Catching up with the SIT chief

Published in Milligazette

http://www.milligazette.com/news/3701-catching-up-with-the-sit-chief

By Firdaus Ahmed[1]

Mr. RK Raghavan, a former director of CBI, is known better for his fortnightly column in the reputed journal Frontline, a flagship publication advertised as India’s National Magazine from the publishers of the equally formidable for its erudition, The Hindu. It is therefore with some respect that readers have been accessing his views to inform and shape their own. This regard for his post retirement output on security and policing is perhaps what prompted the Supreme Court to appoint him as the head of the Special Investigation Team that went into the Gujarat carnage to assess the veracity of the more significant crimes committed post Godhra there. The report of the SIT having been submitted it is now clear that the exercise was one of exonerating the political figures involved not only in inciting but later in covering up the crimes. That the report has gone on to even absolve the political leadership of Gujarat then of acts of omission, leave alone of acts of commission, has left the readers of RK Raghavan’s columns in a state of confusion. Was their faith in the credibility of Mr. Raghavan as a guide into the internal security realm misplaced?

Raghavan’s latest column in the Frontline, ‘Tepid on Terror’, (http://www.frontlineonnet.com/stories/20120601291009700.htm, May 19-June 1, 2012) should dispel any doubts of Mr. Raghavan’s political inclination. In effect, Mr. Raghavan is no professional writing dispassionately about his craft. He is instead a political person and his work reflects his politics. Mistaking him is the fault of his readers, not his. If the Supreme Court was likewise misled by his seemingly secular credentials, then it is at the institution’s cost. Mr. Raghavan cannot be blamed for being himself. Clarity on the working of his mind is easily obtainable from his column in which he attempts to advocate the NCTC.

The argument he makes, that comes out clearly in his concluding paragraph, is that the NCTC would be able to network foreign intelligence agencies better and with its policing powers (that has proven its Achilles heel) be able to act autonomously to good effect. His article brings out the ‘threat’ of terror as he sees it in the surviving of Al Qaeda post 2014, and its affiliation to the Lashkar e Taiba. This, given the latter’s penetration of India (in Mr. Raghavan’s estimate) is an existential threat that requires an appropriate response in the form of an NCTC. While the first and last paragraphs have a mention of NCTC on an article purportedly on NCTC, the remainder of the article is scaremongering with which the liberal minority is by now already more than familiar with. 

The problem is that this has now become the ‘common sense’, with ‘authorities’, who ought to know better, also purveying it. With Mr. Raghavan’s ‘clean chit’ to the political leadership in Gujarat, it is apparent that the future may well be a repeat of the past. Mr. Raghavan’s  is a self-fulfilling prophecy in that with the judicial system sabotaged by his report, it would incentivise hotheads to draw their own conclusions. This will then make Mr. Raghavan take the position, ‘See, I told you so, didn’t I?’; thereby buttressing his ‘expert’ credentials. That his article does not carry a mention of Hindutva inspired terror that has masqueraded as minority perpetrated suggests a blind spot. This blind spot is incidentally what reveals Mr. Raghavan’s politics best. These elements have been lying low of late, given the manner they have been exposed as behind many if not most terror incident’s earlier attributed by default as minority perpetrated.

This brings one to the point that Mr. Raghavan yet again misleads by attempts to rely on the ‘common sense’ to make a case for NCTC. This popular, if erroneous, notion has been manufactured by closet cultural nationalists, both in the strategic community and media; the ranks of which now have a distinguished denizen, Mr. Raghavan, now unmasked. The case for NCTC if at all is not that it is required for coping with minority perpetrated terror and its external linkages, but for taming Hindutva inspired terror. The terror that has passed for minority perpetrated terror has been doubly effective. Firstly it has put the minority in the dock and also, secondly, when there, on the backfoot, in getting those so accused to first their prove innocence and then prove the other side guilty. This is what in intelligence circles are called ‘black operations’. This is suggestive of intelligence tutelage of those so engaged. Given the predilections of the well regarded Mr. Raghavan now exposed, it is worth a ponder if there are subterranean linkages between state agencies, well known to be without parliamentary supervision and nefarious groups of a certain political persuasion. Analogy can be drawn from the notorious ISI linkages allegedly with certain grou, brought out copiously in Mr. Raghavan’s article. Given that the state, both at the Union level and provincial, has acted with alacrity against the latter, there is little need then to also have an NCTC based on this logic. Instead, an NCTC with teeth is required for the Union to act against Hindutva inspired terror groups, since there is great reluctance, perhaps due to the possible complicity mentioned here, against Hindutva inspired groups. Given that this argument is not marshalled makes Mr. Raghavan’s critique of those holding up the NCTC somewhat ‘tepid on terror’.

While there are good reasons to go slow on the NCTC with teeth as envisaged, one reason why it is needed is to cope with those that form the blind spot of the state. Admitting to this is perhaps too much to expect of the home ministry, but this is the more pertinent reason why the UPA has perhaps wanted the NCTC in its current form. However, there is a problem area that needs reckoning with. This is that in equipping itself with such powers, in case the Union is captured, democratically or otherwise by forces inimical to the Constitution, then it would be too late to rue them such powers. So although there is good reason to have an NCTC that can take action, there are reservations that can lend the exercise pause.

In enabling these observations on the NCTC and the dominant security discourse, Mr. Raghavan’s column has served a purpose, but not as he imagined. It is time the editors of the Hindu group read their very own columnists since such writings excite dissonance in their readers, being inconsistent with the otherwise credible and creditably liberal line of the publications of the group.

---

[1] Firdaus Ahmed blogs at www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in

army expansion and nyoma incident

http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/may/fah-expand.htm

 SERVICE STRENGTH Expanding too fast?

 23 May 2012 -


The details of the Nyoma Incident need not detain us here. It can be predicted that there will be multiple versions of the unfortunate incident floating in cyber space soon. The military court of inquiry will ascertain the facts, justice will be meted out and the artillery regiment that served as the site of the incident disbanded. The standard operating procedures for the rest of the army will be firmed up and will no doubt include a stricture against families accompanying officers when out in the field.

 While all this can understandably be expected to be internal to the military, it bears reflection as to whether this is an isolated case, an 'aberration' to anticipate an army spokesperson. Or, is there something in it on the good health of the army for the ear of wider society?

 The army has been expanding incessantly over the past three decades. The first round was over the turn of the eighties of mechanisation. The following decade witnessed the raising of the Rashtriya Rifles. The last decade saw the doubling of Rashtriya Rifles and raisings of two mountain divisions for the China front. This decade will see the raising of a mountain strike corps, promised recently by the Defence Minister.

 FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - www.indiatogether.org

 Taken together the three prongs - manpower, material and nuclear - can reasonably expected to keep India safe into the future. But this expectation can be thwarted if the army proves unable to absorb the changes. Tritely put, it's the man behind the gun that matters. Expansion has been managed quite well by the army earlier. In wake of the 1962 debacle, Emergency commission officers were inducted. The showing of the army in 1971 war vindicated the decision. However, this time around, the expansion has been in the wake of incessant deployment in operations.

The story begins with Siachen and Op Blue Star in Punjab in 1984. It is followed by the IPKF sojourn and a near simultaneous deployment on deinduction from there into Punjab, Kashmir and Assam. Thereafter, as one Chief put it, the army has only been 'officially at peace'.

 The army has proven responsive. It has over time firmed in a rotation policy for Rashtriya Rifles that caters for primary group cohesion to an extent. The army website indicates that several training schools have been opened up for preparing junior leaders under a 'train the trainer' system. News reports of summer exercises at field army level, such as the recent Exercise Shoor Vir, indicate a heavy schedule for collective training. Socialisation has been furthered by greater military interface with veterans.

 Nevertheless, the challenge continues to be daunting. Universally, the army's good health is dependent on professionalism of the officer corps. Therefore to focus here on this facet first makes sense. The intake is over 1500 officers a year. (Compare this to the 900 who make it to the civil services every year.) The tension between quantity and quality can only be expected to be resolved in favour of quantity, since the army never tires of pointing to vacancies in the officer cadre pegged consistently in the low five figures.

 This was the case in wake of the Kargil War, when it was rumoured that standards had been diluted for expanding intake in real time. Also there was reportedly a one-time truncating of pre-commission training length. The chickens have apparently come home to roost, with the incident in question suggesting a breakdown in discipline of officers commissioned post Kargil War.

 There is also deficiency in socialisation into military mores. Rashtriya Rifles and field postings having created such personnel turbulence that both horizontal and vertical integration have been impacted at both the officer and soldier level. Additional raisings mean the transfer of empathetic leadership and stolid manpower to the new set up; the vacancies so created in existing organizations being filled up by raw recruits. Further, the age and service of officers holding appointments at unit level has gone down, and with good reason. However, the pressures on them of performance and demands from the wider army, that has in turn gone top-heavy, are higher. And all this is in face of higher career pressures stemming from competition to go up a wide-based but steep sided pyramid.

 Acknowledging the latter, the army's response has been to compound the problem. The army has opened another Officer Training Academy at Gaya, intending to have a higher officer intake but of short service commission officers. While resolving the problem of the pyramidal structure of its promotion system, it could deepen the other one of fraying officer-soldier bonding. The army may be intending to overcome this problem by higher levels of manpower and higher technological levels in relation to the adversary. The Kargil War was won by concentrating two divisions and a large proportion of the firepower available in J&K, thereby overwhelming the enemy.

