INDO-PAK DIALOGUE
Talk another day

India and Pakistan - in the failed meeting of their two foreign ministers in Islamabad in mid-July - have agreed to meet once again in December. This can be seen as a 'gain' only if no terrorist intervention rocks the interim. In case of a terrorist strike originating in Pakistan, the just-concluded meeting would be viewed as a lost opportunity. Instead of bridging the 'trust deficit', as intended by the prime ministers as suggested by the Prime Ministers of both countries during their meeting at the sidelines of the SAARC summit at Thimpu, it only reflected the distrust.

The failure indicates that the two sides are not prepared to take the minimum steps necessary to get the other side to move likewise. They now have six months to prepare the ground to do so. Is it possible?

Pakistan's foreign minister is seen in the Indian media as the one to have wrecked the talks. This is being taken as part of a script written in the GHQ, Rawalpindi. The Pakistani military perhaps feels that country is not in a strong position, constrained as it is by the pressures on its internal polity and on the Af-Pak front. Therefore, it is playing for time. It expects it can ride out the risks, given that the US military effort moves towards a climax over the coming autumn. When the position gets clearer and hopefully better by end of the year, it would be better placed to weigh its cards.



In any case its grand strategy is to ride out the US intervention in the region without having to sacrifice its crown jewels in terms of the India, Kashmir, Afghan and nuclear policies. It also would not like the civil government to take credit for any useful movement on the India front, lest it upset the internal balance in its favour.

India for its part had nothing to offer at the talks. The talks process is ongoing through repeated meetings of leaders, even if consequential talks in the form of the composite dialogue are on hold. The latter, though an Indian idea, perhaps no longer serves India's purpose since it believes that the growing power asymmetry with Pakistan is making its position stronger. While it is pledged to talk, it is not pledged to take the talks process to an outcome acceptable to both. Since a composite dialogue implies timelines, concessions, and outcomes, India is quite happy to postpone this reckoning.

India therefore continued to insist on visible proof of Pakistani sincerity in acting against the handlers of the 26/11 terror attack. The UPA government, already on the defensive due to 26/11, inflation, Maoism etc. is in any case susceptible to right wing critique. Within itself too there appears to be a lack of consensus, given Home Secretary Pillai's statement on the eve of talks that held ISI directly responsible for the Mumbai terror attack. The Foreign Minister has since accepted that it could have been better timed.

Secondly, Pakistan did stir the pot in Kashmir by bringing disaffected youth out into the streets over the summer in an intifida-like confrontation with authorities. Therefore, there is no urgency to talk to either the internal dissidents or with their sponsors in Pakistan, lest the pressure be viewed as successful to get India to talk.

The talks have been seen as being influenced by the Americans - brought on by the US's need to ease its Af-Pak circumstance. Therefore, even if talks proceeded, meaningful outcomes from them were ruled out, lest Indian interests be sacrificed for US interests. Also, with 26/11, the Indian tolerance threshold has been stretched. Its procedures and organisations for response are considerably better placed. Therefore, seeing itself as capable of handling another crisis, India does not see any necessity for engaging Pakistan.

Lastly, in case Pakistan does succumb to Indian demands, then going after its home grown terrorists would result in an introspective Pakistan. A weaker Pakistan with an internally embroiled Army is one India can then manipulate with greater ease.

Both states have thus independently concluded that they would be able to extract better concessions from the other at a later date.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

Both states are therefore acting in accordance with their respective strategic logic. Progress in December would be predicated on how the situation develops in Af-Pak. This impasse in South Asia has an underside. Firstly, are the two states underestimating prospects of another terror attack and possible escalation into an inter-state war thereafter? The linkage of terror directly with the ISI, seconded by the NSA Shiv Shankar Menon at a seminar in New Delhi, could yet come back to haunt the government in case of another provocative action by terrorists. It would then not be able to make a distinction between the Pakistani state and the non-state actors that could help buffer its response. The government, already proven weak in its ability to take talks ahead meaningfully, would not be able to resist calls for extreme steps.

Secondly, the newly framed Multidimensional Poverty Index has half the world's poor living in South Asia. The recent survey by the Oxford University and the UNDP indicates that just eight Indian states have more poor people than 26 poorest African countries combined. This yardstick calls for a revision of strategic priorities and gameplan. The Sonia Gandhi-led NAC needs to provide right-headed direction to a grand strategy for UPA II, as it had done in UPA I.

Lastly, while Pakistan's position can certainly get weaker, it does not imply that India is necessarily the gainer. The talk of Pukhtoonistan, emanating lately in hardline US circles and finding echo in the conservative sections of Indian strategic community, can only be a pressure point at best. As a self-regarding regional power, India needs to be in charge. Assisting a neighbour going downhill is an indicator of power alright, as was the case in 1971. But are there better indicators and is this in India's self interest? There is much more to do before December than merely avoiding war

Kashmir: No end in sight

The alternative media has it that over the last year over 70 youth are reported to have died in stone pelting related violence in Kashmir. They were agitating against the alleged rape and killings of two women in Shupiyan. The year prior, Kashmir had taken to the streets over the Amarnath land transfer issue. This year the toll is close to a score. Complacency of the state is breathtaking in that the lessons in crowd control of the previous two years were completely ignored. Given the past pattern and the coming talks with Pakistan at foreign minister level, the eruption in the Valley was entirely predictable.

Speculation is that this owes to a governance deficit. With development and a corruption free delivery system, the problem would go away. Realists have it that the agitation is manipulated by separatists, themselves orchestrated from Pakistan. The government has released taped conversations to prove the linkages. Given the ‘foreign hand’, a law and order approach is necessary lest the word get out that the state can be held to ransom.

The fact escapes attention that even the tapes suggest that the agitation has gone out of hand of those manipulating them. Consequently, attuned and empathetic observers have discerned that brutalization over the past two decades has resulted in the intifida-like expression of angst by youth. There is little doubt that this is a generation lost to militancy. There is little India can do to eliminate their alienation. There is little India is not already doing. The writing on the wall is that alienation persists. With a whole life ahead, India has little choice but to get along in one unaddressed direction – the political approach.

The methods of expression of disaffection can only get more innovative. That militarization of the present movement has not occurred indicates the capacity for learning from the past mistake of early nineties. Then the militants had hijacked the agitation for ‘azadi’, thereby legitimising the military ‘crackdowns’. Borrowing a leaf out of the Indian legacy of the freedom struggle would be strategically portentous. Already the central government is considerably embarrassed in having to deploy the army in a ‘standby’ role for the first time since the mid nineties when the Army ceased operations inside Srinagar.

Even as India was moving into a self-congratulatory mode in gaining the upper hand in Kashmir, it has been reminded that placing a military lid on the situation does not make it go away. This has been acknowledged by both the Kashmir Chief Minister and the Army Chief calling for ‘political’ steps.

There have been promises aplenty going back to Narasimha Rao’s formulation that the ‘sky is the limit’. The parameters since have included ‘the four corners of the constitution’ and ‘insaniyat’ (the principles of humanity). The state autonomy report was laid by the National Conference government when in power last in 2000. The UPA government initiated the five working groups during the second round table conference on Kashmir in 2005. Four groups tendered their reports in the third conference in 2007 and action on them is underway. The last, that of Justice Sagheer Ahmed, on center-state relations did so only in December last year. The report did not command credibility. KC Pant earlier and NN Vohra later were to progress talks. Reports have it that the latest initiative, that of ‘secret diplomacy’ by the home minister, was also discontinued recently. All these political initiatives testify that the intent exists and that there are promises to be kept. These require to be made good.

Why the state has held back is a valid question. The first set of reasons give the state the benefit of the doubt. Firstly, India’s nation building project is a work in progress. It is wary of demands of its constituent subnationalities. While it can accommodate demands made by ethnic groups through creating autonomous councils etc, it is less constitutionally venturesome when it comes to the major cases, such as, among others, those of the Nagas and Kashmiris. It fears that setting a precedent may encourage the others through working of the ‘demonstration effect’. The domino theory in this case would conjure up an eventual unraveling of India. Secondly, the complexity of Kashmir’s case is daunting. There are two other regions to contend with. Thirdly, Kashmir cannot be seen in isolation of India’s problems with Pakistan. The proxy war Pakistan has waged cannot be allowed to be seen to succeed through Indian concessions, even if these are solely internal.

The second set comprises reasons more critical of the state. Firstly, the right wing in India’s polity is stronger than its electoral showing may indicate. Even during the Nehruvian period the presence of Sardar Patel and stalwarts such as GB Pant indicated the strength of conservatives in the Congress party. Nehru’s early Kashmir initiatives faced a strong riposte by Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and the Praja Parishad. This led to Sheikh Abdullah’s reservations on credibility of Indian secularism. The pattern of conservatism holding India’s Kashmir policy hostage persists till today. While the NDA government expectedly ignored its alliance partner in 2000 on the autonomy question, the Congress does not have the political strength or will to make any political overtures. The fear is that even if reasonable these would be criticized as ‘competitive communalism’. This fear of its own shadow explains India’s lack of follow through in reaching out to Pakistan; Sharm es Sheikh being the most visible example. Absence of any preparation of ground in terms of selling the necessity and contours of a political agenda to shape public opinion indicates that the political approach is ruled out as an option.

Secondly, the ‘insurgency economy’ in terms of vested interests of all players – be it separatists or security forces - has grown roots. For instance, a political approach would inevitably imply reconsidering the AFSPA and the militarization of the state. Anticipating this, the input of security forces in any such consideration would be that it is inadvisable since it would play into Pakistani hands that are behind the agitation. A government with deficit in political will would in such a circumstance take prudence as the better part of valour. Such a play can be discerned from the recent utterance of the Army Chief that demands for dilution of the AFSPA originate in hope for ‘narrow political gains’. That the Army Chief was allowed to get away by the Army making a subsequent clarification that the remarks were directed at ‘local’, ‘separatist’ politics indicates the underside of India’s civil-military relations.

