, it would amount to an abdication of the its responsibility to own up to its policy. Implying that it is acting in accordance with the recommendation of a task force is to pass on the onus of policy and decision making to the task force. The very purpose of talks, to facilitate ceasefire in order to forge trust and confidence for the more significant part of a comprehensive agreement, is then lost.

Last, is the issue of extending the army's presence for training the paramilitary. Such deployments are to help with the local economy and to wean away locals from Maoists. Clearly, there are better ways to revive the local economy. Training the paramilitary to take on Maoists in their strongholds is at best a long-term goal, which signals that for the moment the government will not do much to help tribal communities. Yet again an example from the AfPak experience in the failure to train the Afghan National Security Forces to take on the Taliban suggests that this is yet another recommendation bereft of good sense.

What's more likely is that the initial deployments are to perhaps serve as bridgeheads for deployment of the army if and when it is ready to give up its Kashmir obsession. This is an even more problematic possibility.

Clearly, the task force has extended itself. It cannot possibly have had the time and expertise to take on two tasks, both of providing the government with a proto-national security policy, as also suggesting the restructuring necessary to work it. Since the report is currently under examination by stakeholders, it seems this exercise in futility is being taken to its logical 'do nothing thereafter' conclusion as is the case with most reports by government-appointed commissions. That might not be such a bad ending after all, in this case.
⊕

Firdaus Ahmed 
10 Sep 2012

A secure minority, for a secure nation   http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/aug/fah-mussec.htm The dark clouds gathered since the early nineties have not quite dissipated. Inevitably so, since  the actions that should have been taken were never taken up, writes Firdaus Ahmed.  20 August 2012 - In the wake of the Gujarat carnage exactly ten years ago,  my debut column in India Together (see this link) addressed the issue of  security for India's largest minority. I believe now, as I did then, that the  multiple Muslim communities across India's geography can enhance their  security, by, among other measures, relying on the state and the vast liberal  majority among the non-Muslims. We must be wary of becoming pawns in  political games at the subcontinental level, and also pawns of party politics.  The only ones who gain when we fail to strengthen our internal conversations  are mafia dons, Pakistani intelligence operatives and the propaganda apparatus  of the Sangh Parivar. In light of the events over the past month beginning with the riots in Bodo areas  of Assam and culminating in a mass exit of North Easterners from south Indian cities,  it is apt to revisit this point, and the larger issues addressed in the earlier article. FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org It is here the conspiracy theory can be given the benefit of doubt. The departure of north- easterners, beginning in Bangalore, spread to Channai and Hyderabad. While the police  are investigating the origin of the rumours that instigated the flight, they would do well to include  majoritarian extremists in their ambit. Such groups have profited under the rightist government in Karnataka, evident from periodic  reports of depredations ranging from moral policing to more insidious exploits. The alacrity of  the arrival of workers of the rightist formation, RSS, on to railway station to 'commiserate'  (some of them wielding canes!) with the victims, suggests a potent line of investigation. Their  message was no doubt one of religious solidarity with Hindu Bodos, even while deprecating Muslims  for being 'just like that only'. Shifting to the wider issue of minority security, it can be predicted to figure prominently in the long  run up to elections two years hence. The first shots have been fired with the Gujarat chief  minister unambiguously using the term 'Bangladeshis' in his Independence Day onslaught on the  prime minister. The issue of infiltrators has returned. It was last in the news when BJP-ruled  Rajasthan rounded up a few in wake of the bomb blasts in Jaipur. Clearly, the land issue in  Bodoland will have an all-India resonance, yielding up as it does a stick for the otherwise  politically bereft opposition. It therefore seems prescient on part of the MIM MP from Hyderabad to have led a medical  relief mission to the camps of internally displaced people in Assam. Such expression of  solidarity is a useful broadcast that Muslim communities cannot be put upon in isolation.  It is useful deterrence of another Nellie massacre or Gujarat carnage. While it does give courage  to vulnerable communities, there is no call to restrict access to this aid to the minority alone as the  MIM at its self-congratulatory best states. For full article see www.indiatogether.org First, the interest of the global community in the South Asia region during the last decade was  an opportunity to resolve the problems between India and Pakistan, with a global 'stamp' to a  mutually agreed way forward. But this opportunity was wasted, and now that the West is preparing  to exit its war in Afghanistan, the two South Asian countries await the impending departure with  bated breath and preparations for a return to rivalry. While the implications for Kashmir are easily  comprehended, India's other Muslims too will be affected. The second direction along which the government was hesitant to proceed was in pursuing right  wing terrorists. A significant feature of the past decade was terror bombings. These were popularly  attributed, by a media that should have known better, to Muslim perpetrators. Enlarging the line up  of suspects to include hyper-nationalists would have helped greatly, but the Centre decided to let  sleeping dogs lie. This strategy will probably come home to roost in the run-up to elections. 'Sleeper cells',  particularly those with Bengali (read 'Bangladeshi') features, will once again be in the news as fifth column. The lack of any notable progress in other promising areas keeps the communal scene fertile for disruption.  The major plank of employment, recommended in the Sachar Committee report, has been stymied by the  government's under-prepared brief in the Supreme Court for inclusion of the backward groups of the minority  in the quota system. Second, the RK Raghavan-led SIT has inexplicably made any hope of justice recede.  The eventual outcome will be akin to apprehending the sailors on Haji Mastan's ship even as Haji Mastan  remains free. Lastly, recompense for minority members wrongly arrested for terror attacks has only been done in a few  cases in Hyderabad. Youth apprehended for the Malegaon attacks are still in jail despite better knowledge  of the perpetrators. This brings to fore the fourth and last point, that the wheels of justice have been slow  and unsteady in nailing Hindutva-inspired terrorists. Lt Col Purohit is mounting a counter-attack presenting  himself as a mole, while a lead conspirator turned approver, Swami Aseemanand, has reneged. The government, fearing the electoral price of the tag of minority 'appeaser', is unlikely to take any of its  own initiatives any further. This may seem politic, but a resulting loss of the minority vote may end up  helping its rival to power, bringing back the toxicity of its philosophy and endangering certainly the nation,  if not the state. So to answer the question directly, India is indeed less secure. It is the price of a wasted decade. But two  years being a long time in politics, the government can yet turn to complete its unfinished agenda.

NOT SO EASY, MR. MODI

http://www.milligazette.com/print/issue/16-31-august-2012

http://twocircles.net/2012aug01/not_so_easy_mr_modi.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Twocirclesnet-IndianMuslim+%28TwoCircles.net+-+Indian+Muslim+News%29&utm_content=Yahoo%21+Mail

The locus of controversy over Mr. Modi’s remarks has shifted from the contents of his interview to the internal politics of a regional party of which the interviewer was a member. In the melee, there is danger of Mr. Modi’s remarks passing uncontested into history. The risk of dwelling on them any further is in giving them more column space, thereby adding to his original intent in giving the interview of gaining greater political acceptability for himself in his run up not so much for provincial elections due soon, but for national hustings soon thereafter. However, not to engage with them would be to have readers give him the benefit of the doubt.

While it is a truism that unless held guilty in a court of law, a person is to be taken as innocent, the problem with allowing Mr. Modi that status is that the evidence that could have been used in a court of law has in the years of his being at the helm been systematically removed or reworked. As a result even the Supreme Court appointed Special Investigation Team has been unable to gain access to prosecutable evidence. While this should really have triggered a line of investigation into the ‘cover up’, as prompted by some courageous police officers in Gujarat, the SIT has taken Mr. Modi’s administration at its word. That is to give him more than his due.