 However, neglecting the idea that 'the man behind the gun' is consequential may prove debilitating over the long run. This point has a wider import. Expansion has not been restricted to the army. In fact the security sector has been perhaps the only sector that has expanded over the past decade, given that the neoliberal paradigm believes in contracting government. Even more ambitious expansion has been witnessed in the central armed police forces, with the Central Reserve Police Force becoming the world's largest internal security force. And yet, it is unable to penetrate into the forests of Abujmad!

 The point that emerges is that expansion is the easier answer. And in any case it must not be at the cost of quality. Since this has been the case with both the army and the paramilitary, compensation needs to be done by heightened training, accentuated socialization and intimate supervision. This is doubly important since these forces are operationally committed, particularly in people-centric counter insurgency.

 The gravity of the problem can be inferred from the fact that its most significant facet has been pushed right to the very end: impact of societal turbulence, especially so in an officer cadre springing from the lower middle class. Given this, it can be sensed that Nyoma was only waiting to happen. The army leadership that has been enmeshed lately in peripheral matters needs now to return to its bread and butter. ⊕

http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/apr/fah-civil.htm

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Uncivil war in South Block

The snarling between the military and the bureaucracy continues. It appeared as though the matter was settled, with the Supreme Court ruling in favour of the government in the case of the age of the Army Chief. However, the uncivil war that broke out in South Block - in the form of motivated leaks - between the babus and the brass continues to unfold on prime time.

Varied explanations have been offered for why we are seeing this controversy. One is that the Chief, since he did not get a year's extention, is a 'frustrated man'. Second is the good-versus-bad story: a corruption-fighting Chief battling it out with the usual suspects. The third theory is as old as the Army itself, the tussle for supremacy between bureaucracy and the military. Finally, there is the view that the Chief is exposing a dithering 'Saint' Antony, who has happily prioritised honesty over everything else, and left the Army without arms and ammunition.

The actual problem is in differing strategic perspectives between the civilians and the military. The differing perspectives have led to the civilians going slow on defence acquisitions and stymieing the military's preferred response of expansion in numbers. The divergence is also evident elsewhere - in the military's position on the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), its incidence in Kashmir, and on the question of demilitarisation of Siachen.

Given that democratic civil-military relations require subordination of the military to the civilian, the military's insistence on its views amounts to a challenge to the principle of civilian supremacy. However, in this the Army has been emboldened by precedent - whenever it has held fast to its position, the civilian leadership has eventually accepted it, so why yield now? The natural escalation of this cycle is a military that has stepped out of control.

The military, necessarily and universally conservative and realist, has a threat perception of a 'clear and present' danger in the form of a 'two front war'. This has been upscaled by the collusion between China and Pakistan, going back to the 1980s in the nuclear and missile fields, most visible lately in the presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Baltistan. The possible military use of infrastructure created by the Chinese has the military similarly fixated.

Its answer has been to ask for additional forces. While the ministry has granted two divisions, forming up now on the eastern front, it has been less amenable to clear the mountain strike corps. The military wants this for making gains elsewhere as trade-off against the gains China will likely make in any military contest.


The additional forces forming up suggest that the two are in agreement about the need for a robust defence. The civilians, however, are not in favour of the offensive, 'strike' component. Publicly, the reason given is that India cannot afford this additional cost, with the economy now slowing down. But the real reason is that the civilians have a different idea on how to tackle China.

Their concerns are reasonable. India is already putting in place various capabilities by building roads and resuscitating air strips in the border areas. Anything more than this would only trigger a reaction by the Chinese, leading to a threat to India where none might have existed in the first place. India, wanting to concentrate on its economic growth trajectory, does not want to get diverted. An arms race would make India incline towards the US, which is wary of China's rise, at the cost of Indian autonomy.

This concern has spiked the Chief's pet project, the 'Transformation' study done by him in his last appointment as army commander in Kolkata. The project explains why the Chief's was so keen for an extension of his term - which would have allowed him to remain at the helm long enough to see it through. Its critical element of adding 86,000 troops, which has been held up for financial reasons, is attributed instead to bureaucratic obduracy and political ignorance. Therefore, the fightback, showing up the bureaucracy and its political master in poor light by pointing to their tardiness in acquiring machines and ammunition.

In this, the military wants to sit in judgment of its own views. This is also the case with AFSPA; one can argue that this law is not needed at all in India's counter insurgency arsenal. The military has been firm in its position that the Act's provisions are indispensable not only to its deployment but also its effectiveness. One can concede that this is a professional view, but the fact that the military does not want to permit prosecution of its officers who violate the people's rights suggests that its influence is much wider.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE www.indiatogether.org

Next is the case of Siachen. Here too the hardline position is evident. The government wants to progress peace talks with 'doable' issues like Siachen and Sir Creek being tidied over and providing momentum for and trust necessary for tackling the more fraught outstanding issues in composite basket. The military has repeatedly put its foot down, nipping any initiative to turn Siachen into a 'peace park' as once envisaged by the prime minister.

We must also not ignore the 'Cold Start' doctrine that the military autonomously conjured up. The capabilities are to enable it to take off for operations well inside Pakistani territory. This denies the political head the requisite time for engaging in crisis management and diplomacy. This attempt at commandeering the political decision space has led to a predictable response from the politicians - who simply thwart the military's plans to build up this capacity. The military is striking back by labeling this as 'holding up' the capacity building exercise, but conveniently forgets that this was not approved by the political leadership in the first place.

Too often the military has carried the day in these essentially political decisions. This suggests not only that the political class has abdicated its role, which is bad enough, but also that military expansionism is the norm, and that is much worse. The problem is structural. Perceiving itself as outside the policy making tent, the military tends to dig in.

The answer is to integrate the military into the ministry. Unless the distinction between the uniform and safari suit is removed, the civil war will continue. The Naresh Chandra task force currently working on the specifics of next steps in defence reform, needs to complete its job urgently.
⊕

http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/feb/fah-dob2.htm

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
An age-old lesson

19 February 2012 - The case of the Army Chief's date of birth has been laid to rest finally, in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Before leaving for a two-day trip to Saudi Arabia, the Defence Minister said that, "the government has confidence in the present chief and that was conveyed in the Supreme Court also. Everything is clear and we have confidence in him." He has followed up on his return sayting, "We have learnt the right lessons from it ... there is no strain."

The Chief, for his part, has also put the episode behind him, stating while on tour to the UK, "there is no controversy if you are meaning or implying a particular controversy." However, his statement alongside, "I followed a particular path for a particular aim and that was achieved", is pregnant with implications for the 'lessons learnt', referred to by the minister.

The Chief's statement apparently suggests that he set out to make clear to the bureaucrat-dominated ministry that their's is not the last word. If the episode is taken as a symptom of a problem in civil-military relations, the foremost lesson is to configure the apex system using the aegis of the ongoing Naresh Chandra task force deliberations to provide the government early impetus for reform.

Three longstanding problem areas exist in the national security system. These have contributed in some measure to the Date-of-Birth episode getting as difficult as it has. While by all accounts it is merely a 'personal' matter, the structural contribution cannot be ignored. Doing so would make its recurrence over time inevitable, if only in a different manner, but most surely as a higher order crisis in civil-military relations.


The apex military leadership needs social communication skills, political savvy, and democratic and collegial leadership acumen - skills more visible in board rooms than operations rooms.


Firstly, a service Chief is now an over-burdened appointment. The appointment subsumes both commander and staff duties in one office and individual. Since the Chiefs do not usually divest themselves of other commitments, such as the antediluvian appointment of 'Colonel of the Regiment', the burden is inordinate, irrespective of the efficiency of the secretariat and staff. Besides, the age of retirement having been raised, there is less vigour into the tenure and it shows visibly.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

Secondly, is the issue of merit in the choice of the Chief. The long-standing criticism has it that the 'age' criterion detracts from merit and limits the choice to survivors of the steeply pyramidal hierarchy. This accentuates a 'play safe' attitude, with operational spill-over in possible command inadequacy in case conventional push comes to nuclear shove. The advantage of the system is that it preserves the apolitical nature of the military, since there is no incentive for ambitious members of the brass to catch the political master's eye. The case of General Kaul and Krishna Menon has set the precedent to avoid.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

This debate needs to be settled in favour of merit and youth. Stability and predictability have proven useful but these characteristics may not be the most apt ones in face of challenges of 21st-century conflict. This is a good juncture to move beyond the tried and tested, to adapt practices used elsewhere. For instance, Colin Powell and Petraeus reached their positions not because of seniority, but competence.

The characteristics needed by today's apex military leadership are not necessarily the traditional ones demonstrated so well by the Chief in his challenge: resolve and standing up for one's beliefs. Instead, the apex military leadership needs social communication skills, political savvy, and democratic and collegial leadership acumen - skills more visible in board rooms than operations rooms. In the case of the current Chief, he had no tenure at the Army Headquarters, other than a sheltered appointment in a former Chief's secretariat. Socialisation absent, he thought it fit to rock the boat.

The Indian military needs help in moving forward. In India's case, the military's 'holy cow' status ever since India over learned the lessons of 1962 means that this is unlikely until the issue acquires some momentum in public debate. Now is the appropriate juncture to start.

Thirdly, the abiding perception in service circles, voiced repeatedly in in-service journals and by veterans in seminar rooms, is that rules of business are such that the ministry is overbearing both in weight and attitude. The hollowing out of the Indian Police Service has lent urgency to the military's actions for self-preservation from the bureaucratic layer; otherwise the same fall may befall it too.

This acquires added importance from the military's professional obligation to provide security. In theory, the military is answerable to the the political heads, not an intervening bureaucracy. However, in practice the rules of governmental business have been devised in such a manner that the bureaucracy, in discharging its role of giving 'advice to the minister', has appropriated the policy space from him more or less fully. This has resulted in a sense of alienation among the brass, voiced by its former chiefs, such as Arun Prakash, that even the Chiefs do not have voice. The ministry does not appreciate this.

