Afzal Guru: The Man Who Knew Too Much

Milligazette 1-15 March 13

http://www.milligazette.com/print/issue/1-15-march-2013

A wit’s answer to the question that is set to become an eternal one: ‘Why did they hang Afzal Guru?’, reads: ‘Afzal Guru was hanged because the Indian law doesn't allow electric chair, lethal injection, stoning to death, guillotine or any other form of execution.’ However, there is another straight answer: He knew too much. He had already exposed the Indian state’s behavior in Kashmir in his pleadings for justice over the years. But the true face of the state is unremarkable. He knew more. He was the exposed link into a chain of subterfuge leading into the STF (Special Task Force), a unit of Kashmiri rebels who turned coat.

He had pointed this out while alive referring to a certain ‘Tariq’ in the shadowy world of the renegade rebels who set the stage for India to prevail in Kashmir by systematically killing their former comrades and their supporters using fair means and foul. The outfit called Ikhwan was inducted into the police to regularize them. Their notoriety was such that one campaign promise of a political party that won in the polls in 2002 was that they would be disbanded. They were rechristened instead, regularized and hopefully more disciplined since. That Pakistani trained jihadis were degenerate and their terror acts reprehensible, the cliché ‘fight fire with fire’ provided legitimacy to such paramilitary outfits. In that troubled era in their heyday they served to undertake the ‘dirty war’ on behalf of the state.

The ‘conspiracy theory’ needs airing at this juncture. Was the STF used, and did it, in turn, use Afzal Guru for nefarious purpose? Spelling out the conspiracy theory is necessary. This has been done competently elsewhere by the likes of Arundhati Roy and Nirmalangshu Mukherjee. It is with reason they have titled the volume in which their case appears: 13 December, a Reader: The Strange Case of the Attack on the Indian Parliament(Penguin India, pp. 233, Rs. 200, 2006). The very term ‘conspiracy’ is a way to marginalize what could well be the truth. The fact that no inquiry has gone into the parliamentary attack, the truth has not been plumbed. With Afzal gone, it is now also probably beyond reach.

As with any ‘strange case’, it is best to begin with the motives. Parliament attack led up to the Indian military mobilization. That the mobilization stopped at the border and did not cross it suggests more than just statesmanship on Prime Minister Vajpayee’s part. It indicates a strategy, one premeditated and not one thought up at the spur of the moment in the crisis brought on by the dastardly attack. Crisis environments do not lend themselves to cool heads. Stopping at the border was  cool headed decision. That can only have been induced by a predetermined plan of action. In effect, the conspiracy theory has it that the parliament attack was a doing of the intelligence agency put to it by the national security apparatus at the apex level. The one who could have more information on this, the then national security adviser and principal secretary, Mr. Brajeah Mishra, is now no more to confirm this. That in his absence his denial can be anticipated makes the theory a ‘conspiracy theory’.

The diplomatic coercion - coercive diplomacy in strategic terms –mounted thereafter also needed a trigger. Pakistan had crept back into American good books with 9/11. India that had begun courting the US ever since it burst its way into the nuclear club, felt left out in the cold. It needed to embarrass Pakistan, snap America out of its Musharraf infatuation. India needed a trigger. A trigger could not have waited for a bunch of obliging terrorists to come round and timelystorm the parliament. India required instead manufacturing a trigger. This is where the STF comes in.

Given the nature of the violent conflict on in Kashmir at the time, the existence of detention centers is well known. That these would have had inmates with very little chance of seeing freedom once again can also be conceded. Consider that in case a few of these inmates – who were incarcerated since they wanted to harm India – were given a choice of dying a death they had always imagined for themselves, one of a jihadi, how many would have agreed to the proposal. It is obvious that there would be at least some wanting a crack at India, dying in a blaze of imagined glory rather than blindfolded in front of a death squad.  It can be surmised that there would have been no shortage of recruits from those dark chambers. All it needed now was to put together the supporting cast and the equipment, and have a cover story. It is here that unfortunate Afzal figures in the story. The rest as they say is history; but most of it unwritten, deliberately kept unknown, and now, unknowable.

Afzal therefore had to go. The shortcomings in his trial are now well known. The unacceptable reason for his hanging – the demand of the ‘collective conscience’ – is reversion to the bygone days of human sacrifice. He would have gone earlier had the ruling formation and its lead party of the period of the parliament attack returned to power in 2004. They had much to hide. The Congress that has been around since needed him alive to keep the pressure on that party, now in opposition. However, the tide having turned against the Congress to the extent the writing is on the wall, a human sacrifice was decreed for its revival. This explains the timing of Afzal’s departure. As for the Congress, it will prove an insincere act equivalent to the opening of the locks of Babri Masjid the last time it was under siege.

Perhaps dark clouds overhead in that era – nuclear tests, Kandahar hijack, fidayeen attacks, Kargil War, Chittisingpora massacre, Srinagar assembly bombing, right wing rule, 9/11, military rule in the neighbor etc – made the intelligence games necessary. These are games nations play since Chanakyan times. Machivelli testifies that these are indulgences of princes. When elephants fight, grass suffers. Afzal Guru was but another blade of grass.

India’s security under Modi

countercurrents.org, Kashmir Times
http://www.countercurrents.org/ahmed140413.htm
http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=15163



That Mr. Modi is attempting to get to Delhi is by now no secret. It is also apparent that the Congress will find it hard to stay on at the Centre for another term. Finally, the third front alternative has yet to emerge. Given this configuration, it is well nigh possible that hopes of Mr. Modi’s not inconsiderable constituency of support, that includes big business, cultural nationalists, well-heeled Gujaratis, traditional conservatives, Chetan Bhagat inspired youth brigade etc, can yet come about.  

His supporters point to Modi’s record in Gujarat to make their case that this will be good for India’s continuing rise as a power. Their argument is anchored in Modi’s personality. To them he has the economic credentials to push through the pending reforms that the Congress has been at the cusp of for all of its second term but has been unable to deliver. He has also kept his state largely terrorism free through resolute leadership and can therefore be relied on to take on security challenges, unlike the pusillanimity of politicians in general and the Congress in particular in face of crises such as 26/11.

