AFSPA: Between battlelines
The new Army Chief has given out his mind on the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). He has said that, "Any dilution of the Act will impinge adversely on the manner in which the armed forces operate.'' To him ‘in constrained and trying circumstances, the armed forces need requisite legal protection' and on that account the Act ‘cannot be disputed’. Having come in from Kolkata after command of the Field Army deployed in countering insurgency in the North East and being an infantry officer with counter insurgency experience at the grassroots and at the operational level, his is a considered opinion.
This explains the Army’s reservations on the draft of an amended version of the AFSPA that the Ministry of Home Affairs had sent for concurrence.
See indiatogether.org for full article.
Specifically, an amended AFSPA was to have had the Do’s and Don’ts incorporated. The Supreme Court judgment had stated that the Army, ‘shall strictly follow the instructions contained in the list of ‘Do’s and Don’ts” issued by the army authorities which are binding and any disregard to the said instructions would entail suitable action under the Army Act, 1950.’ It had required that ‘the instructions contained in the list of ‘Do’s and Don’ts” shall be suitably amended so as to bring them in conformity with the guidelines contained in the decisions of this Court and to incorporate the safeguards…’
Second, but more importantly, was in respect of Section 4 (a): ‘if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area…’ This clause has been considered ‘draconian’. The draft under preparation for tabling an amended law in parliament this session had perhaps watered this down. But the Army has not proved agreeable to results of half a decade long exertions in the MHA and Law ministry.
Why this is so is because the Army prefers to see itself as the force of last resort in internal security situation. The role is itself seen as a secondary one to its primary role of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. Therefore, if the situation is bad enough, it feels it requires the powers necessary to cope with it including legal cover for its soldiery. This is especially so given the information war that surrounds insurgency, in which allegations of human rights violations are a weapon.
This perspective is not problematic. Extraordinary situations require extraordinary powers to cope, lest the republic unravel. What is problematic instead is the Army’s insistence that it would deploy only under the legal cover of the Act in areas declared ‘disturbed’ under Section 3 of the Act. Thus even where the situation is not bad enough to warrant Army deployment with such powers, the Act is invoked to enable the Army’s deployment. This position of the Army is not without logic in that by insisting that the law be invoked protects it from being used as a default option in internal security, as yet another paramilitary.
The issue is therefore on how to identify situations that warrant Army deployment under the Act and how to cope with those that are less critical. Understanding, if not agreeing with the Army’s position has led to the government’s position on a consensus, with the Army on board, before any further move is made. In the interim however much can be done.
Firstly, in areas where the Army’s efforts, among other reasons, have brought down the insurgency to manageable levels, a review of whether Army deployment is necessary needs be done. The J&K government has been asking for this for better part of last decade. The political dividend of this would be more useful in making balance of the insurgency recede than anything the Army is currently doing by remaining deployed. Even if this may not be readily possible in the Valley, an experiment can be done with withdrawing both the AFSPA and Army deployment in districts south of Pirpanjal. Such areas primed for vacation include Assam also, in particular lower Assam and the autonomous councils. The state has been amiss in extending Army deployment even where not required. Therefore a proportion of the blame must go to elected representatives in state legislatures, rather than the Army.
Secondly, the Center need not be as protective as it has been over granting permissions for the Army to be investigated where it is remiss. The Army in any case follows up on allegations and takes pride in delivering justice where warranted. However, as the Manorama case indicates institutional interest may at times over ride higher considerations. The Supreme Court has required the government to be strict, stating, ‘A complaint containing an allegation about misuse or abuse of the powers conferred under the Central Act shall be thoroughly inquired into and, if on enquiry it is found that the allegations are correct, the victim should be suitably compensated and the necessary sanction for institution of prosecution and/or suit or other proceeding should be granted under Section 6 of the Central Act.’ For instance, the J&K state government made 38 requests to prosecute soldiers but no permission was granted by the Centre. Defence Minister A K Antony told Rajya Sabha that 133 complaints were made against army between 2004 and 2009. In case the Ministry is less reticent, the Army can be expected to be doubly conscious of observing its obligations.
The AFSPA is perhaps necessary to deal with extreme situations. Such situations are a rarity. Therefore, the Act needs to be withdrawn where not necessary. However, in case the Army is still needed in such cases, then it can be deployed under cover of the relevant Code of Criminal Procedure sections. This may deprive of its extensive powers, but since these would not be necessary in less critical situations, it can afford to forego them. Army deployment in any case must be made judiciously. For instance the Chintalnar incident indicates that it may be required in select areas of Dantewada for a specific purpose of dislodging the PLGA and for that limited duration only, rather than across the board in Central India indefinitely.
It would appear that the truth lies somewhere between the battle-lines of the Army and the NGOs against the AFSPA.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Monday, April 05, 2010
The Bright Side of ‘Asymmetric Escalation’
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/the-bright-side-of-asymmetric-escalation-3081.html
Vipin Narang in his article ‘Posturing for Peace?’ gets it wrong. This is uncharacteristic of the reputed journal, International Security; but he would not be wrong for long. What he thinks is Pakistan’s posture today is not quite true for now, but is likely the way Pakistan is headed in the future. He characterises the Pakistani nuclear deterrent as one of ‘asymmetric escalation’, since Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons for deterring conventional attack also. He maintains that Pakistan has already incorporated nuclear weapons into its war-fighting repertoire. This is not true for the moment. However, in light of India’s movement towards increasing the conventional asymmetry, this is the way Pakistan is likely headed.
He claims that Pakistan ‘believed it had little choice but to test its nuclear weapons and adopt an asymmetric escalation posture that fully integrated nuclear weapons into its military forces to credibly and directly deter Indian conventional attacks ‘(Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,’ International Security, 34 (3), p. 47).’ In this view, Pakistan has resorted to delegation, has the doctrine, organisation, capabilities and numbers to ‘escalate the conflict by threatening first use of nuclear weapons on advancing Indian forces once they cross the border onto Pakistani soil – through deterrence by denial (p. 57).’ He opines that this has deterred India since the Chagai tests to the extent of deterring even surgical strikes in the wake of 26/11.
That the possibility of escalation would have informed Indian considerations since can be conceded. That it was clinching, thereby deterring India, is more difficult to accept. Instead, India has been more restrained than deterred. The reason for restraint could well be more self-serving than Indians would let on; because that restraint helps build up political capital for the time India does resort to military force. Self-deterrence at the conventional level in not having the requisite wherewithal would have been a more compelling argument than deterrence due to Pakistani nuclear postures.
The nuclear posture of default reliance on nuclear weapons in an outbreak of conflict is in any case unlikely to exist. Moreover, Indian conventional attacks would unlikely be nudging any thresholds in any case. Finally, analysts like the US’ Peter Lavoy, and India’s Gurmeet Kanwal, maintain that Pakistan would largely rely on the conventional deterrent. Therefore, as the Indian military believes, there is a case for conventional operations, albeit limited, restricted to a short, sharp war.
By this yardstick, Narang’s is an inaccurate reading of the current status. At best, Pakistan could resort to warning shots across the bow as a war termination signal. This does not require the posture that Narang attributes it. While Pakistan does use nuclear weapons to deter conventional war also, this does not, as of now, involve a posture reminiscent of the NATO during the Cold War. Nevertheless, his view is prescient.