Thankfully for history, the Amicus Curiae, also appointed by the SC, has a different story to tell. His differing take lends balance to the suspension of disbelief by Mr. Raghavan of SIT fame. Therefore, there is no reason to take Mr. Modi at his word in the interview. He cannot but be expected to defend his case in the manner he has. And yet, the content of the interview is chilling. Take for instance Mr. Modi’s exhortation: ‘think about how many Muslims were protected then! If they were to be killed systematically, who would have been spared today?’ In other words, Muslims, spared of a worse fate, should really be grateful! After all, he insists he stopped the ‘rioting’, stating that, ‘I think I managed to stop the rioting.’ In the same breath, he lets on: ‘I will not admit that I couldn’t.’ In other words, he is a saviour since he tried to stop the ‘riots’ but couldn’t!

Two points bear mention. Firstly, the use of the term, ‘riots’, suggests that the two communities were slugging it out. This is hardly likely in light of his version of the first 72 hours: ‘There hasn’t been even one police gun shot, no lathi charge… But, here people were arrested in advance.’ It bears investigation as to which ‘people’ were arrested. It can be surmised that these were of the minority. In effect, the minority was disarmed. Therefore, the question of a ‘riot’, and its two-sided implication, does not arise. Also, since he says there was not ‘even one police gun shot’, the rioters who should have been stopped in their tracks were instead handled with kid gloves. Had the besieged minority been rioting instead, as national statistics consistently bear out there would have been a deadly toll.

Secondly, this means that space was created for majoritarian supremacists to take center stage. He claims in self-vindication he gave ‘shoot at sight’ order to stop the ‘riots’. The numbers are already in the public domain as to who died in such firing. These were certainly not the ones later caught boasting in a Tehelka sting operation on their bravado.

Mr. Modi brings the abject state of affairs elsewhere to claim that his record is better on two counts: one is on prosecution and sentencing in Gujarat cases as against that meted out in the 1984 carnage against Sikhs; the second is on encounters. There is a difference between what happened in Gujarat and elsewhere. In the anti Sikh carnage in Delhi, there is no allegation of state complicity. As for encounters, in none of the other states were cover up stories fomented with a dual purpose: to embellish the image of the political head as a nationalist strongman, while at the same time tarnishing that of the minority as a subverted fifth column susceptible to infiltration by terrorists. In any case, instances elsewhere cannot legitimize what happens in Gujarat.

To tide over the controversy, the interviewer in a damage limitation exercise, has claimed: ‘I asked him questions that no one has.’ This obfuscates the fact that it was a tame interview amounting to image building for Mr. Modi. Take for instance the poser: ‘But they say you were in the control room.’ It is well known that the ministerial henchmen of Mr. Modi were assigned such duty including one who has served time behind bars subsequently in the false encounters case. Therefore such questions figuring in an interview damns its motives.

Finally, is the question of the military being called out timely. This increases in significance in light of the current day Bodo-Muslim clashes in Assam in which the Assam government has been critical of the new procedures in place for getting the Army to react in internal crisis. The procedures date to the Vohra Committee report recommendations to the GOM in 2001. The cases of over resort to the military in the eighties and nineties had resulted in a hardening of the military’s position against intervening in such crisis. The military was hard pressed by its internal security commitments and over extended by simultaneous calls on it when in peace stations. The older rules that enabled the DC to call out the army in aid to civil authority had consequently been reframed. The current procedures call for such demands for military aid to be routed from the state to the home ministry and thereafter to the defence ministry. A decision is then taken. This can prove too late for victims as evident from the case in Assam lately. More importantly, delay results in deepening of divides with trans- generational effects. Clearly, there is a case to revisit the procedures, particularly since the CRPF that was expanded with the purpose of relieving the army from such duty is itself bogged down in Central India.

In the Gujarat case, the army that was then deployed at the borders in Op Parakram could not be made available in a real time frame. Clearly, the onus of stamping out fires then devolved on Mr. Modi. This gave Mr. Modi and his supporters the time they needed. Therefore even if we are to follow Mr. Modi’s advice, ‘The Supreme Court asked for an investigation to be conducted. We should trust that’; he still needs to answer for incompetence. Since his campaign rhetoric focuses on his competence, revealing Mr. Modi’s record is in order, the latest attempt at embellishment notwithstanding.

Mr. Modi has expressed a preference thus, ‘If Modi has sinned, then Modi should be hanged’. But his only reflects a medieval mindset that conjured up the ‘action-reaction’ thesis. Its implication for his fitness for his current office is for the voters of his state to decide on, but it certainly disqualifies him from aspiring to higher office. 

CHETAN BHAGAT: CAUGHT AT IT AGAIN
http://www.milligazette.com/print/issue/16-31-july-2012
Milligazette, 16-31 July 12, p. 10

Chetan Bhagat’s latest column in the Sunday Times (the masthead of the Times of India on Sundays redolent of a publication in UK), The Underage Optimist, is titled ‘And the people’s choice is…’ (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-toi/all-that-matters/And-the-peoples-choice-is--/articleshow/14539995.cms). He considers two candidates for the answer, Rahul Gandhi and Narendra Modi. Bhagat exercises his democratic right in favour of Mr. Modi. There is nothing exceptionable with either his debunking of the Congress ‘crown prince’ or his political inclination for Mr. Modi. The issue is in his arriving at Mr. Modi as the ‘people’s choice’.

He claims that 82 percent of those voting on a poser from him on his Facebook page between the two political personalities weighed in favour of Mr. Modi, helping Modi beat Rahul Gandhi by ‘an astonishing 16 times’. Those who follow Bhagat’s socio-political writings in his columns and op-eds as against his bestsellers are by now familiar with his political predilections. Yet again in a free country there is no problem with that. It can be expected that those agreeing with him would also be linked to his site on Facebook. Therefore, if the vote goes a particular way, it cannot but be otherwise. From that to stretch the argument and prejudge the national election two years away is, to quote a phrase in his article, ‘a bit much’.

The matter of using his column for propagating a candidate as he has been indulging in over the past is also one between him and his editor. However, it is important to equally consistently dissect Bhagat’s argument in favour of his choice, lest through biased propagation by his influential supporters Mr. Modi does end up acquiring the prime minister’s chair in the real forum as against Facebook.

Bhagat, as befitting an IIT-IIM graduate, sensibly builds up his case as a comment on the manner Mr. Modi is acquiring a following in cyberspace among the youth. He caveats his advocacy by requiring Mr. Modi get ‘lucky, stay humble, has some genuine remorse and make the right moves.’ Getting ‘lucky’ is meaningless. ‘Staying humble’ is a notably tall order for Mr. Modi, as his recent campaign against his bete noire in the right wing, Mr. Joshi, indicates. It is the contradiction between the latter two – ‘genuine remorse’ and ‘making the right moves’ – that needs interrogation.

‘Genuine remorse’ cannot be felt and expressed as part of making the ‘right moves’. While remorse is right, it cannot be a right ‘move’. It cannot be taken as a means to an end. It has to be an end in itself. Genuine remorse in this case would amount to abdication, not only of the gaddi but by taking political sanyas. A life spent thereafter in service of the victims is one that can efface the blot, since the state and its judicial system has not deigned to bring justice to bear. However, since neither this is not about to happen, it is best that Mr. Modi be shown the door democratically. 