The structural remedy to this problem is in following other democracies - in integrating the two sides. This would bring the role of the Chief to the forefront, either as head of staff or as commander, and along with it the need for a Chief of Defence Staff. The current system would favour the Chief as commander, with the CDS heading the joint staff in an integrated ministry alongside the defence secretary. Arriving at the right choice is what will ensure Naresh Chandra, currently grappling with the issue, a place in history.

The mantra that India's military is apolitical has potential to lull political alertness and sensibilities. Even an elementary acquaintance with military sociology will reveal that militaries are political players as institutions. They have the ability and inclination to forge alliances in polity for consensus building on their national security concerns. The legitimacy for such behaviour is in their self-image as custodians of national security.

This does not necessarily imply partisan politics. However, if the civil war in South Block worsens, and the political scenario in the country vitiates for any reason, politicisation in a conservative-military semi-covert quasi-alliance can occur. The current 'game' of bureaucratic politics, explicable in organization theory, can yet get murkier at a national cost. The political role and ministerial responsibility at this juncture is therefore clear cut.

The happy fallout of this otherwise sorry episode can be in the form of new directions. Reforms that place the Chief inside the policy loop are needed to help avert a future 'perfect storm' in such crises. It is better, as the old Arab fable goes, to have the camel inside the tent than outside it.
⊕

The 'Age' of misjudgment

http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/jan/fah-chief.htm

19 January 2012 - The legal assault of the Army chief on the ministry of defence is set to keep national attention affixed for a while. Partisans of both sides of the case, backed by vested interests, will chip in to enliven prime time. What is likely to be missed in the debate is the meaning of the chief's action for military ethics.

The chief's stand indicates his valuing of 'integrity and honour' and his determination. These two character traits are highly laudable in military men. However, the chief is not just another military man. He is a general officer and head of the army. A chief has certain responsibilities that necessitate characteristics over and above those in other military men. In fact, these traits otherwise praiseworthy need being leavened by others that enable shouldering of responsibilities that go with the rank and appointment. Judgment, in particular, is key.

For illustration, while the generals in the First World War exhibited great steadfastness in steadying the frontline in the trenches, they ended up sending a generation to its death. No wonder, they are known to military history as 'donkeys'. Candidates for promotion to higher rank must not only have resolve but also exhibit judgment; else firmness ends up as dogmatism. In the present case whether the chief has exhibited judgment is at issue.


His unprecedented action, redolent with moral courage, is unexceptionable on the surface. He has taken legal recourse, as is his right, to protect his 'honour and integrity'. However, the best measure of judgment happens to be sense of timing. He had occasions twice over in the past to take an equally legitimate position, while coming up for consideration for appointment as corps commander and army commander. At those junctures, he had the military hierarchy to take on. He chose not to do so and instead was 'pressurised' into sending in the letters in which he accepted the wrong date of birth to be communicated to the ministry.

Had he taken a firm position then, his sense of honour would not have been trifled with. Now, he had the opportunity of either resigning or waiting to retire before taking the action.

Additionally, the credibility of his citing of 'honour and integrity' has been diminished by the earlier punishment by courts martial of two generals in the Sukhna land scam case. This has been presented as his high minded anti-corruption stance to clean up the stables. It turns out that the Military Secretary who faced courts martial for influencing the general in command in Sukhna was the one instrumental in holding up his case for amending his date of birth with the Military Secretary's branch, no doubt at the behest of the then chief. The case can now be re-read as personal vendetta.

The present case has potential to get dirtier. The problem now is that he has taken on the ministry instead. Since the military is steeped in a 'command' culture, he represents the service. His position requires him to perform both a representative function and an advisory function. This constricts the personal domain, making the chief's action consequential for civil-military relations. His is therefore a challenge to civil control, critical in a democracy. He neglects a principle in democratic civil-military relations: civilian masters have the right to be wrong.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

The first shots have already been fired - with insinuations that the army's demand for a mountain strike corps has been held up due to bureaucratic games. The idea of this corps is part of the Army chief's major 'Transformation' initiative; it entails Rs.60,000 crores in expenditure on expanding the army by 86,000 troops, including 12,000 officers. The allegation made now is that the ministry is responsible for 'going slow' on this, while there is relative smooth sailing for the projects of the air force and navy.

This is damaging for the government, that requires contending with the effects of a global slowdown as well. The figure of 8 to 9 per cent growth having been revised downwards, knock-on effects on the defence budget can be expected. The military has built up a new 'two-front' threat perception to justify the expenditure. The government will be shown up as 'soft' on defence, if it does not accede to the expenditure demands of the military. Other measures to mitigate the threat - such as arriving at a joint border management mechanism with China, as undertaken in the recent talks - get lost in the cacophony.

The case is therefore only seemingly one of an individual's besmirched honour. It is instead one in civil-military relations. Drastic, and eminently avoidable, precedent is available to the government for guiding its action. The last time such a challenge occurred, in Admiral Bhagwat challenging the government's right to appoint a deputy chief of its choice, he was sacked. This time the chief is in effect asking to continue for ten months longer; something that in the government's domain to decide on.

Clearly, a government cannot be comfortable with a litigious chief for longer than necessary. Yet, for the sake of keeping civil-military relations on even keel, it has to compensate for lack of judgment on his part by displaying maturity. One option is to make a distinction between the rank of general and appointment of army chief. The government can appoint a chief of its choosing, as is it's prerogative. The general can then serve out his tenure as a general without an army, even as the new chief navigates the army beyond eddies.

But more importantly, measures to streamline civil-military relations need be taken. There is little doubt that the perception of a bureaucratic substitution of political control has led the chief to go the distance he has. The general impression in the military that it is 'outside the loop' on policy making, and this needs to be dispelled by co-opting the military into decision making through appropriate institutional arrangements. The military for its part must develop a collegiate command culture. This is one good purpose that can be served by the otherwise unsavoury case unfolding on prime time.
⊕

http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/dec/fah-special.htm

DEFENCE BUREAUCRACY
To specialise or not?

26 December 2011 - The deliberations of the Naresh Chandra National Security Task Force are being deliberately kept off the headlines - perhaps because the conventional thinking is that national security is a non-partisan sphere from which politics is to be kept out. The dominant understanding is that there ought to be a consensus over the defence sector. This would be disrupted if its findings find their way into the headlines.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

While these are weighty matters that can do without raucous political and ill-informed media attention, there is one aspect that is likely to figure in the report that requires open debate. This is the aspect of specialisation of the national security bureaucracy.

Currently, bureaucrats posted in the defence ministry are non-specialists. They acquire their knowledge and expertise to the extent that they finally do during their tenure in the ministry. They come from various ministries and state cadres, and there is inevitably a time lag before they can understand their role and the demands of the ministry. Their stay is usually of five years, at the end of which, when they finally acquire a certain degree of competence, they are out.

The argument for specialisation

The long standing argument, made particularly by the late K Subrahmanyam who was himself once a bureaucrat in the defence ministry, has been that this impacts the ministry's work negatively. With the bureaucratic layer having interposed itself between the military and the political master, the impact is more severe. The file system was reportedly earlier a 'double file' one in which the ministry duplicated the military's file that would come up for decision, thereby keeping the military 'out of the loop' and the logic of the decision. Their lack of expertise in the field of national security and in the procedural aspects of acquisitions, etc. has apparently led to much delay in processing cases, with corresponding implications for military readiness and defence spending.


Currently, bureaucrats posted in the defence ministry are non-specialists.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE www.indiatogether.org


The advantages would be great - the ministry's ability to facilitate defence related projects such as acquisitions, infrastructure, defence industry and technology would rise dramatically. The usual stand-off between the bureaucrats and the brass would also become a thing of the past. The harmony in South Block will translate into synergy in the defence sector, including defence production and technology base and the services.

But there are risks

Of course there is a downside, and in persuading ourselves of the positives we should not miss seeing that. Socialisation into national security thinking will lead to bureaucrats adopting the 'party' line. In other words, group-think will set in.

This is not to hold fort for the current system. It does have the problems that the critics point out. But their solution to the problem, of bringing in uniformity in thinking in the national security system, goes against India's principal strength and characteristic - the ability to draw from its diversity. The selection and conditioning of the bureaucrats into the system would ensure that the dominant power-oriented view prevails. Dissent will be a casualty. The defence sector will end up a greater 'holy cow' than what it already is. The 'committed' bureaucrat, a phrase redolent with Emergency connotations, will be in demand.

Moreover, since India is a developing state, an overdeveloped defence sector will tend to overshadow the development sector. While national security may benefit in the short term, its long term consequence for democracy cannot be benign.

Consider the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which has been in the headlines since autumn in Kashmir. The defence ministry has seconded the position of the army that it should not be tweaked in Kashmir. This has held up political initiative in Kashmir despite the home ministry, which is responsible for internal security, and the state government being amenable to change. In case of a ministry manned by a specialised cadre of bureaucrats, it would be so much more difficult to bring about changes such as this.

Currently the status quo owes to bureaucratic politics in the ministry, rather than the ministry being persuaded by the army's case. The political level is not strong enough to override the army's objection, beset as it has been with diverse challenges for the past six months. Batting to one script, they will not be able to bring their independent judgment, informed by a wider-than-defence world view, to their advice. In case the bureaucrats serving in the ministry of defence parrot the power-oriented national security line, the political level will not be able to exercise political control adequately.