With India set to spend US$50-80 billion on acquisitions, Pakistan may feel compelled towards ‘asymmetric escalation’ as visualised by Narang. Pakistan has coaxed a few more F-16s out of the US and more military and counter-insurgency aid. It can be expected to also divert a proportion of the latter to the eastern front as was admitted to by Musharraf, despite Obama promising to be more eagle eyed than was Bush. These exertions indicate that it prefers a conventional counter. A nuclear counter would be one forced on it.
India’s defence minister, commenting on the ‘strategic dialogue’ between Pakistan and the US, criticised conventional arms flows to Pakistan. Retired General Deepak Kapoor in his capacity as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee had earlier questioned its nuclear build up. Apprehending the worst from a potential adversary’s growing capability is expected from those in charge of a country’s national security. Indian apprehension is that greater power with Pakistan only emboldens it in the pursuit of a proxy war. This compels India not only to consider escalatory options but also to up-the-ante, militarily.
Pakistani moves on both conventional and nuclear levels can liberally be interpreted as balancing. It helps dissuade India from chancing the war option. Nevertheless, India’s reservations need to be taken on board. As the stability/instability paradox indicates, Pakistan could be tempted to renew the proxy war to tie down surplus Indian military capacity. A nuclear posture that Narang discerns would be a cover for the same. Despite this, it would not be able to cause a movement on Kashmir. India’s defence expenditure would gain justification but as to whether upping-the-ante would make India more secure, would remain questionable. Both states would be chasing the chimera of security at a higher level of conventional and nuclear capability, at higher costs, risks, dangers and less likelihood of success.
The silver lining is perhaps that all this brings the need for a political resolution of outstanding issues to the foreground. India’s slow acquisitions processes indicate that it is only unwillingly upping-the-ante. The backlash of proxy war in Pakistan may yet unfold to the cost of its Army. Therefore, prior to testing military waters afresh, the two could attempt the political route once again.
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/the-bright-side-of-asymmetric-escalation-3081.html
Vipin Narang in his article ‘Posturing for Peace?’ gets it wrong. This is uncharacteristic of the reputed journal, International Security; but he would not be wrong for long. What he thinks is Pakistan’s posture today is not quite true for now, but is likely the way Pakistan is headed in the future. He characterises the Pakistani nuclear deterrent as one of ‘asymmetric escalation’, since Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons for deterring conventional attack also. He maintains that Pakistan has already incorporated nuclear weapons into its war-fighting repertoire. This is not true for the moment. However, in light of India’s movement towards increasing the conventional asymmetry, this is the way Pakistan is likely headed.
He claims that Pakistan ‘believed it had little choice but to test its nuclear weapons and adopt an asymmetric escalation posture that fully integrated nuclear weapons into its military forces to credibly and directly deter Indian conventional attacks ‘(Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,’ International Security, 34 (3), p. 47).’ In this view, Pakistan has resorted to delegation, has the doctrine, organisation, capabilities and numbers to ‘escalate the conflict by threatening first use of nuclear weapons on advancing Indian forces once they cross the border onto Pakistani soil – through deterrence by denial (p. 57).’ He opines that this has deterred India since the Chagai tests to the extent of deterring even surgical strikes in the wake of 26/11.
That the possibility of escalation would have informed Indian considerations since can be conceded. That it was clinching, thereby deterring India, is more difficult to accept. Instead, India has been more restrained than deterred. The reason for restraint could well be more self-serving than Indians would let on; because that restraint helps build up political capital for the time India does resort to military force. Self-deterrence at the conventional level in not having the requisite wherewithal would have been a more compelling argument than deterrence due to Pakistani nuclear postures.
The nuclear posture of default reliance on nuclear weapons in an outbreak of conflict is in any case unlikely to exist. Moreover, Indian conventional attacks would unlikely be nudging any thresholds in any case. Finally, analysts like the US’ Peter Lavoy, and India’s Gurmeet Kanwal, maintain that Pakistan would largely rely on the conventional deterrent. Therefore, as the Indian military believes, there is a case for conventional operations, albeit limited, restricted to a short, sharp war.
By this yardstick, Narang’s is an inaccurate reading of the current status. At best, Pakistan could resort to warning shots across the bow as a war termination signal. This does not require the posture that Narang attributes it. While Pakistan does use nuclear weapons to deter conventional war also, this does not, as of now, involve a posture reminiscent of the NATO during the Cold War. Nevertheless, his view is prescient.
With India set to spend US$50-80 billion on acquisitions, Pakistan may feel compelled towards ‘asymmetric escalation’ as visualised by Narang. Pakistan has coaxed a few more F-16s out of the US and more military and counter-insurgency aid. It can be expected to also divert a proportion of the latter to the eastern front as was admitted to by Musharraf, despite Obama promising to be more eagle eyed than was Bush. These exertions indicate that it prefers a conventional counter. A nuclear counter would be one forced on it.
India’s defence minister, commenting on the ‘strategic dialogue’ between Pakistan and the US, criticised conventional arms flows to Pakistan. Retired General Deepak Kapoor in his capacity as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee had earlier questioned its nuclear build up. Apprehending the worst from a potential adversary’s growing capability is expected from those in charge of a country’s national security. Indian apprehension is that greater power with Pakistan only emboldens it in the pursuit of a proxy war. This compels India not only to consider escalatory options but also to up-the-ante, militarily.
Pakistani moves on both conventional and nuclear levels can liberally be interpreted as balancing. It helps dissuade India from chancing the war option. Nevertheless, India’s reservations need to be taken on board. As the stability/instability paradox indicates, Pakistan could be tempted to renew the proxy war to tie down surplus Indian military capacity. A nuclear posture that Narang discerns would be a cover for the same. Despite this, it would not be able to cause a movement on Kashmir. India’s defence expenditure would gain justification but as to whether upping-the-ante would make India more secure, would remain questionable. Both states would be chasing the chimera of security at a higher level of conventional and nuclear capability, at higher costs, risks, dangers and less likelihood of success.
The silver lining is perhaps that all this brings the need for a political resolution of outstanding issues to the foreground. India’s slow acquisitions processes indicate that it is only unwillingly upping-the-ante. The backlash of proxy war in Pakistan may yet unfold to the cost of its Army. Therefore, prior to testing military waters afresh, the two could attempt the political route once again.
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
See indiatogether.org
The Government and the Military
An exasperated defence watcher, former Colonel of the Armoured Corps, Ajai Shukla, in his blog, Broadsword, calls on India's Defence Minister A K Antony to 'Go' because in Shukla's reading, "It is harder to determine what this country pays to perpetuate Defence Minister A K Antony's reputation for honesty, but the monetary penalty alone is thousands of crores per year." The minister, he says, is holding up acquisitions for the necessary preparedness to deter Pakistan.
Another knowledgeable defence commentator, Manoj Joshi, in his blog, referring to the Comptroller and Auditor General's report informs, "The Army's towed artillery is a quarter century old, two-thirds of its tank fleet comprises outdated T-72s which joined service some 30 years ago. The Army has no self-propelled artillery or attack helicopters, and mobile air defence in the form of Tunguska systems is limited." Consequently, he too is no fan of the defence minister, and this is evident from his view that, "A great deal of blame for this state of affairs must fall on Union Defence Minister A K Antony. His leadership of the department since 2005 has been uninspiring, if not downright disastrous. His sole aim, critics say, is to preserve his image as "St Antony", the honest.'