While Modi’s supporters rely on his leadership persona to suggest he is the right choice; his detractors point in the same direction to arrive at a conclusion to the contrary. To them, Modi, seen as a divisive and authoritarian figure, is the problem. To Modi baiters, his ‘record’ in Gujarat includes the carnage of 2002 and his culpability. To them it is not a case of inaction but active complicity that condemns Modi.

One question that has not figured so far is: What will be the security consequences of Modi’s elevation to PM? To most prosperity begets security. With prosperity, resources are made available for security. With a firm Modi hand on the security rudder, India’s redoubtable security agencies will keep India secure.  Unfortunately, the prosperity-security link is seldom so easy.

The internal security consequences of ‘Modi as PM’ seem self-evident. A consequence of Modi’s economic policies will likely spur the leftist challenge. In replicating the Gujarat model for rest of India, Modi will create ‘have nots’ that will with time form a constituency for Maoist penetration of the rest of India from their heartland currently confined to Central India.

Modi’s ascent could also see the resurfacing of minority perpetrated terror. In the short term, extremist elements will challenge the triumphalism of majoritarian extremists. In the broader social context, India’s minority has been wary of the rise of cultural nationalists in Indian polity. This suspicion of the majoritarian project will heighten its minority complex. The spread of Hindutva that was interrupted by the Congress interregnum will have a redoubled impetus since this time at the helm will be without the restraining hand of a Vajpayee. A defensive reaction from geographic and societal periphery may instigate violence.

Such internal security scenarios will provoke a ‘proactive’ steps, reminiscent of LK Advani, ‘iron man’ aspirant as home minister in the NDA regime. But if Modi’s association with his home ministers in his state is any guide Modi’s methods will not be merely suppressive, as is the wont of a state. It bears recall that one home minister was assassinated in unexplained circumstance and another was in jail temporarily for his role in custodial killings. What can be expected is that a permissive atmosphere for security forces to be less mindful for citizens’ rights will emerge. Intelligence agencies, that have little accountability at the best of times, will be much more innovative in cutting corners. The information war theme for legitimising such action will be painting of a threat from the coalescing of ‘red’ and ‘green’ terror. In short, a vicious circle can be predicted on the internal security front.  

On the external security front, the usual refrain has been that right wing governments are good for security. They are more mindful of security issues and have the tacit respect of security related institutions such as the military and intelligence services that traditionally lean conservative. Given their image and record, they have a wider berth for peace initiatives, a luxury that is not permitted to other parties such as for instance the Congress that have to be ever watchful of their flanks fearing criticism of ‘sell out’ for such initiatives.

Yet again the case for either side would be based on Modi’s leadership traits. His supporters would point to his decisiveness, claiming that India’s response to incidents like 26/11 would be firm and unmistakable. His detractors would say that decisiveness in the wrong direction can only be disastrous in crisis. The authoritarian streak in Modi will keep from diverse viewpoints necessary in strategic decision making being voiced. Silencing of dissent will make group think emerge with its associated consequences. In a nuclear neighbourhood, exhibiting political will – that nuclear deterrent theorists in India so breathlessly require of the political decision maker – is not necessarily the best or only recourse as strategists advocating political resolve portray.    

It is predicted that the India-Pakistan equations will return to square one with the departure of the west from Afghanistan in 2014. In Kashmir it is obvious that there is enough tinder awaiting the proverbial spark. In case Mr. Modi is tested with a crisis, he would be liable to fall victim to his image as worthy Gujarati descendant of the original ‘iron man’, Sardar Patel. To distance himself from the choices Congress has made in such crisis, he will be liable to privilege the military options over the diplomatic. In effect, decisions will be made not by strategic sense in the alternatives, but impulses rooted in character traits of the decision maker and in the nature of the group that such decision makers bring forth.

In respect of his prospective government’s approach to China, it would be reliant on the foundations being laid under the UPA: deterrence and external balancing by proximity to the west led democratic camp. The expectation that Modi will prove a liability for the relationship with the west in light of his human rights record is false since the west has never been known to privilege human rights considerations over its strategic objectives. In fact, UK’s actions of late suggest that Modi’s rehabilitation is well underway.

Modi for his part, not needing to wear his nationalism on his sleeve, will hardly be coy. In effect, India will overtly bid for frontline status in the anti-China front being forged by the US in its rebalancing towards Asia currently underway. The difference is that the Congress is getting to this position surreptitiously. The upshot will be that a ‘two front’ situation – a contingency assiduously being prepared for by the armed forces – will no longer be a ‘contingency’. It will be the strategic circumstance for India.

But security is not only physical. It is also about security of values and the kind of nation and state India wishes to be. The last time the BJP was in power it appointed a committee to recommend changes in the Constitution. Luckily for the country, the electorate denied it a second term. This time round there would be greater hurry in saffron ideologues to unfurl their ideological agenda. It is easier to push change in a climate vitiated by an adverse security condition as painted. Therefore, the security threat will not be from without as much from the government itself.   

While there are other good reasons for the voter to keep Mr. Modi out, security must hereon also figure among them.

A Good School For Maqbool

http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/feb/fah-schools.htm

11 February 2013 - A revealing, if unsurprising, observation brings out starkly how marginalised the Muslim community is, and is set to remain over the middle term. I happened to browse through the results of the Class V Aryabhatta Mathematics Inter-School Competition, posted on the website of one of the participating institutions. The competition is an annual event which tests the mathematical skills of students in middle school.

Eighty nine schools participated, including all the elite schools of Delhi. One school, Hamdard Public School, Sangam Vihar, fielded 10 Muslim student participants. Of the other 880 students from 88 schools (each school sending in 10 students of Class V), only eight had Muslim names, making a figure of less than one per cent. All told 13 children with Muslim names participated out of 880, making a total of two per cent. From the list of schools, it is evident that these are the elite public schools in the national capital.

The percentage of Muslims in Delhi is about 12 per cent. This implies that Muslim representation has been one sixth of what it could, and perhaps should, have been in a city-wide competition.

The refrain of late has been that a Muslim middle class is developing, implying that Muslims are beginning to do well in the country. This does not seem to be borne out by this stark statistic. It could have been expected that traces of the so-called Muslim middle class would show up in such data. However, the opposite seems to be true; the touted take off of the Muslim community has not quite begun. Muslims remain marginalized.

