Thursday, May 24, 2018

http://indiatogether.org/what-nuclear-weapons-have-done-to-us-op-ed

What nuclear weapons have done to us?

Ordinarily the title would be ‘What nuclear weapons have done for us?’ Nuclear enthusiasts would have us believe that we are more secure now than we were twenty years ago, when in May 1998 India broke out of the nuclear closet, forcing Pakistan’s hand too by month end.
The nuclear optimists would point out that there has been no war since. Even Kargil war was not quite a war. Operation Parakram that soon followed remained short of being called a war. Mumbai 26/11 was not followed up with a war. Deterrence has worked, and that is what nuclear weapons are for.
That nuclear deterrence has worked is Pakistan’s side of the story. Though aggressors in Kargil, they escaped lightly by only been thrown back. They warded off Operation Parakram and deterred war after 26/11.
India would loathe to accept that it has been deterred. It would point to Kargil being vacated without the need to go to war. Operation Parakram was but coercive diplomacy. After 26/11, war would have hurt our economic interests which were already under threat from global depression setting in by then.  
India has been voluble, since it needs to convince Pakistan that it is not deterred by Pakistan introducing tactical nuclear weapons into the subcontinent. A rather elaborate seminar at the army’s think tank Center for Land Warfare Studies was held in February at which operations in a nuclear environment were discussed in all domains – land, air, sea. The first session was devoted to what Pakistan hopes to do with its tactical nuclear weapons.
Presumably the rest of the seminar was on pressing on with the war, after Pakistan’s nuclear first use and India’s nuclear retaliation. Since the nuclear dimension was not slated for discussion, it is uncertain if the nuclear response by India was as promised – ‘massive’. Instead, if military operations were to continue after introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict, it would suggest a nuclear strategy in which India will respond proportionately to Pakistan’s nuclear use.
What this suggests is that war continues to be a possibility, twenty years since overt nuclearization. 
In short, nuclear weapons appear to have made little difference in resolving the outstanding problems. War could well have broken out, but for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. India’s nuclear weapons were unusable in their intended manner of use – ‘massive’ retaliation. However, India seems to have thought up ways to increase their utility.
A word about the China front is necessary since India cited the China threat as a cause for the Pokhran II tests. Twenty years of developments in missiles and nuclear submarines have not yet led to a reassuring second-strike capability, leaving India relatively vulnerable all through these years. Even so, India has stared down China twice over, at Chumar and lately at Doklam. In other words, India could be tough without nuclear weapons. Both India and China swear by No First Use – and India with good reason. It appears then that the China threat merely served as a cover for India to go nuclear for other reasons.
In short, there is not much that nuclear weapons’ possession has done for India. But there is much that they have done to India. The need for their management has led to an accumulation of power at a power node - the National Security Adviser - that has no mention in the Constitution and has grave implications for a democratic system based on ministerial responsibility and cabinet accountability to parliament.
The power over the weapons is vested largely with the national security adviser (NSA), an individual who is appointed by an executive fiat. As seen from our meandering national security policy under the incumbent NSA – whether it be in relation to Pakistan, China, Kashmir or terrorism – individuals matter. National security management over the past four years has been ideologically driven. This does not lend confidence that nuclear weapon use will be informed by sound strategic thinking
It is no secret that India’s higher level defence structure is dysfunctional. NSA’s foray four years too late into some correction, through setting up of a defence planning committee, is chimerical since it is merely a measure to substitute for the chief of defence staff, a key figure missing in India’s system. As India appears to be moving towards nuclear warfighting, it needs a military man at the coordinating hub, not an NSA, and certainly not the current one with tactical brilliance but known deficit in strategic good sense.
In any case it is not only the Indian system that India needs worrying about. It stands to suffer as much from the pathologies of the system in Pakistan, which Indian strategists never fail to point out is rather vulnerable to threats ranging from jihadists to praetorian. 
The twentieth anniversary is a good time to look at the usefulness of the nuclear weapons. They have not enhanced Indian security and instead the ongoing shift to making them more relevant to security by increasing their usability makes for an increase in Indian insecurity.
This brings to fore the more significant aspect of what nuclear weapons have done to us. They have been so normalized that any anti-nuclear movement is left to activists and to local opposition to nuclear plants. Indians have abdicated control over their own security and, indeed, destiny.

Thursday, March 15, 2018

http://indiatogether.org/dissension-in-the-top-brass-op-ed

Dissension in the top brass?