Clearly, there appears a disconnect between what the military desires and the government is willing to deliver. While each service has drawn up its wish list, the government has wrapped these up in procedures that would only deliver the capability over a considerable length of time. For instance, the Army's list will materialise in full only by 2027.
Why is the ministry going much slower than the services would like? One answer is that it is being careful not to have a repeat of its infamous scams - dating back to 'Bofors' and 'coffins for Kargil martyrs'. Once bitten by exposure in the Bofors case, the ruling party for certain is twice shy or doubly wary. But is the ministry only being wary that such scams should not repeat themselves, or are there other reasons too? Since the ministry itself is not saying, it is impossible to know for sure.
Since the government intends spending over US $50 billion over the coming half decade under the defence capital account, there is a considerable push among those in the arms industry - that includes the private sector these days - to steer matters their way. This is partially behind the bad press coming Antony's way.
One reason the ministry is going much slower than the services would like may be that it is being careful not to have a repeat of its infamous scams like Bofors.
Another possibility is that the ministry is not too happy with the strategies for defence articulated by the services. As Joshi informs, the Cold Start strategy, which is the basis of the Army's demands, has not received political blessing yet. But even in this case, the ministry should not be dragging out the purchases of the services, to slow down their agenda. Instead, as Manoj Joshi concludes, "the political leadership [should] closely work with the armed forces to evolve a strategy to deal with Pakistan ... to work with them on all aspects of a strategy that will deter Islamabad." A viable strategy for the nuclear era is clearly needed.
The earlier promise that nuclearisation would result in a peace dividend was rudely contradicted by the Kargil War. The military has come up with its own answers to the strategic problem posed by Pakistan. The political leadership is obliged to consider the military's 'solution'. In case there are qualms over the proposals, or other ideas that have come up elsewhere, the government needs to bring these out as well. Hiding behind procedural rigmarole as it appears to be currently doing is to disregard its authority to over rule the military. So why is the government not taking a stand?
First, do no harm
Firstly, at the heart of the government is in an accommodationist solution to India's Pakistan problem. Therefore, it follows a carrot-and-stick policy requiring a mix of containment through intelligence operations, military coercion, diplomatic pressure and political incentives. This way it prefers to keep the lid on the India-Pakistan relationship, to prevent it from boiling over and scalding India's growth trajectory, on which the national grand strategy depends. Pakistan, cognisant only to the pressure applied on it, is unresponsive to carrots, knowing it can compensate for Indian pressure through external balancing, such as leaning on China and the US.
Secondly, the government has lost the initiative to hardliners. The government, once bitten by the reaction to Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement, is now twice shy in appearing accommodationist. It is forever watching its back against allegations of a 'sell out', using which the opposition right wing that is currently down and out might claw its way back into the political reckoning. The strategic community, dominated by vocal and telegenic hardliners, keeps the government on the defensive. Their latest salvo has been on India's marginalisation in the Af-Pak arena at the London Conferene, despite the significant financial and other contributions the country has made.
Lastly, the government is possibly persuaded by the logic ranged against military options in the nuclear age. Since escalation cannot be ruled out, the risk of military action is unwarranted. It is easy for strategists to talk endlessly on escalation control and the viability of deterrence. It is a much graver matter for political leadership to take decisions on the issue. For decision makers, life and death issues cannot be replicated in academic exercises, wargames and intellectual constructs.
To work its way out of the conundrum the government needs to do three things. One is to make Pakistan an offer it cannot refuse. This has already been done through the back channels, both during the Vajpayee era and during Manmohan Singh's first term. However, since the government has never officially acknowledged this exchange, it has not built the political ballast necessary for seeing the initiative through. Secondly, it needs to build the conditions necessary to get Pakistan - and more importantly, its Army - to bite. And lastly, it needs to proceed with a public information campaign to bring the public round to accepting the unavoidable necessity of a political solution. This would require political investment on the part of the party.
Taking the bull of strategic doctrine by the horns is important lest the government continue to be in the cross hairs of critics, some of whom may well be in the pay roll of arms companies waiting for the windfall. Flush with funds from continuing growth, India is presently comfortable with spending on arms. This also achieves the political objective of not appearing 'soft'. The irony is that when these weapons are used tomorrow, they will endanger the very prosperity that enables their purchase today. The government needs to take a call on whether it is persuaded by the logic of the purchases it is set to make. Antony has enough ammunition to outlast his critics! ⊕
Firdaus Ahmed
06 Mar 2010
The Government and the Military
An exasperated defence watcher, former Colonel of the Armoured Corps, Ajai Shukla, in his blog, Broadsword, calls on India's Defence Minister A K Antony to 'Go' because in Shukla's reading, "It is harder to determine what this country pays to perpetuate Defence Minister A K Antony's reputation for honesty, but the monetary penalty alone is thousands of crores per year." The minister, he says, is holding up acquisitions for the necessary preparedness to deter Pakistan.
Another knowledgeable defence commentator, Manoj Joshi, in his blog, referring to the Comptroller and Auditor General's report informs, "The Army's towed artillery is a quarter century old, two-thirds of its tank fleet comprises outdated T-72s which joined service some 30 years ago. The Army has no self-propelled artillery or attack helicopters, and mobile air defence in the form of Tunguska systems is limited." Consequently, he too is no fan of the defence minister, and this is evident from his view that, "A great deal of blame for this state of affairs must fall on Union Defence Minister A K Antony. His leadership of the department since 2005 has been uninspiring, if not downright disastrous. His sole aim, critics say, is to preserve his image as "St Antony", the honest.'
Clearly, there appears a disconnect between what the military desires and the government is willing to deliver. While each service has drawn up its wish list, the government has wrapped these up in procedures that would only deliver the capability over a considerable length of time. For instance, the Army's list will materialise in full only by 2027.
Why is the ministry going much slower than the services would like? One answer is that it is being careful not to have a repeat of its infamous scams - dating back to 'Bofors' and 'coffins for Kargil martyrs'. Once bitten by exposure in the Bofors case, the ruling party for certain is twice shy or doubly wary. But is the ministry only being wary that such scams should not repeat themselves, or are there other reasons too? Since the ministry itself is not saying, it is impossible to know for sure.
Since the government intends spending over US $50 billion over the coming half decade under the defence capital account, there is a considerable push among those in the arms industry - that includes the private sector these days - to steer matters their way. This is partially behind the bad press coming Antony's way.
One reason the ministry is going much slower than the services would like may be that it is being careful not to have a repeat of its infamous scams like Bofors.
Another possibility is that the ministry is not too happy with the strategies for defence articulated by the services. As Joshi informs, the Cold Start strategy, which is the basis of the Army's demands, has not received political blessing yet. But even in this case, the ministry should not be dragging out the purchases of the services, to slow down their agenda. Instead, as Manoj Joshi concludes, "the political leadership [should] closely work with the armed forces to evolve a strategy to deal with Pakistan ... to work with them on all aspects of a strategy that will deter Islamabad." A viable strategy for the nuclear era is clearly needed.
