india's brass

Opinion

India's brass: What the controversy misses http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=32003 By Firdaus Ahmed The movement of a particular file within the corridors of South Block is being watched very closely by partisans involved who then speedily convey its location to their acolytes in the media. The file's movement is expected to result in an announcement on nomination of General Suhag as the next army chief on Bikram Singh demitting office in end July. The defence minister has assured that all procedures will be followed. Media commentary has nevertheless served up yet another agenda item to divide the attentive public into two: those for the government or those against it, not only in general but also on this particular score. In the discussion the major point emphasized is that the military must not be politicized. It is interesting that both sides are using the same argument. Those on the BJP side suggest that undue haste in declaring the successor by the Congress-led government is to ensure that their nominee is in place. This would ensure a 'line of succession' forged by its pushing out of VK Singh from the chief's office a year before he was due to leave. The opposite view is that not nominating the next chief's successor timely would be to allow BJP to politicize the process by its possibly passing over Suhag as chief. Currently, the next senior in line is an army commander who incidentally is related to VK Singh. However, this is only the ongoing row. Anticipating the forthcoming row would also be in order. In the widely expected case of the government changing to one headed by the BJP what could likely happen will make the current controversy pale in comparison. If the BJP gets into power, it could consider overturning the announcement of the successor of the chief and undertake the same process yet again to arrive at a different name of successor. Procedurally it will no doubt be well taken care of by bureaucrats piloting the file past the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet; this will by far amount to greater politicization. By no means is this the only possible future. Firstly, the Congress may get cold feet and leave the appointment to the next government. Secondly, the BJP may not come to power and a third front or a Congress led minority government may have no problem with the changeover. Thirdly, the BJP may choose to stick out the tenure of the next chief. The latter is not impossible to visualize since the BJP may well be deterred. It would be blamed for politicising the appointment. If it appoints the general related to VK Singh, it could be fingered for favouritism, particularly since VK Singh may also be in the legislature by then. It may also be able to live with Suhag since Suhag would be on the defensive from the beginning under the impression that the government is averse to him owing to the controversy preceding his appointment. Compromised thus, he may be more willing to play along. The example of the sacking of Admiral Bhagwat in the initial period of the earlier BJP government could make him bow even where he need not. Even if it does not pressurise Suhag, as a professional he would be faced with a choice of complying or resigning. In case it does show Suhag the door, the BJP would reason that it is not so much politicising the brass as much as applying a necessary corrective to politicization by the Congress. Therefore, the possibility of a forthcoming controversy over the near term that is much worse than the ongoing one over the impending announcement of the chief designate is yet at an arms distance, though not remote. It can unfold as early as month end. However, the more significant point is not so much the personalities involved or the issue of politicization of the appointment of army chief. The latter while important in itself is more so because of the subsequent politicization could upturn the apolitical character and image of the forces. Even if in a hierarchical structure such as is the army, the chief carries much weight, the military's apex functioning is collegial with the major decisions being taken at the biannual army commanders' conference. Therefore, having a politicized chief is not enough to have critical mass in politicizing the army. The top order needs working on equally. A politicized chief serves a useful function in opening up the military for further politicization over time by enabling the conditions that make only those with right political credentials to rise in the hierarchy setting its political tone and texture as an organisation. For most part, the scope for politicization is restricted by the professional and technical content of the military's social function. Since by all accounts it is kept out of the loop on key decisions, it is not particularly worrying as to who gets to be chief. Most reaching the rank of army commander are of equal professional worth, so individuals are not of much consequence either. However, the significant issue is that the shift in grounding of professionalism of the military, from an objective to a subjective mode. Currently, the military is taken as exhibiting objective professionalism. This implies that its input to national security decision making is unbiased, frank and forthright. While it can be accused of having organizational interest clutter such input often, such as in the case of its input on Siachen or on AFSPA for instance, overall, the Indian military has been credited with practicing objective professionalism. However, the problem is that with the BJP coming to power, particularly if it is unencumbered by any coalition partners, it may prefer a subjective model of military professionalism. This is the critical issue that will face India and its military over the forthcoming BJP tenure, if it comes to it. It would be a tribute to the professionalism of the Indian military in case it survives the encounter with religious nationalism with its moorings intact. It has been hypothesized earlier by this writer that this may prove difficult in light of the nationalist subcultures waiting on wings for just such an opportunity to 'take over' as the dominant subculture and to eventually dissolve other subcultures, including that of professional and radical professional within the military. Subjective professionalism in a military implies an obedience that comes from imbibing the ideological predispositions of its civilian superiors rather than basing input on the objective coordinates of a situation. This implies that even if in olive green, the brass could well think saffron. Not only would the government have to bear the opportunity cost of an advice it wishes to hear, but also its consequences. To illustrate, even if retention of Siachen is taken as strategically sustainable, in the nationalist subculture this would owe not to the strategic coordinates of the argument, but for a 'weak' India to overcome its millennial strategic sloth and display its six-pack finally. Therefore, if an act is to be judged as politicization, a key criterion would be the intent and consequence. The unseemly controversy being raised is only partially about the ambitions of VK Singh, a BJP party candidate. It betrays an intent to take over what is widely regarded as a professional institution with an intent to subvert its professionalism from objective, to the extent it is, to subjective, that it has lately exhibited a potential towards (as pointed out in this column from time to time). The threat of politicization is not about a military taking over the government but the government's ideological orientation taking over the military. A possible future is that the military will no longer be a professional military of a secular state, but a religious nationalism inspired military serving a majoritarian state. However, by no means is this a 'done' deal yet. Considered against this yardstick, the Congress' move to get a new chief in place before it demits office, in keeping with the supposed 'chain of succession', is positively benign. It is a defensive maneuver out to protect the army from appointment of a political chief, who would then open up the army to right wing inroads. Consequently, the current controversy over the appointment of the army chief is but a symptom of a wider syndrome out to beset India that may manifest in the army as politicization, soon.

