The echo of Gaza closer home http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=34991 http://caravandaily.com/portal/echoes-of-gaza-closer-home/ | ||
Here one's reservations on this score are given a go-bye to make a passing mention to the article dean of the Jindal School of International Relations in the Asian Age, a paper once presided over by MJ Akbar (http://www.asianage.com/columnists/children-conflict-773). The worthy writes of Kashmiris agitating over a far off war. He notes that one of them got killed in the bargain. He rues this loss of life for an unknown cause, informing of the manner these agitators are paid to go out on the street. To him this is best explained by figures of unemployment of youth close to 50 per cent. It is only natural for him to alight on the stipend as somehow delegitimising the protests since it makes for a cadre of professional agitators, described by one forgettable army general in Badami Bagh as participating in 'agitational terrorism'. The neo-liberal in the intellectual comes forth in this unidimensional economic analysis. Understandably, he goes on to articulate that if these youth had a job, they would not be on the streets. So QED: open up the space to private capital, retire the state administration, and look and behold! Kashmir will be transformed into the secular crown of India. It is also only natural for him to miss that point that a quarter century after the Indian state has faced up to crowds in Kashmir, it has not mastered the art of non-lethal crowd control. This is so despite a defence budget tripling over this century. If it is the paramilitary that is at the spear tip in Kashmir, then a greater proportion of this should rightly have gone to outfitting them. Such a thought may not occur to busy bodies of international affairs and strategic studies faculties. They barter access for their intellectual capacities. For instance, the good dean was enroute back from Gurez, where he was most unlikely to have been hosted by either a local or an NGO. To think the government has declared its intent to dole out more for strategic studies departments and increase their numbers across the country. This can only expand the tribe of those insensitive to such questions. No such largesse is for peace studies departments, such as the one in Awantipore, that could lend some balance to the discourse. The question as to why the Indian state does not care to resort to non-lethal means is easy to answer. It is because it does not need to since there is the AFSPA and the Disturbed Areas Act in force. Next, punitive action such as this helps deter more vigorous demonstrations. It conveys the resolve of the state not to tolerate a repeat of 2009 and 2010. It helps nip a problem in the bud in that the situation is stabilised before it spirals out of control resulting in more deaths. Also, just as it silenced its parliament from expressing disapproval of Israel, it is not interested in having this disapproval shown on the streets instead. Remember, it is Israel that has given the technology, not a little hardware and perhaps even the tactical ideas on anti-infiltration along the line of control. However, other than commercial reasons, and the fact that India serves as the 'rest and recuperation' base for the Israeli conscripts between their tenures on West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon, there are other good reasons. India too may require to 'mow the lawn' in the neighbourhood as Israel does time and again in Gaza and Lebanon. The expectation of a spill over from AfPak when the US departs informs India's Kashmir strategy. It explains the inaction over the past decade in which violence levels were low enough to justify political resolution efforts. That these remained frozen instead suggests Indian strategy of wait and watch. Now that the wait is over, the 'mow the lawn' strategy may be on the cards. It does not want to have the rationale for this challenged even before it gets to operationalise it. Finally, the state is aware that even if the situation in Gaza does boil the blood of the faithful, particularly as the good dean reminds us after a session in the mosque with the bearded haranguer, the succeeding agitations are less directed at Israel than the state itself. The stone is not intended for Israel. Given the pent up angst and each succeeding Kashmiri generation, rightly termed by the good dean as 'children of conflict', wanting to prove itself against the Indian state, the situation can turn nasty. Magnification of this in the mind of the poor paramilitary soldier peering out of his bunker through the concertina coils at advancing crowds, leads to lethal use of force. It escapes the academic that such demonstrations cannot be for the money that no doubt is also doled out. Facing possible death and certainty of loss of avenues to earn, particularly with the Kashmir police charging agitators so as to make their record untenable for government and other jobs, is certainly not due to the stipend they may receive for their pains. Instead, they pocket the money since they need it and take their chances on the street, again since they need to but for different reasons. It is with good reason that India has ordered the UN mission in Kashmir, the UNMOGIP, out of its building in Delhi. UNMOGIP has been focus of agitations in Kashmir in the early nineties in which crowds would petition the UN. Telling the visiting Ladsous, head of UN peacekeeping, off, is to keep the UN on the defensive. When the time comes for India to 'mow the lawn', it would like the same impunity as Israel, since it would be giving the same rationale: self defence. While political inaction has attended Kashmir, by no means has India been inactive on other fronts. It has topped the table of arms imports, importing more than three times the amount of the next two states - China and Pakistan - combined. Unlike in November 2008, it is better