The earlier promise that nuclearisation would result in a peace dividend was rudely contradicted by the Kargil War. The military has come up with its own answers to the strategic problem posed by Pakistan. The political leadership is obliged to consider the military's 'solution'. In case there are qualms over the proposals, or other ideas that have come up elsewhere, the government needs to bring these out as well. Hiding behind procedural rigmarole as it appears to be currently doing is to disregard its authority to over rule the military. So why is the government not taking a stand?
First, do no harm
Firstly, at the heart of the government is in an accommodationist solution to India's Pakistan problem. Therefore, it follows a carrot-and-stick policy requiring a mix of containment through intelligence operations, military coercion, diplomatic pressure and political incentives. This way it prefers to keep the lid on the India-Pakistan relationship, to prevent it from boiling over and scalding India's growth trajectory, on which the national grand strategy depends. Pakistan, cognisant only to the pressure applied on it, is unresponsive to carrots, knowing it can compensate for Indian pressure through external balancing, such as leaning on China and the US.
Secondly, the government has lost the initiative to hardliners. The government, once bitten by the reaction to Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement, is now twice shy in appearing accommodationist. It is forever watching its back against allegations of a 'sell out', using which the opposition right wing that is currently down and out might claw its way back into the political reckoning. The strategic community, dominated by vocal and telegenic hardliners, keeps the government on the defensive. Their latest salvo has been on India's marginalisation in the Af-Pak arena at the London Conferene, despite the significant financial and other contributions the country has made.
Lastly, the government is possibly persuaded by the logic ranged against military options in the nuclear age. Since escalation cannot be ruled out, the risk of military action is unwarranted. It is easy for strategists to talk endlessly on escalation control and the viability of deterrence. It is a much graver matter for political leadership to take decisions on the issue. For decision makers, life and death issues cannot be replicated in academic exercises, wargames and intellectual constructs.
To work its way out of the conundrum the government needs to do three things. One is to make Pakistan an offer it cannot refuse. This has already been done through the back channels, both during the Vajpayee era and during Manmohan Singh's first term. However, since the government has never officially acknowledged this exchange, it has not built the political ballast necessary for seeing the initiative through. Secondly, it needs to build the conditions necessary to get Pakistan - and more importantly, its Army - to bite. And lastly, it needs to proceed with a public information campaign to bring the public round to accepting the unavoidable necessity of a political solution. This would require political investment on the part of the party.
Taking the bull of strategic doctrine by the horns is important lest the government continue to be in the cross hairs of critics, some of whom may well be in the pay roll of arms companies waiting for the windfall. Flush with funds from continuing growth, India is presently comfortable with spending on arms. This also achieves the political objective of not appearing 'soft'. The irony is that when these weapons are used tomorrow, they will endanger the very prosperity that enables their purchase today. The government needs to take a call on whether it is persuaded by the logic of the purchases it is set to make. Antony has enough ammunition to outlast his critics! ⊕
Firdaus Ahmed
06 Mar 2010
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
QUESTIONING INDIA’S MILITARY TRAJECTORY
India intends spending an equivalent amount but in half the time to the $ 50 billion it spent on armaments over the last decade. Among the big ticket items lined up, are the first purchases of artillery pieces since the Bofors scandal for the Army. The Air Force is going in for the strategic lift Globemaster, C 130s and 126 Multi Role Combat Aircrafts. The Navy is to receive the $ 4 billion rechristened Gorshkov, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, and is building another aircraft carrier and a nuclear submarine and a new generation of submarines this decade. With the success of the Agni III test, the Strategic Forces Command has set its eyes towards the 5000 Km Agni V. Whether all these are necessary is a valid question.
Multiple reasons are given as answer with deterrence usually being the main reason. Firstly, India’s growing economy requires securing through deterring threats that are there in the environment. Future threats need to be catered for now since incorporating weapons into the repertoire requires time. Since India is in a ‘dangerous neighbourhood’ in which are two nuclear armed powers that are close enough to each other for acting in collusion, India has to be prepared for a ‘two front’ eventuality as the worst case scenario. India’s expanding economy would in future require access to energy, trading routes, resources and markets. This entails both a strong Navy and an out of area capability for the Army and strategic reach for the Air Force. Credible nuclear deterrence requires delivery capability in missiles of range and performance, assurance in the second strike capability in terms of the sea leg of the ‘triad’, an elastic quantity of warheads of varying types and yields, and protection through ballistic missile defences of command and control and second strike assets.
Secondly, current threats also figure as logic. The draw down in proxy war in Kashmir and abatement of terror incidents since 26/11 is attributed to success in conventional deterrence. This owes to an offensive doctrine backed by a capability enabled by defence budgets that have expanded three fold over the past decade. It is deemed that China’s venturesomeness across the disputed boundary can only be dissuaded by a visible and usable military capability.
Lastly, India is seen as an emerging power that needs to carry its weight in international affairs. With the US facing prospects of a long term decline, India needs to redress the balance on the side of democracies. By giving itself the capability, it can discharge responsibilities coming its way.
Interrogating this logic is warranted, even if the defence budget is pegged at a seemingly reasonable 2-2.5 per cent of the GDP and is supposedly not necessarily and obviously at the cost of the social sector.
The arms are intended to deter war and if unavoidable to fight and if possible win. The Prussian military thinker, Clausewitz’s most important idea concerned the two types of war. The first was a war of conquest and the second a limited war to bring about a negotiated settlement. While the first amounting to Total War is unthinkable in the nuclear era, the second is being deemed feasible if the Army Chief is to be believed. He had this to say in late November: “The possibility of limited war under a nuclear overhang is still a reality, at least in the Indian sub-continent…”
Since the kind of war that can be fought, if at all is only a limited war, are the preparations reflecting this. Not so. The armaments can well be meant for Total War. The logic is perhaps that once a war is begun it could end up as a wider war even if the original intent was to keep it a limited one. The enemy may up the ante for which prior preparedness on our part would act as deterrence. Therefore, the purchases are for a Total War in order paradoxically to keep any war a limited one. The counter argument is that if there is no guarantee that a war can be kept limited, there is no question of getting into one. And if war is not an option, then arming for one as we are is not necessary.
Lets take the effect on one possible adversary, Pakistan, as example. The range, quality and depth of capabilities that India is acquiring enables India to prevail over Pakistan. Pakistan cannot know what Indian aims are. If India advertises its limited aims, Pakistan can ensure it denies these with greater energy. Denied a win, India, seen as the bigger power, would be facing a loss. It may then be tempted to widen war aims or escalate. It can be denied even these by Pakistan going nuclear. This is not in Indian interests, even if it is decidedly not so in Pakistani interests either. Therefore, even a limited war makes little sense.
The supposed aims in such a war are to ‘punish’ Pakistan. The satisfaction of punishing it cannot be risked. Even if the war is intended to bring Pakistan to the negotiating table, then root causes as Kashmir etc. would require to be addressed on the table. In which case, why should it take a war? Such negotiations can be proceeded with, thereby undercutting the prohibitive option of war. This has the added advantage that the expenses being incurred and the militarization resulting can also be avoided.