The military chafes at the present situation in which the political master uses the bureaucrats for exercising political control. In case the bureaucrats and the military are of one mind, the minister would not be able to access contrary views that could help with informed decision making. The argument is made that the bureaucrats would be better able to tender their advice since they would be more knowledgeable. However, the problem is in their acquiring a uniform perspective through selection bias, training and personnel policies such as promotion, rotations and appointments.

The diversity of perspective that they bring to their task currently helps situate the defence sector in the wider national scheme. Creating a specialised cadre would cut them off from the rest of the national scene, making the defence sector an island and a law unto itself. The resulting political challenges can be quite severe.

One way to overcome this problem would be in integrating service headquarters with the ministry. While the uniformed element would bring in the expertise, bureaucrats, more familiar with how the government system works, will be able to balance any overly militarised input. Their exposure on military courses and on university courses will raise the respect for them within the military, thereby ending the feud between the ministry and the service headquarters.

Throwing the baby out with the bathwater will only lead to us repenting at leisure.
⊕

ipcs.org
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/rescuing-tribal-india-the-nagaland-model-3505.html

#3505, 5 December 2011
RESCUING TRIBAL INDIA: THE NAGALAND MODEL

Firdaus Ahmed

An army brigade has been deployed for its jungle warfare training to Chhattisgarh for the second round. Reportedly it is located closer to the forested area than the brigade that had trained there earlier. With another such deployment, troops would edge closer to the Maoist ‘liberated zone’ as by then there would be enough troops familiar with the terrain and the challenge. The decision to give a free rein to them to ‘liberate’ the tribals held ‘hostage’ by Maoists in the forests can be easily taken.

From the preliminary moves underway it is apparent that the option is open, subject to the army’s readiness. Though the army is not in favour since its engagement in Kashmir continues, leaving no troops to spare. The army deployment for training purposes is an internal variant of ‘coercive diplomacy’ - it is to goad the Maoists on to the table.

In the interim the window for talks is closing. The Maoists interlocutor, Azad, was shot last year. The new state government in Kolkata has resumed operations successfully in claiming the Maoist leader, Kishenji, after a short ceasefire. Fresh thinking on breaking the status quo is called for. Operations to open up ‘no go’ areas do not seem imminent. The paramilitary is doing a reasonable job of keeping the areas needed for extraction of minerals open, but at a non-trivial cost in lives. The companies accessing difficult areas are arriving at an arrangement with the Maoists. Maoists have been contained in their hold outs. The only ones suffering are the already marginalized tribal communities within and in the adjacent region.

In the meanwhile, the government has extended its tried and tested policy of dole to the region, empowering its administrators already burdened with the usual development load with another 25 crore Rupees per district. This may well end up with contractors, who will pay out some to the Maoists as protection money. Glacial operations are set to be indefinitely extended. This is good enough for security managers perhaps; but not so for tribal communities. They have been squeezed between Maoists and the state supported SPOs. The Supreme Court judgment on the SPOs has been undercut by the Chhattisgarh state enacting a law institutionalizing their employment.

Then, can the tribal communities be saved? The military option, in case mere military posturing fails, has precedent. The clearing of the Lakhipather reserve forests off the ULFA in late 1990 and Operation Sarp Vinash in Surankot in Poonch district are examples, which involved the army setting up a firm base and then moving in. In both cases the quarry had fled by the time the army closed the cordon. For Maoists to flee into neighbouring areas within time in case of military operations is possible. This will leave the resident village communities open to the attention of the SPOs, Koya Commondos etc, inevitably part of the vanguard of the operation. In case the Moaists are indeed trapped, with the military learning lessons from earlier operations, their plight will be worse. Pre-empting operations would also benefit the state and the military since jungle operations are known to consume troops and time, witness the operations of the IPKF in late eighties.

An idea is to apply the ‘Nagaland model’ to conflict resolution in Central India. In Nagaland the ceasefire is into its fourteenth year, even as talks continue. Loosely applied regulations enable the armed groups to coexist with the security forces. A parallel government of the no-longer-underground is in place that ‘taxes’ people. The good part is that the two sides are not shooting at each other. The resulting peace has proved addictive and chances of reversion to internal conflict are receding. The talks have been buoyed lately by ideas such as a ‘non-territorial’ or ‘supra state’ solution to the major holdup, Nagalim.

Maoists stand to make gains in legitimacy, visibility and power. This may tempt them down the democratic route. This is worth conceding for the state in exchange for protecting Indian citizens: their life and liberties and restoring a dignified life to the people. The state’s policies will get better implemented, with areas opened for development. The major gain, as in Nagaland, would be in backtracking being precluded by either side. It would make them lose out strategically in terms of losing support among the people, who would prefer that peace acquire roots. Peace would then be self-sustaining.

Over the past three years, there has been a lot of ‘talk about talks’. The problems of this strategy are that with a dwindling leadership, the insurgent groups break up. While easier to tackle, bringing the violence to end becomes problematic. The stated intent of the Home Minister needs translation into action. The Nagaland model exists. The promise of development will be easier to deliver. The elimination of the top Maoist leader, Kishenji, provides an opportunity for acting from a position of strength. Seizing it would certainly spare India’s tribal communities becoming a site for yet another unending counter-insurgency.

http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/afspa-in-jk-why-should-it-go-3483.html

#3483, 3 November 2011
AFSPA IN J&K: WHY SHOULD IT GO?

Firdaus Ahmed
Freelancer
email: firdyahmed@yahoo.com

Head bureaucrats of the home and defence ministries and the cabinet secretary reportedly had a pre-Diwali meeting to attend to a divergence between the two ministries that needed attention at the political level. News reports carry unconfirmed reports of the CCS having met to settle the divergence. That no announcement of the retraction of the ‘disturbed areas’ status from parts of J&K have been made since means that the decision is to persist with the AFSPA in its present ambit.

The divergence between the two ministries was therefore not of a trivial level in which the army was merely disputing the disturbed areas status of a few areas. If that was the case it could well have been settled at the Unified HQs level. From governmental reticence it can be inferred that the divergence is more extensive. Self-evidently, the army has weighed in against the rollback of the AFSPA, irrespective of whether normalcy has returned to areas in question or not.

That no announcement has been made of any rollback as had been indicated by Omar Abdullah, reportedly after commiserations from the home minister, implies that the CCS is persuaded with the army’s viewpoint. What is the viewpoint and what are its implications?

The army argues that there are 2500 terrorists in 42 camps across the state. At seven of these camps there are 700 terrorists set to cross. It is no secret that terror infrastructure has not been rolled back by Pakistan. Pakistan is capable of reasserting itself in Kashmir and may do so once its current preoccupation to the west is over. It still has support in the Valley and terrorists inside have been instructed to survive till they are employed. Having the AFSPA rolled back in the interim will generate greater freedom of movement for resurgence in terrorism.

This presumably reinforces the input of agencies such as RAW and IB that the government is privy to. This also perhaps explains the lack of action from the suggestion made by Omar Abdullah that the AFSPA’s imminent retraction will only occur in select areas where the security situation is more permissive of it. However, if it was only a question of security then the government’s inaction could be received with equanimity. But the implications of inaction are graver.

The suggestion that emerges is that the government is unwilling to switch its ‘main effort’ from a military template to a political one. The understanding that the prime minister gave in his interaction with the all party delegation at the end of last summer’s tumult, that the problem in J&K has both internal and external dimensions that require to be addressed politically, stands nullified.

The confidential recommendations in the interlocutors’ report in early October provided an entry point into furthering a political solution. The practicable ones do not need to await the outcome of governmental deliberations. These could have progressed piecemeal along with a modification to AFSPA’s application in J&K, for instance by withdrawal of the disturbed areas status of areas south of the Pir Panjals. That this has not been done indicates not just a lost opportunity but a deliberate government strategy that disallows the switch from military to political.

In other words, the government is not interested in following up on its own tried and tested doctrine that conflict termination can only be through political initiative. The problematic aspect is therefore less about whether the disturbed areas status needs be revoked in some areas and more about the government’s unwillingness to comprehend a political opportunity. That this is not a case of inability is quite clear for India has not been better placed both internally and externally in two decades.

Two significant implications remain. One is that the government expects to be able to handle the external factor. Second, that it would consequently be able to manage the internal fallout, if any. This may well be true. Pakistan is under considerable pressure. However, the understanding that containment as strategy can result in changing its strategic posture is questionable.

But more worrying is the tacit acceptance of the government that it can withstand anything Pakistan throws across with diminished ability in Kashmir. This betrays a willingness to expose the hapless citizenry to machinations from without and the resulting consequences once again.

The AFSPA issue therefore has graver implications. If the understanding here is a misplaced one, then the implication is far worse, namely that the government lacks the credibility to over-rule its military. In other words the military has a veto, making it an issue in civil-military relations.

It is to dispel this unfortunate, if unwitting, message that the government needs to modify the sway of the AFSPA in J&K irrespective of whether it is persuaded by the military case or not.

http://www.milligazette.com/news/2349-mr-chetan-bhagat-please-get-off-our-indian-muslims-backs-will-you
Opinions

Mr. Bhagat: Please get off our backs, will you!

By Firdaus Ahmed, The Milli Gazette
Published Online: Sep 25, 2011

Gratuitous advice is better ignored. Nevertheless, the ‘Underage Optimist’, Chetan Bhagat, intellectual icon of Generation Y, needs an answer. His advice for Muslims in his latest column, is, ‘Don’t let them divide and rule any more’. The assumption is that Muslims are permitting ‘them’ to ‘divide and rule’. For ‘them’ to not to rule ‘any more’, his ‘urge’ is that Muslims ‘not commit (their) vote and loyalty to any political party forever’.