A clear eyed assessment indicates that the problem thrown up for India is unlikely to nudge India down the political road, though this is its sole option. India’s reluctance would be especially attenuated at a juncture when it contemplates reengaging Pakistan. Therefore, this can only be yet another wasted summer of wasted lives. Regrettably, the inescapable conclusion is that a state fearful of its own shadow may prove an unbearable burden on a future with a nuclear backdrop.

IPCS article
#3152, 21 June 2010
Countering the Naxal Threat-IV: Military as an Option?

The Times of India headlines has it that the ‘Army is bracing to take on the Naxals’ (17 June 2010). The report informs that up to five divisions of the Army are being readied for deployment. A training center is planned to be opened that would put through other ranks of the supporting arms such as armour and artillery. In the traditional way the Army does counter insurgency, a grid is apparently to be deployed and the Maoists isolated from the populace. Brigadier level advisers have been earmarked. Earlier last month, the cabinet committee on security had debated Army deployment and at that time, the Army deployment had been ruled against, to prevent it from being over-stretched.

Preparations as reported may be contingency planning on part of the Army. The training center reported could even be one being opened by the Army for training the paramilitary troops. However, it’s possible that in light of the inadequacies of the police leadership and paramilitary sub-units revealed by the EN Rammohan enquiry in the Chintalnar episode, the government may have decided otherwise. The government has been persuaded of the need to use the right tool for the job of gaining control over the massive area comprising difficult terrain. The preparations would in any case be useful in buttressing any political reaching out that may be underway, behind the scenes to Maoists, to bring them to the table under threat of unleashing the Army.

On the issue of whether the Army ‘should’ be deployed at all, it is quite apparent from the recurring losses sustained by the paramilitary that there are shortfalls in its organization, leadership, ethos and training. The argument, usually heard on air waves, that the Army should not be used against its own people implies that where it has been so employed such as in J&K and the North East, the people are somehow ‘different’. Even in Kashmir, the operations were in a human terrain comprising Indians, if alienated Indians. If the Army is to be deployed, it is best to rehearse counter-insurgency lessons in a timely manner. By this yardstick, the mental and training preparedness as reported being undertaken by the Army is a commendable start.

The foremost concern, however, remains human rights. The killing of three ‘infiltrators’ who later turned out to be men lured by the TA (H&H) in Kashmir recently is not a one-off incident. Note that the crime occurred in the present environment of human rights watchfulness in Kashmir. There were also earlier reports of the fake action in Siachen and of the ‘ketchup’ Colonel in Assam. The lesson is that the state would require being wary from the outset. The understanding that operations are an independent military domain is in light of the past experience, unpersuasive.

It follows from this that political over-watch would be required. This cannot be expected at the provincial level. The very fact that the situation has been ‘handed over’ to the Army would lead the weak political class at this level to abdicate responsibility. Delhi is indeed too far and the indefatigable Minister for Home Affairs over-burdened; his latest additional responsibility being to head the GoM on the Bhopal tragedy! Given that the required levels of supervision would be absent; can the military be expected to exercise suitable self-regulation?

This is not impossible to conceive. The opposition expected is unlikely to be of the order the military has experienced elsewhere. The dimension of external interference is missing. The military has an ‘iron fist in velvet glove’ doctrine, dating to 2006, as a guide. The military values the difference in approach to insurgency with that of other armies in the close vicinity, such as the US and in particular the Pakistani Army. Beginning the new mission on a clean slate, it is in a position to build in best practices from the outset itself. Knowledgeable sources have it that the in-service reputation of the commanding general, head of its Central Command, inspires confidence on this score.

Nevertheless, pathologies need pointing out. One is that quantification of the officer promotion system - reportedly under re-examination on priority on order of the new Chief - could lead to a ‘numbers game’. Second, the need to show ‘results’, particularly to distinguish its deployment as an improvement over the paramilitary, needs being guarded against. Third, military recruitment practices favour officers and troops from a particular strata and region. The impact of this on their perception of the tribal people needs factoring in. Fourth, the ‘grid’ system contemplated indicates a lasting deployment. Instead, the grid could be furnished by the paramilitary. Staying on as the grid suggests, implies avoidable militarization in which the military would over time gain a vested interest. Lastly, theory on primary group cohesion, reinforced by the earlier experience of the Rashtriya Rifles, warns against using subunits of amalgamated troops.

Even if the Army is seemingly the best instrument, a far better approach would still be political first, negotiations based, development led and precluding violence.

MILITARY RECRUITMENT
Soldiers in our own images

'Pipping' ceremonies at the Indian Military Academy were solemn occasions. With the media revolution and the need to attract officer material, the Academy has over the past decade resorted to ceremonial innovation, such as singing a patriotic song during the oath taking ceremony. TV grabs and photos accompanying the twice-yearly news reports on officer commissions usually feature jubilant newly commissioned officers throwing their regimental caps in the air, in an imitation of the scene in the cult film, An Officer and a Gentleman.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE http://www.indiatogether.org/2010/jun/fah-recruit.htm

While 23 were from friendly foreign countries, 132 were from UP, 56 from Haryana and 51 from Uttarkhand. Thus, more than one third of the Indian's newly commissioned officers were from this belt. It can be assumed that other areas from which cadets have always come - such as Delhi, Punjab and nearby areas - were not very far behind. In other words, it can be hazarded that about 50 per cent of newly commissioned officers are from a narrow region in North India. The breakdown of the officer cadre of the paramilitary and central police forces is not known. It is very likely that their intake patterns are similar. Is this good for India's security?

And as for the soliders, what is their representation pattern? The figures are not known. The Ministry of Home Affairs sets ratios of desirable recruitment for its forces. In case of the Ministry of Defence, the recruitable male population serves as the index. Unfilled vacancies are to be carried over. However, this only accentuates over-representation.


While there are stipulations on vacancies for intake below officer ranks in the military and paramilitary, the officer cadres of both have all-India recruitment.

It can be conjectured that the general lack of transparency in recruitment is a defensive move, since the figures if known could prove embarrassing. The recruitable male population is supposed to serve as the index for recruitment. However, for instance in the Army, this can be expected to be weighted in favour of ethnic groups traditionally contributing to respective infantry regiments. Besides, some ethnic groups have representation in other arms such as in Engineers groups, artillery regiments etc.

The example of the Air Force is instructive. It has jettisoned the recruitable male population index in favour of an 'All-India' recruitment pattern. As a result, those self-selecting are mainly from UP and Bihar. The reason for departure was lack of response from non-traditional areas of recruitment. In the interest of efficiency, the Air Force opted to sacrifice broad representation. Even if this was acceptable from a point of view of military effectiveness, is this in the overall interest of the service and the nation?

While there are stipulations on vacancies for intake below officer ranks in the military and paramilitary, the officer cadres of both have all-India recruitment. This implies that a selection is made from those volunteering. Given the information available and anecdotal evidence, it can be reasonably inferred that the intake for the security forces is biased towards a narrow region in North India. Those volunteering from other regions are apparently fewer or found to be less qualified. This means the nation is getting the best on offer.

It should be pointed out that the officer cadre is still as good as it has ever been, and has not been found lacking in any way as a result of skewed intake. The military remains a respected and independent institution, focused on professional training and goals, and with no participation in the political affairs of the country. Coups have been ruled out by every expert on civil-military relations in India. If the officer corps is less alluring to some, it could be partially due to the draw of other occupations. For instance in South India, other avenues in Bangalore and Hyderabad and abroad such as in the US and the Gulf perhaps lead to fewer officer candidates.

We could conclude, therefore, that there is no reason to be concerned if the intake of officers or soldiers is particularly high from one region, and less so from elsewhere. Nevertheless, the case of Pakistan is illustrative. Up to two thirds of the officer cadre is filled by Punjabis, and many of the ills of that country can be attributed to this, including the primacy of Punjab over other states. Though Indian socio-political reality is much more complex, the implications of having majority of officers and lower ranks originating from one region still bears consideration. Some concerns are highlighted below for the attention of policy makers and their political overseers.

Firstly, in principle, the multi-ethnic reality of India must find expression in its institutions, especially those charged with security. While 'recruitable male population' may be the basis of filling in the rank and file, the practice in case of under-representation of states is not known. The Army's reluctance to share figures regarding Muslim presence, in response to the query from the Sachar Committee, is well known. It indicates that shortfalls exist. Parliament should examine how the military compensates.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE http://www.indiatogether.org/2010/jun/fah-recruit.htm

Secondly, although the military has been spared the operation of caste-based reservations, it still has anachronistic recruitment practices. These may not have any self-evident negative connotations for military effectiveness. However, recall that the Punjab problem did lead to changes in recruiting policy. Broad-basing recruitment is the best manner of preempting problems. For instance, modernisation may require a different type of officer candidate and recruit, more technology-inclined. This may prove beyond the capacity of the unwittingly favoured recruiting area. Additionally, over representation also owes to coaching centers in these areas offering intensive coaching on how to crack the exam. This results in poor standards at intake. This original debility cannot easily be corrected through training.

Thirdly, given the unexceptionable largesse of the latest Pay Commission, it would be unfair if the same is channeled into only one region, as seems to be the case. Higher order gains - such as regional equity, and a stake in the system for all including the social and geographical periphery - need to guide decisions over recruitment.