http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Op100911proscons.asp

Tehelka Magazine, Vol 8, Issue 36, Dated 10 Sep 2011


tehelka.com

Dear General, Please Stay Out Of Politics

In these politically charged times, Army chief VK Singh’s comments on civilian issues could hurt democracy

By Firdaus Ahmed

ARMY CHIEF VK Singh’s comment on the state of the nation as equivalent to “daldal” (morass) comes as no surprise. The remarks were part of his take on social activist Anna Hazare’s high-voltage agitation against corruption. As a citizen, Singh has every right to an opinion. As a member of the defence services, the right to voicing it is curtailed considerably. As army chief, it is much less so, particularly on politically charged issues and especially so in politically charged times as now.

That the army chief is currently in a tussle with the defence ministry over the controversy surrounding his date of birth makes his remarks mistimed. The decision of the ministry has been in favour of the earlier date of birth, resulting in Singh having to retire next year. The adjutant general has reportedly asked the ministry for the reason. Therefore his comments cannot but be read with his personal predicament as backdrop.

More importantly, the chief has laid himself open to questions from a different angle in his take: “Interesting in terms of how we are witnessing the power of democracy, the power of the people.” The democratic protests that the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) has attracted, both in Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeast, have not displaced the army from its position on the continuance of the Act. The fast of Irom Sharmila is into its second decade, to little avail. The move on dilution of AFSPA’s ‘draconian’ provisions has become a political football between the ministries of home, defence and law, since the army refuses to budge. Clearly, it appears that the democratic sensibilities of the chief are only selectively aroused.

To the chief’s credit is his own record on tackling corruption. That he has identified himself closely with curbing it within the ranks can be seen in his remarks on taking over the baton, “We will focus attention on improving internal health.” In his previous billet at Kolkata, he had taken action in the infamous Sukhna land scam. The graver Adarsh Housing Society scam, involving politicians and bureaucrats, has since scarred his predecessor’s name. Therefore, his desire to personally provide ballast to the national focus on the issue is understandable.

For the military as an institution, the message is loud and clear. A series of scandals has dented its image. Because it expends 10-15 per cent of public monies, being untainted is more than an issue in ethics — it is one of combat effectiveness. Singh is only echoing what he once said, “Until the time our internal health is good, we would not be able to fight the external threats.”

However, the immanent issue is one of civil-military relations. The fragility of our democratic polity, currently fully on display, suggests greater exercise of circumspection on part of the brass. Any overt overstepping of the line of deference rightly calls for a formal check by the minister. The brass is already reportedly under a ‘gag’ to curb its tendency to snipe at the bureaucracy, which in their mind’s eye runs the government. The problem with this is that it further weakens the credibility of the government, showing it up as ‘weak’. This redounds to increase the relative power of the army internally. This may not be in the best democratic interest.

As it is, democratic good health in terms of Parliament’s authority to legislate autonomously is under challenge. That the occasion has enabled a diversionary rallying of conservative formations behind the agitation indicates that the democratic upsurge is equally political as civil society-rooted. The military as an institution is in danger of an unwitting alliance with the conservative forces. Because it has weight in prestige, the army’s position can be misappropriated by forces it has little comprehension of, being politically naïve. Democratic good health can do without gratuitous buffeting of civil-military relations at this juncture.

www.indiatogether.org

The Army's right to its opinion

24 December 2010 - The right of the Army to voice an opinion has been defended by Minister of State for Defence, Pallam Raju. The background to his defence was Omar Abdullah's complaint to the Prime Minister on an Army press release of a day earlier. The press release indicated that the decision to remove certain bunkers from Srinagar did not have the Army's concurrence.