His version of ‘vote-bank politics’ is in the minority choosing representatives ‘because he is a symbol of hope for the minority’. To him, ‘Muslim citizens are wooed the most because their community is one of the largest in terms of actual numbers and ‘also as a community they are believed to vote en-bloc’. This does not necessarily get them any dividends, since the representative then kept ‘us busy with the Hindu vs Muslim debate, while they hid the fact that the entire country suffered due to their misgovernance.’

Chetan Bhagat’s seemingly unexceptionable counsel needs to be juxtaposed with his earlier utterances. In earlier columns this year, he had offered public advice, that hindsight suggests may not necessarily have been unsolicited nor innocent, to Mr. Narendra Modi requiring him to make a transition to the national stage. He had praised Modi’s development record, attributing it to Modi’s ‘firmness’ on development. Look and behold, barely six months on and the nation has witnessed the first steps of Mr. Modi to break out of his regional satrapi, Gujarat.

In terminating a fast that has unfortunately for his pains, gone unremarked into history, Modi declined to sport a cap, the cultural marker of a Muslim community, offered by a Muslim follower. The commentary that attended the gesture had it that Mr. Modi did not want to spoil his image favoured by his majority supporters. In effect, there is an even more significant ‘vote-bank’ out there, the Hindu vote. The effort is to get it to vote ‘en-bloc’, an effort that has been on ever since the ‘Optimist’, even if ‘Underage’, has been old enough to know of. Why does this escape Mr. Bhagat’s admiring, though undiscerning, eye?

Chetan’s right for soliciting supporters for his favoured candidate is not in question. For him to employ his not inconsiderable talents and use his Times of India column for the purpose is between him and his maker and the editors of that newspaper. But his bias needs outing.

That he thinks in terms of ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ is clear. Note his advice, this time to his co-religionists: ‘We as majority members have to be extra cautious to not hurt the feelings of minorities.’ In other words, the division he rails against is one in his own mind, one that he needs working on when he is not too busy advising others in the Sunday Times.

Rightly, there is a division, but not one between religions, but based on vision for the nation. The Muslims, sensibly are against majoritarian democracy, especially one in which the majority is defined, as Mr. Bhagat has it, by a denominational majority. To prevent this if they are to cast their vote the way they do, it is what usually trounces psephologists, the traditional wisdom of the Indian voter.

In his earlier ‘demystification’ of Mr. Modi, Mr. Bhagat deems him to be at best a pardonable ‘opportunist’. While that may be so, Muslims having had a taste of the ‘opportunism’ of Mr. Modi cannot facilitate it at the national stage by following Mr. Bhagat’s advice, even if it is for the sake of the argument here taken momentarily as well meant and above board.

Mr. Bhagat had once made out Mr. Modi as one who ‘believes in action’. He needs being asked where was this man of action, when Gujarat was burning? Or that it burnt was evidence of his being a man of ‘action’? Should not then Muslims take the evidence seriously, or should they believe his millionaire-writer apologist, Mr. Bhagat? It must be admitted that to his credit Mr. Bhagat admits to an incapacity, writing, ‘i can never fully understand the feelings a minority person goes through.’ But surely that does not prevent him from empathy, the stock of which is known to be more than most others in authors.

However, it must be conceded, Mr. Bhagat is right in his call, ‘my dear Muslim brothers and sisters, you have been had.’ There are several reports that bring this out, the latest being Harsh Mander’s Center for Equity Studies report. This is not necessarily as Mr. Bhagat implies because Muslims have propped up the Congress. Their support has been for those championing the development and secular plank. Mr. Bhagat appears to support without voicing it, a party that is not secular, howsoever strong it may be on development – a questionable proposition in itself once its record in Karnataka is taken on board. Consequently, it cannot benefit from the enlightened vote of Muslims.

Therefore, Mr. Bhagat’s parting shot – ‘It is our nation, yours and mine, that has to be made great now. Are you on board?’ – sounds trifle like a Bushism – ‘Either you are with us or against us!’. By that yardstick, Mr. Bhagat needs being told off, ‘We are manifestly not on board!’ For all his ‘audacious’ pains, he deserves the reason: Any unilateral redefinition of India by those he supports is not in the national interest and therefore cannot be endorsed by patriotic Muslims.

A Reply for Mr. Narendra Modi

By Firdaus Ahmed

Dear Mr. Modi,

You begin your letter by conflating the ‘government’ and the ‘state’ of Gujarat with yourself. This is a case of double whammy. You can shield yourself behind Gujaratis. Manipulating them thus also helps consolidate them behind you. The ploy is to deter Modi skeptics from tarring them with the same brush they would use to attack you.

The ploy cannot be allowed to work. Indeed, all three, the state, its government and the chief minister at the helm, are culpable to varying degrees. The government of Gujarat can be indicted for its unwillingness to ignore patently illegitimate directions to ‘look the other way’ as mobs incited by majoritarian extremists went on the rampage. It has taken a decade for policemen to finally start standing up for the truth. Second, interpreting the ‘state’ you refer to include people of Gujarat, they are answerable at the very least to their own conscience, and at a stretch, to their fellow countrymen for being manipulated into enabling your second term.

Your reference to the past decade in Gujarat as one of ‘peace’ misinterprets peace. Peace, as theory would have it, is of three types. ‘Negative peace’ comprises absence of direct violence. This is the peace of the grave or peace brought on by fear that obtains in Gujarat. But that is to discount the happenings in the Dangs district, the several ‘encounters’ and unexplained killings, such as that of no less than the former home minister, Pandya.

The second is ‘positive peace’ or absence of structural violence. This stands negated by Muslim ghettoisation, continued existence of displaced persons in camps and the continuing denial of justice. The third, ‘cultural peace’, is freedom of all to join in an inclusive march towards prosperity. Remembering harmony and unity in diversity ten years since its need was most acute is hardly timely.

The timing of your letter suggests panic as the case is now in court. The bombast is diversionary since surely, even if slowly, justice is set to culminate. Is your orchestration of public opinion a measure to influence the court? But there is hope that the courts in Gujarat may yet prove ‘satyamev jayate’, a hope that has been unfortunately been belied so far.

As for your ‘development’ record, firstly, Gujarat has been uniquely poised to benefit from the liberalization that has been ongoing for two decades now by its location, its entrepreneurial citizenry and its pre-existing economic base. This would have happened despite your presence. Secondly, any cohesion and administrative capacity it reflects owes in part to apprehension in the state apparatus and society. Watching the carnage and the blatant manner you have got away with accountability for it, would no doubt inform the common administrators attitude and output. After all, did not the great JRD Tata once remark that in the Emergency, trains were on time. India does not need and can do without the Chinese authoritarian model of development. Lastly, the record on development is to be judged independently of your record during the carnage. Harnessing it to suggest ‘forgive and forget’ is trifle self-serving.

Development is useful from restorative justice point of view that deals with restitution and reconciliation. However, that still leaves the demands of retributive justice, or punishment for transgressions, unaddressed. The ‘sad bhavna’ on display at government expense on Gujarat university grounds by preaching only to the converted is a patently political act and can hardly be called a compensation for an apology or acknowledgement of deficiency.

Your repeated references to the ‘nation’ betray instead that your act is the first volley of an attempted hat trick in Gujarat to prepare for a shift to New Delhi. Be reminded that the ‘nation’, comprising India’s voters, has proven far more sensible than politicians give it credit for.

Borrowing your salutation, ‘Always at your service’,
Firdaus Ahmed

Please see
http://www.milligazette.com/news/2347-an-open-reply-to-modi-s-open-letter-gujarat-narendra-modi-riots-indian-muslims

Opinions
An open reply to Modi's open letter

Narendra Modi, Chief Minister of Gujarat wrote an open letter to citizens of India on 13 September 2011, in it he resolved to fast for three days from, Saturday, the 17th September 2011, starting a movement of "Sadbhavana Mission." Here is a reply to it from a well-wisher of Gujarat.
By Firdaus Ahmed, The Milli Gazette
Published Online: Sep 18, 2011

Dear Mr. Modi,
You open your letter thus – “The unhealthy environment created by the unfounded and false allegations made against me and Government of Gujarat, after 2002 riots, has come to an end. For the past ten years, it has become fashionable to defame me and the state of Gujarat. These elements who could not tolerate any positive development of Gujarat have not left any stone unturned to defame Gujarat.”

Your attempt to conflate the government and the state of Gujarat with yourself is apparent. The opprobrium due to the government and its chief minister in respective measure in their deplorable reaction to the carnage in Gujarat cannot be escaped. The “state” of Gujarat, that presumably refers to fellow Indians belonging there, also have to answer to their collective and individual conscience in so far they have chosen you as their chief minister despite knowledge of your record in the carnage. Therefore, there is no escaping accountability of the three – the state, its government and you – in the Gujarat carnage, misrepresented in the media as “riots”.

The government of Gujarat is to be arraigned for its supine obedience to illegal directions that it restricted its damage control responses after the Godhra incident, the antecedents of which have been willfully misrepresented. The administration and the police required to react with professional zeal. This would have been possible had they had the moral fiber to disregard the directions allowing certain sections to vent their spleen. The second reason for the government’s culpability is in complicity of sections of it in suppressing evidence, propagating false accounts and pursuing justice selectively. These cannot be obscured by pointing to a development record.

The state of Gujarat, that is interpreted here as its citizens, bears the onus of not disciplining you at the elections. The one manner of expressing its displeasure at the events in their home state would have been to exercise their franchise bearing in mind the inadmissibility of the manner of your stewardship of the state during the crisis. Even if the details of your culpability were not as well known then as is now known, the fact that carnage was allowed to be perpetrated and its perpetrators continue in their midst is something that the society needed to have dwelt on while exercising their democratic prerogative. That they did not do so is apparent in their giving you a reprieve and allowing you to chalk up a development record to help paper over your earlier demonstration of incapacity and ill will.