Fourthly, fighting insurgency can be expected to continue as a preoccupation. A narrow recruiting base, particularly of the officer corps, would lead to problems with perception. A Mainstream vs Other perception tends to emerge, clouding judgments on the applicability of force. This only accentuates in case the social origin of the officers in the lower middle class is added to the consideration. For instance, dilution in the intake of percentages from the North East in Assam Rifles has been done in favour of Gorkhas and other hill people from North India. This affects the culture of the Assam Rifles defined by its motto Friends of Hill People, changing it towards a more militarized paramilitary resembling the Army from which it draws its officer cadre

Likewise, imbalanced representation would lead to institutional bias or neglect of some or other feature in security concerns. Such imbalances in perceptions can creep into institutional inputs, for instance, on India's Pakistan or Kashmir policy. It is well said that the manner the equanimity with which these problems are viewed increases with distance from Delhi. Keeping relations with Pakistan adversarial would keep the hardline policy option underwritten by military power in play. Such a policy input could result from ethnic imbalances since parochial considerations could override the rational alternative or national interest.

Happy with the status quo, institutional leadership is likely to advise: "Leave well enough, alone." Political sagacity, however, calls for initiating the change.
⊕

The doyen of India's strategists, K Subrahmanyam, has got it wrong before. He advocated Indian vivisection of Pakistan in 1971, not only in the East, but also in the West advising for a drive up to the Indus to bisect West Pakistan between Sindh and Punjab. In the event, India settled only for the former. But even this smaller intervention has had long consequences for India. Pakistan determined that it would go nuclear to overcome its disadvantage in conventional forces, and has since waged an endless proxy war against India under nuclear cover.

Back then, he had argued that India should go nuclear to ensure deterrence, making war prohibitive and resulting in settling of issues as Kashmir. We now know otherwise, with Kashmir figuring in a war and a near war since 1998. This reality, quite different from what was predicted back in the 1970s, should be borne in mind as we read Subrahmanyam's latest (below) on the internal conflict strategy for Central India:

"India cannot industrialise without displacing populations. While the displaced population should be compensated generously, swiftly and made stakeholders in industrialisation, it is unrealistic to talk of eliminating poverty without industrialisation and fast growth. If this proposition is considered valid, India is going to face the challenge of left-wing and secessionist insurgencies to fast growth through efficient and just governance and delivery of services to the common man. To ensure that a three-pronged approach is imperative - an effective civil armed force free from the parochial political influence, a just governance and a fast growing industrialisation cum urbanisation and poverty elimination programme" (from his article, "Wake Up Call" in Dainik Jagran (Hindi), dated 11 April 2010).

Advancing years have not made a dent on his combative prose. However, Subrahmanyam's argument is predicated on a very big 'IF'. India could go down the route of fast growth 'if' it can 'compensate generously', provide 'just governance', ensure 'delivery of services' and undertake 'poverty elimination'. Since the country's past record does not instil confidence that it can do any of this adequately well, it bears questioning whether it should venture down the route of 'displacing populations' at all. In that case, would the country's war in the central provinces - referred to as Operation Green Hunt and avidly denied by authorities - be the wrong war to fight?

It is certain now that an internal war is on. A Home Ministry's statement has it that "some Maoist leaders have been directly contacting certain NGOs and intellectuals to propagate their ideology and persuade them to take steps which would provide support to the CPI (Maoist) ideology." The warning perhaps owes to Arundhati Roy's and Gautam Navlakha's take on the Maoists in Outlook and Economic and Political Weekly respectively, based on some days spent with them in Central India.

As a prescient letter to the editor in the EPW informs, the Karnataka police have served a 'notice' to a journalist on publication of his interview with a Maoist. The subtext is threat of action under Section 43 (F) UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 'Obligation to furnish information'. The article states: 'The failure to furnish the information called for under sub-section (1), or deliberately furnishing false information shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.' Such an embargo on freedom of thought and expression indicates a war is on.


Taking the development prong of strategy first, K Subrahmanyam seems to suggest displacement is justifiable, if resettlement is done alongside. The argument is that the outcome in larger good of higher growth rates will help reduce poverty. The government's record on this can best be seen in the case of the Narmada dam. Despite this being under judicial scrutiny and civil society focus, the record has been dismal. On the Maheshwar Hydel project, Chittaroopa Palit, an activist of the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), says, "The dam construction is about 80 per cent complete, but the R&R (resettlement and rehabilitation) is only about five per cent complete (The Hindu, 23 Apr 2010)."

This reality cannot but be even worse in case of remote areas where there is little scrutiny of the government's actions. Displacement figures are taken as 30-60 million since Independence; most of the advantages having been cornered by the 'haves' at the expense of the 'have nots'.

Next, is the military prong. The gag order on the two service chiefs speaking in the wake of the Chintalnar incident shows how sensitive the Home Ministry is to criticism of its military strategy. The E N Rammohan report on the Chintalnar ambush, not released in the open domain, is also apparently critical. In a knee-jerk reaction to another ambush soon thereafter, Dantewada District Collector, Reena Kangale told the Hindustan Times, "We are working on issuing an order that the security personnel should not travel by public transport." This is war by standard operating procedures - SOPs, in military parlance - at its best!

SEE indiatogether.org for full article -


K Subrahmanyam recalls suggesting in the Kargil Committee Report that he headed, "They (the paramilitary) need to be trained to much higher standards of performance and better equipped to deal with terrorist threats. The possibility of adopting an integrated manpower policy for the armed forces, paramilitary forces and the central police forces merit examination." Yet another questionable suggestion, flying as it does in the face of insights from military sociology. Fighting capability at the lower level is dependent on cohesion. 'Integrated' forces from disparate backgrounds cannot hope to develop this. The Army learned this at its cost, and that of worsening the human plight in Kashmir, by deploying the Rashtriya Rifles that suffered similarly.

The Home Minister seeks to expand his mandate, spelling further militarisation at the expense of the non-existent development prong. The argument for this advanced by Swapan Dasgupta in his weekly Sunday Times column is for development to take place, "the state must uproot an illegal military presence first". With the media and civil rights activists intimidated and the higher echelon leadership of IPS officers absent from the frontline, there would be no oversight of operations or resettlement. Continuing military action by Maoists, and all untoward incidents such as that of the tragedy of the train accident at West Midnapore being placed at their door, has placed them at odds with public opinion, making the military option - even one less than effective and very definitely, inefficient - a virtual certainty.

The third suggestion of the Bhisma Pitamah of the strategic community is on improving governance. This is unexceptionable. However, the question is, can it be done given the political reality in Jharkhand and Chattisgarh? Even relatively advanced states with Naxal presence, such as Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka - one ruled by the Congress and the other by the BJP - are rocked by political dissidence based on mining-related money power.

The Centre cannot step in easily, as some would suggest, in light of the federal structure. In case stepping in is compelled by the war, the federal pillar of polity will be easily eclipsed. Mineral wealth and development are issues not only in adivasi lands, but in the corridors of organised state power too. A politically hobbled administrative structure whose inadequacy has caused the tribal backlash in first place, is being expected to further development on a war footing. Even if assuming the Infantry was available to roll back the Maoists, the governance prong would lag behind.

Since the strategy is wishful, what is the answer? Since Subrahmanyam's strategy cannot be operationalised on all three counts, the aim he suggests also needs jettisoning. The mineral wealth of Central India can remain untapped till the people there acquire the capacity to negotiate the terms for its use. This may take a generation, but it will protect the people from the known consequences of the ongoing war. Equally importantly, this may also shield India from the unforeseen consequences of triumph - by either left wing extremists, or the right-wingers who would seek to demolish them.

The cost of a couple of percentile points of the growth rate is a price worth paying to avoid India's Red Indian moment.

IPCS, ipcs.org
#3134, 21 May 2010
Revisiting ‘1971’



The latest, if muted, storm in the military’s tea cup has been the destruction of documents relating to India’s 1971 victory. Apparently, Eastern Command made a search for the documents in order to interact with erstwhile Mukti Bahini fighters as part of a forthcoming observance of the event. It turned out that the documents in question had been destroyed on orders. This was confirmed by Lt Gen Jacob, architect of the famous victory, recalling that this was done before he took over as the Eastern Army commander soon after the war. Promptly, it surfaced that the records of the great naval action – the sinking of the Pakistani naval submarine, PNS Ghazi – were also missing.

The controversy provides an opportunity to revisit 1971. The landmark events have since had considerable resonance, particularly because the Pakistani Army has been engaged in ‘paying back’ India over the past three decades. However, this article dwells on the problems with strategic thinking in India, using the 1971 War as an entry point.

It is now widely known that the decision to go to war was taken sometime in mid April of that year, after the extreme brutality of the crack down on Bengalis in East Pakistan the previous month. Late Field Marshal Manekshaw recounted how he had stood up to his political masters insisting on postponing the date to a more opportune time later in the year for which his army would be better prepared. (It is perhaps his retelling of this ‘legend’ that led to India’s political elite inexplicably keeping away from his last rites.) The interim gave India ample scope for interfering in East Pakistan, by supporting the Mukti Bahini.

While state terrorism that occurred in East Pakistan is inexcusable, it bears mention that in the Third World context of state weaknesses, dealing with foreign interference is usually done through greater violence than is otherwise the case. Therefore, India’s earlier role in sponsoring irregulars and later in conducting operations alongside them prior to the outbreak of war contributed in some measure to the brutality of the Pakistani state and its army. There is also a question mark in history on the hijacking of and blowing up of the ‘Ganga’ Air India flight in Lahore. This enabled India to terminate over-flights between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan as early as February 1971, accentuating its problems of access and heightening its security dilemma. Therefore, to an extent the final figures of three million dead and ten million refugees can also be attributed to India’s strategy. It is no wonder that the records held with the Army are missing.