The same is the case with China. The former Chairman of the Chief’s of Staff in his landmark speech to Delhi’s strategic community on relinquishing office said, “Common sense dictates that Cooperation with China would be preferable to Competition or Conflict, as it would be foolhardy to compare India and China as equal… On the military front, our strategy to deal with China must include reducing the military gap.” As expected he recommends diplomacy backed by military preparedness. The idea is that diplomacy succeeds if there is military force to back it. Since China, on its way to super-powerdom, is expected to get more assertive; but seeing military backing would be more responsive to Indian diplomacy.
The question is that in case diplomacy fails can military power, as is being created, be of any use? That it would be mutually hurtful is no satisfaction for getting hurt oneself. Having military power to fall back on makes diplomacy less amenable to the ‘give and take’ of negotiations. Politically, there would be little incentive to arrive at solutions to, say, the border problem, since militarily there would be no need to. In effect the cyclic argument of militarists can be identified: military preparedness delays solution to problems and their continuing existence gives military power a seemingly plausible rationale.
Arming now for the envisaged future threat of two Asiatic giants fighting it out for strategic space in Asia; for markets, resources and energy; and for prestige can only be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Ending up as cannon fodder for the US in a superpower face off with China for global hegemony can only be gainful for arms merchants and their points men in India.
As a nuclear power, all India need have is the capability to defend itself. A peace dividend for having gone nuclear is what India should instead be looking towards. That was the promise by nuclear salesmen when India nuclearised. The ongoing expansion of the military is intended for much more than that. Its time the nuclear and military bluff is called, lest it be too late.
India intends spending an equivalent amount but in half the time to the $ 50 billion it spent on armaments over the last decade. Among the big ticket items lined up, are the first purchases of artillery pieces since the Bofors scandal for the Army. The Air Force is going in for the strategic lift Globemaster, C 130s and 126 Multi Role Combat Aircrafts. The Navy is to receive the $ 4 billion rechristened Gorshkov, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, and is building another aircraft carrier and a nuclear submarine and a new generation of submarines this decade. With the success of the Agni III test, the Strategic Forces Command has set its eyes towards the 5000 Km Agni V. Whether all these are necessary is a valid question.
Multiple reasons are given as answer with deterrence usually being the main reason. Firstly, India’s growing economy requires securing through deterring threats that are there in the environment. Future threats need to be catered for now since incorporating weapons into the repertoire requires time. Since India is in a ‘dangerous neighbourhood’ in which are two nuclear armed powers that are close enough to each other for acting in collusion, India has to be prepared for a ‘two front’ eventuality as the worst case scenario. India’s expanding economy would in future require access to energy, trading routes, resources and markets. This entails both a strong Navy and an out of area capability for the Army and strategic reach for the Air Force. Credible nuclear deterrence requires delivery capability in missiles of range and performance, assurance in the second strike capability in terms of the sea leg of the ‘triad’, an elastic quantity of warheads of varying types and yields, and protection through ballistic missile defences of command and control and second strike assets.
Secondly, current threats also figure as logic. The draw down in proxy war in Kashmir and abatement of terror incidents since 26/11 is attributed to success in conventional deterrence. This owes to an offensive doctrine backed by a capability enabled by defence budgets that have expanded three fold over the past decade. It is deemed that China’s venturesomeness across the disputed boundary can only be dissuaded by a visible and usable military capability.
Lastly, India is seen as an emerging power that needs to carry its weight in international affairs. With the US facing prospects of a long term decline, India needs to redress the balance on the side of democracies. By giving itself the capability, it can discharge responsibilities coming its way.
Interrogating this logic is warranted, even if the defence budget is pegged at a seemingly reasonable 2-2.5 per cent of the GDP and is supposedly not necessarily and obviously at the cost of the social sector.
The arms are intended to deter war and if unavoidable to fight and if possible win. The Prussian military thinker, Clausewitz’s most important idea concerned the two types of war. The first was a war of conquest and the second a limited war to bring about a negotiated settlement. While the first amounting to Total War is unthinkable in the nuclear era, the second is being deemed feasible if the Army Chief is to be believed. He had this to say in late November: “The possibility of limited war under a nuclear overhang is still a reality, at least in the Indian sub-continent…”
Since the kind of war that can be fought, if at all is only a limited war, are the preparations reflecting this. Not so. The armaments can well be meant for Total War. The logic is perhaps that once a war is begun it could end up as a wider war even if the original intent was to keep it a limited one. The enemy may up the ante for which prior preparedness on our part would act as deterrence. Therefore, the purchases are for a Total War in order paradoxically to keep any war a limited one. The counter argument is that if there is no guarantee that a war can be kept limited, there is no question of getting into one. And if war is not an option, then arming for one as we are is not necessary.
Lets take the effect on one possible adversary, Pakistan, as example. The range, quality and depth of capabilities that India is acquiring enables India to prevail over Pakistan. Pakistan cannot know what Indian aims are. If India advertises its limited aims, Pakistan can ensure it denies these with greater energy. Denied a win, India, seen as the bigger power, would be facing a loss. It may then be tempted to widen war aims or escalate. It can be denied even these by Pakistan going nuclear. This is not in Indian interests, even if it is decidedly not so in Pakistani interests either. Therefore, even a limited war makes little sense.
The supposed aims in such a war are to ‘punish’ Pakistan. The satisfaction of punishing it cannot be risked. Even if the war is intended to bring Pakistan to the negotiating table, then root causes as Kashmir etc. would require to be addressed on the table. In which case, why should it take a war? Such negotiations can be proceeded with, thereby undercutting the prohibitive option of war. This has the added advantage that the expenses being incurred and the militarization resulting can also be avoided.
The same is the case with China. The former Chairman of the Chief’s of Staff in his landmark speech to Delhi’s strategic community on relinquishing office said, “Common sense dictates that Cooperation with China would be preferable to Competition or Conflict, as it would be foolhardy to compare India and China as equal… On the military front, our strategy to deal with China must include reducing the military gap.” As expected he recommends diplomacy backed by military preparedness. The idea is that diplomacy succeeds if there is military force to back it. Since China, on its way to super-powerdom, is expected to get more assertive; but seeing military backing would be more responsive to Indian diplomacy.
The question is that in case diplomacy fails can military power, as is being created, be of any use? That it would be mutually hurtful is no satisfaction for getting hurt oneself. Having military power to fall back on makes diplomacy less amenable to the ‘give and take’ of negotiations. Politically, there would be little incentive to arrive at solutions to, say, the border problem, since militarily there would be no need to. In effect the cyclic argument of militarists can be identified: military preparedness delays solution to problems and their continuing existence gives military power a seemingly plausible rationale.
Arming now for the envisaged future threat of two Asiatic giants fighting it out for strategic space in Asia; for markets, resources and energy; and for prestige can only be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Ending up as cannon fodder for the US in a superpower face off with China for global hegemony can only be gainful for arms merchants and their points men in India.
As a nuclear power, all India need have is the capability to defend itself. A peace dividend for having gone nuclear is what India should instead be looking towards. That was the promise by nuclear salesmen when India nuclearised. The ongoing expansion of the military is intended for much more than that. Its time the nuclear and military bluff is called, lest it be too late.