Will that happen? Not if the likes of Mr. Bhagat manipulate their fan following into turning in a majoritarian verdict. Even if backed by the majority, it would hardly be ‘democratic’, since political theory well knows that majority and democracy are not synonymous. A graduate with a technical degree such as Mr. Bhagat cannot be expected to know better.

A decade of uninhibited manipulation of the evidence in the Gujarat carnage using a cowed down state machinery and docile police has led to Mr. Modi being given the benefit of the doubt by the likes of the Supreme Court appointed SIT led by RK Raghavan. However, his supporters are ever willing to keep skepticism in suspended animation blinded by majoritarian supremacism.

This does not imply, as Bhagat suggests, a willingness to forget someone else’s past in order to gain a future. It is instead to be well aware of the past and not be bothered by it. Bhagat’s suggestion that the nation should follow such a cohort is to be blind to their motives going beyond a development orientation as Mr. Bhagat selectively presents them.

Bhagat’s selective blindness tells more about him than does his column. It is for this reason his case needs interrogation. And the fact that as a ‘youth icon’ – in the wikipedia’s words – his words may be taken as gospel in youth liable to mistake the credentials – IIT-IIM – as those of Almighty himself. It is no wonder then that Bhagat in his conclusion advises the BJP to go about ‘mobilizing people to vote’.

There remains one last bone to pick. Bhagat in drawing up his negative contrast of Rahul Gandhi to his champion has Gandhi ‘hiding whenever there is a national crisis.’ Bhagat can be forgiven for not knowing where Mr. Modi was in late February 2002, since Bhagat was perhaps over in Hong Kong busy with investment banking.

But, where was Mr. Modi hiding during the national crisis in rajdharma? Keeping his political buddies in police control rooms, Mr. Modi was certainly not busying himself with preempting the carnage at the controversial meeting on the evening of 27 February 2002 in his residence office. The SIT claims he was not busy precipitating it either.

The vote on this due in 2014 will surely confine Bhagat’s ‘people’s choice’ as PM of his Facebook page.

  

TACKLING MAOISM 
The fog of jungle warfare 
Firdaus Ahmed

http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/jul/fah-crpf.htm 
 

7 July 2012 - Sixteen tribals, claimed to be innocent by no less than the Union Tribal Affairs minister, were killed one night late last month in 'encounters' in Chhatisgarh. Apparently, three Maoists were also killed in the operation, and six CRPF men sustained injuries as well. No inquiry has been ordered, with the CRPF top brass privy to the internal report convincing the home minister that none is necessary.

However, after 'fact finding', civil society activists such as Professor Nandini Sundar assert that civilians died that night even though no Maoists were in sight. In the absence of an inquiry, reconstruction of what happened can only be from news reports.

FOR FULL  ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

The intrepid Times of India reporter, Rakhi Chakraborty, reporting from the general area after the incident, paints a picture of the general area as one that has witnessed several explosions of improvised explosive devices along the lone road in the area. The camps of the CRPF are along the road and have been engaged in self-protection and defensive action restricted to road opening for logistics access. Beyond lies the forest into which governmental authority does not penetrate, nor does its armed police. In effect, the CRPF in the camps was unfamiliar with the terrain and not up to the offensive operations by night in the middle of the forest.

It is no wonder then that as the operation got underway they 'encountered' opposition. Arriving at the village in question in which the Maoists were said to be in a meeting in the presence of villagers, the CRPF reports that it drew fire, whereupon it was forced to fire back in self-defence. It is possible that the Maoists were surprised by the boldness of the CRPF to have penetrated the jungle. In this case, it would likely to have been led by tribal SPOs who have terrain knowledge and are adept in jungle movement. However, it is difficult for a large column moving in the jungle to maintain surprise. It is too much to expect of a motley force to tactically maneuver into cordon silently and then spring the surprise.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

At this point one can expect of a trained force reassertion of command and control and fire control, beginning from corporal rank upwards. However, knowing the complexion of the force and aware of training levels of the CRPF, it is very likely the converse occurred.

It is not unlikely that the officer in charge was to the middle of the column since the front elements would have been under their respective corporals and warrant officers. By the time the hierarchy would have gained situational awareness, much ammunition would have been expended. Firings in such situations by inadequately trained troops is usually prophylactic and also to expiate their own fear. Under such firing, it is difficult for the leader to move, gain situational awareness and ascendancy over his troops once again.

The kind of leadership required for this can be expected to be missing in armed police forces. Intimate supervision by their cadre officers is absent since cadre officers who are superior to those at the frontline are divested of authority as the troops are operating in support of the police, led by the district SP from the IPS. Those supervising operations are comfortably away from the frontline in headquarters operations rooms.

Such a leadership vacuum is not without effect. SPOs, due to their local knowledge and tribal instinct for the jungle, become more venturesome. Since they lead columns and therefore bear higher risk, they cannot but be allowed greater leeway. The cost is, in a firefight they would likely adopt a 'Rambo' profile. The police and CRPF in their wake, less adept in jungle lore, is equally likely to be trigger happy, but out of funk, with the action being a form of release.

In a jungle with swaying trees, rustling leaves and varying patterns of moonlight and dark, every bush can be imagined as a Maoist or with a Maoist lurking behind it. This is how more ammunition gets 'poofed off' than warranted. This is probably how 16 bodies got lined up that night.

An inquiry would certainly not have revealed all this, by asking about ammunition and the numbers who fired. The higher the numbers, the greater the chaos, easily explaining the deaths. Even an honest inquiry would instead have looked at the information, the planning and preparation, the tactical reaction and the contingency responses. More likely it would have been to push the muck under the carpet. The psychological and emotive aspect of combat, brought out here, would certainly have been missed. The confidential inquiry after the Chintalnar episode of 2010, in which 75 CRPF bravehearts were killed by Maoists, has no doubt pointed out the gaps. These have over the past two years been equally likely to have been plugged. This has given the CRPF confidence to venture out again into the jungles, resulting in the latest Sarkeguda killings.

While procedural, operational and logistical remedial measures can be taken, it is a wholly different problem in both magnitude and kind to be able to create soldiers able to best the challenge of the jungle. This is not impossible, as the World War II mastering of the jungle by the Indian army indicates. The difference is then it was under masterly leadership and with the urgency of a grave threat. The manner in which Operation Green Hunt has been unfolding as an operation that isn't! does not inspire confidence.

This begs the question as to why the CRPF is being sent out on such duty. Is the answer at the individual level of analysis? The home minister would like to break out of the opposition's ring of allegations. The CRPF head, Vijay Kumar, has a reputation to protect, one formed on his exploits in the jungle in pursuit of Veerappan. Or is it at the organisational level? The CRPF has to prove itself as the custodian for internal security. Its dismal showing in Kashmir in replacing the BSF has resulted in the army insisting on staying on under the AFSPA. Or is it at the political level with the state government hurrying to vacate the 'liberated zones' for corporate access?

The right lesson from the episode, that no state sponsored inquiry would have alighted at, is that only the army can do the job. If it is politically inexpedient to use it, then there is no alternative to a peace process. Some good can still come out of the sorry incident

Catching up with the SIT chief

Published in Milligazette

http://www.milligazette.com/news/3701-catching-up-with-the-sit-chief

By Firdaus Ahmed[1]

Mr. RK Raghavan, a former director of CBI, is known better for his fortnightly column in the reputed journal Frontline, a flagship publication advertised as India’s National Magazine from the publishers of the equally formidable for its erudition, The Hindu. It is therefore with some respect that readers have been accessing his views to inform and shape their own. This regard for his post retirement output on security and policing is perhaps what prompted the Supreme Court to appoint him as the head of the Special Investigation Team that went into the Gujarat carnage to assess the veracity of the more significant crimes committed post Godhra there. The report of the SIT having been submitted it is now clear that the exercise was one of exonerating the political figures involved not only in inciting but later in covering up the crimes. That the report has gone on to even absolve the political leadership of Gujarat then of acts of omission, leave alone of acts of commission, has left the readers of RK Raghavan’s columns in a state of confusion. Was their faith in the credibility of Mr. Raghavan as a guide into the internal security realm misplaced?