The costs of India’s strategy are easy to discern. It could have been anticipated that Pakistan’s paranoia would heighten due to the Indian angle to the crisis. Was it perhaps that Pakistan’s despicable behaviour provided India the casus belli? Was the strategy to provoke just such a response? At the UN, India initially alluded to the humanitarian consequences of Pakistani action as the casus belli, swiftly its UN officials retracted and attributed India’s action to self-defence instead; brought on, incidentally, by Pakistani attacks after a fortnight of Indian ground force presence in East Pakistan.

K Subrahmanyam, doyen of India’s strategic community, won his spurs then by making a case for dividing Pakistan. He records insisting with YB Chavan that India also take the war to West Pakistan to dictate the agenda of peace. In the event that India’s aims were limited to taking some territory in the East and being defensive in the West would Subrahmanyam’s case have led to a better outcome? The USS Enterprise was enroute to the Bay of Bengal leaving India with enough time to revert troops from the West to East. Operational level ingenuity resulted in the stunning victory. However, factoring in the entirely predictable human cost preceding it and that continues to rack the subcontinent today, makes it much less so.

The criticism today is that the gains to the east were not exploited adequately at Shimla to force Bhutto’s weak hand. The usual argument is that holding onto prisoners would have been a useful pressure point. This is ignorance of the Third Geneva Convention which requires the return of prisoners at the earliest. In the event India chose to return even the 150 prisoners pointed out by Bangladesh as war criminals. Perhaps returning them, after getting Bangladesh to acquiesce, would have closed the chapter. War crime trials would no doubt have brought out the Indian angle to the internal crisis.

Lastly, the telling lesson of 1971 is that continuing political control over the military is required, even over action seemingly in the military domain. War aims formulated in Calcutta by Eastern Command’s Chief of Staff keeping Dhaka as the center of gravity were not those of Delhi, as elaborated by the General Jacob himself in his surrender at Dhaka. In today’s nuclear environment –a consequence of political inattention then– such a situation cannot be allowed to replicate.

AFSPA: Between battlelines


The new Army Chief has given out his mind on the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). He has said that, "Any dilution of the Act will impinge adversely on the manner in which the armed forces operate.'' To him ‘in constrained and trying circumstances, the armed forces need requisite legal protection' and on that account the Act ‘cannot be disputed’. Having come in from Kolkata after command of the Field Army deployed in countering insurgency in the North East and being an infantry officer with counter insurgency experience at the grassroots and at the operational level, his is a considered opinion.


This explains the Army’s reservations on the draft of an amended version of the AFSPA that the Ministry of Home Affairs had sent for concurrence.

See indiatogether.org for full article.


Specifically, an amended AFSPA was to have had the Do’s and Don’ts incorporated. The Supreme Court judgment had stated that the Army, ‘shall strictly follow the instructions contained in the list of ‘Do’s and Don’ts” issued by the army authorities which are binding and any disregard to the said instructions would entail suitable action under the Army Act, 1950.’ It had required that ‘the instructions contained in the list of ‘Do’s and Don’ts” shall be suitably amended so as to bring them in conformity with the guidelines contained in the decisions of this Court and to incorporate the safeguards…’


Second, but more importantly, was in respect of Section 4 (a): ‘if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area…’ This clause has been considered ‘draconian’. The draft under preparation for tabling an amended law in parliament this session had perhaps watered this down. But the Army has not proved agreeable to results of half a decade long exertions in the MHA and Law ministry.


Why this is so is because the Army prefers to see itself as the force of last resort in internal security situation. The role is itself seen as a secondary one to its primary role of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. Therefore, if the situation is bad enough, it feels it requires the powers necessary to cope with it including legal cover for its soldiery. This is especially so given the information war that surrounds insurgency, in which allegations of human rights violations are a weapon.


This perspective is not problematic. Extraordinary situations require extraordinary powers to cope, lest the republic unravel. What is problematic instead is the Army’s insistence that it would deploy only under the legal cover of the Act in areas declared ‘disturbed’ under Section 3 of the Act. Thus even where the situation is not bad enough to warrant Army deployment with such powers, the Act is invoked to enable the Army’s deployment. This position of the Army is not without logic in that by insisting that the law be invoked protects it from being used as a default option in internal security, as yet another paramilitary.


The issue is therefore on how to identify situations that warrant Army deployment under the Act and how to cope with those that are less critical. Understanding, if not agreeing with the Army’s position has led to the government’s position on a consensus, with the Army on board, before any further move is made. In the interim however much can be done.


Firstly, in areas where the Army’s efforts, among other reasons, have brought down the insurgency to manageable levels, a review of whether Army deployment is necessary needs be done. The J&K government has been asking for this for better part of last decade. The political dividend of this would be more useful in making balance of the insurgency recede than anything the Army is currently doing by remaining deployed. Even if this may not be readily possible in the Valley, an experiment can be done with withdrawing both the AFSPA and Army deployment in districts south of Pirpanjal. Such areas primed for vacation include Assam also, in particular lower Assam and the autonomous councils. The state has been amiss in extending Army deployment even where not required. Therefore a proportion of the blame must go to elected representatives in state legislatures, rather than the Army.


Secondly, the Center need not be as protective as it has been over granting permissions for the Army to be investigated where it is remiss. The Army in any case follows up on allegations and takes pride in delivering justice where warranted. However, as the Manorama case indicates institutional interest may at times over ride higher considerations. The Supreme Court has required the government to be strict, stating, ‘A complaint containing an allegation about misuse or abuse of the powers conferred under the Central Act shall be thoroughly inquired into and, if on enquiry it is found that the allegations are correct, the victim should be suitably compensated and the necessary sanction for institution of prosecution and/or suit or other proceeding should be granted under Section 6 of the Central Act.’ For instance, the J&K state government made 38 requests to prosecute soldiers but no permission was granted by the Centre. Defence Minister A K Antony told Rajya Sabha that 133 complaints were made against army between 2004 and 2009. In case the Ministry is less reticent, the Army can be expected to be doubly conscious of observing its obligations.


The AFSPA is perhaps necessary to deal with extreme situations. Such situations are a rarity. Therefore, the Act needs to be withdrawn where not necessary. However, in case the Army is still needed in such cases, then it can be deployed under cover of the relevant Code of Criminal Procedure sections. This may deprive of its extensive powers, but since these would not be necessary in less critical situations, it can afford to forego them. Army deployment in any case must be made judiciously. For instance the Chintalnar incident indicates that it may be required in select areas of Dantewada for a specific purpose of dislodging the PLGA and for that limited duration only, rather than across the board in Central India indefinitely.


It would appear that the truth lies somewhere between the battle-lines of the Army and the NGOs against the AFSPA.

The Bright Side of ‘Asymmetric Escalation’

http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/the-bright-side-of-asymmetric-escalation-3081.html

Vipin Narang in his article ‘Posturing for Peace?’ gets it wrong. This is uncharacteristic of the reputed journal, International Security; but he would not be wrong for long. What he thinks is Pakistan’s posture today is not quite true for now, but is likely the way Pakistan is headed in the future. He characterises the Pakistani nuclear deterrent as one of ‘asymmetric escalation’, since Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons for deterring conventional attack also. He maintains that Pakistan has already incorporated nuclear weapons into its war-fighting repertoire. This is not true for the moment. However, in light of India’s movement towards increasing the conventional asymmetry, this is the way Pakistan is likely headed.

He claims that Pakistan ‘believed it had little choice but to test its nuclear weapons and adopt an asymmetric escalation posture that fully integrated nuclear weapons into its military forces to credibly and directly deter Indian conventional attacks ‘(Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,’ International Security, 34 (3), p. 47).’ In this view, Pakistan has resorted to delegation, has the doctrine, organisation, capabilities and numbers to ‘escalate the conflict by threatening first use of nuclear weapons on advancing Indian forces once they cross the border onto Pakistani soil – through deterrence by denial (p. 57).’ He opines that this has deterred India since the Chagai tests to the extent of deterring even surgical strikes in the wake of 26/11.

That the possibility of escalation would have informed Indian considerations since can be conceded. That it was clinching, thereby deterring India, is more difficult to accept. Instead, India has been more restrained than deterred. The reason for restraint could well be more self-serving than Indians would let on; because that restraint helps build up political capital for the time India does resort to military force. Self-deterrence at the conventional level in not having the requisite wherewithal would have been a more compelling argument than deterrence due to Pakistani nuclear postures.

The nuclear posture of default reliance on nuclear weapons in an outbreak of conflict is in any case unlikely to exist. Moreover, Indian conventional attacks would unlikely be nudging any thresholds in any case. Finally, analysts like the US’ Peter Lavoy, and India’s Gurmeet Kanwal, maintain that Pakistan would largely rely on the conventional deterrent. Therefore, as the Indian military believes, there is a case for conventional operations, albeit limited, restricted to a short, sharp war.

By this yardstick, Narang’s is an inaccurate reading of the current status. At best, Pakistan could resort to warning shots across the bow as a war termination signal. This does not require the posture that Narang attributes it. While Pakistan does use nuclear weapons to deter conventional war also, this does not, as of now, involve a posture reminiscent of the NATO during the Cold War. Nevertheless, his view is prescient.

With India set to spend US$50-80 billion on acquisitions, Pakistan may feel compelled towards ‘asymmetric escalation’ as visualised by Narang. Pakistan has coaxed a few more F-16s out of the US and more military and counter-insurgency aid. It can be expected to also divert a proportion of the latter to the eastern front as was admitted to by Musharraf, despite Obama promising to be more eagle eyed than was Bush. These exertions indicate that it prefers a conventional counter. A nuclear counter would be one forced on it.