It seems that only Muslim-run schools now have Muslim students. That is a double disadvantage. For other schools, it is to deprive them of the diversity that reflects the national composition. For Muslims, it suggests two things. One is that their children do not manage to qualify for such schools. But more pertinently, it is possible that the lack of exposure to Muslims in general and Muslim children, due to underrepresentation, sets up a vicious circle in which schools are reluctant to give Muslim children the benefit of doubt. There could be a more sinister reason to this that regrettably must also be included here: such schools may have an unwritten policy that keeps Muslim children out.

What are the long term implications of this? In case the emerging Muslim middle class is kept out, as suggested by the statistics, Muslims will continue to be disadvantaged for some time to come. Not being represented in this cohort of young children means that they will be underrepresented in the work force in middle class-favoured occupations for at least a score years and more. This means the already existing gap between Muslims and forward communities will expand. In fact, since Muslims of the middle class are not normally covered by reservations, they will lose out to communities in other religions that are so favoured. Marginalisation will only deepen.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE www.indiatogether.org

What needs to be done? 

The administration needs looking at the figures of Muslim children in schools. A finding of 'Nil' would indicate clearly a policy that keeps them out. Such schools must be encouraged to reform, if not penalized. 'Naming and shaming' is one way, but unlikely to work since such schools can brazenly resort to a communal rationale, knowing that the times are such that they will get away.

Change is therefore easier said than done. At least one school in the middle class locality I live in is reputed to have no Muslim children in its rolls. This cannot be by default. It is by design, one in which the management, staff and education department officials are culpable. Parents from my neighbourhood are equally culpable in turning a blind eye at best and at worst condoning and insisting on the practice.

This is not a stand-alone feature. It is linked to the well-known nation-wide malady of Muslims not finding flats to buy or rent in 'respectable' neighbourhoods - note use of the apostrophes here! Not living in such locales, they don't get to send their children to either middle class or elite schools either. This personal aside is entirely unremarkable in terms of amounting almost to a defining feature of modern India.

The representative lists of Aryabhatta prize competitors can be perused for other clues such as the numbers of children with upper caste names or the absence of names that are usually found in lower castes. Allowance can be made for Sanskritisation by way of which the Hindu majority is being rapidly homogenized towards a telling political outcome. The picture could reveal much more than the backwardness of India's largest minority discussed here. It would tell about the warts on India's complexion that even as enlightened a document as the Constitution has been unable to erase over three score years and as many generations of Indians.

One way out could be to sensitise schools to include more children from the marginalised peoples, without compromising merit. This will be to the betterment in terms of well-rounded growth of their students. After all, much learning in school is from peers. Anecdotally, it is fairly evident that having friends and class fellows of other religious and ethnic backgrounds does make for a secular and tolerant outlook among children. This can be done by parents' bodies interfacing with schools and with the management to oversee the change in the best interests of their wards.

Middle class India is a reality that has surfaced unmistakably over this decade. Anti-corruption and a fair treatment of women have been causes that have seen national level assertiveness from this class. One area calling out for its attention is to make school-going a level playing field.
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http://www.milligazette.com/print/issue/16-31-december-2012

INDO-PAK TENSIONS 
The new 'normal' at the border 
The gruesome beheading along the Line of Control should alert us that the intensity and the nature of the ongoing conflict with Pakistan is far worse than we are led to believe, writes Firdaus Ahmed. 


 http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/jan/fah-newnormal.htm


22 January 2013 - Media focus over the last month or so has brought into the open the secret brutality of the war in Kashmir. The beheadings have naturally revolted many, a few because of their very nature and most because some heads have been lost on our own side. To the former the revelations mean that there is more than meets the eye on the Line of Control. To the latter it only confirms that the other side does not merely require swift and stern response, but must be administered a disciplining time and again.

The ceasefire along the Line of Control in place since November 2003 is a tacit one, not contained in a written document. This is because there is no acknowledgement of a prior war on the LC. The LC has always had ordnance being traded across it, even prior to the outbreak of the insurgency in Kashmir. Some locations along its length have been more active than others. There was once largely a 'live-and-let-live' environment. However the onset of the insurgency made the LC an active sub-theatre.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/jan/fah-newnormal.htm

Since the army was answerable for the numbers infiltrating and fuelling the insurgency every summer, it resorted to innovative tactics to cope. These included laying mines, setting up posts in climatically hostile high altitude terrain, refining operating procedures for deployment ambushes, and bringing down firepower. The cover of the ceasefire enabled the construction of the LC fence. Higher defence budgets enabled by a rising GDP, input from the Israeli experience at their wall in the West Bank and greater literacy in the rank and file enabled the adaption of technology to the effort.

Pakistani handlers and the jihadi foot soldiers were not far behind. The inevitable contest between attack and defence involving will and wits of fighting men has played out across the wide front. The Pakistani innovation was in 'Bat' action by Border Action Teams. These groups watched the Indian routine, identified vulnerabilities and then speedily exploited these. The degeneration into inhumanity that has occurred is attributable to them. Proving their success to ISI minders required them to carry back a 'trophy'. They therefore cast the first stone in this saga of beheadings. Episodes such as the 'ketchup Colonel' and the controversial medal grab in Siachen may have prompted the Indian army to also ask for 'proof'.

The army chief has pointed out that the nature of the battlefield and battle on the LC requires commanders to be aggressive and proactive. There is the element of military morale and martial spirit at stake. He basically is echoing one of the insights of von Clausewitz, the doyen of modern military thinkers.

Clausewitz said that the first consideration of decision makers when embarking on a war is to understand its nature. Arriving at such an understanding helps in ensuring that the forces are not set on tasks beyond their capability, nor are demands made on them that they are unable to fulfil. Therefore, if there is an LC in place since 1949 that is the most heavily militarised portion of the earth, then surely it is unreasonable to expect peace to prevail along its length all the time.

While there is a case for regulating the nature of that contest, the nature of war itself - the second major insight of Clausewitz - needs also to be factored in. The nature of war is not for the faint hearted. It is, to adapt a classic phrase associated with Hobbes: 'nasty and brutal' though not necessarily 'short'. In other words, theory suggests that what passes for revelations today are actually quite unsurprising, and only to be expected.