prepared. It is engaged in demonstrating its resolve in, to quote the military, giving a 'befitting reply' to the spate of infiltration attempts this summer, some as the army commander reminds owing to the fallout from the Pakistani operation Zarb e Azb in North Waziristan. It is only hoped that India has not borrowed another leaf out of Israel's book, that of keeping the surroundings unstable. So long as enemies are fighting each other, they remain busy at each other's throats. This strategy no doubt explains the extent to which the nasty turn of the 'Arab spring' has left Israel as seemingly the only stable place in the region, its Iron Dome notwithstanding. By this yardstick, India could pull the plug on Pakistan and allow it to go down the tube. From press hagiographies, its NSA appears easily capable of divining the way. This way it can more easily ward off fallout of implosion in Pakistan, rather than have a stable Pakistan divert its jihadi energy India's way. Kashmir having busted the Fukuyama thesis at its very conception in the early nineties, it is clear that history has not ended yet. The state's preparedness has reduced any incentive for it to resolve the problem. The two foreign secretaries will meet no doubt to arrive at an excuse for further bloodletting: 'Look we tried'. Israel has provided the precedence. Proximity to the US is set to increase with the ongoing Kerry visit and follow up Hegel visit, in the run up to the Modi's US yatra. India will have the cover to proceed to cauterise the restive Islamic crescent at the Neelam, Jhelum, Ravi and Sutlej. More visits of the learned professor can be expected and some gratis advice. |
Showing posts with label paramilitary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label paramilitary. Show all posts
Friday, August 01, 2014
kashmir and gaza
Thursday, July 08, 2010
IPCS article
#3152, 21 June 2010
Countering the Naxal Threat-IV: Military as an Option?
The Times of India headlines has it that the ‘Army is bracing to take on the Naxals’ (17 June 2010). The report informs that up to five divisions of the Army are being readied for deployment. A training center is planned to be opened that would put through other ranks of the supporting arms such as armour and artillery. In the traditional way the Army does counter insurgency, a grid is apparently to be deployed and the Maoists isolated from the populace. Brigadier level advisers have been earmarked. Earlier last month, the cabinet committee on security had debated Army deployment and at that time, the Army deployment had been ruled against, to prevent it from being over-stretched.
Preparations as reported may be contingency planning on part of the Army. The training center reported could even be one being opened by the Army for training the paramilitary troops. However, it’s possible that in light of the inadequacies of the police leadership and paramilitary sub-units revealed by the EN Rammohan enquiry in the Chintalnar episode, the government may have decided otherwise. The government has been persuaded of the need to use the right tool for the job of gaining control over the massive area comprising difficult terrain. The preparations would in any case be useful in buttressing any political reaching out that may be underway, behind the scenes to Maoists, to bring them to the table under threat of unleashing the Army.
On the issue of whether the Army ‘should’ be deployed at all, it is quite apparent from the recurring losses sustained by the paramilitary that there are shortfalls in its organization, leadership, ethos and training. The argument, usually heard on air waves, that the Army should not be used against its own people implies that where it has been so employed such as in J&K and the North East, the people are somehow ‘different’. Even in Kashmir, the operations were in a human terrain comprising Indians, if alienated Indians. If the Army is to be deployed, it is best to rehearse counter-insurgency lessons in a timely manner. By this yardstick, the mental and training preparedness as reported being undertaken by the Army is a commendable start.
The foremost concern, however, remains human rights. The killing of three ‘infiltrators’ who later turned out to be men lured by the TA (H&H) in Kashmir recently is not a one-off incident. Note that the crime occurred in the present environment of human rights watchfulness in Kashmir. There were also earlier reports of the fake action in Siachen and of the ‘ketchup’ Colonel in Assam. The lesson is that the state would require being wary from the outset. The understanding that operations are an independent military domain is in light of the past experience, unpersuasive.
It follows from this that political over-watch would be required. This cannot be expected at the provincial level. The very fact that the situation has been ‘handed over’ to the Army would lead the weak political class at this level to abdicate responsibility. Delhi is indeed too far and the indefatigable Minister for Home Affairs over-burdened; his latest additional responsibility being to head the GoM on the Bhopal tragedy! Given that the required levels of supervision would be absent; can the military be expected to exercise suitable self-regulation?
This is not impossible to conceive. The opposition expected is unlikely to be of the order the military has experienced elsewhere. The dimension of external interference is missing. The military has an ‘iron fist in velvet glove’ doctrine, dating to 2006, as a guide. The military values the difference in approach to insurgency with that of other armies in the close vicinity, such as the US and in particular the Pakistani Army. Beginning the new mission on a clean slate, it is in a position to build in best practices from the outset itself. Knowledgeable sources have it that the in-service reputation of the commanding general, head of its Central Command, inspires confidence on this score.