Sunday, January 24, 2010
INDIA AT 60: ACQUIRING ESCAPE VELOCITY?
The parade down the Rajpath on India’s sixtieth Republic Day can be expected to showcase its growing power signified best by the replica of INS Arihant, the third leg of its ‘triad’ launched by the Prime Minister in the preceding year. While the operationalisation will take up to mid-decade, by then India would have acquired Agni missiles with reach enough to ‘take out’ cities on Chinese eastern sea board perhaps with H-Bombs, despite existence of the latter being questioned over last year. With the mountain ‘strike corps’ under raising having stabilised by then, India would be in a position to parlay with China from a position of symmetry. The expectation is that this would give it the confidence to enter into the necessary ‘give and take’ that negotiations imply. Presently, it does not have the political capital internally.
However, consequential for the interim is its relationship with Pakistan, presently on ‘pause’. India’s strategy dating to the eighties of hiking the defence imbalance in its favour to such an extent that Pakistan falls off as a challenger has not met with the success of the strategy’s votaries so far. Economic problems of the nineties set back the endeavour by a decade. But at the start of this decade, India has the requisite economic ballast to push this strategy; de-hyphenation already having taken place over the last one. The current stridency in Pakistan’s view of India seemingly indicates increasing success for this strategy. The expectation is that eventually the Pakistani Army, attuned to the power imbalance, would acknowledge it and realistically ‘throw in the towel’.
In the coming decade security is to be so managed as to materialise this outcome on both fronts. The reference to ‘two front’ war can be explained as India’s attempt at arriving at conventional deterrence capabilities, placing it in a position of strength in the ‘worst case’ scenario. Pakistan’s utility as a surrogate for China would end. This may open up future possibilities by end decade in which South Asia as a unified, if not unitary, strategic entity balances China, with or without ballast of an external power.
There are two problems with this grand strategy. One is its over-reliance on power and second is that it does not take on board several problem areas that could derail it.
It amounts to a truism that power under grids the world order. This reliance on power is therefore explicable. The paradox is that though the utility of power is in deterrence, it nevertheless ends up being used. Just as in the early part of last century, in this century too the argument persists that globalisation induced thicker economic relations would help prevent war. The expectation was belied by the First World War. That too was a period of rising new powers. Learning would have it that avoiding a like eventuality entails departing from over-reliance on power. The irony is that the economic underpinning of power is itself endangered. Finally when India has much to lose, it is all being placed at stake in a power gamble. Though a globalised world, it remains very much a nuclear one too. Therefore, more needs doing with more imagination and urgency along other planes such as institutionalising inter-relationships and Asian security architectures.
Secondly, Pakistan managed to under-cut Indian strategy for the past three decades. Over the eighties and the naughties, it lent itself to US purposes in Afghanistan. In the nineties, India was hobbled by the shift to liberalisation and by proxy war. Pakistan has managed to checkmate Indian rise manifest in the conventional plane on the sub-conventional and nuclear planes. How its counter plays out this decade would determine whether India reaches decade end as planned. Pakistan will lend itself to the Chinese game plan keeping alive India’s ‘two front’ dilemma. Creating the ability to cope does not help India transcend it, but materialises it instead.
Underlying grand strategy is the assumption that India’s growing proximity with the US would help. To close the military gap with China, K. Subrahmanyam advocates: ‘India is seen as one of the key partners for the US to reshape the 21st century. The US has agreed to sell high technology defence equipment to India while it is not likely to sell them to China, its main rival in the coming decades.’ In respect of Pakistan, India’s actions, at variance with what it professes, seem to indicate a perverse hope of the situation in AfPak deteriorating to the extent that the US requires Indian assistance, thereby raising its profile, indispensability and bargaining power.
A conclusion from this brief survey is that India is honing its power capacities hoping to make up any short fall by leaning on the US. This would render it vulnerable to shocks as the international order transits decisively away from the post Cold War unipolar moment. Success in this requires deft footwork. Commentary on the recent changeover of the NSA does not infuse confidence that India can manage this. With institutional and internal incapacities remaining, India requires postponing its tryst by another decade.
The parade down the Rajpath on India’s sixtieth Republic Day can be expected to showcase its growing power signified best by the replica of INS Arihant, the third leg of its ‘triad’ launched by the Prime Minister in the preceding year. While the operationalisation will take up to mid-decade, by then India would have acquired Agni missiles with reach enough to ‘take out’ cities on Chinese eastern sea board perhaps with H-Bombs, despite existence of the latter being questioned over last year. With the mountain ‘strike corps’ under raising having stabilised by then, India would be in a position to parlay with China from a position of symmetry. The expectation is that this would give it the confidence to enter into the necessary ‘give and take’ that negotiations imply. Presently, it does not have the political capital internally.
However, consequential for the interim is its relationship with Pakistan, presently on ‘pause’. India’s strategy dating to the eighties of hiking the defence imbalance in its favour to such an extent that Pakistan falls off as a challenger has not met with the success of the strategy’s votaries so far. Economic problems of the nineties set back the endeavour by a decade. But at the start of this decade, India has the requisite economic ballast to push this strategy; de-hyphenation already having taken place over the last one. The current stridency in Pakistan’s view of India seemingly indicates increasing success for this strategy. The expectation is that eventually the Pakistani Army, attuned to the power imbalance, would acknowledge it and realistically ‘throw in the towel’.
In the coming decade security is to be so managed as to materialise this outcome on both fronts. The reference to ‘two front’ war can be explained as India’s attempt at arriving at conventional deterrence capabilities, placing it in a position of strength in the ‘worst case’ scenario. Pakistan’s utility as a surrogate for China would end. This may open up future possibilities by end decade in which South Asia as a unified, if not unitary, strategic entity balances China, with or without ballast of an external power.
There are two problems with this grand strategy. One is its over-reliance on power and second is that it does not take on board several problem areas that could derail it.
It amounts to a truism that power under grids the world order. This reliance on power is therefore explicable. The paradox is that though the utility of power is in deterrence, it nevertheless ends up being used. Just as in the early part of last century, in this century too the argument persists that globalisation induced thicker economic relations would help prevent war. The expectation was belied by the First World War. That too was a period of rising new powers. Learning would have it that avoiding a like eventuality entails departing from over-reliance on power. The irony is that the economic underpinning of power is itself endangered. Finally when India has much to lose, it is all being placed at stake in a power gamble. Though a globalised world, it remains very much a nuclear one too. Therefore, more needs doing with more imagination and urgency along other planes such as institutionalising inter-relationships and Asian security architectures.
Secondly, Pakistan managed to under-cut Indian strategy for the past three decades. Over the eighties and the naughties, it lent itself to US purposes in Afghanistan. In the nineties, India was hobbled by the shift to liberalisation and by proxy war. Pakistan has managed to checkmate Indian rise manifest in the conventional plane on the sub-conventional and nuclear planes. How its counter plays out this decade would determine whether India reaches decade end as planned. Pakistan will lend itself to the Chinese game plan keeping alive India’s ‘two front’ dilemma. Creating the ability to cope does not help India transcend it, but materialises it instead.