Additionally, the LC was a site where the army could hit back hard at the Pakistani army, the bulwark behind their proxies. It could not be allowed to sit with impunity while the Indian army lost sleep and blood chasing after the designs of the ISI. Besides, an element of retribution would help with deterrence. Unwilling to pay a direct price, the Pakistani army would keep its jihadi proxies in check to an extent. This would keep a lid on the conflict and keep it manageable. In other words, the brutalisation could be worse, but for gruesome events like the beheadings.

This can indeed be taken as after-the-fact rationalisation. It is entirely plausible that hatred and a need to incite such hatred enable such decisions. There is a mirroring of religion-based distaste for the other side across the LC. There are also organisational factors. Just as along the Western front in the Great War, a 'christmas' truce cannot be allowed to prevail. This was made possible then by innovating Infantry tactics of ambush and raids across the 'no man's land' into the enemy trenchline. The army chief's statement echoes this sentiment across generations of military commanders.

A minor problem is when such negative perception influences military input into strategic decision making. The military would, based on such experience, naturally caution against any engagement with Pakistan. Institutional pushing and nudging that accompanies such decisions then results in hedging of bets, as has been the case over the past half decade. A similar consideration in Pakistan has kept the two states at odds. There cannot but be political consequences for both states.

As has been evident from India's reaching out in fits and starts to Pakistan over the past half decade, there is always an accompanying outbreak of negativity. There are forces in India who can do without a friendly neighbour. They have internal political utility for such a stance. They hope to construct a national identity in a particular way. Articulation of the 'internally abetted external threat', to paraphrase Chanakya, is a step in this process. Such forces need an enemy on the borders.

If this is the political consequence of having an LC and if this is found to be questionable, then there is a case to rethink the very existence of the LC. It is proving too costly. The costs are no longer economic and human resulting from forces along it, but more compelling. The LC is but part of a larger problem. The last paragraph suggests that the wider problem is not one of territory, resolvable through negotiations, but an identity problem requiring political attention.

Since getting troops off the trenches has proven impossible over the past half century, in the absence of political vision, outraged opinion must regrettably reconcile to the 'new normal' and assimilate what it means for the 'idea of India'.
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Firdaus Ahmed 
22 Jan 2013

NEW IB CHIEF 
The importance of being Asif Ibrahim 
http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/dec/fah-ibrahim.htm

The new IB chief's track record has made it impossible for the government to ignore his claim. But for all that, there is more at stake, writes Firdaus Ahmed. 

17 December 2012 - The dust has settled after the announcement that Asif Ibrahim is to be the next IB chief. The controversial issue was not so much on Ibrahim pipping at least three of his seniors to the post, but the fact that he is Muslim. It can be surmised that there could have been little difference between the professional records of his competitors. Professionalism implies being apolitical. Therefore, on the factor, political amenability, all four would have scored similarly.

For full article see - http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/dec/fah-ibrahim.htm

But there are two other things worth noting. One, this is a signal of the government's politics. The choice aptly symbolizes - and is meant to, we can be sure of that - a secular democratic India, though it is not quite India's 'Obama moment'. This is therefore a refreshing move of the Congress that has otherwise been perpetually on the brink of losing its political moorings. In effect, it is among the opening gambits for the forthcoming national polls that with Narendra Modi exercising his bid for a national role, will surely compel the grand old party to return to its ideological roots.

Whatever the clinching reason, Asif Ibrahim can hardly be envied. The Muslim community, or more appropriately the multiple communities across India that collectively comprise India's largest minority, has been enthused by the news. He, like it or otherwise, has the weight of their expectations riding on his shoulders, and that is the second noteworthy thing.

The IB, with internal security as remit, has been at odds with India's minority over at least a decade and half. The phenomenon of 'home grown' terrorism has placed Muslims at its cross hairs. The refrain in Muslim drawing rooms is that the terror stereotype has been deliberately foisted on it as a grand design of right wing extremist formations, with the media either unwittingly co-opted or barefacedly complicit. The IB, and its fellow organisations, such as ATS at state level and NIA at the Union, have at best gingerly faced up to the real face of 'home grown'.

Insofar as political motivation finds expression in policing action or intelligence reports, it is seen as ideological penetration of majoritarian extremists of the institutions of state and contamination of professionalism by a virulent strain of the otherwise unexceptionable conservative politics, cultural nationalism.

News reports have cryptically referred to Ibrahim's take on this that could do with some deconstruction. The venerable The Hindu writes, 'To his credit, Mr. Ibrahim was the first one to have a clear sense of the whole Indian Mujahideen movement within the organization.' Outlook has this to say: 'At a time none of us were aware of the Indian Mujahideen, I remember Ibrahim telling us, "Don't look to Pakistan after every terror attack. Look within too."'

While not self-evident, these observations suggest that Ibrahim subscribes to the dominant view that IM is the key source of 'home grown' terror. This has perhaps made him amenable to the government. However, the converse is also possible. Ibrahim may well be a skeptic on the intelligence agency-facilitated and media-generated 'IM' discourse.

There are other sources of such terror, some unexamined to the degree warranted, such as majoritarian extremists masquerading their handiwork as Muslim perpetrated. Clues to that effect have not been taken to their logical conclusion with a degree of professional rectitude; this has allowed the reputation of intelligence agencies and the police to come under a cloud in the minority perspective.

Ibrahim, with a reputation as a thorough professional, will no doubt have to contend with, at a minimum with some selective spring-cleaning, and at a maximum, detoxification. As he proceeds with this, insinuations raised on his nomination will get more strident. Since politics is set to get messier, he will be on a tight rope without a safety net.

The moot question is why the government thinks it necessary to entrust this task to a Muslim officer. The professional instinct of his contenders could equally have been relied on to undertake this. A cynical view in the Muslim commentary on the promotion has been that the government does not really want to reset the professionalism of the intelligence agencies. Entrusting the top job to a Muslim therefore can be its alibi, even while catching it votes: a case of accounting for two birds with one stone.

The unfortunate fact, however, is that officers like Hemant Karkare are getting scarcer. More disturbingly, the check on the motivated stereotype of the suspect Muslim has been marginalised to a narrow left-liberal circle. Even the Congress scion, Rahul Gandhi, cannot openly admit to the graver danger. Wikileaks informs of his venting his reservations instead to the American ambassador once over lunch.