An opinion piece in The Tribune referring to the subtext of the statements of two army commanders speaking at a seminar late last month at Punjab University, Chandigarh, calls for the army chief Bipin Rawat to listen to those statements and pull himself back from going down a political route and taking the army down the same route with him.
At the Chandigarh seminar, the head of the army’s western command said that the idea of a two-front war is not ‘smart’. The army chief had dwelt on the concept of ‘two and half front war’ with the Doklam crisis as context mid last year. The second general, its training command head, called for activation of a political track with Pakistan. He seemed to suggest that even though the Line of Control (LoC) has been activated for some three years now, there is nothing to show for the political utility of the military operations there.
 His latest remarks in the context of elections in three north eastern states drew attention to the threat of illegal immigration. While it cannot be said that BJP’s good showing in the elections was a result of those remarks but the timing unfortunately rules in the possibility that they were designed to be helpful. The timing has a precedence. In the run up to the Karnataka elections, the Chief went down to Coorg and pitched for the Bharat Ratna for a son-of-the-soil, Field Marshal Cariappa. His comments were criticised  by the commentariat and assorted politicians.
Over his tenure, the army chief has through his public remarks been rather useful for the ruling dispensation. Not only is the army chief voluble, but his utterances are political. This explains the latitude he has been given to discourse on aspects that are much outside the army’s domain.
The two army commanders were speaking at a seminar on Pakistan. Drawing analogy from Pakistan’s case, the training command head had this to say, “This (Pakistani praetorianism) is in stark contrast to India where the armed forces owe allegiance to the Constitution, and not to any party, person or religion (italics added).”
This follows the joint doctrine (p.2) of the armed forces that reiterated the national interest as being: ‘To preserve the democratic, secular and federal character of the Indian Republic.’ This is a corollary to the national values encapsulated in the documents as: ‘sovereignty, socialism secularism, democracy, republican character, justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, human dignity, unity and integrity of our Nation, respect for our diversity, peaceful co-existence, pluralism and tolerance and international peace defined by a just international order.’
The training command head said as much, likening Pakistan to a mirror on the wall, which India needs to look at so as not to “make the same mistakes, particularly in light of growing radicalisation and intolerance within our own society over mundane issues.”
An unseemly political proximity is visible between the army and the right wing. While traditionally only personages of national stature are allowed to speak at the military’s haloed training institutions, a captive military audience is now being treated to talks by cultural nationalists such as Zee News anchor, Sudhir  Chaudhary, at the staff college at Wellington and former major and current day Republic TV host Gaurav  Arya at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. Former Chief VK Singh donned his true colours by taking up the RSS uniform.
The extent to which the strategic path adopted by the army is sustainable in strategic terms has been questioned, not just by the General heading perhaps the most consequential command in case of conventional war, but also by a retired General who served as military adviser in the national security council system of  the previous administration.
The army chief in the context of nothing specific had at a conference this winter called for keeping the army out of politics. It is unlikely the advice was for himself. Army’s discipline and sense of obedience cannot be an excuse to ignore the change in its public profile brought about by a Chief, deliberately given rather a loose rope by a self-interested government.
The two army commanders need to pay heed to the subtext of their own remarks and, at the closed door conference of army commanders, discuss the new phenomenon of the army flirting with politics. Hopefully a Chief suitably cautioned by his peers would then steer a strictly neutral course, particularly as national elections are on the horizon.

Thursday, January 11, 2018

FROM WITHIN: REFLECTIONS ON INDIA’S ARMY

The book comprises unpublished writings of Ali Ahmed from his time in uniform. The author served in the Indian army for two decades. His reflections in the period that did not make it into print ...

ON INDIA’S MILITARY: WRITINGS FROM WITHIN

The book comprises the published writings in service journals of Ali Ahmed while serving in the army. They cover the two decades on either side of the turn of the century, thereby providing a win...

INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE LIBERAL LENS

Ali Ahmed continues his engagement with the themes of his previous two books, On War in South Asia and On Peace in South Asia (both CinnamonTeal 2014), specifically on issues related to IndiaR...

ON PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA

After doffing his military uniform, Ali Ahmed joined New Delhi’s vibrant strategic community as a researcher in a leading think tank, a doctoral scholar and later on the faculty of a centra...

ON WAR IN SOUTH ASIA

The book comprises Ali Ahmed’s writings on strategic affairs and military matters in the period 2008-14. It comprises commentaries on conventional warfare and nuclear deterrence. The work i...

Wednesday, January 10, 2018