Democracy requires an alert citizenry, one that is sensitive to manipulation attempts. The voters in Gujarat have to answer as to why they have allowed themselves to be misled. This is not to deny their democratic right to cast their vote to who they wish, but to remind them that it is a responsibility they owe themselves and their fellow citizens to cast the vote with due discrimination.

This brings one to your record. That you were in charge of the state when these events were allowed to occur rightly should have led to your tendering your resignation taking moral responsibility. That you did not do so indicates your continuing need to be in a position to address the aftermath, to manipulate evidence. As is well known, you were saved from dismissal since the Centre was being run then by your own party and you had a well wisher as the Union home minister.

As for the development record, questioning its under-gridding drivers is in order. Firstly, Gujarat has been uniquely poised to benefit from the liberalization that has been ongoing for two decades now by its location, its entrepreneurial citizenry and its pre-existing economic base. This would have happened despite your presence or leadership. In fact, the development record stands blemished by the blot on Gujarat that you were principally instrumental in placing on its fair name. Secondly, any cohesion and administrative capacity it reflects owes in part to apprehension in the state apparatus and society.

Watching the carnage and the blatant manner you have got away with accountability for it, would no doubt inform the common man’s attitudes and output. After all, did not someone as important as Tata once remark that in the Emergency trains ran on time. Evaluating means is important to assessing ends. Lastly, the record on development is to be judged independently of your record during the carnage. The “forgive and forget” formula that your letter purveys is trifle self-serving on this score.

The timing of your letter also bears reflection. It bespeaks of a strategic move to move centerstage. The BJP central leadership in disarray and the Congress on the defensive makes it an opportune juncture to make the move. With the next Gujarat elections behind you, you would be in a position to stake a claim for a national profile. While there is no gainsaying that Gujaratis will have to take their own decisions, your attempt at acquiring a national role means that it would require to be purposefully combated.

You are democratically empowered to take a try. But this nation cannot afford to allow people to take charge of its destiny who have not paid a price for their past actions of omission or commission. That it has done so earlier such as in case of Mr. Advani, is no reason for it to err a second time. In his case, it was a mosque that was demolished for which he owed primary responsibility. To say that crowds he mobilised went out of control is only self-exculpatory. Likewise, the mobs that went wild in Gujarat were yours to control. The allegation you need to face up to is that you not merely failed to control them, but set them about their task by restraining the only force that could have prevented this, the police. They exacted a price of Gujaratis in lives. This is clearly greater a case for accountability than that of Mr. Advani.

Your references to the “nation” testify that the battle set to culminate in 2014 has been kicked off by you. Be mindful that India’s voters have proven far more sensible than their politicians give them credit for. They will surely teach you a lesson that your supporters in Gujarat have so far prevented you from receiving. That is, in case the courts do not do so earlier. After all, the case in the sessions court has only just begun; despite your obfuscation in giving the impression of closure at beginning your letter.

As the popular line goes: ‘picture abhi baki hai mere dost’. You will no doubt find, quite as you tweeted, that indeed, “God is Great!”

Regards,
A friend of Gujarat

http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/sep/fah-terror.htm

TERROR INVESTIGATIONS
Shall we imprison everyone?

11 September 2011 - A recent op-ed in the Times of India, "No More Chasing Shadows" (9 September), has the head of 'a group on C4ISRT (Command, Control, Communications and Computers Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaisance and Targeting) in South Asia' casting the net of prospective terrorists wider, but not wide enough to possibly net the likely suspects.

He considers the public stereotype of the terrorist as a 'desperately poor, illiterate, uneducated, rural-based or ghetto-based, religious fanatic, a single young man in his late teens or early twenties' as inadequate. 'Madrassa students from poor families' are no longer the usual suspects. Instead, he alights on those who 'have no criminal records; are usually highly educated professionals such as engineers, doctors and architects; are usually married men with children; and have never displayed any religious extremism.'

As I read all this I got a feeling he's describing me. He goes on to say, chillingly for me as I read on, that they come from 'upper middle class families and exhibit only moderate religious behaviour.' According to him, I am now half way down to becoming a 'terror activist'. Casting his net to include both the 'poor, illiterate' and the 'rich, educated', he leaves out the non-existent 'poor, educated' and 'rich, uneducated'. Perhaps he'll include them in the dragnet over the next two blasts. Muslim women, Ishrat Jahan notwithstanding, have got away unscathed.

He goes on to enlighten us, 'Most of them joined the SIMI or HuJI only a few weeks earlier, and their families, colleagues, and close friends had detected no indications of their having done so.' To him, 'Even their families and friends would have no inkling of their having been recruited...'. This means that you don't really know if I have joined up or not as yet. You will only know when I commit my first terror act which to him will be the 'first illegal or immoral act which they have ever committed.' Apparently, elsewhere it has taken but 'three weeks' for the likes of me to 'carry out a terror attack to avenge the perceived discrimination.'

Luckily, my employers have not 'discriminated' against me professionally nor have I been 'denied entry in social circles commensurate' with my education. Thankfully, I have no reason to be a terrorist, on this score at least. That is a relief. But, not for long though.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

As an educated middle class Muslim, I have often had to hear, 'Stand up and speak out!' I was required to speak out against the usurpation of my religion by fanatics and condemn terrorism. I now choose to follow the advice. I begin by emulating SR 'Epiglottis' Khan, "I am not a terrorist!" I venture further than my brief, "Nor are my co-religionists!" Let me explain why.

By his cryptic designation, Prasad appears to be a denizen of the shadowy, intelligence world. His world view is perhaps widely held in the intelligence community. On that score it needs dissection.

He quotes profusely from the 'Band of Boys' theory of Marc Sageman, 'a forensic psychiatrist who has worked for the CIA in Pakistan and Afghanistan.' He also approvingly points to the UK police's surveillance of congregations in mosques. Clearly, great gains have been made by Mr. Chidambaram's trips overseas in terms of emulating homeland security measures elsewhere, as indeed they must. But how far are the conditions there replicated in India and corresponding counter measures import worthy?

The intelligence agencies can be likened to someone who has lost his car keys in the dark and proceeds to look for them under the light of the lamp post only. While no effort needs to be spared in getting terrorists to book, this is applicable for terrorists of any hue. The problem is in assuming the blasts that have taken place as having the minority's signature. This is true only to an extent. A proportion of blasts can now be irrefutably attributed to majoritarian extremists of the Abhinav Bharat variety. It may be worth investigation if the Abhinav Bharat is merely the tip of the iceberg, with its underwater mass perhaps stretching into the state and its intelligence agencies.

There are several blasts yet unexplained. These include the horrendous ones in metropolitan cities of 2008. The holes in the Batla House encounter story do not lend confidence to close these cases currently attributed to Aqil and his Azamgarh cohort, now largely eliminated. The pre CWG shooting of Taiwanese tourists, the High Court blast of earlier this year and now the latest, the nineteenth, blast in Delhi, cannot necessarily be ascribed as minority perpetrated violence. In other words, the net needs to be cast wider. Why?

The 2008 blasts were in the run up to national elections. The narrative sought could have been that the UPA was 'soft' on terror because of vote bank concerns. Likewise, this time round, the Supreme Court mandated investigations in the Gujarat carnage case are set to culminate soon. There is disarray in the right wing mainstream. The Anna agitation provided a momentary respite. It is perhaps reckoned that it is time to get back to the main story.

In other words, a crime has been committed, a motive exists. Evidence must then be sought. There is a case for setting the NIA to look for the keys where they are as likely to be found as anywhere else. The government, in not owning up to a strategy, makes Digvijay Singh appear a maverick.

Prasad is right in demanding 'original innovative thinking on part of India's intelligence agencies', but wrong in pointing them towards an 'appreciation of the psychology of urban Indian Muslim professionals.' That he does so stinks of an attempt to put the intelligence agencies off the smell. The purpose, now easier to discern, is to intimidate into silence engaged Muslim voices pointing out that the emperor is without clothes.

With this piece of propaganda occupying prime place in a leading national daily, it can be irrefutably said that the fringe has gone mainstream. At such junctures, Niemoeller's phrase comes readily to mind, 'Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak out because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak out for me.' They've now passed the secular Muslims, so secular Hindus must be next!
⊕

milligazette
BLASTING THE TERROR NARRATIVE

By Firdaus Ahmed

In a first, the NIA has been launched from the very outset to probe a bomb blast at the Delhi High Court. It has earlier been grafted onto cases already being pursued by the police. In yet another useful precedent, the government has been careful not to point fingers prematurely. These two suggest an improvement in India’s response to terrorism, even if yet another blast is a case of one too many.

As is usual by now, ‘informed’ analysts are taking it upon themselves to dwell on the helpful pointers in the email purportedly received from the perpetrators. The HUJI has apparently claimed responsibility, with the blasts intended to force the release Afzal Guru from death row. With newspapers carrying the identity kit portrait of a bearded suspect with upper lip clean shaven, the know-all analysts rest their case.

But the government’s initial caution bespeaks of a wider set of suspects. By its two acts the government has broadcast that the net cast will be much wider. It will hopefully include majoritarian terrorists, even as the HUJI angle is pursued to its logical conclusion. The implication is that there is more to the Abhinav Bharat case than out in the open.