India’s defence minister, commenting on the ‘strategic dialogue’ between Pakistan and the US, criticised conventional arms flows to Pakistan. Retired General Deepak Kapoor in his capacity as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee had earlier questioned its nuclear build up. Apprehending the worst from a potential adversary’s growing capability is expected from those in charge of a country’s national security. Indian apprehension is that greater power with Pakistan only emboldens it in the pursuit of a proxy war. This compels India not only to consider escalatory options but also to up-the-ante, militarily.

Pakistani moves on both conventional and nuclear levels can liberally be interpreted as balancing. It helps dissuade India from chancing the war option. Nevertheless, India’s reservations need to be taken on board. As the stability/instability paradox indicates, Pakistan could be tempted to renew the proxy war to tie down surplus Indian military capacity. A nuclear posture that Narang discerns would be a cover for the same. Despite this, it would not be able to cause a movement on Kashmir. India’s defence expenditure would gain justification but as to whether upping-the-ante would make India more secure, would remain questionable. Both states would be chasing the chimera of security at a higher level of conventional and nuclear capability, at higher costs, risks, dangers and less likelihood of success.

The silver lining is perhaps that all this brings the need for a political resolution of outstanding issues to the foreground. India’s slow acquisitions processes indicate that it is only unwillingly upping-the-ante. The backlash of proxy war in Pakistan may yet unfold to the cost of its Army. Therefore, prior to testing military waters afresh, the two could attempt the political route once again.

See indiatogether.org

The Government and the Military

An exasperated defence watcher, former Colonel of the Armoured Corps, Ajai Shukla, in his blog, Broadsword, calls on India's Defence Minister A K Antony to 'Go' because in Shukla's reading, "It is harder to determine what this country pays to perpetuate Defence Minister A K Antony's reputation for honesty, but the monetary penalty alone is thousands of crores per year." The minister, he says, is holding up acquisitions for the necessary preparedness to deter Pakistan.

Another knowledgeable defence commentator, Manoj Joshi, in his blog, referring to the Comptroller and Auditor General's report informs, "The Army's towed artillery is a quarter century old, two-thirds of its tank fleet comprises outdated T-72s which joined service some 30 years ago. The Army has no self-propelled artillery or attack helicopters, and mobile air defence in the form of Tunguska systems is limited." Consequently, he too is no fan of the defence minister, and this is evident from his view that, "A great deal of blame for this state of affairs must fall on Union Defence Minister A K Antony. His leadership of the department since 2005 has been uninspiring, if not downright disastrous. His sole aim, critics say, is to preserve his image as "St Antony", the honest.'

Clearly, there appears a disconnect between what the military desires and the government is willing to deliver. While each service has drawn up its wish list, the government has wrapped these up in procedures that would only deliver the capability over a considerable length of time. For instance, the Army's list will materialise in full only by 2027.

Why is the ministry going much slower than the services would like? One answer is that it is being careful not to have a repeat of its infamous scams - dating back to 'Bofors' and 'coffins for Kargil martyrs'. Once bitten by exposure in the Bofors case, the ruling party for certain is twice shy or doubly wary. But is the ministry only being wary that such scams should not repeat themselves, or are there other reasons too? Since the ministry itself is not saying, it is impossible to know for sure.

Since the government intends spending over US $50 billion over the coming half decade under the defence capital account, there is a considerable push among those in the arms industry - that includes the private sector these days - to steer matters their way. This is partially behind the bad press coming Antony's way.


One reason the ministry is going much slower than the services would like may be that it is being careful not to have a repeat of its infamous scams like Bofors.


Another possibility is that the ministry is not too happy with the strategies for defence articulated by the services. As Joshi informs, the Cold Start strategy, which is the basis of the Army's demands, has not received political blessing yet. But even in this case, the ministry should not be dragging out the purchases of the services, to slow down their agenda. Instead, as Manoj Joshi concludes, "the political leadership [should] closely work with the armed forces to evolve a strategy to deal with Pakistan ... to work with them on all aspects of a strategy that will deter Islamabad." A viable strategy for the nuclear era is clearly needed.

The earlier promise that nuclearisation would result in a peace dividend was rudely contradicted by the Kargil War. The military has come up with its own answers to the strategic problem posed by Pakistan. The political leadership is obliged to consider the military's 'solution'. In case there are qualms over the proposals, or other ideas that have come up elsewhere, the government needs to bring these out as well. Hiding behind procedural rigmarole as it appears to be currently doing is to disregard its authority to over rule the military. So why is the government not taking a stand?

First, do no harm

Firstly, at the heart of the government is in an accommodationist solution to India's Pakistan problem. Therefore, it follows a carrot-and-stick policy requiring a mix of containment through intelligence operations, military coercion, diplomatic pressure and political incentives. This way it prefers to keep the lid on the India-Pakistan relationship, to prevent it from boiling over and scalding India's growth trajectory, on which the national grand strategy depends. Pakistan, cognisant only to the pressure applied on it, is unresponsive to carrots, knowing it can compensate for Indian pressure through external balancing, such as leaning on China and the US.

Secondly, the government has lost the initiative to hardliners. The government, once bitten by the reaction to Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement, is now twice shy in appearing accommodationist. It is forever watching its back against allegations of a 'sell out', using which the opposition right wing that is currently down and out might claw its way back into the political reckoning. The strategic community, dominated by vocal and telegenic hardliners, keeps the government on the defensive. Their latest salvo has been on India's marginalisation in the Af-Pak arena at the London Conferene, despite the significant financial and other contributions the country has made.

Lastly, the government is possibly persuaded by the logic ranged against military options in the nuclear age. Since escalation cannot be ruled out, the risk of military action is unwarranted. It is easy for strategists to talk endlessly on escalation control and the viability of deterrence. It is a much graver matter for political leadership to take decisions on the issue. For decision makers, life and death issues cannot be replicated in academic exercises, wargames and intellectual constructs.

To work its way out of the conundrum the government needs to do three things. One is to make Pakistan an offer it cannot refuse. This has already been done through the back channels, both during the Vajpayee era and during Manmohan Singh's first term. However, since the government has never officially acknowledged this exchange, it has not built the political ballast necessary for seeing the initiative through. Secondly, it needs to build the conditions necessary to get Pakistan - and more importantly, its Army - to bite. And lastly, it needs to proceed with a public information campaign to bring the public round to accepting the unavoidable necessity of a political solution. This would require political investment on the part of the party.

Taking the bull of strategic doctrine by the horns is important lest the government continue to be in the cross hairs of critics, some of whom may well be in the pay roll of arms companies waiting for the windfall. Flush with funds from continuing growth, India is presently comfortable with spending on arms. This also achieves the political objective of not appearing 'soft'. The irony is that when these weapons are used tomorrow, they will endanger the very prosperity that enables their purchase today. The government needs to take a call on whether it is persuaded by the logic of the purchases it is set to make. Antony has enough ammunition to outlast his critics! ⊕

Firdaus Ahmed
06 Mar 2010

QUESTIONING INDIA’S MILITARY TRAJECTORY

India intends spending an equivalent amount but in half the time to the $ 50 billion it spent on armaments over the last decade. Among the big ticket items lined up, are the first purchases of artillery pieces since the Bofors scandal for the Army. The Air Force is going in for the strategic lift Globemaster, C 130s and 126 Multi Role Combat Aircrafts. The Navy is to receive the $ 4 billion rechristened Gorshkov, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, and is building another aircraft carrier and a nuclear submarine and a new generation of submarines this decade. With the success of the Agni III test, the Strategic Forces Command has set its eyes towards the 5000 Km Agni V. Whether all these are necessary is a valid question.

Multiple reasons are given as answer with deterrence usually being the main reason. Firstly, India’s growing economy requires securing through deterring threats that are there in the environment. Future threats need to be catered for now since incorporating weapons into the repertoire requires time. Since India is in a ‘dangerous neighbourhood’ in which are two nuclear armed powers that are close enough to each other for acting in collusion, India has to be prepared for a ‘two front’ eventuality as the worst case scenario. India’s expanding economy would in future require access to energy, trading routes, resources and markets. This entails both a strong Navy and an out of area capability for the Army and strategic reach for the Air Force. Credible nuclear deterrence requires delivery capability in missiles of range and performance, assurance in the second strike capability in terms of the sea leg of the ‘triad’, an elastic quantity of warheads of varying types and yields, and protection through ballistic missile defences of command and control and second strike assets.

Secondly, current threats also figure as logic. The draw down in proxy war in Kashmir and abatement of terror incidents since 26/11 is attributed to success in conventional deterrence. This owes to an offensive doctrine backed by a capability enabled by defence budgets that have expanded three fold over the past decade. It is deemed that China’s venturesomeness across the disputed boundary can only be dissuaded by a visible and usable military capability.

Lastly, India is seen as an emerging power that needs to carry its weight in international affairs. With the US facing prospects of a long term decline, India needs to redress the balance on the side of democracies. By giving itself the capability, it can discharge responsibilities coming its way.

Interrogating this logic is warranted, even if the defence budget is pegged at a seemingly reasonable 2-2.5 per cent of the GDP and is supposedly not necessarily and obviously at the cost of the social sector.

The arms are intended to deter war and if unavoidable to fight and if possible win. The Prussian military thinker, Clausewitz’s most important idea concerned the two types of war. The first was a war of conquest and the second a limited war to bring about a negotiated settlement. While the first amounting to Total War is unthinkable in the nuclear era, the second is being deemed feasible if the Army Chief is to be believed. He had this to say in late November: “The possibility of limited war under a nuclear overhang is still a reality, at least in the Indian sub-continent…”

Since the kind of war that can be fought, if at all is only a limited war, are the preparations reflecting this. Not so. The armaments can well be meant for Total War. The logic is perhaps that once a war is begun it could end up as a wider war even if the original intent was to keep it a limited one. The enemy may up the ante for which prior preparedness on our part would act as deterrence. Therefore, the purchases are for a Total War in order paradoxically to keep any war a limited one. The counter argument is that if there is no guarantee that a war can be kept limited, there is no question of getting into one. And if war is not an option, then arming for one as we are is not necessary.