Raghavan’s latest column in the Frontline, ‘Tepid on Terror’, (http://www.frontlineonnet.com/stories/20120601291009700.htm, May 19-June 1, 2012) should dispel any doubts of Mr. Raghavan’s political inclination. In effect, Mr. Raghavan is no professional writing dispassionately about his craft. He is instead a political person and his work reflects his politics. Mistaking him is the fault of his readers, not his. If the Supreme Court was likewise misled by his seemingly secular credentials, then it is at the institution’s cost. Mr. Raghavan cannot be blamed for being himself. Clarity on the working of his mind is easily obtainable from his column in which he attempts to advocate the NCTC.

The argument he makes, that comes out clearly in his concluding paragraph, is that the NCTC would be able to network foreign intelligence agencies better and with its policing powers (that has proven its Achilles heel) be able to act autonomously to good effect. His article brings out the ‘threat’ of terror as he sees it in the surviving of Al Qaeda post 2014, and its affiliation to the Lashkar e Taiba. This, given the latter’s penetration of India (in Mr. Raghavan’s estimate) is an existential threat that requires an appropriate response in the form of an NCTC. While the first and last paragraphs have a mention of NCTC on an article purportedly on NCTC, the remainder of the article is scaremongering with which the liberal minority is by now already more than familiar with. 

The problem is that this has now become the ‘common sense’, with ‘authorities’, who ought to know better, also purveying it. With Mr. Raghavan’s ‘clean chit’ to the political leadership in Gujarat, it is apparent that the future may well be a repeat of the past. Mr. Raghavan’s  is a self-fulfilling prophecy in that with the judicial system sabotaged by his report, it would incentivise hotheads to draw their own conclusions. This will then make Mr. Raghavan take the position, ‘See, I told you so, didn’t I?’; thereby buttressing his ‘expert’ credentials. That his article does not carry a mention of Hindutva inspired terror that has masqueraded as minority perpetrated suggests a blind spot. This blind spot is incidentally what reveals Mr. Raghavan’s politics best. These elements have been lying low of late, given the manner they have been exposed as behind many if not most terror incident’s earlier attributed by default as minority perpetrated.

This brings one to the point that Mr. Raghavan yet again misleads by attempts to rely on the ‘common sense’ to make a case for NCTC. This popular, if erroneous, notion has been manufactured by closet cultural nationalists, both in the strategic community and media; the ranks of which now have a distinguished denizen, Mr. Raghavan, now unmasked. The case for NCTC if at all is not that it is required for coping with minority perpetrated terror and its external linkages, but for taming Hindutva inspired terror. The terror that has passed for minority perpetrated terror has been doubly effective. Firstly it has put the minority in the dock and also, secondly, when there, on the backfoot, in getting those so accused to first their prove innocence and then prove the other side guilty. This is what in intelligence circles are called ‘black operations’. This is suggestive of intelligence tutelage of those so engaged. Given the predilections of the well regarded Mr. Raghavan now exposed, it is worth a ponder if there are subterranean linkages between state agencies, well known to be without parliamentary supervision and nefarious groups of a certain political persuasion. Analogy can be drawn from the notorious ISI linkages allegedly with certain grou, brought out copiously in Mr. Raghavan’s article. Given that the state, both at the Union level and provincial, has acted with alacrity against the latter, there is little need then to also have an NCTC based on this logic. Instead, an NCTC with teeth is required for the Union to act against Hindutva inspired terror groups, since there is great reluctance, perhaps due to the possible complicity mentioned here, against Hindutva inspired groups. Given that this argument is not marshalled makes Mr. Raghavan’s critique of those holding up the NCTC somewhat ‘tepid on terror’.

While there are good reasons to go slow on the NCTC with teeth as envisaged, one reason why it is needed is to cope with those that form the blind spot of the state. Admitting to this is perhaps too much to expect of the home ministry, but this is the more pertinent reason why the UPA has perhaps wanted the NCTC in its current form. However, there is a problem area that needs reckoning with. This is that in equipping itself with such powers, in case the Union is captured, democratically or otherwise by forces inimical to the Constitution, then it would be too late to rue them such powers. So although there is good reason to have an NCTC that can take action, there are reservations that can lend the exercise pause.

In enabling these observations on the NCTC and the dominant security discourse, Mr. Raghavan’s column has served a purpose, but not as he imagined. It is time the editors of the Hindu group read their very own columnists since such writings excite dissonance in their readers, being inconsistent with the otherwise credible and creditably liberal line of the publications of the group.

---

[1] Firdaus Ahmed blogs at www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in

army expansion and nyoma incident

http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/may/fah-expand.htm

 SERVICE STRENGTH Expanding too fast?

 23 May 2012 -


The details of the Nyoma Incident need not detain us here. It can be predicted that there will be multiple versions of the unfortunate incident floating in cyber space soon. The military court of inquiry will ascertain the facts, justice will be meted out and the artillery regiment that served as the site of the incident disbanded. The standard operating procedures for the rest of the army will be firmed up and will no doubt include a stricture against families accompanying officers when out in the field.

 While all this can understandably be expected to be internal to the military, it bears reflection as to whether this is an isolated case, an 'aberration' to anticipate an army spokesperson. Or, is there something in it on the good health of the army for the ear of wider society?

 The army has been expanding incessantly over the past three decades. The first round was over the turn of the eighties of mechanisation. The following decade witnessed the raising of the Rashtriya Rifles. The last decade saw the doubling of Rashtriya Rifles and raisings of two mountain divisions for the China front. This decade will see the raising of a mountain strike corps, promised recently by the Defence Minister.

 FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - www.indiatogether.org

 Taken together the three prongs - manpower, material and nuclear - can reasonably expected to keep India safe into the future. But this expectation can be thwarted if the army proves unable to absorb the changes. Tritely put, it's the man behind the gun that matters. Expansion has been managed quite well by the army earlier. In wake of the 1962 debacle, Emergency commission officers were inducted. The showing of the army in 1971 war vindicated the decision. However, this time around, the expansion has been in the wake of incessant deployment in operations.

The story begins with Siachen and Op Blue Star in Punjab in 1984. It is followed by the IPKF sojourn and a near simultaneous deployment on deinduction from there into Punjab, Kashmir and Assam. Thereafter, as one Chief put it, the army has only been 'officially at peace'.

 The army has proven responsive. It has over time firmed in a rotation policy for Rashtriya Rifles that caters for primary group cohesion to an extent. The army website indicates that several training schools have been opened up for preparing junior leaders under a 'train the trainer' system. News reports of summer exercises at field army level, such as the recent Exercise Shoor Vir, indicate a heavy schedule for collective training. Socialisation has been furthered by greater military interface with veterans.

 Nevertheless, the challenge continues to be daunting. Universally, the army's good health is dependent on professionalism of the officer corps. Therefore to focus here on this facet first makes sense. The intake is over 1500 officers a year. (Compare this to the 900 who make it to the civil services every year.) The tension between quantity and quality can only be expected to be resolved in favour of quantity, since the army never tires of pointing to vacancies in the officer cadre pegged consistently in the low five figures.