Nevertheless, pathologies need pointing out. One is that quantification of the officer promotion system - reportedly under re-examination on priority on order of the new Chief - could lead to a ‘numbers game’. Second, the need to show ‘results’, particularly to distinguish its deployment as an improvement over the paramilitary, needs being guarded against. Third, military recruitment practices favour officers and troops from a particular strata and region. The impact of this on their perception of the tribal people needs factoring in. Fourth, the ‘grid’ system contemplated indicates a lasting deployment. Instead, the grid could be furnished by the paramilitary. Staying on as the grid suggests, implies avoidable militarization in which the military would over time gain a vested interest. Lastly, theory on primary group cohesion, reinforced by the earlier experience of the Rashtriya Rifles, warns against using subunits of amalgamated troops.
Even if the Army is seemingly the best instrument, a far better approach would still be political first, negotiations based, development led and precluding violence.
#3152, 21 June 2010
Countering the Naxal Threat-IV: Military as an Option?
The Times of India headlines has it that the ‘Army is bracing to take on the Naxals’ (17 June 2010). The report informs that up to five divisions of the Army are being readied for deployment. A training center is planned to be opened that would put through other ranks of the supporting arms such as armour and artillery. In the traditional way the Army does counter insurgency, a grid is apparently to be deployed and the Maoists isolated from the populace. Brigadier level advisers have been earmarked. Earlier last month, the cabinet committee on security had debated Army deployment and at that time, the Army deployment had been ruled against, to prevent it from being over-stretched.
Preparations as reported may be contingency planning on part of the Army. The training center reported could even be one being opened by the Army for training the paramilitary troops. However, it’s possible that in light of the inadequacies of the police leadership and paramilitary sub-units revealed by the EN Rammohan enquiry in the Chintalnar episode, the government may have decided otherwise. The government has been persuaded of the need to use the right tool for the job of gaining control over the massive area comprising difficult terrain. The preparations would in any case be useful in buttressing any political reaching out that may be underway, behind the scenes to Maoists, to bring them to the table under threat of unleashing the Army.
On the issue of whether the Army ‘should’ be deployed at all, it is quite apparent from the recurring losses sustained by the paramilitary that there are shortfalls in its organization, leadership, ethos and training. The argument, usually heard on air waves, that the Army should not be used against its own people implies that where it has been so employed such as in J&K and the North East, the people are somehow ‘different’. Even in Kashmir, the operations were in a human terrain comprising Indians, if alienated Indians. If the Army is to be deployed, it is best to rehearse counter-insurgency lessons in a timely manner. By this yardstick, the mental and training preparedness as reported being undertaken by the Army is a commendable start.
The foremost concern, however, remains human rights. The killing of three ‘infiltrators’ who later turned out to be men lured by the TA (H&H) in Kashmir recently is not a one-off incident. Note that the crime occurred in the present environment of human rights watchfulness in Kashmir. There were also earlier reports of the fake action in Siachen and of the ‘ketchup’ Colonel in Assam. The lesson is that the state would require being wary from the outset. The understanding that operations are an independent military domain is in light of the past experience, unpersuasive.
It follows from this that political over-watch would be required. This cannot be expected at the provincial level. The very fact that the situation has been ‘handed over’ to the Army would lead the weak political class at this level to abdicate responsibility. Delhi is indeed too far and the indefatigable Minister for Home Affairs over-burdened; his latest additional responsibility being to head the GoM on the Bhopal tragedy! Given that the required levels of supervision would be absent; can the military be expected to exercise suitable self-regulation?
This is not impossible to conceive. The opposition expected is unlikely to be of the order the military has experienced elsewhere. The dimension of external interference is missing. The military has an ‘iron fist in velvet glove’ doctrine, dating to 2006, as a guide. The military values the difference in approach to insurgency with that of other armies in the close vicinity, such as the US and in particular the Pakistani Army. Beginning the new mission on a clean slate, it is in a position to build in best practices from the outset itself. Knowledgeable sources have it that the in-service reputation of the commanding general, head of its Central Command, inspires confidence on this score.
Nevertheless, pathologies need pointing out. One is that quantification of the officer promotion system - reportedly under re-examination on priority on order of the new Chief - could lead to a ‘numbers game’. Second, the need to show ‘results’, particularly to distinguish its deployment as an improvement over the paramilitary, needs being guarded against. Third, military recruitment practices favour officers and troops from a particular strata and region. The impact of this on their perception of the tribal people needs factoring in. Fourth, the ‘grid’ system contemplated indicates a lasting deployment. Instead, the grid could be furnished by the paramilitary. Staying on as the grid suggests, implies avoidable militarization in which the military would over time gain a vested interest. Lastly, theory on primary group cohesion, reinforced by the earlier experience of the Rashtriya Rifles, warns against using subunits of amalgamated troops.
Even if the Army is seemingly the best instrument, a far better approach would still be political first, negotiations based, development led and precluding violence.
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