Underlying grand strategy is the assumption that India’s growing proximity with the US would help. To close the military gap with China, K. Subrahmanyam advocates: ‘India is seen as one of the key partners for the US to reshape the 21st century. The US has agreed to sell high technology defence equipment to India while it is not likely to sell them to China, its main rival in the coming decades.’ In respect of Pakistan, India’s actions, at variance with what it professes, seem to indicate a perverse hope of the situation in AfPak deteriorating to the extent that the US requires Indian assistance, thereby raising its profile, indispensability and bargaining power.
A conclusion from this brief survey is that India is honing its power capacities hoping to make up any short fall by leaning on the US. This would render it vulnerable to shocks as the international order transits decisively away from the post Cold War unipolar moment. Success in this requires deft footwork. Commentary on the recent changeover of the NSA does not infuse confidence that India can manage this. With institutional and internal incapacities remaining, India requires postponing its tryst by another decade.
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
TAKING FICCI SERIOUSLY
It is unsurprising that the FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) has gone back on the report on terrorism of a task force commissioned by it. This was prompted by the concerns raised by its Pakistani counter part, FPCCI, on the recommendation of ‘surgical strikes’ in response to the next terror attack made by the task force. It is perhaps apprehensive that ‘surgical strikes’ would do more to disrupt the investment climate than terror strikes, for which it thinks these strikes are remedy. That the recommendation was made a year ago does not detract from the fact that even today it continues to be discussed as an option.
This article discusses whether ‘surgical strikes’ are at all a sensible option. It does not dwell on two other options mentioned in the report, but deserving of mention here. The first is a ‘covert’, ‘deniable’, reply for if Zaid Hamid writing in the Pakistani press is to be believed, this is already underway! The second is the report’s advocacy of an ‘All Out Assault’ involving ‘a limited but intense attack on the PoK’, taking this as more as outlet for justified exasperation close in wake of the dastardly 26/11.
The FICCI report has it that with the locations of terror outfits largely known in Pakistan, it would be possible to attack these. India could use artillery if in range, the air force and possibly Special Forces operations. Given the linkage of ballistic missiles with the nuclear capability, these would not be used. Also, Prithvi missiles are being retired. The levels to which cruise missiles are operational, is uncertain.
The report rightly assesses that India would require to be prepared for a backlash of international opinion, as also for a possible war. While it can reasonably be expected that robust Indian diplomacy can handle international opinion, particularly by referring to Indian restraint in wake of Mumbai 26/11, it is worth considering whether conflict escalation can be avoided and if such an outcome can be coped with.
The latter is easy to concede in light of the Army Chief’s comment that India is preparing for a ‘two front’ war. India has the advantage of quality and quantity and can be expected to be effective if not efficient in conventional conflict. Nevertheless, efficiency is importance to the eventual outcome of the conflict. This is because even while India will prevail, the margin of the win will determine the victor. Just as 1979 is treated as a Vietnamese victory and the Israeli campaigns of 2006 and 2009 are seen as defeats, to win all that Pakistan needs to ensure is that is does not lose. The political cost of such a ‘tainted’ ‘victory’ would be such that no Indian government would likely be willing to countenance.
Would a ‘victory’ be messy? Consider the opinion of the Standing Committee on Defence: ‘Considering the fact that the key to success in modern day warfare operations is the ability of the different wings of the Armed Forces to integrate their efforts under a single command without any loss of time…The Committee, have also recommended that till such time the post of CDS is created, the Government may take steps to give appropriate authority to the Chairman COSC in the present set up to command and control the resources of the Defence Services whenever the situation so demands.’ In effect, the principal coordinator of the defence forces would only be served with an enhanced staff!
This would be at a time when the weighty decision on the relative weight of each service involved is to be taken. Friction between service viewpoints was referred to in the famous speech of the last COSC, Admiral Mehta. He concurred with the Air Force’s view that he quoted as being, ‘“Jointness does not necessarily imply equal partnership” and that there was a need to “adopt correct combinations, whilst respecting the core expertise of individual Services”.’ Writing in Mail Today, Pinaki Bhattacharya writes: ‘The army and air force are battling it out over how to beat Pakistan in a flash war if and when that happens.’
The efficacy of the current COSC system is revealed best in Admiral Mehta’s speech in which he states: ‘We have a draft nuclear doctrine in place, which is restrained, in keeping with our traditional national culture.’ In referring to the Draft nuclear doctrine of 1999, the Admiral reveals that he is unaware that the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) approved the doctrine in 2003. This, despite having the Strategic Forces Command under him in his capacity as COSC!
To answer the question posed, it could get messy.
The government would require not only being supportive, but also tolerant of shortcomings. The Army has already revealed shortcomings in its inventory. The Air Force’s Vice Chief has already controversially attributed this to do with the kind of politics India has. Therefore, the armed forces would have a ready alibi and the buck, as it must, would stop with the government. Can the government, the ruling party and, more importantly, its inner core centered on the Gandhi family, afford it politically?
The report raises concerns of corporate sector, ostensibly as part of its civil society duties, with respect to terrorism in India’s hinterland, the Naxal belt and the North East. It makes the point that terror is designed to disrupt India’s economic growth by, among other reasons, making India an unsafe destination for foreign capital and visitors. It fails to mention that the same would be doubly so with increase in threat of conflict. Perhaps it smells an economic opportunity in the resulting militarisation. That the FICCI that should instead be interested in increased trade with Pakistan be linked to a report that calls for an attack on it. This calls for an explanation.
Increased defence budgets, the promise of defence offsets and the incipient growth of an industrial-military complex in India as it attempts to gain great power status may lead to manipulation of the threat perception by corporate elements who stand to gain from the resulting militarisation. The Preface of the report is candid on this calling, ‘for greater involvement of industry in national security strategies and improved cooperation between policy-makers, government and Industry as part of a robust public-private partnership.’ Already there is talk of a two front war, necessitating greater military spending and exertion by India. The FICCI report heralds a trend warned against by Eisenhower in his farewell address.
Not only would vigil over the next 26/11 and India’s response continue into the New Year, but the larger trend referred to would bear watching into the coming decade.
It is unsurprising that the FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) has gone back on the report on terrorism of a task force commissioned by it. This was prompted by the concerns raised by its Pakistani counter part, FPCCI, on the recommendation of ‘surgical strikes’ in response to the next terror attack made by the task force. It is perhaps apprehensive that ‘surgical strikes’ would do more to disrupt the investment climate than terror strikes, for which it thinks these strikes are remedy. That the recommendation was made a year ago does not detract from the fact that even today it continues to be discussed as an option.
This article discusses whether ‘surgical strikes’ are at all a sensible option. It does not dwell on two other options mentioned in the report, but deserving of mention here. The first is a ‘covert’, ‘deniable’, reply for if Zaid Hamid writing in the Pakistani press is to be believed, this is already underway! The second is the report’s advocacy of an ‘All Out Assault’ involving ‘a limited but intense attack on the PoK’, taking this as more as outlet for justified exasperation close in wake of the dastardly 26/11.
The FICCI report has it that with the locations of terror outfits largely known in Pakistan, it would be possible to attack these. India could use artillery if in range, the air force and possibly Special Forces operations. Given the linkage of ballistic missiles with the nuclear capability, these would not be used. Also, Prithvi missiles are being retired. The levels to which cruise missiles are operational, is uncertain.