 This was the case in wake of the Kargil War, when it was rumoured that standards had been diluted for expanding intake in real time. Also there was reportedly a one-time truncating of pre-commission training length. The chickens have apparently come home to roost, with the incident in question suggesting a breakdown in discipline of officers commissioned post Kargil War.

 There is also deficiency in socialisation into military mores. Rashtriya Rifles and field postings having created such personnel turbulence that both horizontal and vertical integration have been impacted at both the officer and soldier level. Additional raisings mean the transfer of empathetic leadership and stolid manpower to the new set up; the vacancies so created in existing organizations being filled up by raw recruits. Further, the age and service of officers holding appointments at unit level has gone down, and with good reason. However, the pressures on them of performance and demands from the wider army, that has in turn gone top-heavy, are higher. And all this is in face of higher career pressures stemming from competition to go up a wide-based but steep sided pyramid.

 Acknowledging the latter, the army's response has been to compound the problem. The army has opened another Officer Training Academy at Gaya, intending to have a higher officer intake but of short service commission officers. While resolving the problem of the pyramidal structure of its promotion system, it could deepen the other one of fraying officer-soldier bonding. The army may be intending to overcome this problem by higher levels of manpower and higher technological levels in relation to the adversary. The Kargil War was won by concentrating two divisions and a large proportion of the firepower available in J&K, thereby overwhelming the enemy.

 However, neglecting the idea that 'the man behind the gun' is consequential may prove debilitating over the long run. This point has a wider import. Expansion has not been restricted to the army. In fact the security sector has been perhaps the only sector that has expanded over the past decade, given that the neoliberal paradigm believes in contracting government. Even more ambitious expansion has been witnessed in the central armed police forces, with the Central Reserve Police Force becoming the world's largest internal security force. And yet, it is unable to penetrate into the forests of Abujmad!

 The point that emerges is that expansion is the easier answer. And in any case it must not be at the cost of quality. Since this has been the case with both the army and the paramilitary, compensation needs to be done by heightened training, accentuated socialization and intimate supervision. This is doubly important since these forces are operationally committed, particularly in people-centric counter insurgency.

 The gravity of the problem can be inferred from the fact that its most significant facet has been pushed right to the very end: impact of societal turbulence, especially so in an officer cadre springing from the lower middle class. Given this, it can be sensed that Nyoma was only waiting to happen. The army leadership that has been enmeshed lately in peripheral matters needs now to return to its bread and butter. ⊕

http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/apr/fah-civil.htm

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Uncivil war in South Block

The snarling between the military and the bureaucracy continues. It appeared as though the matter was settled, with the Supreme Court ruling in favour of the government in the case of the age of the Army Chief. However, the uncivil war that broke out in South Block - in the form of motivated leaks - between the babus and the brass continues to unfold on prime time.

Varied explanations have been offered for why we are seeing this controversy. One is that the Chief, since he did not get a year's extention, is a 'frustrated man'. Second is the good-versus-bad story: a corruption-fighting Chief battling it out with the usual suspects. The third theory is as old as the Army itself, the tussle for supremacy between bureaucracy and the military. Finally, there is the view that the Chief is exposing a dithering 'Saint' Antony, who has happily prioritised honesty over everything else, and left the Army without arms and ammunition.

The actual problem is in differing strategic perspectives between the civilians and the military. The differing perspectives have led to the civilians going slow on defence acquisitions and stymieing the military's preferred response of expansion in numbers. The divergence is also evident elsewhere - in the military's position on the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), its incidence in Kashmir, and on the question of demilitarisation of Siachen.

Given that democratic civil-military relations require subordination of the military to the civilian, the military's insistence on its views amounts to a challenge to the principle of civilian supremacy. However, in this the Army has been emboldened by precedent - whenever it has held fast to its position, the civilian leadership has eventually accepted it, so why yield now? The natural escalation of this cycle is a military that has stepped out of control.

The military, necessarily and universally conservative and realist, has a threat perception of a 'clear and present' danger in the form of a 'two front war'. This has been upscaled by the collusion between China and Pakistan, going back to the 1980s in the nuclear and missile fields, most visible lately in the presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Baltistan. The possible military use of infrastructure created by the Chinese has the military similarly fixated.

Its answer has been to ask for additional forces. While the ministry has granted two divisions, forming up now on the eastern front, it has been less amenable to clear the mountain strike corps. The military wants this for making gains elsewhere as trade-off against the gains China will likely make in any military contest.


The additional forces forming up suggest that the two are in agreement about the need for a robust defence. The civilians, however, are not in favour of the offensive, 'strike' component. Publicly, the reason given is that India cannot afford this additional cost, with the economy now slowing down. But the real reason is that the civilians have a different idea on how to tackle China.

Their concerns are reasonable. India is already putting in place various capabilities by building roads and resuscitating air strips in the border areas. Anything more than this would only trigger a reaction by the Chinese, leading to a threat to India where none might have existed in the first place. India, wanting to concentrate on its economic growth trajectory, does not want to get diverted. An arms race would make India incline towards the US, which is wary of China's rise, at the cost of Indian autonomy.

This concern has spiked the Chief's pet project, the 'Transformation' study done by him in his last appointment as army commander in Kolkata. The project explains why the Chief's was so keen for an extension of his term - which would have allowed him to remain at the helm long enough to see it through. Its critical element of adding 86,000 troops, which has been held up for financial reasons, is attributed instead to bureaucratic obduracy and political ignorance. Therefore, the fightback, showing up the bureaucracy and its political master in poor light by pointing to their tardiness in acquiring machines and ammunition.

In this, the military wants to sit in judgment of its own views. This is also the case with AFSPA; one can argue that this law is not needed at all in India's counter insurgency arsenal. The military has been firm in its position that the Act's provisions are indispensable not only to its deployment but also its effectiveness. One can concede that this is a professional view, but the fact that the military does not want to permit prosecution of its officers who violate the people's rights suggests that its influence is much wider.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE www.indiatogether.org

Next is the case of Siachen. Here too the hardline position is evident. The government wants to progress peace talks with 'doable' issues like Siachen and Sir Creek being tidied over and providing momentum for and trust necessary for tackling the more fraught outstanding issues in composite basket. The military has repeatedly put its foot down, nipping any initiative to turn Siachen into a 'peace park' as once envisaged by the prime minister.

We must also not ignore the 'Cold Start' doctrine that the military autonomously conjured up. The capabilities are to enable it to take off for operations well inside Pakistani territory. This denies the political head the requisite time for engaging in crisis management and diplomacy. This attempt at commandeering the political decision space has led to a predictable response from the politicians - who simply thwart the military's plans to build up this capacity. The military is striking back by labeling this as 'holding up' the capacity building exercise, but conveniently forgets that this was not approved by the political leadership in the first place.

Too often the military has carried the day in these essentially political decisions. This suggests not only that the political class has abdicated its role, which is bad enough, but also that military expansionism is the norm, and that is much worse. The problem is structural. Perceiving itself as outside the policy making tent, the military tends to dig in.