It remains to be seen if two years hence Ibrahim's achievement goes beyond only reaching the pinnacle, or more significantly, once there making the necessary and well overdue difference. Assuming that there would be a government change by then, it is important to act now on this front, lest after another five years, and that too under the opposition's ascendant candidate, it becomes wholly impossible.
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Firdaus Ahmed 
17 Dec 2012

Taking on Mr. Modi’s Chief Cheerleader: Chetan Bhagat

http://www.milligazette.com/news/4812-taking-on-gujarat-narendra-modis-chief-cheerleader-chetan-bhagat-india

The Milli Gazette Online

Published Online: Dec 01, 2012

http://twocircles.net/2012dec03/narendra_modi%E2%80%99s_new_cheerleader_chetan_bhagat.html
TwoCircles.net 3 December 2012

By Firdaus Ahmed 

The final round in the fight for India’s soul is underway. Mr. Modi’s forthcoming triumph in the provincial elections in the western Indian state he heads is intended to set the stage for his elevation soon thereafter as the potential prime ministerial candidate of India’s conservative party, the BJP. One leader from of the competition, Ms. Sushma Swaraj, has already thrown in the towel for party leadership and prime ministerial ambition, citing Modi’s development record. The other, Mr. Arun Jaitley, is not known to command a mass following within or without the party. Of the official leader of the party, Mr. Nitin Gadkari, political obits are already past the draft stage.

The first blow of the final round has been struck by Mr. Modi’s unofficial spokeman, Mr. Chetan Bhagat. Earlier his outpourings in favour of his preferred leader were confined to his Sunday Timescolumn. Today they have been elevated to the op-ed space of the widely read, The Times of India(1 December 2012). The thesis this time round is essentially that “if India has to move forward, the voting public must wean itself off the Gandhi family.” QED!

With the “family” out of the way, in particular the princeling, Rahul Gandhi, Bhagat knows it would be cakewalk for his fighter in the ring, Mr. Modi. This explains his thrust on getting “the family out of the way,” which explains why his piece is misleadingly titled, “Out of the family way.” That his piece does not mention Mr. Modi’s name even once is yet another dead giveaway. There seems to be much to hide, and Bhagat, in doing so, knows this best.

To have Mr. Bhagat as an unpaid PR man can prove a boon for Mr. Modi’s incipient national campaign. After all, Bhagat’s self-description as a “best-selling novelist” is not incredible. It is, therefore, important to interrogate Mr. Bhagat, lest his writings going uncontested lend ballast on Mr. Modi’s journey to 7 Race Course Road.

Bhagat’s piece is ostensibly on the shortcomings of the conservative party and how these would prove debilitating its bid for power in 2014. By default, the ruling party stands to gain although it has little that Mr. Bhagat finds on offer. This owes to the dynastic impulse of “our feudal mindset”. Weaning ourselves off the Gandhi family to him is the first step to acknowledging the Sun rising in the west, Mr. Modi.

In Mr. Bhagat’s laundry list of the BJP’s shortcomings a discerning reader will fail to find mention on the party’s chief limitation: the nature of its subterranean connection with the wider rightist fraternity, the Sangh Parivar. This amounts to a resounding silence. Such sleights of hand explain why Bhagat is chief cheerleader and, therefore, need pointing out as relentlessly as Bhagat champions his champion.

To Bhagat, “the new India the youth wants to see - merit-based, efficient, accountable and progressive” – requires the BJP to reinvent itself; be less like the Congress. However, Bhagat, and many who agree with him, do not factor in the umbilical cord between the BJP and its mother entity, the RSS. Being management savvy and technocratic, they are politically naïve.

The “new India” in the world view of conservative extremists – that Mr. Bhagat is seemingly oblivious to - is at least a century-old in conception, situated as it is in the world view of triumphant fascism of the between-wars years in Europe. Since history has taken a beating in curriculum reinvention over the recent decade, the youth need reminding of this intellectual legacy of the party Bhagat promotes.

Bhagat expertly papers over the cracks by sandwiching “efficient, accountable” between “merit based” and “progressive” in his version of the vision of India’s youth. On “efficient,” it needs mention that authoritarian methods sometimes bear such result. After all, it was said that the trains ran on time during the Emergency. The model of “development” of Gujarat can instead be attributed to an extended, if undeclared, Emergency. Look at the fate of officers such as Sanjeev Bhatt. With hatchet men such as the former state home minister continuing if not prospering in politics, the common government official can surely sense which way the wind blows. As for “accountable,” even the formidable Vajpayee - the very same blaster-in-chief himself of India’s grand entry into the nuclear club - could not exact accountability for the absence of “raj dharma” in Gujarat of 2002.

This leaves “merit based” and “progressive” as the remaining yardsticks; in themselves inoffensive standards but worth a “dekho”. “Merit based” has been mantra of anti-reservationists, the ones who agree with Bhagat. Their reading of India is blind to India’s logic of caste – its defining feature if any. By making a case to privilege “merit”, their’s is an easy-to-see-through bid to remain interminably ahead. With starting blocks way ahead, there is little chance of the gap attenuating. To them, “merit” is a formula to stay on top. “Merit” busting is therefore of significance for the readers of this journal, most being disadvantaged at, and sometimes by, birth.

Lastly, Bhagat’s use of the term “progressive” is to stand it on its head. It’s an easy bid to steal the thunder, usually a property in this instance of the left. By progressive, Mr. Bhagat presumably means the alacrity with which Gujarat can attract the Tatas when divested off their land in West Bengal. What makes Gujarat able to do this and what prevents others? Answering this would reveal how self-serving Bhagat’s definition of “progressive” actually is; yet another instance of his expertise: word play.

Mr. Bhagat’s columns will get more strident as the national elections campaign draws closer. Silence in response may be misread as silence of the lambs. To do as he advises – overthrow the dynasty – would be to throw out the baby with the bathwater. To do so would pave way for a pracharak as prime minister. Though Mr. Modi’s self-exculpatory version of the 2002 presents himself at best as “The Nero of 2002,” history knows best that this is a charitable honorific. And that is enough to expose the cheer-leader for what he is not, a political analyst.

http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/nov/fah-kargil.htm

A KARGIL MARTYR? 
The strange case of 2nd Lt. Kalia 
The story of a heroic soldier captured by the enemy and tortured to death stirred strong emotions during the Kargil war. Why, then, is there a lid of secrecy around his death, wonders Firdaus Ahmed. 
 