Lets take the effect on one possible adversary, Pakistan, as example. The range, quality and depth of capabilities that India is acquiring enables India to prevail over Pakistan. Pakistan cannot know what Indian aims are. If India advertises its limited aims, Pakistan can ensure it denies these with greater energy. Denied a win, India, seen as the bigger power, would be facing a loss. It may then be tempted to widen war aims or escalate. It can be denied even these by Pakistan going nuclear. This is not in Indian interests, even if it is decidedly not so in Pakistani interests either. Therefore, even a limited war makes little sense.

The supposed aims in such a war are to ‘punish’ Pakistan. The satisfaction of punishing it cannot be risked. Even if the war is intended to bring Pakistan to the negotiating table, then root causes as Kashmir etc. would require to be addressed on the table. In which case, why should it take a war? Such negotiations can be proceeded with, thereby undercutting the prohibitive option of war. This has the added advantage that the expenses being incurred and the militarization resulting can also be avoided.

The same is the case with China. The former Chairman of the Chief’s of Staff in his landmark speech to Delhi’s strategic community on relinquishing office said, “Common sense dictates that Cooperation with China would be preferable to Competition or Conflict, as it would be foolhardy to compare India and China as equal… On the military front, our strategy to deal with China must include reducing the military gap.” As expected he recommends diplomacy backed by military preparedness. The idea is that diplomacy succeeds if there is military force to back it. Since China, on its way to super-powerdom, is expected to get more assertive; but seeing military backing would be more responsive to Indian diplomacy.

The question is that in case diplomacy fails can military power, as is being created, be of any use? That it would be mutually hurtful is no satisfaction for getting hurt oneself. Having military power to fall back on makes diplomacy less amenable to the ‘give and take’ of negotiations. Politically, there would be little incentive to arrive at solutions to, say, the border problem, since militarily there would be no need to. In effect the cyclic argument of militarists can be identified: military preparedness delays solution to problems and their continuing existence gives military power a seemingly plausible rationale.

Arming now for the envisaged future threat of two Asiatic giants fighting it out for strategic space in Asia; for markets, resources and energy; and for prestige can only be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Ending up as cannon fodder for the US in a superpower face off with China for global hegemony can only be gainful for arms merchants and their points men in India.

As a nuclear power, all India need have is the capability to defend itself. A peace dividend for having gone nuclear is what India should instead be looking towards. That was the promise by nuclear salesmen when India nuclearised. The ongoing expansion of the military is intended for much more than that. Its time the nuclear and military bluff is called, lest it be too late.

INDIA AT 60: ACQUIRING ESCAPE VELOCITY?


The parade down the Rajpath on India’s sixtieth Republic Day can be expected to showcase its growing power signified best by the replica of INS Arihant, the third leg of its ‘triad’ launched by the Prime Minister in the preceding year. While the operationalisation will take up to mid-decade, by then India would have acquired Agni missiles with reach enough to ‘take out’ cities on Chinese eastern sea board perhaps with H-Bombs, despite existence of the latter being questioned over last year. With the mountain ‘strike corps’ under raising having stabilised by then, India would be in a position to parlay with China from a position of symmetry. The expectation is that this would give it the confidence to enter into the necessary ‘give and take’ that negotiations imply. Presently, it does not have the political capital internally.

However, consequential for the interim is its relationship with Pakistan, presently on ‘pause’. India’s strategy dating to the eighties of hiking the defence imbalance in its favour to such an extent that Pakistan falls off as a challenger has not met with the success of the strategy’s votaries so far. Economic problems of the nineties set back the endeavour by a decade. But at the start of this decade, India has the requisite economic ballast to push this strategy; de-hyphenation already having taken place over the last one. The current stridency in Pakistan’s view of India seemingly indicates increasing success for this strategy. The expectation is that eventually the Pakistani Army, attuned to the power imbalance, would acknowledge it and realistically ‘throw in the towel’.

In the coming decade security is to be so managed as to materialise this outcome on both fronts. The reference to ‘two front’ war can be explained as India’s attempt at arriving at conventional deterrence capabilities, placing it in a position of strength in the ‘worst case’ scenario. Pakistan’s utility as a surrogate for China would end. This may open up future possibilities by end decade in which South Asia as a unified, if not unitary, strategic entity balances China, with or without ballast of an external power.

There are two problems with this grand strategy. One is its over-reliance on power and second is that it does not take on board several problem areas that could derail it.

It amounts to a truism that power under grids the world order. This reliance on power is therefore explicable. The paradox is that though the utility of power is in deterrence, it nevertheless ends up being used. Just as in the early part of last century, in this century too the argument persists that globalisation induced thicker economic relations would help prevent war. The expectation was belied by the First World War. That too was a period of rising new powers. Learning would have it that avoiding a like eventuality entails departing from over-reliance on power. The irony is that the economic underpinning of power is itself endangered. Finally when India has much to lose, it is all being placed at stake in a power gamble. Though a globalised world, it remains very much a nuclear one too. Therefore, more needs doing with more imagination and urgency along other planes such as institutionalising inter-relationships and Asian security architectures.

Secondly, Pakistan managed to under-cut Indian strategy for the past three decades. Over the eighties and the naughties, it lent itself to US purposes in Afghanistan. In the nineties, India was hobbled by the shift to liberalisation and by proxy war. Pakistan has managed to checkmate Indian rise manifest in the conventional plane on the sub-conventional and nuclear planes. How its counter plays out this decade would determine whether India reaches decade end as planned. Pakistan will lend itself to the Chinese game plan keeping alive India’s ‘two front’ dilemma. Creating the ability to cope does not help India transcend it, but materialises it instead.

Underlying grand strategy is the assumption that India’s growing proximity with the US would help. To close the military gap with China, K. Subrahmanyam advocates: ‘India is seen as one of the key partners for the US to reshape the 21st century. The US has agreed to sell high technology defence equipment to India while it is not likely to sell them to China, its main rival in the coming decades.’ In respect of Pakistan, India’s actions, at variance with what it professes, seem to indicate a perverse hope of the situation in AfPak deteriorating to the extent that the US requires Indian assistance, thereby raising its profile, indispensability and bargaining power.

A conclusion from this brief survey is that India is honing its power capacities hoping to make up any short fall by leaning on the US. This would render it vulnerable to shocks as the international order transits decisively away from the post Cold War unipolar moment. Success in this requires deft footwork. Commentary on the recent changeover of the NSA does not infuse confidence that India can manage this. With institutional and internal incapacities remaining, India requires postponing its tryst by another decade.

TAKING FICCI SERIOUSLY

It is unsurprising that the FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) has gone back on the report on terrorism of a task force commissioned by it. This was prompted by the concerns raised by its Pakistani counter part, FPCCI, on the recommendation of ‘surgical strikes’ in response to the next terror attack made by the task force. It is perhaps apprehensive that ‘surgical strikes’ would do more to disrupt the investment climate than terror strikes, for which it thinks these strikes are remedy. That the recommendation was made a year ago does not detract from the fact that even today it continues to be discussed as an option.

This article discusses whether ‘surgical strikes’ are at all a sensible option. It does not dwell on two other options mentioned in the report, but deserving of mention here. The first is a ‘covert’, ‘deniable’, reply for if Zaid Hamid writing in the Pakistani press is to be believed, this is already underway! The second is the report’s advocacy of an ‘All Out Assault’ involving ‘a limited but intense attack on the PoK’, taking this as more as outlet for justified exasperation close in wake of the dastardly 26/11.

The FICCI report has it that with the locations of terror outfits largely known in Pakistan, it would be possible to attack these. India could use artillery if in range, the air force and possibly Special Forces operations. Given the linkage of ballistic missiles with the nuclear capability, these would not be used. Also, Prithvi missiles are being retired. The levels to which cruise missiles are operational, is uncertain.

The report rightly assesses that India would require to be prepared for a backlash of international opinion, as also for a possible war. While it can reasonably be expected that robust Indian diplomacy can handle international opinion, particularly by referring to Indian restraint in wake of Mumbai 26/11, it is worth considering whether conflict escalation can be avoided and if such an outcome can be coped with.

The latter is easy to concede in light of the Army Chief’s comment that India is preparing for a ‘two front’ war. India has the advantage of quality and quantity and can be expected to be effective if not efficient in conventional conflict. Nevertheless, efficiency is importance to the eventual outcome of the conflict. This is because even while India will prevail, the margin of the win will determine the victor. Just as 1979 is treated as a Vietnamese victory and the Israeli campaigns of 2006 and 2009 are seen as defeats, to win all that Pakistan needs to ensure is that is does not lose. The political cost of such a ‘tainted’ ‘victory’ would be such that no Indian government would likely be willing to countenance.

Would a ‘victory’ be messy? Consider the opinion of the Standing Committee on Defence: ‘Considering the fact that the key to success in modern day warfare operations is the ability of the different wings of the Armed Forces to integrate their efforts under a single command without any loss of time…The Committee, have also recommended that till such time the post of CDS is created, the Government may take steps to give appropriate authority to the Chairman COSC in the present set up to command and control the resources of the Defence Services whenever the situation so demands.’ In effect, the principal coordinator of the defence forces would only be served with an enhanced staff!