The press release had stated: "Though it appeared to be a well-considered decision, the latest incident has raised many questions. It may have pleased a few separatists and their handlers in Pakistan, but what about the common man in the Valley? Will the reduced security and visible absence of security forces raise uncertainties, fear and doubt in the minds of the population during the long winter ahead?"

The Army Commander has since apologised for the offending press release saying it was unauthorised. The press release has been explained away as the 'personal predilections of a junior officer'. Yet, the Army being a highly centralised system, it is likely that the press release on a sensitive subject would have been vetted in the Command Headquarters Information Warfare section. The Army Commander, in tendering an apology to the Chief Minister, has apparently taken responsibility, as a good leader must, and there the matter could rest. However, does the contretemps have any ramifications?

This case can be seen as part of the continuum of the Army's unease with the security implications of moves towards normalisation of the Valley. These initiatives include the reported dismantling of 20 bunkers, removal of 1000 CRPF jawans and contemplation of removal of the notification of disturbed areas from some parts in Srinagar. The latter was to presage the progressive withdrawal of the AFSPA from the Valley where the security situation made it feasible.


The Army, understandably focused on the military dimension of the security situation, has apparently missed the larger gameplan unfolding.

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The Army, understandably focused on the military dimension of the security situation, has apparently missed the larger gameplan unfolding. It has two aspects. One is wider regarding AFSPA as law. Deliberations in North and South Block have focused on diluting its less 'humane' parts by either reframing it or incorporating the legal cover the Army needs into the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The Army Commander had earlier made his reservations on any dilution of the AFSPA, terming it a 'holy book'.

The second is of local significance, relating to the security aspect of the draw down in Srinagar. The Army had been called out in July for the first time since early nineties in 'standby' in case the agitations in the run up to the foreign minister's meeting in Islamabad got out of hand. Such a situation would have placed the Army in a delicate position, that it no doubt apprehends in case control over Srinagar by the central police forces is diluted.

With regard to the latter, the Army has the Corps Commander in Srinagar as the advisor to the Chief Minister in the Unified Headquarters looking after the Valley. His position, taken with approval of the next rung in hierarchy at Udhampur, has doubtless been taken on board in its decision making by the Chief Minister. In any case, Srinagar town does not have Army deployment and is the responsibility of the state police assisted by central police forces. The onus is therefore of the state, legally and structurally. Therefore, the apology was due.

But it does indicate a major perspective in the military. Outside the small print is the fact that the Army Commander is due to retire at year end. He can therefore choose to go the extra distance in firming up the military position. Army Commanders in the Indian system have considerable stature and power. This has proven disruptive at times in J&K, since the Army Commander curiously does not figure as the security adviser, though corps commanders, reporting to him, do.

That the Army has a right to an opinion is well understood. This enables it to perform its advisory function in a democracy. That it should voice its opinion is also useful - in providing access to its view for the attentive public. This helps make the democratic debate better informed. However, the question is whether it can voice it openly in a manner as to bring a policy and the policy-maker under cloud.

Watchful commentators, such as AG Noorani and Srinath Raghavan, are of the opinion that the military's repeated assertion of its position is an attempt to expand its role. Such views are based on the recent publicly-voiced position of the military by multiple personages at different occasions against deployment in Central India and against reformulation of the AFSPA. The point these critics make is that this ties down the policy maker's hands, since the politicians who make policy are often short of wide political capital, and would not like to be pilloried for going against professional judgment if things go wrong.

In the political process unfolding in the Valley, there is a need for calculated risks to be run to bring about a modicum of trust necessary for talks to proceed. Over a hundred youth have died in the summer agitations, and something substantive must be done to reverse this downward spiral. The slow and limited draw-down of visible security in Kashmir is part of this effort. The problem is that the Army is apparently not on board with this agenda.

This is a structural deficiency and a political gap that needs to be filled. The state government which is taking the initiative, backed by North Block, has only limited oversight over the Army, since the latter reports up its channel to South Block. Compounding this, the top brass of the armed forces is skeptical of political processes in general.

The Supreme Court judgment in the Nagaland Human Rights case against the AFSPA for the North East in 1997 had required that the armed forces maintain a relationship of 'cooperation' with the state when in 'aid to civil authority'. They are however outside the scope of authority of the state government. This means that the military is accountable neither to the state nor the Ministry of Home, responsible for internal security. It is instead accountable to the Raksha Mantri, who has no answerability for internal affairs. This divergence requires reconciling.

In the interim the onus is on the military leadership to navigate the structural deficiencies of the system by better formulation and articulation of the military's institutional position.
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