The answer is to integrate the military into the ministry. Unless the distinction between the uniform and safari suit is removed, the civil war will continue. The Naresh Chandra task force currently working on the specifics of next steps in defence reform, needs to complete its job urgently.
⊕

http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/feb/fah-dob2.htm

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
An age-old lesson

19 February 2012 - The case of the Army Chief's date of birth has been laid to rest finally, in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Before leaving for a two-day trip to Saudi Arabia, the Defence Minister said that, "the government has confidence in the present chief and that was conveyed in the Supreme Court also. Everything is clear and we have confidence in him." He has followed up on his return sayting, "We have learnt the right lessons from it ... there is no strain."

The Chief, for his part, has also put the episode behind him, stating while on tour to the UK, "there is no controversy if you are meaning or implying a particular controversy." However, his statement alongside, "I followed a particular path for a particular aim and that was achieved", is pregnant with implications for the 'lessons learnt', referred to by the minister.

The Chief's statement apparently suggests that he set out to make clear to the bureaucrat-dominated ministry that their's is not the last word. If the episode is taken as a symptom of a problem in civil-military relations, the foremost lesson is to configure the apex system using the aegis of the ongoing Naresh Chandra task force deliberations to provide the government early impetus for reform.

Three longstanding problem areas exist in the national security system. These have contributed in some measure to the Date-of-Birth episode getting as difficult as it has. While by all accounts it is merely a 'personal' matter, the structural contribution cannot be ignored. Doing so would make its recurrence over time inevitable, if only in a different manner, but most surely as a higher order crisis in civil-military relations.


The apex military leadership needs social communication skills, political savvy, and democratic and collegial leadership acumen - skills more visible in board rooms than operations rooms.


Firstly, a service Chief is now an over-burdened appointment. The appointment subsumes both commander and staff duties in one office and individual. Since the Chiefs do not usually divest themselves of other commitments, such as the antediluvian appointment of 'Colonel of the Regiment', the burden is inordinate, irrespective of the efficiency of the secretariat and staff. Besides, the age of retirement having been raised, there is less vigour into the tenure and it shows visibly.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

Secondly, is the issue of merit in the choice of the Chief. The long-standing criticism has it that the 'age' criterion detracts from merit and limits the choice to survivors of the steeply pyramidal hierarchy. This accentuates a 'play safe' attitude, with operational spill-over in possible command inadequacy in case conventional push comes to nuclear shove. The advantage of the system is that it preserves the apolitical nature of the military, since there is no incentive for ambitious members of the brass to catch the political master's eye. The case of General Kaul and Krishna Menon has set the precedent to avoid.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

This debate needs to be settled in favour of merit and youth. Stability and predictability have proven useful but these characteristics may not be the most apt ones in face of challenges of 21st-century conflict. This is a good juncture to move beyond the tried and tested, to adapt practices used elsewhere. For instance, Colin Powell and Petraeus reached their positions not because of seniority, but competence.

The characteristics needed by today's apex military leadership are not necessarily the traditional ones demonstrated so well by the Chief in his challenge: resolve and standing up for one's beliefs. Instead, the apex military leadership needs social communication skills, political savvy, and democratic and collegial leadership acumen - skills more visible in board rooms than operations rooms. In the case of the current Chief, he had no tenure at the Army Headquarters, other than a sheltered appointment in a former Chief's secretariat. Socialisation absent, he thought it fit to rock the boat.

The Indian military needs help in moving forward. In India's case, the military's 'holy cow' status ever since India over learned the lessons of 1962 means that this is unlikely until the issue acquires some momentum in public debate. Now is the appropriate juncture to start.

Thirdly, the abiding perception in service circles, voiced repeatedly in in-service journals and by veterans in seminar rooms, is that rules of business are such that the ministry is overbearing both in weight and attitude. The hollowing out of the Indian Police Service has lent urgency to the military's actions for self-preservation from the bureaucratic layer; otherwise the same fall may befall it too.

This acquires added importance from the military's professional obligation to provide security. In theory, the military is answerable to the the political heads, not an intervening bureaucracy. However, in practice the rules of governmental business have been devised in such a manner that the bureaucracy, in discharging its role of giving 'advice to the minister', has appropriated the policy space from him more or less fully. This has resulted in a sense of alienation among the brass, voiced by its former chiefs, such as Arun Prakash, that even the Chiefs do not have voice. The ministry does not appreciate this.

The structural remedy to this problem is in following other democracies - in integrating the two sides. This would bring the role of the Chief to the forefront, either as head of staff or as commander, and along with it the need for a Chief of Defence Staff. The current system would favour the Chief as commander, with the CDS heading the joint staff in an integrated ministry alongside the defence secretary. Arriving at the right choice is what will ensure Naresh Chandra, currently grappling with the issue, a place in history.

The mantra that India's military is apolitical has potential to lull political alertness and sensibilities. Even an elementary acquaintance with military sociology will reveal that militaries are political players as institutions. They have the ability and inclination to forge alliances in polity for consensus building on their national security concerns. The legitimacy for such behaviour is in their self-image as custodians of national security.

This does not necessarily imply partisan politics. However, if the civil war in South Block worsens, and the political scenario in the country vitiates for any reason, politicisation in a conservative-military semi-covert quasi-alliance can occur. The current 'game' of bureaucratic politics, explicable in organization theory, can yet get murkier at a national cost. The political role and ministerial responsibility at this juncture is therefore clear cut.

The happy fallout of this otherwise sorry episode can be in the form of new directions. Reforms that place the Chief inside the policy loop are needed to help avert a future 'perfect storm' in such crises. It is better, as the old Arab fable goes, to have the camel inside the tent than outside it.
⊕

The 'Age' of misjudgment

http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/jan/fah-chief.htm

19 January 2012 - The legal assault of the Army chief on the ministry of defence is set to keep national attention affixed for a while. Partisans of both sides of the case, backed by vested interests, will chip in to enliven prime time. What is likely to be missed in the debate is the meaning of the chief's action for military ethics.

The chief's stand indicates his valuing of 'integrity and honour' and his determination. These two character traits are highly laudable in military men. However, the chief is not just another military man. He is a general officer and head of the army. A chief has certain responsibilities that necessitate characteristics over and above those in other military men. In fact, these traits otherwise praiseworthy need being leavened by others that enable shouldering of responsibilities that go with the rank and appointment. Judgment, in particular, is key.

For illustration, while the generals in the First World War exhibited great steadfastness in steadying the frontline in the trenches, they ended up sending a generation to its death. No wonder, they are known to military history as 'donkeys'. Candidates for promotion to higher rank must not only have resolve but also exhibit judgment; else firmness ends up as dogmatism. In the present case whether the chief has exhibited judgment is at issue.


His unprecedented action, redolent with moral courage, is unexceptionable on the surface. He has taken legal recourse, as is his right, to protect his 'honour and integrity'. However, the best measure of judgment happens to be sense of timing. He had occasions twice over in the past to take an equally legitimate position, while coming up for consideration for appointment as corps commander and army commander. At those junctures, he had the military hierarchy to take on. He chose not to do so and instead was 'pressurised' into sending in the letters in which he accepted the wrong date of birth to be communicated to the ministry.

Had he taken a firm position then, his sense of honour would not have been trifled with. Now, he had the opportunity of either resigning or waiting to retire before taking the action.

Additionally, the credibility of his citing of 'honour and integrity' has been diminished by the earlier punishment by courts martial of two generals in the Sukhna land scam case. This has been presented as his high minded anti-corruption stance to clean up the stables. It turns out that the Military Secretary who faced courts martial for influencing the general in command in Sukhna was the one instrumental in holding up his case for amending his date of birth with the Military Secretary's branch, no doubt at the behest of the then chief. The case can now be re-read as personal vendetta.