This would be at a time when the weighty decision on the relative weight of each service involved is to be taken. Friction between service viewpoints was referred to in the famous speech of the last COSC, Admiral Mehta. He concurred with the Air Force’s view that he quoted as being, ‘“Jointness does not necessarily imply equal partnership” and that there was a need to “adopt correct combinations, whilst respecting the core expertise of individual Services”.’ Writing in Mail Today, Pinaki Bhattacharya writes: ‘The army and air force are battling it out over how to beat Pakistan in a flash war if and when that happens.’

The efficacy of the current COSC system is revealed best in Admiral Mehta’s speech in which he states: ‘We have a draft nuclear doctrine in place, which is restrained, in keeping with our traditional national culture.’ In referring to the Draft nuclear doctrine of 1999, the Admiral reveals that he is unaware that the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) approved the doctrine in 2003. This, despite having the Strategic Forces Command under him in his capacity as COSC!

To answer the question posed, it could get messy.

The government would require not only being supportive, but also tolerant of shortcomings. The Army has already revealed shortcomings in its inventory. The Air Force’s Vice Chief has already controversially attributed this to do with the kind of politics India has. Therefore, the armed forces would have a ready alibi and the buck, as it must, would stop with the government. Can the government, the ruling party and, more importantly, its inner core centered on the Gandhi family, afford it politically?

The report raises concerns of corporate sector, ostensibly as part of its civil society duties, with respect to terrorism in India’s hinterland, the Naxal belt and the North East. It makes the point that terror is designed to disrupt India’s economic growth by, among other reasons, making India an unsafe destination for foreign capital and visitors. It fails to mention that the same would be doubly so with increase in threat of conflict. Perhaps it smells an economic opportunity in the resulting militarisation. That the FICCI that should instead be interested in increased trade with Pakistan be linked to a report that calls for an attack on it. This calls for an explanation.

Increased defence budgets, the promise of defence offsets and the incipient growth of an industrial-military complex in India as it attempts to gain great power status may lead to manipulation of the threat perception by corporate elements who stand to gain from the resulting militarisation. The Preface of the report is candid on this calling, ‘for greater involvement of industry in national security strategies and improved cooperation between policy-makers, government and Industry as part of a robust public-private partnership.’ Already there is talk of a two front war, necessitating greater military spending and exertion by India. The FICCI report heralds a trend warned against by Eisenhower in his farewell address.

Not only would vigil over the next 26/11 and India’s response continue into the New Year, but the larger trend referred to would bear watching into the coming decade.

Much hullaballoo, little cause

20 December 2009 - Manoj Joshi, an informed commentator on military affairs, has in his latest volley taken a crack at a Ministry of Defence claim that the armed forces "are fully prepared, battle-worthy and capable to counter any challenges at very short notice". The statement in question was MoD's response to a news item based on leaked information about a presentation made by the army to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence.

In its presentation, the army had voiced concerns about shortages in several key areas - 71 per cent in armour, 17 per cent in combat helicopters, 62 per cent in mechanised infantry and 52 per cent in artillery. Joshi opines that, "Even these figures don't tell the whole truth. They do not tell us, for example, that India only has 300 T-90 main battle tanks and that the 2000-strong T-72 fleet is yet to be modernised to fight at night ... it appears that what the army will achieve by 2027 is not a modern army circa 2027, but [instead it will] achieve the targets that it had set nearly 10 years ago."

The Army's readiness - or more correctly, the lack of it - would appear alarming, particularly if it is related to the requirements of the prevalent 'Cold Start' doctrine. This doctrine attempts to undercut the impunity enjoyed by Pakistan due to the proximity of its military formations to the border and its nuclear card. The idea is to have the capability for speedy launch of an attack in battle groups that would confound Pakistan's nuclear calculus. This would not only deter Pakistan from expanding the proxy war, but the military threat would force Pakistan to also roll back its terror infrastructure.

The doctrine can be seen as an attempt by the military to furnish the political leadership with an option for responding to the strategic problem of proxy war posed by Pakistan. As can be seen from recent history, political leaders have been selective in using the military option. Both during Operation Parakram and post 26/11, India refrained from using even the mildest military option. Also, it limited its military response to its own side of the Line of Control at Kargil. Going back to the 1990s and further back to Zia-ul Haq's provocations, a restrained approach to Pakistani adventurism has been the preferred yardstick at the political level.

Of course the military should be prepared for conflict. However, whether to engage in such conflict (and if so, how) is a decision for the civilian leadership. On this score, the military and the political leadership in India are not on the same page. The military's self-given program requires a higher level of capability and a political resolve and intention to use it than the civilian heads appear willing to support.


India's strategic posture - brought about by the overall effect of its grand strategy combining all elements of power such as economic, political, military, diplomatic, cultural etc. - has traditionally been of deterrence. The offensive content of this deterrence has of late increased, due to doctrinal innovation and budget expansion in India. Thus, it has shifted from defensive deterrence to offensive deterrence. The difference between the two is that in the former India would await an enemy offensive before responding, but of late with the movement to the latter, it would be proactive in the launch of its offensive - though only when provoked beyond a point. This ability is nevertheless to heighten deterrence, not for compellence.

It is arguable that the military has arbitrarily settled on a higher degree of offensive deterrence, bordering on compellence (i.e. forcing the other side to behave in a particular way). This stronger posture apparently does not have explicit government sanction. This is the military's answer to keeping conventional strength relevant to the strategic problem posed by Pakistan and into the nuclear era. The government on the other hand would be content instead to remain with defensive deterrence of the pre-Cold Start period, since it is more mindful of the possible implications and consequences of nuclearisation of offensive deterrence and compellence.

The impact of nuclearisation has been such that the military's traditional sphere can no longer be considered solely its own. The military may prefer a higher level of readiness, especially for conventional operations, but the politicians will be alert to the implications of even non-nuclear action on the nuclear aspect. Therefore, the figures on readiness need not necessarily be taken as alarming. The government it seems would prefer non-military means, such as diplomacy and intelligence, instead. These have worked to an extent in restricting Pakistani strategic space over the past half decade.

Military means also need to be seen in context of the state of the opponent. Pakistan is in considerable disarray. Its army is engaged on its western border. Even through it tries to upscale its conventional forces through diversion of US funds meant for operations against the Taliban, the equation is in India's favour, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Second, India's grand strategy calls for a sustained period of growth. It cannot be distracted by a conflict, howsoever localised or limited.

Third, its military preparedness is being undertaken with a long term eye on China. This explains developments and procurements of missiles, submarines, air craft carriers and multi role fighters. Whether these are sufficient to deal with future challenges from the Chinese or not, they would obviously help India militarily out-class Pakistan.

Lastly, in case the higher capability - to the extent the Army wants and Manoj Joshi seems to support - were made available, then the temptation to use that capability would surely be greater. At junctures such as 26/11, when resort to lower levels of military force such as through surgical strikes was thinkable, the very existence of the capability would weigh in favour of such action. Therefore, not having the capability for compellence is not such a bad thing after all. Even if hypothetically, resorting to it would have proved counter-productive in any case. Since it cannot be guaranteed that the conflict would not escalate, there is no reason to risk it in light of India's higher order aims and grand strategy. Therefore, India is better of without it.

See for full article -
http://www.indiatogether.org/2009/dec/fah-compel.htm


But more pertinently, there is a case for political direction of the military. It would be much better for the government to debate and indicate which posture it prefers - defensive deterrence, offensive deterrence or compellence - so that the military could work towards this, rather than define its scope on its own, as it currently does. ⊕

MAKING OBAMA’S WAR ALSO INDIA’S

Leadership involves taking a call. Obama has placed himself in the firing line, not only on account of what he said at West Point but also for what he did not. His laying a deadline has already drawn fire; that of his defeated rival from the presidential polls, Senator McCain. What he left unsaid in terms of addressing the Taliban directly, has already drawn a response in the Taliban threatening heightened violence. In effect, in case the Taliban are not on board as the deadline approaches, then prospects of civil war loom. But by then it would no longer be Obama’s War since he has already announced, ‘Now, we must come together to end this war successfully.’

The exit strategy comprises another ‘surge’ of 30000 troops, supplemented by additional European contributions. This is intended to bring about a sense of security in which the civilian ‘surge’ and training of the ANA can be progressed. With the ANA suitably trained by additional trainers, it would progressively take on responsibility for security. This implies that the ANA has to be made battle ready in a year and half.

This is a tight time schedule for firstly imparting basic soldier training and then training the trained soldier into being a counter insurgent. Pitching the raw counter insurgent into action against the Taliban, that has been waging an insurgency for the last few years against the US-NATO combine, would be a tall order. Particularly when the ANA is known to suffer desertions and is prone to infiltration by Taliban sympathisers. The ANA would be able to take on the Taliban if foreign troops assist with superior technology, mobility and air assets. When they leave, the threat of a Taliban return heightens, even if Americans intend to ‘continue to assist and act as advisers’. This would be an unfortunate aftermath for a war that has seen so much investment of resources and blood.

What needs to be done to avoid this possibility? Clearly, if the past four years of a widening Afghan commitment have not worked, a year’s additional military effort will not. Obama did not spell out the answer. But in the deadline and his stating that, ‘it will be clear to the Afghan government - and, more importantly, to the Afghan people - that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country’, he has implied a political resolution needs to be worked towards. The advantage of the deadline is that it would focus minds.

A beginning has already probably been made. The suspicion of ISI connections with the Taliban has been virtually acknowledged by former Pakistani president Musharraf. In addition, Obama has wisely placated Afghan nationalism and sense of honour that under-grids the insurgency, stating, ‘We have no interest in occupying your country...And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect - to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.’ Thus, an approach on an equal footing has been made. The Taliban can be expected to eschew temptation to wait out the US. This understanding has perhaps already been arrived at, otherwise Obama would not have ventured to set so explicit a deadline.