30 November 2012 -

The father of Saurabh Kalia, a Kargil martyr, has moved the Supreme Court asking for its directions to the government to take up a case of war crimes by the Pakistani army during the Kargil War. Kalia was leading a patrol to ascertain reports on Pakistani occupation of Kargil heights when it is alleged he was captured by Pakistanis who had infiltrated and occupied Indian winter vacated posts on 14 May 1999. The charge is that Pakistani troops then subjected him to torture that killed him. His brutalised body was returned to India on 9 June, along with those of five of his comrades.

For full article see indiatogether.org

The International Criminal Court at The Hague can undertake such trials but since the war took place prior to its formation, and neither India nor Pakistan is a signatory to the Rome Statute, cannot take up this case. Nor can the International Court of Justice; its jurisdiction is limited to cases brought before it if both parties agree to it. The ICJ remit is on contentious cases over which there is disagreement over issues of law or fact, a conflict or a clash over legal views and interest; not in criminal cases.

Therefore, with the ICC and ICJ ruled out, there is only the 'universal jurisdiction' clause of the Convention. The problem would in this case be of ascertaining the facts. India's case is that this is a straight-forward war crime. This can easily be established in case the autopsy report is made available. However, India has kept this confidential. It is not certain if India has shared the report with Pakistan either.

For full article see - indiatogether.org

Kalia's patrol - which had been sent up to ascertain reports of Pakistani forces being sighted in Indian defence posts vacated over the winter - would certainly have been at least a section strength. Since only six men were reported captured and killed, the fact of their capture must have been made known to Indian authorities once the remainder of the patrol returned to base. Also, since Kalia had only recently been commissioned, the patrol would most certainly have had a Junior Commissioned Officer, familiar with the terrain and defence layout, as his deputy. The debriefing report of this official and the patrol report would establish whether Kalia was captured.

Indeed it is not certain from India's remonstration with the Pakistan then that India was aware of the details of the case. The press release goes on to state: 'It is further requested that a full account of the date, place and circumstance of capture, period of detention and particulars concerning the wounds and cause of death are communicated to the Government of India immediately.' It is clear that the patrol report had little to say on circumstance of capture, for if this was so India did not have to ask Pakistan to clarify the circumstance.

It is possible that the patrol separated under the impact of the ambush, and those who made it back had little clue as to what happened to those who did not. This is not surprising, given that the patrol was perhaps not duly prepared for such an encounter - as the dimensions of the Kargil intrusion were very vague at the time. This uncertainty is clear in the diplomatic note. To infer that they were captured, tortured and killed is therefore to stretch a possibility. India should have pressed for an investigation, and made its case stronger by sharing with Pakistan the reason for its stand: the autopsy report.

The circumstantial evidence does not help India's case. It begs imagination as to why Pakistan would return the bodies in case they bear marks of evidence of torture and mutilation. They would not have admitted to having them in first place. That they did so indicates that any disfigurement could be attributable to the effects of cold from exposure for the duration of two to three weeks at high altitude, type of wounds suffered in the firefight and even wild animals as they lay there unattended. This is possible in case the bodies were out in the open where they came under fire. This permits the alternative possibility that the patrol was not captured as the Indian case makes out.

Further, it is now well-known that the Pakistani troops in occupation of the heights were of the paramilitary, Gilgit Scouts, largely locals from Northern Areas. They are of the Shia community and not known to be fundamentalist or anti-India. Earlier reports of Kashmiri 'mujahedeen', as projected by Pakistan for plausible deniability, in league with extremist allies in Pakistan as being the forces on the heights were soon proven false. It can be surmised that only extremists filled with hatred may have had any reason to torture the officer and his patrol members. Since such elements did not form part of the troops participating in the war, the motive is difficult to substantiate.

Lastly, the lack of clarity in India's case suggests the reason why it has been less than full throated in its pursuit. Indeed, the allegations could well have been part of whipping up national feelings in the build up phase of the war in early June 1999. It helped firm up national support for India's reaction in the form of a localized border war. As a counter factual, the case could have been taken further in the event there was a need to expand the war.

Nevertheless, Pakistan is bound by the Geneva Convention to investigate the allegations. The role of its army can be established if there are reports of capture of Indian troops by their troops in their daily situation reports. In case such situation reports are accessed by an inquiry then Pakistan would be hard put to explain the deaths of the officer and the soldiers in their custody as demanded by India.

While India's taking up of the case with Pakistan is in public knowledge, Pakistan's reply is not known. Pakistan would do well to clarify, for in doing so it could put the ball back in India's court, compelling India to review its allegations. However, the levels of trust between the two states being such, neither Indian allegations nor Pakistani clarifications are likely to be credible to the other side.

Truth is said to be the first casualty in war. Propaganda of yore, and lately, information warfare, have ensured this. The cliche stands proven by the nature of the first casualty of the Kargil War, Second Lieutenant Kalia. Hopefully, the case will ensure that next time around, international humanitarian law is respected better. The unfortunate part is that the nationalist hysteria unleashed by Kalia's return to the headlines suggests that there is no guarantee against another such chance.

The unfolding gameplan of majoritarian extremists

http://www.milligazette.com/news/4126-the-unfolding-gameplan-of-majoritarian-extremists-india

Special Reports

 

It is not the success of the majoritarian extremists as much as the government's weakness that is keeping this costly charade going.

By Firdaus Ahmed, The Milli Gazette

Published Online: Oct 01, 2012

Print Issue: 1-15 September 2012

The cat is out of the bag. The gameplan of extremists subscribing to cultural nationalism, Hindutva, is so simple, as to make them appear simple minded. Alternatively, they think others are simple minded; else they could not have been so transparently deceptive.

The game plan is one of deception. This has been well known among those watching them over the past half a decade at least. In the run up to the last elections, when they suffered under the delusion of regaining power, they conducted a bombing campaign against metros - Delhi, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Mumbai etc.

The tell-tale signs they left behind were stark - if only the blind will take a look. Take the inexplicable recovery of bombs in Surat for instance. Their more brazen use of disguise and Chaplinesque efforts at terror elsewhere are too well-known to recount. The case of raising the Pakistani flag in Hubli is a mild example. Their strategy was to make it look to the gullible media as though this was handiwork of the Indian Mujahedeen, IM. The organization was itself a useful invention to serve their ends.