The present case has potential to get dirtier. The problem now is that he has taken on the ministry instead. Since the military is steeped in a 'command' culture, he represents the service. His position requires him to perform both a representative function and an advisory function. This constricts the personal domain, making the chief's action consequential for civil-military relations. His is therefore a challenge to civil control, critical in a democracy. He neglects a principle in democratic civil-military relations: civilian masters have the right to be wrong.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

The first shots have already been fired - with insinuations that the army's demand for a mountain strike corps has been held up due to bureaucratic games. The idea of this corps is part of the Army chief's major 'Transformation' initiative; it entails Rs.60,000 crores in expenditure on expanding the army by 86,000 troops, including 12,000 officers. The allegation made now is that the ministry is responsible for 'going slow' on this, while there is relative smooth sailing for the projects of the air force and navy.

This is damaging for the government, that requires contending with the effects of a global slowdown as well. The figure of 8 to 9 per cent growth having been revised downwards, knock-on effects on the defence budget can be expected. The military has built up a new 'two-front' threat perception to justify the expenditure. The government will be shown up as 'soft' on defence, if it does not accede to the expenditure demands of the military. Other measures to mitigate the threat - such as arriving at a joint border management mechanism with China, as undertaken in the recent talks - get lost in the cacophony.

The case is therefore only seemingly one of an individual's besmirched honour. It is instead one in civil-military relations. Drastic, and eminently avoidable, precedent is available to the government for guiding its action. The last time such a challenge occurred, in Admiral Bhagwat challenging the government's right to appoint a deputy chief of its choice, he was sacked. This time the chief is in effect asking to continue for ten months longer; something that in the government's domain to decide on.

Clearly, a government cannot be comfortable with a litigious chief for longer than necessary. Yet, for the sake of keeping civil-military relations on even keel, it has to compensate for lack of judgment on his part by displaying maturity. One option is to make a distinction between the rank of general and appointment of army chief. The government can appoint a chief of its choosing, as is it's prerogative. The general can then serve out his tenure as a general without an army, even as the new chief navigates the army beyond eddies.

But more importantly, measures to streamline civil-military relations need be taken. There is little doubt that the perception of a bureaucratic substitution of political control has led the chief to go the distance he has. The general impression in the military that it is 'outside the loop' on policy making, and this needs to be dispelled by co-opting the military into decision making through appropriate institutional arrangements. The military for its part must develop a collegiate command culture. This is one good purpose that can be served by the otherwise unsavoury case unfolding on prime time.
⊕

http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/dec/fah-special.htm

DEFENCE BUREAUCRACY
To specialise or not?

26 December 2011 - The deliberations of the Naresh Chandra National Security Task Force are being deliberately kept off the headlines - perhaps because the conventional thinking is that national security is a non-partisan sphere from which politics is to be kept out. The dominant understanding is that there ought to be a consensus over the defence sector. This would be disrupted if its findings find their way into the headlines.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

While these are weighty matters that can do without raucous political and ill-informed media attention, there is one aspect that is likely to figure in the report that requires open debate. This is the aspect of specialisation of the national security bureaucracy.

Currently, bureaucrats posted in the defence ministry are non-specialists. They acquire their knowledge and expertise to the extent that they finally do during their tenure in the ministry. They come from various ministries and state cadres, and there is inevitably a time lag before they can understand their role and the demands of the ministry. Their stay is usually of five years, at the end of which, when they finally acquire a certain degree of competence, they are out.

The argument for specialisation

The long standing argument, made particularly by the late K Subrahmanyam who was himself once a bureaucrat in the defence ministry, has been that this impacts the ministry's work negatively. With the bureaucratic layer having interposed itself between the military and the political master, the impact is more severe. The file system was reportedly earlier a 'double file' one in which the ministry duplicated the military's file that would come up for decision, thereby keeping the military 'out of the loop' and the logic of the decision. Their lack of expertise in the field of national security and in the procedural aspects of acquisitions, etc. has apparently led to much delay in processing cases, with corresponding implications for military readiness and defence spending.


Currently, bureaucrats posted in the defence ministry are non-specialists.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE www.indiatogether.org


The advantages would be great - the ministry's ability to facilitate defence related projects such as acquisitions, infrastructure, defence industry and technology would rise dramatically. The usual stand-off between the bureaucrats and the brass would also become a thing of the past. The harmony in South Block will translate into synergy in the defence sector, including defence production and technology base and the services.

But there are risks

Of course there is a downside, and in persuading ourselves of the positives we should not miss seeing that. Socialisation into national security thinking will lead to bureaucrats adopting the 'party' line. In other words, group-think will set in.

This is not to hold fort for the current system. It does have the problems that the critics point out. But their solution to the problem, of bringing in uniformity in thinking in the national security system, goes against India's principal strength and characteristic - the ability to draw from its diversity. The selection and conditioning of the bureaucrats into the system would ensure that the dominant power-oriented view prevails. Dissent will be a casualty. The defence sector will end up a greater 'holy cow' than what it already is. The 'committed' bureaucrat, a phrase redolent with Emergency connotations, will be in demand.

Moreover, since India is a developing state, an overdeveloped defence sector will tend to overshadow the development sector. While national security may benefit in the short term, its long term consequence for democracy cannot be benign.

Consider the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which has been in the headlines since autumn in Kashmir. The defence ministry has seconded the position of the army that it should not be tweaked in Kashmir. This has held up political initiative in Kashmir despite the home ministry, which is responsible for internal security, and the state government being amenable to change. In case of a ministry manned by a specialised cadre of bureaucrats, it would be so much more difficult to bring about changes such as this.

Currently the status quo owes to bureaucratic politics in the ministry, rather than the ministry being persuaded by the army's case. The political level is not strong enough to override the army's objection, beset as it has been with diverse challenges for the past six months. Batting to one script, they will not be able to bring their independent judgment, informed by a wider-than-defence world view, to their advice. In case the bureaucrats serving in the ministry of defence parrot the power-oriented national security line, the political level will not be able to exercise political control adequately.

The military chafes at the present situation in which the political master uses the bureaucrats for exercising political control. In case the bureaucrats and the military are of one mind, the minister would not be able to access contrary views that could help with informed decision making. The argument is made that the bureaucrats would be better able to tender their advice since they would be more knowledgeable. However, the problem is in their acquiring a uniform perspective through selection bias, training and personnel policies such as promotion, rotations and appointments.

The diversity of perspective that they bring to their task currently helps situate the defence sector in the wider national scheme. Creating a specialised cadre would cut them off from the rest of the national scene, making the defence sector an island and a law unto itself. The resulting political challenges can be quite severe.

One way to overcome this problem would be in integrating service headquarters with the ministry. While the uniformed element would bring in the expertise, bureaucrats, more familiar with how the government system works, will be able to balance any overly militarised input. Their exposure on military courses and on university courses will raise the respect for them within the military, thereby ending the feud between the ministry and the service headquarters.

Throwing the baby out with the bathwater will only lead to us repenting at leisure.
⊕

ipcs.org
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/rescuing-tribal-india-the-nagaland-model-3505.html

#3505, 5 December 2011
RESCUING TRIBAL INDIA: THE NAGALAND MODEL

Firdaus Ahmed

An army brigade has been deployed for its jungle warfare training to Chhattisgarh for the second round. Reportedly it is located closer to the forested area than the brigade that had trained there earlier. With another such deployment, troops would edge closer to the Maoist ‘liberated zone’ as by then there would be enough troops familiar with the terrain and the challenge. The decision to give a free rein to them to ‘liberate’ the tribals held ‘hostage’ by Maoists in the forests can be easily taken.