What are the implications for India? India’s position has been anti-Taliban form the outset. In case of an attempt at accommodation with the Taliban, India is likely to view it adversely. This owes to it being seen as a vehicle of Pakistani interests and because of its involvement in Kashmir. It would be unwilling to make a constructive contribution since it has been locked in a zero-sum relationship with Pakistan since 26/11. It can play a negative role by promising aid to its friends standing up to the Taliban after US exit, along with other concerned regional states. Though hard-line strategists in India would encourage this line, the problems are firstly its practicability and second it would only lengthen the conflict and lastly it would re-hyphenate India with Pakistan. However, it would not like to place itself at odds with the US led international community’s effort.

Therefore, what should India do? Firstly, it should cauterise itself against the worst case outcome. It has rightly already reopened talks with the separatists in Kashmir. It needs to continue keeping social harmony - managed well over the preceding year - on even keel. Secondly, it would require reining in any intelligence activity that would set Indian interests up as a target in Afghanistan. In case of an action-reaction cycle getting set, there would be no escaping deepening Indian commitment to upset the Pakistani game plan. Thirdly, on a positive note, it needs rereading the last part of Obama’s speech in which he addresses the Pakistani state and nation. From this would emerge how India can modulate its foreign policy to supplement the Obama initiative. In doing so it can extract from Pakistan like reciprocation. It must resume that stalled peace process as a first step.

Our view, their view, the world-view
23 November 2009 -
In the context of Pakistan, India has acted as a status quo-ist power, whereas Pakistan is well known for being the revisionist keen on upsetting the territorial status quo. It has resorted to military means in 1965, proxy war in the nineties and a border war at Kargil. India on the other hand has been defensive in the post-1971 War period, relying on Bhutto to deliver on the secret pact at Simla. Through the eighties and nineties it has relied on deterrence.

And lately, its exasperation is evident in its movement to quasi-compellence of Pakistan, insisting that the state should roll back its anti-India terror infrastructure. All this popular reading of the strategic equation points to a uniform fact - India prefers to keep the status quo.But this view is not shared by the Pakistani Establishment - the informal clique of decision makers and influential personalities, historically centered on the Pakistan Army chief, and the formal conference of corps commanders that runs the Pakistan Army and underwrites the state.

To them, Kashmir is the most salient issue on the table between the two nations. And, as they see it, India committed to resolving the Kashmir issue at Simla, Lahore and Islamabad, but did not follow through with enough despatch with the progress made in the back channel during the Musharraf years. They accuse India of engaging in talks for the sake of talks, and has reneged on its commitment to resolving Kashmir. In other words, they see India as reivisionist, reneging from the mutually agreed position that Kashmir is an issue that needs resolving in favour of ensuring that only the Indian view prevails - i.e. that the Line of Control be turned into an international border, if necessary by exertion of compellence!

The fact is that the infiltration and terror activity in Kashmir has steadily gone down since 2002. The interpretations as to why this has happened differ. We in India believe that this is due to action by Indian security forces, and the creation of the fence separating the territories controlled by India and Pakistan. The Pakistani security establishment would argue, since they cannot own up to terrorism in the first place, that the lessened terrorist activity in Kashmir is due to movement promised by India, particularly so at the Islamabad joint statement.

See http://www.indiatogether.org/2009/nov/fah-usvisit.htm for full article

Whether Pakistan is exercising restraint can never be proven to Indian satisfaction. There are too many periodic reminders of the terrorist threat and its links to Pakistan, for India to believe that its neighbour is doing much to rein in its agents. 26/11 particularly reinforced this view, with India threatening immediate and strong action. Any quietening-down by Pakistan over the last year is attributed to this new Indian anger, and not to any self-restraint by the Pakistanis themselves.

Pakistan's support of terrorist actions, albeit patently illegitimate, can be interpreted as means to goad India to seek a resolution of the Kashmir issue through talks. India has indicated its willingness to engage in talks, but it has been reluctant to arrive at an understanding with Pakistan at the point of a gun. Internally, no government would be able to sell its case of accommodation if seen to have been forced into talks and their outcome by terrorist action. Therefore, India maintains that it would talk to Pakistan only when terror ceases to be its instrument.

By this yardstick, Pakistan would have to defang itself, at a time when India's power credentials are growing and have placed it further out of Pakistan's league. Pakistan is thus being required to make a leap of faith twice over - first to take at face value that India still believes in talks even while it strengthens itself militarily, and second to accept that India would engage in talks in case Pakistan complies with the demand to stop arming the terrorists first. But, says the Pakistani establishment, if Pakistans lowers the militaristic tone of its engagement, India would have no incentive to talk and there would be no 'issue' left to talk about. This, the Pakistani Army is unlikely to bite.



It can be expected that President Obama will try to prevail on the Indian Prime Minister during his visit to White House. The silver lining internally has been that in the run up to the visit India has opened up a long delayed line to Kashmiri separatists. Externally, the least that will come about could be a declaration to resume the 'paused' dialogue process.

But this may not be very significant. Pakistan has virtually dropped out of the Kashmir question, no doubt due to its own counter productive strategy. Moreover, India would not know who to engage with in Pakistan - the longevity of the civilian government is questionable, and the Army there is scrambling to outlast the current adverse turn in the Global War of Terror, before it returns to the traditional and familiar Indo-Pak game of 'balance of power'.

All of this is made complicated by the fact that each side - India as well as Pakistan - would not like to be seen as acting under compulsion. Thus any new moves proposed during the PM's visit would have to be seen as emanating from the self-interest of all the parties, rather than merely responding to the expectations of others. Just to prove internally that action is not being taken at others' behest, no meaningful moves will be taken. Unless more is done to change the perceptions of each other as 'revisionist', fingers will continue to remain crossed. ⊕

AN ISSUE IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS?

The Army Chief has said, "US has not allowed a second 9/11 to happen. Indonesia has not allowed a second Bali bombing to happen. India has allowed people to get away after the Parliament attack, the Delhi blasts and finally the 26/11. It's time for all of us to say no more." In light of weightier civil-military relations issues in question, that both analogies are inappropriate is not worth a pause. But first a consideration of whether this is indeed a defining juncture in India’s civil-military relations.

The context is the forthcoming anniversary of 26/11, which India would like to traverse without incident. The urgency owes to the situation in Pakistan worsening. It is possible that the government is putting the pressure on Pakistan to rein in the jihadis to the extent it can. This explains the Home Minister’s earlier warning, “I'm warning Pakistan for the last time. If Pakistan attempts to send terrorists into India again, India will not only foil those attempts but also give them a crushing response.” Such a ‘good cop-bad cop’ routine helps balance the prime minister’s extending a ‘hand of friendship’ to Pakistan on his trip to the Valley late last month. The Chief said this in the presence of the Minister of State for Defence. News that the latest terror plan, bust by the FBI in the US, was to target the prestigious National Defence College, was perhaps the provocation. The statement of the present Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee is in keeping with precedent of policy influencing pronouncements set by the previous COSC Chairman, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, in his address at a National Maritime Foundation lecture recently – the statement in question then being on India’s China policy.

But is India capable of such finesse in signalling? Answering this question in the ‘affirmative’ would mean that treating the Chief’s statement as a departure in civil-military norms as an attempt at generating a conflict where there is none. Since whether there is a plan to the government’s moves cannot be known with any certainty, giving the benefit of doubt is warranted. The government is using the Chief’s broad shoulders to unmistakably convey to Pakistan that India is poised precariously on its proverbial ‘tolerance threshold’.

Nevertheless, even as an academic exercise, its worth probing what the juncture implies. Keeping civil-military relations under scrutiny periodically helps keep militarization in check and democracy in good health.

Firstly, the statement was at a CII-Army seminar. This indicates the vested interest corporate India, and external arms dealers, have in arming India. The Minister of Defence having indicated that India is likely to spend $ 50 billion over the middle term, this is not surprising. Of consequence is what this implies for policy choices. This can only be to facilitate military expenditure in pursuit of capabilities allowing India to prevail in case of exercise of the military option, an inevitability since the Chief has spoken.

Secondly, with the Home Minister and the Chief having in their utterances sealed India’s policy choice, whether it is the right one needs questioning. Higher end options, such as war, can be ruled out for the very reasons that have stayed India’s hand earlier. These are economy, US presence and the nuclear overhang. However, surgical strikes on any of the list of 5000 targets that the Air Force Western Command boss has said they have drawn up, is possible. This could perhaps be supplemented with Army action across the Line of Control, so that all services have a piece of the action. Would this make sense in a situation in which Pakistan finds itself in currently? The expectation that India can pull off a mini Israel style punishing strike is to mistake a nuclear armed state with Palestinian non state actors. Since madrasas can reasonably be expected to be part of jihadi training complexes, bloodied madrasa children on CNN would make for a avoidable political debacle.

Thirdly, in case India has not foreclosed its options, then credibility of the minister and the Chief, and in turn that of India, would suffer. With credibility at stake the pressures for the military option would increase. This would be in addition to right wing pressures that would be strident, in the hope of regaining the ground lost in recent electoral battles. Therefore, even if the option is open, it has been virtually foreclosed.

This brings to fore the most important implication. Can the military pronounce on policy choices? It can discuss and advise on options. Making choices in democratic systems are patently a political prerogative. Military positions on issues command credibility that a government would find hard to challenge. The leaking of the MacChrystal report is an example from civil-military relations in the US. In the current circumstance, were the government to choose the saner option once again, it would fall foul of the opinion, albeit inadvertently generated by the Chief’s remarks, in favour of an overtly militarised response.

While not over dramatising the juncture, any lessons it has can only serve deepen India’s democracy and military professionalism.