This did not help them in winning the elections, but it did throw many off their scent. They succeeded to the extent of manufacturing a constituency that believes that terrorism perpetrated by Muslim extremists is a graver threat. Using this as a spring board, they have started off their campaign for New Delhi 2014. Their latest series of actions, bespeaks of a similar, if more ambitious, gameplan.

They took advantage of the social media-induced collective reaction by the minority to the happenings in Assam. While the doctored images of atrocities from the east have been spread by sources of equally extreme persuasion in Pakistan, as claimed by the Union home secretary, there is ambiguity surrounding the origin of threat messages to north-easterners. It is taken by default as originating from Muslim sources. However, that these could well have their dubious parentage cannot be discounted.

The advantages that accrue for them are legion. They get to paint the minority, already on the defensive, into a corner. They manage to give an ethnic conflict an all-India communal colour, thereby heightening the perception of threat of the Muslim “Other” that they have so studiously manufactured over the past decade. They can keep the government on the backfoot, one that is already under pressure on multiple fronts including the political fight with the opposition baying against crony capitalism.

How have they exposed themselves? Firstly, the RSS was too sprightly in cashing in on the SMS episode. They were all over TV screens on railway platforms out to defend the North Eastern citizens fleeing the southern capital where the BJP rules. Secondly, the bomb blasts that fizzled out in Pune are another give away. As the Pune police let on, these were the handiwork of mischief makers. Surely, this was a sign of exultation on the departure of the Union home minister. Third, the infiltration by agents provocateurs of the mass solidarity gathering in Azad Maidan on 11 August in the hope that police over-reaction would lead to a bloodbath, can be spotted in their belatedly ruing the police’s uncharacteristic but praiseworthy professional handling of the situation. Lastly, the “encounter” deaths in Batla House earlier and the custodial murder of Qateel Siddiqui, have helped clean up their tracks. The case on the bomb blasts can safely be closed in public memory with the “perpetrators” eliminated.

The government is surely not oblivious. It is, however, too much on the ropes to be able to launch a counter-attack. The ruling party does not have the political resources for turning back the tide of deception-induced, media-fanned suspicion of the minority. It also cannot take the extremists head on since it would damage India’s diplomatic position that Pakistan is at the root of all of India’s ills. Therefore, it is not the success of the majoritarian extremists as much as the government’s weakness that is keeping this costly charade going.

If the government is not going to do its job and the Hindutva-inspired extremists are going to keep up their momentum, there is little for those targeted to do than to keep their fingers pointed at the culprits. This is an effort to such an end. Doing so is necessary lest 7 Race Course Road be usurped and the “idea of India” subverted come 2014. There is no question of going silently into gas chambers.

But, more consequentially, the Qur'anic injunction of excel all in good works makes more sense, since the mud that they sling will then simply not stick.

 

The author blogs at subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in

This article appeared in The Milli Gazette print issue of 1-15 September 2012 on page no. 6

More than just a visit

http://www.milligazette.com/news/4281-more-than-just-a-visit

The Milli Gazette

Published Online: Sep 27, 2012

Print Issue: 1-15 October 2012

By Firdaus Ahmed

The complaint of Mr. Vivek Katju, a retired diplomat, against his views being ‘censored’ by the AIR, has featured in the press. The question in particular on the program ‘Charcha’ on AIR was on whether the prime minister should visit Pakistan. Mr. Katju’s reply was in the negative. The complaint has served not only to attract attention to ‘censorship’ but also to Mr. Katju’s view that the prime minister should not be considering visiting Pakistan. On the latter, is Mr. Katju right? 

It is possible that Mr. Katju is wrong, but he is entitled to his views. He is also entitled to airing these and having them carried by the national broadcaster. However, this is not the first time Mr. Katju has attempted to exercise influence on the trajectory of India-Pakistan relations. His earlier foray has been recorded by General Musharraf in his self-serving autobiography, In the Line of Fire.

The general having elevated himself from CEO to president had alighted at Agra with high expectations. India’s surprise announcement reaching out to the troublemaker at Kargil, one who had derailed the promising Lahore peace process, had led to the general imagining that India had a mind to resolve the Kashmir dispute his way. However, Musharraf noted in his book that Mr. Katju, then a bureaucrat in the MEA with a seat at the negotiation table, played a role in holding Mr. Vajpayee back at a critical juncture in the talks. The rest as they say, that has since included a near war and at least one crisis, is now history.   

Mr. Katju’s is just a pre-emptive salvo from the better known quarters. Mr. Katju’s views, no doubt well founded after a lifetime in service of Indian diplomacy in hot spots such as Afghanistan and in hot seats such as the Pakistan desk, are also widely shared by those with less exposure and reflection. These are the less visible vested political interests on the Indian side that prefer a communal polarization in South Asia, one reflected in and fed by the interstate face-off. They are not only not averse to seeing this cut straight through Indian society, but instead prefer it. The advantage these forces take of seemingly professional opinion, such as voiced by Mr. Katju, is indeterminate.

Additionally, it is also indeterminate as to how much of the strategic opinion is informed by ‘soft’ cultural nationalism, the hard variant of which is propagated by the communal forces. The extent of subscription to cultural nationalist tenets by officials has been understudied, deliberately so since finding it to be consequential would detract from India’s secular credentials.

Secondly, Mr. Katju’s opinion cannot but have been informed by his life experience, that would perhaps include the tremendous challenges faced by the Kashmiri Pandit community. Having also been exposed to the underside of the Pakistani establishment, Mr. Katju cannot but exert to warn as he does.

Cumulatively, this suggests that Pakistan related strategizing is not without its limitations in terms of well springs. It is important to be clear eyed about such possible contamination of strategic prescriptions. Opinion’s such as that of Mr. Katju can then be taken with a pinch of salt. Acknowledging that such opinion and such opinion makers do not have monopoly over strategic rationality, is the first step in moving to examine alternatives that otherwise remain unexamined due to lack of imprimature by strategic ‘experts’.