From the preliminary moves underway it is apparent that the option is open, subject to the army’s readiness. Though the army is not in favour since its engagement in Kashmir continues, leaving no troops to spare. The army deployment for training purposes is an internal variant of ‘coercive diplomacy’ - it is to goad the Maoists on to the table.

In the interim the window for talks is closing. The Maoists interlocutor, Azad, was shot last year. The new state government in Kolkata has resumed operations successfully in claiming the Maoist leader, Kishenji, after a short ceasefire. Fresh thinking on breaking the status quo is called for. Operations to open up ‘no go’ areas do not seem imminent. The paramilitary is doing a reasonable job of keeping the areas needed for extraction of minerals open, but at a non-trivial cost in lives. The companies accessing difficult areas are arriving at an arrangement with the Maoists. Maoists have been contained in their hold outs. The only ones suffering are the already marginalized tribal communities within and in the adjacent region.

In the meanwhile, the government has extended its tried and tested policy of dole to the region, empowering its administrators already burdened with the usual development load with another 25 crore Rupees per district. This may well end up with contractors, who will pay out some to the Maoists as protection money. Glacial operations are set to be indefinitely extended. This is good enough for security managers perhaps; but not so for tribal communities. They have been squeezed between Maoists and the state supported SPOs. The Supreme Court judgment on the SPOs has been undercut by the Chhattisgarh state enacting a law institutionalizing their employment.

Then, can the tribal communities be saved? The military option, in case mere military posturing fails, has precedent. The clearing of the Lakhipather reserve forests off the ULFA in late 1990 and Operation Sarp Vinash in Surankot in Poonch district are examples, which involved the army setting up a firm base and then moving in. In both cases the quarry had fled by the time the army closed the cordon. For Maoists to flee into neighbouring areas within time in case of military operations is possible. This will leave the resident village communities open to the attention of the SPOs, Koya Commondos etc, inevitably part of the vanguard of the operation. In case the Moaists are indeed trapped, with the military learning lessons from earlier operations, their plight will be worse. Pre-empting operations would also benefit the state and the military since jungle operations are known to consume troops and time, witness the operations of the IPKF in late eighties.

An idea is to apply the ‘Nagaland model’ to conflict resolution in Central India. In Nagaland the ceasefire is into its fourteenth year, even as talks continue. Loosely applied regulations enable the armed groups to coexist with the security forces. A parallel government of the no-longer-underground is in place that ‘taxes’ people. The good part is that the two sides are not shooting at each other. The resulting peace has proved addictive and chances of reversion to internal conflict are receding. The talks have been buoyed lately by ideas such as a ‘non-territorial’ or ‘supra state’ solution to the major holdup, Nagalim.

Maoists stand to make gains in legitimacy, visibility and power. This may tempt them down the democratic route. This is worth conceding for the state in exchange for protecting Indian citizens: their life and liberties and restoring a dignified life to the people. The state’s policies will get better implemented, with areas opened for development. The major gain, as in Nagaland, would be in backtracking being precluded by either side. It would make them lose out strategically in terms of losing support among the people, who would prefer that peace acquire roots. Peace would then be self-sustaining.

Over the past three years, there has been a lot of ‘talk about talks’. The problems of this strategy are that with a dwindling leadership, the insurgent groups break up. While easier to tackle, bringing the violence to end becomes problematic. The stated intent of the Home Minister needs translation into action. The Nagaland model exists. The promise of development will be easier to deliver. The elimination of the top Maoist leader, Kishenji, provides an opportunity for acting from a position of strength. Seizing it would certainly spare India’s tribal communities becoming a site for yet another unending counter-insurgency.

http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/afspa-in-jk-why-should-it-go-3483.html

#3483, 3 November 2011
AFSPA IN J&K: WHY SHOULD IT GO?

Firdaus Ahmed
Freelancer
email: firdyahmed@yahoo.com

Head bureaucrats of the home and defence ministries and the cabinet secretary reportedly had a pre-Diwali meeting to attend to a divergence between the two ministries that needed attention at the political level. News reports carry unconfirmed reports of the CCS having met to settle the divergence. That no announcement of the retraction of the ‘disturbed areas’ status from parts of J&K have been made since means that the decision is to persist with the AFSPA in its present ambit.

The divergence between the two ministries was therefore not of a trivial level in which the army was merely disputing the disturbed areas status of a few areas. If that was the case it could well have been settled at the Unified HQs level. From governmental reticence it can be inferred that the divergence is more extensive. Self-evidently, the army has weighed in against the rollback of the AFSPA, irrespective of whether normalcy has returned to areas in question or not.

That no announcement has been made of any rollback as had been indicated by Omar Abdullah, reportedly after commiserations from the home minister, implies that the CCS is persuaded with the army’s viewpoint. What is the viewpoint and what are its implications?

The army argues that there are 2500 terrorists in 42 camps across the state. At seven of these camps there are 700 terrorists set to cross. It is no secret that terror infrastructure has not been rolled back by Pakistan. Pakistan is capable of reasserting itself in Kashmir and may do so once its current preoccupation to the west is over. It still has support in the Valley and terrorists inside have been instructed to survive till they are employed. Having the AFSPA rolled back in the interim will generate greater freedom of movement for resurgence in terrorism.

This presumably reinforces the input of agencies such as RAW and IB that the government is privy to. This also perhaps explains the lack of action from the suggestion made by Omar Abdullah that the AFSPA’s imminent retraction will only occur in select areas where the security situation is more permissive of it. However, if it was only a question of security then the government’s inaction could be received with equanimity. But the implications of inaction are graver.

The suggestion that emerges is that the government is unwilling to switch its ‘main effort’ from a military template to a political one. The understanding that the prime minister gave in his interaction with the all party delegation at the end of last summer’s tumult, that the problem in J&K has both internal and external dimensions that require to be addressed politically, stands nullified.

The confidential recommendations in the interlocutors’ report in early October provided an entry point into furthering a political solution. The practicable ones do not need to await the outcome of governmental deliberations. These could have progressed piecemeal along with a modification to AFSPA’s application in J&K, for instance by withdrawal of the disturbed areas status of areas south of the Pir Panjals. That this has not been done indicates not just a lost opportunity but a deliberate government strategy that disallows the switch from military to political.

In other words, the government is not interested in following up on its own tried and tested doctrine that conflict termination can only be through political initiative. The problematic aspect is therefore less about whether the disturbed areas status needs be revoked in some areas and more about the government’s unwillingness to comprehend a political opportunity. That this is not a case of inability is quite clear for India has not been better placed both internally and externally in two decades.

Two significant implications remain. One is that the government expects to be able to handle the external factor. Second, that it would consequently be able to manage the internal fallout, if any. This may well be true. Pakistan is under considerable pressure. However, the understanding that containment as strategy can result in changing its strategic posture is questionable.

But more worrying is the tacit acceptance of the government that it can withstand anything Pakistan throws across with diminished ability in Kashmir. This betrays a willingness to expose the hapless citizenry to machinations from without and the resulting consequences once again.

The AFSPA issue therefore has graver implications. If the understanding here is a misplaced one, then the implication is far worse, namely that the government lacks the credibility to over-rule its military. In other words the military has a veto, making it an issue in civil-military relations.

It is to dispel this unfortunate, if unwitting, message that the government needs to modify the sway of the AFSPA in J&K irrespective of whether it is persuaded by the military case or not.