It is lazy analysis and worse crime forensics to assume that emails from unidentified sources serve as evidence of culpability. For one, an earlier email for instance had the sender identifying himself as al Arbi, corruption of al Arabi, quite like the current one does. Al Arabi incidentally was a renowned sufi. Second, arrest of a cyber café owner in in Kishtwar suggests a link to Kashmir, the email could be merely to take advantage of the occasion to press home the case for Afzal Guru. Third, that the emails have incendiary content against the majority could equally indicate a desire for deepening the rift, an aim that saffron extremists mirror. Any creative writer can put together such emails.

Questions surrounding the Batla House encounter make the explanation of the blasts in the cosmopolitan cities in 2008 unpersuasive. The blasts that did not occur in Surat remain unexplained. Perpetrators of the blast of May this year in the court premises and those involved in the drive by shooting of the Taiwanese tourists prior to the CWG remain unknown.

One nationalism inspired anchor asked if vote bank politics holds back the government. He is right in sensing that it does, but wrong in his unstated understanding, an understanding seemingly widely shared with his viewers and therefore left unstated, that it is the minority vote at stake. Instead, the government’s reticence stems from its inability and unwillingness to beard the majoritarian terrorist in his den. That would cost it credibility with the majority, misled for over a decade of media fanned minority baiting. The decade since 9/11 formed the perfect backdrop for the campaign.

The government is rightly circumspect, but on the right track. Its noose, with a little help from the Supreme Court, is closing in on an opposition stalwart. The extreme right, with subterranean linkages with the political right, is mobilising silently to thwart it. Behind the current attack can be read once again a diversionary gambit; now that Mr. Anna Hazare is back in Ralegaon Siddhi.

The popular narrative is flawed. It carries little conviction with the minority community. This is itself evidence of the inter-community distance opened up over the last three decades, index of the success of the as yet unidentified standard bearers of Hindutva’s challenge to secular culture. The government, run by center-right party cannot, as the well worn cliché will have it, ‘run with the hare and hunt with the hounds’. It needs taking the opportunity offered by the investigations to open up India’s violent recent past to a ‘warts and all’ scrutiny. This will fetch it votes of the non-denominational secular majority.

http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Op100911proscons.asp

Tehelka Magazine, Vol 8, Issue 36, Dated 10 Sep 2011


tehelka.com

Dear General, Please Stay Out Of Politics

In these politically charged times, Army chief VK Singh’s comments on civilian issues could hurt democracy

By Firdaus Ahmed

ARMY CHIEF VK Singh’s comment on the state of the nation as equivalent to “daldal” (morass) comes as no surprise. The remarks were part of his take on social activist Anna Hazare’s high-voltage agitation against corruption. As a citizen, Singh has every right to an opinion. As a member of the defence services, the right to voicing it is curtailed considerably. As army chief, it is much less so, particularly on politically charged issues and especially so in politically charged times as now.

That the army chief is currently in a tussle with the defence ministry over the controversy surrounding his date of birth makes his remarks mistimed. The decision of the ministry has been in favour of the earlier date of birth, resulting in Singh having to retire next year. The adjutant general has reportedly asked the ministry for the reason. Therefore his comments cannot but be read with his personal predicament as backdrop.

More importantly, the chief has laid himself open to questions from a different angle in his take: “Interesting in terms of how we are witnessing the power of democracy, the power of the people.” The democratic protests that the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) has attracted, both in Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeast, have not displaced the army from its position on the continuance of the Act. The fast of Irom Sharmila is into its second decade, to little avail. The move on dilution of AFSPA’s ‘draconian’ provisions has become a political football between the ministries of home, defence and law, since the army refuses to budge. Clearly, it appears that the democratic sensibilities of the chief are only selectively aroused.

To the chief’s credit is his own record on tackling corruption. That he has identified himself closely with curbing it within the ranks can be seen in his remarks on taking over the baton, “We will focus attention on improving internal health.” In his previous billet at Kolkata, he had taken action in the infamous Sukhna land scam. The graver Adarsh Housing Society scam, involving politicians and bureaucrats, has since scarred his predecessor’s name. Therefore, his desire to personally provide ballast to the national focus on the issue is understandable.

For the military as an institution, the message is loud and clear. A series of scandals has dented its image. Because it expends 10-15 per cent of public monies, being untainted is more than an issue in ethics — it is one of combat effectiveness. Singh is only echoing what he once said, “Until the time our internal health is good, we would not be able to fight the external threats.”

However, the immanent issue is one of civil-military relations. The fragility of our democratic polity, currently fully on display, suggests greater exercise of circumspection on part of the brass. Any overt overstepping of the line of deference rightly calls for a formal check by the minister. The brass is already reportedly under a ‘gag’ to curb its tendency to snipe at the bureaucracy, which in their mind’s eye runs the government. The problem with this is that it further weakens the credibility of the government, showing it up as ‘weak’. This redounds to increase the relative power of the army internally. This may not be in the best democratic interest.

As it is, democratic good health in terms of Parliament’s authority to legislate autonomously is under challenge. That the occasion has enabled a diversionary rallying of conservative formations behind the agitation indicates that the democratic upsurge is equally political as civil society-rooted. The military as an institution is in danger of an unwitting alliance with the conservative forces. Because it has weight in prestige, the army’s position can be misappropriated by forces it has little comprehension of, being politically naïve. Democratic good health can do without gratuitous buffeting of civil-military relations at this juncture.

#3441, 23 August 2011
Interrogating Security Expansionism in India
email: firdyahmed@yahoo.com
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/interrogating-security-expansionism-in-india-3441.html

The head of a think-tank writing in The Tribune (http://bit.ly/o0qXbO) lists military capabilities that India requires up to fifteen years. In strategic circles, ever since remarks of the former army chief were possibly deliberately leaked, the ‘threat’ has been magnified to becoming a ‘twinned’ threat from Pakistan and China combined.

The capabilities deemed desirable are to include a mountain strike corps both in the Northeast and in J&K. It is possible that with time that would mean two for J&K; one for each front. Offensive capabilities for defensive formations are to be created in imitation of those done in the plains prompted by ‘Cold Start’. The three strike corps in the plains are to continue for conventional deterrence purposes. Firepower resources, in particular precision guided munitions, are to be augmented for stand-off degradation, since territory may not be as relevant as an objective. Two rapid reaction-cum-air assault divisions (with an amphibious brigade each) are suggested.

It may be recalled that elsewhere the former Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee had required a wide-ranging intercontinental ballistic missile capability. The DRDO is keen on working on technology for a BMD system, despite its known shortcomings to deliver on more mundane equipment. Further, the Army has requested for placing of the ITBP under its command on the China border. The budget for internal security, handled by the MHA, has gone up three times over the past decade.

This article makes two observations on the foregoing threat-mongering. One is that this indicates expansionism in the security sector, with the consequences that amount to militarization. The second is on possible social consequences, generally neglected in strategic discussions.

The NSA in his Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture asked for moderation in the criticisms mounted by think-tanks, stating, "This also requires that some of our media and commentators, whose unquestioned brilliance is regularly on display lambasting other countries for their politics and policies, learn the virtues of moderation." His take was, "why create self-fulfilling prophesies of conflict with powerful neighbours like China?"

Our goal must be defence, not offense, unless offense is necessary for deterrence or to protect India's ability to continue its own transformation. The think-tank recommendations, in their own words, go well beyond this: “Genuine deterrence can come only from the ability to take the fight deep into the adversary’s territory through the launching of major offensive operations.”

Clearly, there is a case for debate within the national security system on this divergence, with the NSA persuading the army that their recipe - ‘the defence of porous borders requires us to learn new rules for the use and combination of force, persuasion and deterrence, alongside other more benign means’ - holds water.

The second neglected dimension of the social impact of militarization requires acknowledging firstly that recruiting patterns in the security forces have a built in bias towards the ‘Hindi heartland’. In theory this is based on the recruitable male population of a state. Those traditionally contributing to military numbers stand to gain.

There are two implications. One is in the channelling of revenue expenditure of the government in terms of VI pay commission enhanced salaries and perks into certain areas. It is symptomatic of hidden affirmative action. The second is in the diversity of the country not finding reflection in the composition of security forces. A narrower concept of nationalism, emanating from the Hindi heartland, finds sway. This may be at odds with ethnically and culturally diverse host communities, where the deployment takes place. In areas of insurgency, it accentuates the cultural gap.

A result of increased deployment, particularly in thinly populated borderlands, is on the social landscape. For instance, Gautam Naulakha records that the move to provide the Rashtriya Rifles with cantonment accommodation in Kashmir has elicited a negative response from the people and the state administration since it involves land allocation. Likewise, the increase by two divisions in the Northeast and the recommendation of a strike corps there, implies that there would be a larger visibility and imprint on the consciousness of the people of a different ethnic stock. This remains an understudied dimension.

Also, an over-developed security sector draws discourse, policy direction and resources away from a development to a defence template. Higher returns in the defence sector will draw human resources into it. This has qualitative implications for the competing sectors. A fallout is advantaged groups developing a stake in India’s identity as a ‘garrison state’, at the expense of groups on the territorial and economic margins.

While economic growth has released the monies, this has alternative uses overlooked in threat induced expansion. Sole reliance on strategic considerations amounts to strategic determinism. This could prove particularly hurtful if the strategic calculus is misinformed and, worse, possibly motivated by parochial concerns.

The NSA is right in his warning on the dangers of India as a ‘premature superpower’ (Martin Wolf): “Their rise, as that of Wilhelmine Germany or militarist Japan, was cut short prematurely.”

http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/aug/fah-control.htm

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Whose command? Whose control?


14 August 2011 - The significance of the strategic nuclear complex was brought out in the controversy over remarks of the retiring Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that India's response to nuclear attack would be 'very heavy'. The remarks reportedly did not amuse his boss, the defence minister, as they were made when the India-Pakistan foreign ministers talks were ongoing.