The case for the prime minister’s visit is one such. The same yardstick of strategic bias informing opinion, used here to examine Mr. Katju’s opinion, has been applied to Dr. Manmohan Singh’s hope of repairing India-Pakistan relations. His strategic preference is taken as one informed by nostalgia, quite like the work of Mr. IK Gujral earlier. The good that came out of the previous instance of Punjabiat impacting policy has been the ‘composite dialogue’ process. That a dialogue is into its third iteration after its severest test at 26/11 suggests the power of the idea. A prime ministerial visit would ensure resumption of the dialogue in its composite format, as had been forged finally in the Vajpayee-Musharraf joint statement of 2004. Therefore, even if the origin of the strategic preference is not much difference, judging it differently must be in terms of its positive consequence.

But, the lion must be bearded in its own den and on its terms for the case for the visit to be carried. In other words, strategic rationality must be deployed to argue in favour of such a visit. India’s policy is one of expanding and strengthening the pro-peace constituency in Pakistan. This is to be done to the extent that eventually they take over the democratic space in Pakistan, constricting the military-mullah combine. Clearly, if a policy is to be carried through to its logical conclusion in a democratic peace, the prime minister must under take the mission. Not doing so would leave the extremists on both sides in a position to dictate the interstate agenda.

Given this as making strategic sense, the question is now one of timing. The government having been on the back foot over the past two years has just chosen to break out with a slew of second generation economic reforms. Since this can be expected to draw political backlash, it is unlikely the government can sustain yet another policy initiative, this time in the foreign policy field. Being of neo-liberal inclination, it has chosen to prioritise economics over foreign policy. In effect, that Dr. Singh is not going is certainly not because Mr. Katju’s say so.

Taking this as time gained to set back the intellectual sway of ‘naysayers’ in the strategic discourse is the best way to build the climate and momentum to ensure the visit takes place, perhaps not of Dr. Singh but by the next prime minister. The fight will also help keep away figures from the prime ministerial chair having no interest in making the visit in first place. 

SECURITY POLICY 
Reaching beyond its brief 
Outsourcing the policy-making function is bad enough, but the government should certainly not have allowed trespass on its domain by the Naresh Chandra Task Force, writes Firdaus Ahmed. 
 

10 September 2012 - Set up in July last year, the Naresh Chandra Task Force submitted its report to the prime minister in May this year. According to the PMO website, "The Task Force was mandated to review existing processes, procedures and practices in the national security system and to suggest measures to strengthen the national security apparatus."

Such wording allows for a very expansive reading of the mandate; that may be why the PMO also tells us that the "Task Force has made an assessment of the security scenario facing the country and made recommendations to the Government." Reviewing a system is quite different from giving advice on today's geopolitics and internal conflicts. Moreover, the policy domain is that of the government. If it wanted recommendations on this score, it would have mandated the task force. Such outsourcing of the policy-making function would itself be breathtaking, but permitting trespass on its domain by the task force is much worse.

Second, as a practical matter, mixing up the two is unwise. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that the redesign of security proposed by the task force is in line with its policy recommendations. But what happens if the government is not in agreement with the policy plank? In such case, it cannot reasonably redesign security systems that are geared towards such a plank.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE http://www.indiatogether.org/2012/sep/fah-task.htm

In the rest of this article, I want to focus on the task force's recommendation on peace talks with Maoists - which confirms my suspicion that not only has government money been wasted on the task force, but so has the opportunity to make headway in defence reform.

The recommendation, as reported in the press, makes four points. One is that the talks must be so as to divide the Maoists into two camps: those in favour of talks and those against talks. This is to have a strategic benefit in weakening them. The second is that the precondition of Maoists to cease operations is not necessary for talks to be initiated and progressed. This makes sense if the intent is to divide the movement - why wait? Third, is that military operations must continue, lest the Maoists use the opportunity to recoup. The latter is insight the task force draws from the example in Andhra Pradesh. Lastly, the task force has advised on increasing the army's presence in the area through a number of mechanisms, such as setting up training facilities.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org

Secondly, the idea that operations need not cease in order to talk makes sense. After all, talks are a way to get operations to cease from both sides. This was a missing link in the policy under the previous home minister, P Chidambaram. He had insisted that the Maoists demonstrate good faith through a ceasefire, even if a temporary one, before the government agreed to talk. This was suggestive of arrogance on the government's part. Being responsible for the people inconvenienced by operations from both sides, it is incumbent on it to proactively pursue every option, including that of talks, to end the predicament of its people.

In the event, the task force's reminder is timely, but discredited by its motive of 'divide-and-rule'. Yet, it is fairly evident that the government is not averse to such advice, since it had used the talks process earlier to expose and decapitate the Maoist leadership. The killing of 'Azad' is a case in point. Such instrumental use of talks eventually destroys the strategic options, and leave military action as the only choice, even though its limitations as a conflict resolution tool have been consistently demonstrated in all of India's many and manifold conflicts. A government's contract with its people involves concentrating on conflict resolution, not conflict management.

The third point - urging that military operations should continue while talks are on is another irresponsible recommendation. If the government were to take this up, it would amount to an abdication of the its responsibility to own up to its policy. Implying that it is acting in accordance with the recommendation of a task force is to pass on the onus of policy and decision making to the task force. The very purpose of talks, to facilitate ceasefire in order to forge trust and confidence for the more significant part of a comprehensive agreement, is then lost.

Last, is the issue of extending the army's presence for training the paramilitary. Such deployments are to help with the local economy and to wean away locals from Maoists. Clearly, there are better ways to revive the local economy. Training the paramilitary to take on Maoists in their strongholds is at best a long-term goal, which signals that for the moment the government will not do much to help tribal communities. Yet again an example from the AfPak experience in the failure to train the Afghan National Security Forces to take on the Taliban suggests that this is yet another recommendation bereft of good sense.

What's more likely is that the initial deployments are to perhaps serve as bridgeheads for deployment of the army if and when it is ready to give up its Kashmir obsession. This is an even more problematic possibility.

Clearly, the task force has extended itself. It cannot possibly have had the time and expertise to take on two tasks, both of providing the government with a proto-national security policy, as also suggesting the restructuring necessary to work it. Since the report is currently under examination by stakeholders, it seems this exercise in futility is being taken to its logical 'do nothing thereafter' conclusion as is the case with most reports by government-appointed commissions. That might not be such a bad ending after all, in this case.
⊕

Firdaus Ahmed 
10 Sep 2012