To what extent is the Chairman COSC the custodian of the nuclear baton? The current juncture provides an opportunity to reflect on the wider issue of command and control of the nuclear complex, both in peace-time and during wars.

The Saxena task force will reportedly work on a national security doctrine. The idea is that once the national security survey is done, then the structures necessary to keep the country secure would be thought through. The task force's composition and parameters have not been officially released yet; the time is yet ripe to influence its terms of reference to include the nuclear complex.

Command and control of the nuclear complex takes place at different levels. The upper - political - level is of democratic control by the political leadership, which is in turn accountable to the parliament. The second, grand strategic level, is through the national security council system integrating national security experts, the military and technologists. The third one, the strategic level, is the operational one of the Strategic Forces Command.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org


There are problems at the all three levels. Relatively lesser known are those existing at the strategic level, since the work of the SFC is necessarily shrouded in secrecy. At this level, integrating the technologist into the chain of command is possibly a challenge since the military holds the delivery systems, the atomic energy technologist is entrusted with the weapons core and the DRDO representative is in charge of the weapons assembly.

At the second level, it is well known that the COSC is 'double hatted'. He is not only the chief of his service but 'first among equals' among the three chiefs. He is by the latter responsibility also to oversee the SFC. The relationship between the military man in charge of the SFC, the COSC and the NSA is also somewhat nebulous. This results in inadequate attention to the working of the SFC by either the NSA, who presumably would expect the COSC to do the supervisory role, or the COSC, who cannot possibly have the time.

The creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff would presumably resolve this considerably. But the relationship with the NSA would require working out. The SFC cannot be left to serve to two bosses. Unity of command is a universally hallowed command principle in the services. It must be the CDS who is unambiguously in charge. The NSA heads the Executive Council of which the COSC is currently is part. But with the CDS available, the Political Council needs a military adviser to complement the advice of the NSA.

The belief that such advice will be overly militaristic may not be warranted. After all, civilian militarism is also not unknown. The advantage of having clear lines of command and responsibilities is that it would enable accountability. Keeping the nuclear decision making mechanism and process diffuse may make the weapons appear more usable. Pinpointing responsibility will help with self-deterrence, since post bellum accountability will be easier to exact.

Since the nuclear complex, including the Atomic Energy Commission is partially outside of the defence ministry, the defence reforms would be complete if they included the nuclear complex also. This is the opportunity to domesticate it. Presently, it is overseen by the prime minister, but is notably scientist-bureaucrat driven. As a result, institutional interests have a wider play in the way the complex works than is warranted. The place of nuclear weapons in national security needs spelling out and the reforms could emplace the system that will provision it.

As suggested by a noted nuclear watcher, WPS Sidhu, this can be done by having either a new parliamentary committee serve as check or increase the powers of the standing committee on defence to do the same, 'in camera' if necessary. India's nuclear trajectory is now at a juncture that this can be done with maturity and relative openness, as any democratic state should.

Why are these steps necessary?

A discussion on the upward delegation of nuclear-related decision making is needed now, even if some of it were to take place secretly. India's idea that nuclear weapons are political weapons is right, and India has rightly forsworn being the first to introduce them into conflict. Still, the country's proactive conventional doctrine is out of step with its nuclear doctrine, as is evident from India continuing to think of 'heavy' response. With Pakistan's unveiling its tactical nuclear weapon, Nasr, as noted by Manoj Joshi in his columns, the nuclear factor is far more in the foreground than is being acknowledged.

The defence sector cannot be reformed in isolation of its place in national security - that could cause an imbalance in governance. The 'defence versus development' debate is not yet a settled one, either; this is all the more reason to have Parliament more involved in the oversight of the nuclear complex. Ultimately, the elected representatives are the ones who have responsibility for ensuring the security of the nation, and also for delivering economic and social development. The legislature's role as check on the executive can be fulfilled as well, with parliamentary oversight.

The right step to take now is to broaden the Saxena task force's terms of reference. While it is likely to take a deep look at the CDS issue, this is insufficient. The task force must look beyond the defence ministry into the relationship between the legislature and the executive. The legislature should, on its own, bring this on to its agenda, since the executive is unlikely to think of widening the remit of the task force on its own

http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/jul/fah-negotiate.htm
INDO-PAK TALKS
Negotiate in good faith

19 July 2011 - It is quite clear that the intractable conflict between India and Pakistan cannot be solved by military means. Pakistan cannot hope to defeat India and India cannot, in light of the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, hope to control Pakistan; leave alone defeat a nuclear-armed Pakistan. That leaves only the route of peace negotiations open.

Negotiations can be of two types - one is through exercising power in a manner as to extract concessions on the negotiations table from a position of strength. This approach has been the preferred one for both states historically, and the ongoing round of negotiations is also in this vein. The second is to take to these discussions sincerely by not seeing these as yet another arena of power play. A mutually agreeable outcome is only possible by shifting to an accommodationist one.

The current approach is dominated by realism - putting national interest above all other considerations (moral, social), and acting on the belief that each side should focus on maximising its own gains from negotiations, no matter what the implications may be to the other side. This power politics has dominated the way the two sides have gone about their negotiations, and even among the populations of the two countries, a large number have come to see negotiations as a means to achieve dominance. This is simply untenable.

Trust has not resulted from the confidence building measures in place. This was predictable, since both sides have been insincere. They have used the peace negotiations for positional bargaining. Even as they talk, in the background their power contest continues, in the hope that they can deal from a 'position of strength'. Given these military, intelligence, diplomatic and political moves in the background, neither side is willing to concede ground. Both believe that the future may find them better placed to force the issue on their terms. Each takes its interests as non-negotiable, and sees negotiations as only being pursued to get the other side to concede.

The advent of nuclear weapons makes peace through negotiations as the only desirable way to bring their outstanding differences to closure. Their presence has led to a false belief that under their cover, there is little need to engage meaningfully with the other state. The two states appear to be holding out till when their strategic efforts place them in a better position. In India's case it is the military 'surge' brought about by a resurgent economy. In Pakistan's case, it would like to keep negotiations steady till it can come out of its current trough in national circumstance and morale.

Military backdrop

The India-Pakistan conflict ranks alongside the Israel-Palestinian conflict as the oldest in the 'Charter era' of the United Nations, qualifying it as a 'protracted' conflict. Such a conflict is defined as one that sees alternation between periods of peace and conflict over an issue that remains unresolved.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

The military doctrines of both states are offensive, at both the conventional and nuclear levels. The state of peace is considerably precarious in South Asia, and conflict always appears inevitable and imminent. In the last 15 years alone - i.e. since South Asia went nuclear - there have been four periods of crisis: 1987, 1990, 2001-02 and 2008. Given this, why have the two states not invested in peace through negotiations to the extent as is necessary? Do they not sense, during the repeated negotiations and during the various crises that a different approach is necessary?

While the process of negotiations has been pursued, the approach of both states makes it impossible to obtain a mutually acceptable outcome. This is easier explained in respect of Pakistan since it is dominated by the military elite. Militaries typically think in realist terms. In India's case, it has a choice. Yet it too has approached its relations with Pakistan through a realist prism. This mirroring of perspectives between the two leads to negotiations being meaningless. The process itself becomes a site of power tryst. To make progress the two states must come to the table with a 'give and take' attitude, which is by definition necessary to negotiations.

Meandering negotiations

Negotiations have been as frequent as conflict between the two countries. The first war for Kashmir in 1947-48 resulted in a peace settlement and a ceasefire line. Under US pressure, the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian War resulted in the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks of 1963. The Tashkent Agreement succeeded the 1965 war. While the 1971 war was ostensibly fought over East Pakistan, the Kashmir issue figured more prominently in the Simla Agreement of July 1972. The two sides promised to take up the Kashmir issue bilaterally through peaceful means.

India believes that the Simla agreement had a 'secret' clause in which Bhutto agreed to give up Pakistani claims to Kashmir after he consolidated power and returned the military to barracks. However, lack of progress led to Pakistan's proxy war. This energized the peace process from the early nineties, with the two states agreeing to discuss all issues in a 'composite dialogue' in 1997. The Lahore process that took this up in February 1999 was interrupted by the Kargil War of July that year. The Agra Summit was arranged to break the deadlock in 2001. However, the 'twin peaks crisis', of 2001-02, caused disruption.

The peace process finally took off in 2004 along two lines: the composite dialogue and in the 'back channel'. Both made considerable progress till the Musharraf regime ran into internal problems, and were broken off after Mumbai 26/11. A parallel Track Two dialogue has been in progress for the past two decades. The current situation has the two reengaging once again, but only tentatively. As seen from the Mumbai blasts this month, the process is tenuous at best.

A new course needed

There are three reasons why India could change tack. One is that in facing the challenge of China as some foresee in the future, it needs to have Pakistan alongside. The second is that the power play it is current engaged in may witness Pakistan spiraling out of control. In such a case, India would end up at the 'frontline'. Pakistan's predicament as 'frontline' state twice should warn India against aspiring to such status. Third, the kind of power that India is harnessing in terms of military hardware is unusable in the nuclear circumstance. It can in any case continue amassing this with China as excuse.

Lastly, the power play approach privileges certain sections of the establishment such as arms merchants, right wings of both the majority and minority, and the military with a vested interest in fractured relations. Therefore, a changed stance on negotiations is necessary.

The triple blasts in Mumbai provide another opportunity for introspection. The two states continue to be too much closer to war than they need be. To avert nuclear dangers that could result, they need to refocus on negotiations as the only way out of their protracted conflict. This means a move away from their current approach of using the negotiations process for power play