The report rightly assesses that India would require to be prepared for a backlash of international opinion, as also for a possible war. While it can reasonably be expected that robust Indian diplomacy can handle international opinion, particularly by referring to Indian restraint in wake of Mumbai 26/11, it is worth considering whether conflict escalation can be avoided and if such an outcome can be coped with.
The latter is easy to concede in light of the Army Chief’s comment that India is preparing for a ‘two front’ war. India has the advantage of quality and quantity and can be expected to be effective if not efficient in conventional conflict. Nevertheless, efficiency is importance to the eventual outcome of the conflict. This is because even while India will prevail, the margin of the win will determine the victor. Just as 1979 is treated as a Vietnamese victory and the Israeli campaigns of 2006 and 2009 are seen as defeats, to win all that Pakistan needs to ensure is that is does not lose. The political cost of such a ‘tainted’ ‘victory’ would be such that no Indian government would likely be willing to countenance.
Would a ‘victory’ be messy? Consider the opinion of the Standing Committee on Defence: ‘Considering the fact that the key to success in modern day warfare operations is the ability of the different wings of the Armed Forces to integrate their efforts under a single command without any loss of time…The Committee, have also recommended that till such time the post of CDS is created, the Government may take steps to give appropriate authority to the Chairman COSC in the present set up to command and control the resources of the Defence Services whenever the situation so demands.’ In effect, the principal coordinator of the defence forces would only be served with an enhanced staff!
This would be at a time when the weighty decision on the relative weight of each service involved is to be taken. Friction between service viewpoints was referred to in the famous speech of the last COSC, Admiral Mehta. He concurred with the Air Force’s view that he quoted as being, ‘“Jointness does not necessarily imply equal partnership” and that there was a need to “adopt correct combinations, whilst respecting the core expertise of individual Services”.’ Writing in Mail Today, Pinaki Bhattacharya writes: ‘The army and air force are battling it out over how to beat Pakistan in a flash war if and when that happens.’
The efficacy of the current COSC system is revealed best in Admiral Mehta’s speech in which he states: ‘We have a draft nuclear doctrine in place, which is restrained, in keeping with our traditional national culture.’ In referring to the Draft nuclear doctrine of 1999, the Admiral reveals that he is unaware that the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) approved the doctrine in 2003. This, despite having the Strategic Forces Command under him in his capacity as COSC!
To answer the question posed, it could get messy.
The government would require not only being supportive, but also tolerant of shortcomings. The Army has already revealed shortcomings in its inventory. The Air Force’s Vice Chief has already controversially attributed this to do with the kind of politics India has. Therefore, the armed forces would have a ready alibi and the buck, as it must, would stop with the government. Can the government, the ruling party and, more importantly, its inner core centered on the Gandhi family, afford it politically?
The report raises concerns of corporate sector, ostensibly as part of its civil society duties, with respect to terrorism in India’s hinterland, the Naxal belt and the North East. It makes the point that terror is designed to disrupt India’s economic growth by, among other reasons, making India an unsafe destination for foreign capital and visitors. It fails to mention that the same would be doubly so with increase in threat of conflict. Perhaps it smells an economic opportunity in the resulting militarisation. That the FICCI that should instead be interested in increased trade with Pakistan be linked to a report that calls for an attack on it. This calls for an explanation.
Increased defence budgets, the promise of defence offsets and the incipient growth of an industrial-military complex in India as it attempts to gain great power status may lead to manipulation of the threat perception by corporate elements who stand to gain from the resulting militarisation. The Preface of the report is candid on this calling, ‘for greater involvement of industry in national security strategies and improved cooperation between policy-makers, government and Industry as part of a robust public-private partnership.’ Already there is talk of a two front war, necessitating greater military spending and exertion by India. The FICCI report heralds a trend warned against by Eisenhower in his farewell address.
Not only would vigil over the next 26/11 and India’s response continue into the New Year, but the larger trend referred to would bear watching into the coming decade.
Monday, December 21, 2009
Much hullaballoo, little cause
20 December 2009 - Manoj Joshi, an informed commentator on military affairs, has in his latest volley taken a crack at a Ministry of Defence claim that the armed forces "are fully prepared, battle-worthy and capable to counter any challenges at very short notice". The statement in question was MoD's response to a news item based on leaked information about a presentation made by the army to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence.
In its presentation, the army had voiced concerns about shortages in several key areas - 71 per cent in armour, 17 per cent in combat helicopters, 62 per cent in mechanised infantry and 52 per cent in artillery. Joshi opines that, "Even these figures don't tell the whole truth. They do not tell us, for example, that India only has 300 T-90 main battle tanks and that the 2000-strong T-72 fleet is yet to be modernised to fight at night ... it appears that what the army will achieve by 2027 is not a modern army circa 2027, but [instead it will] achieve the targets that it had set nearly 10 years ago."
The Army's readiness - or more correctly, the lack of it - would appear alarming, particularly if it is related to the requirements of the prevalent 'Cold Start' doctrine. This doctrine attempts to undercut the impunity enjoyed by Pakistan due to the proximity of its military formations to the border and its nuclear card. The idea is to have the capability for speedy launch of an attack in battle groups that would confound Pakistan's nuclear calculus. This would not only deter Pakistan from expanding the proxy war, but the military threat would force Pakistan to also roll back its terror infrastructure.
The doctrine can be seen as an attempt by the military to furnish the political leadership with an option for responding to the strategic problem of proxy war posed by Pakistan. As can be seen from recent history, political leaders have been selective in using the military option. Both during Operation Parakram and post 26/11, India refrained from using even the mildest military option. Also, it limited its military response to its own side of the Line of Control at Kargil. Going back to the 1990s and further back to Zia-ul Haq's provocations, a restrained approach to Pakistani adventurism has been the preferred yardstick at the political level.
Of course the military should be prepared for conflict. However, whether to engage in such conflict (and if so, how) is a decision for the civilian leadership. On this score, the military and the political leadership in India are not on the same page. The military's self-given program requires a higher level of capability and a political resolve and intention to use it than the civilian heads appear willing to support.
India's strategic posture - brought about by the overall effect of its grand strategy combining all elements of power such as economic, political, military, diplomatic, cultural etc. - has traditionally been of deterrence. The offensive content of this deterrence has of late increased, due to doctrinal innovation and budget expansion in India. Thus, it has shifted from defensive deterrence to offensive deterrence. The difference between the two is that in the former India would await an enemy offensive before responding, but of late with the movement to the latter, it would be proactive in the launch of its offensive - though only when provoked beyond a point. This ability is nevertheless to heighten deterrence, not for compellence.
It is arguable that the military has arbitrarily settled on a higher degree of offensive deterrence, bordering on compellence (i.e. forcing the other side to behave in a particular way). This stronger posture apparently does not have explicit government sanction. This is the military's answer to keeping conventional strength relevant to the strategic problem posed by Pakistan and into the nuclear era. The government on the other hand would be content instead to remain with defensive deterrence of the pre-Cold Start period, since it is more mindful of the possible implications and consequences of nuclearisation of offensive deterrence and compellence.
The impact of nuclearisation has been such that the military's traditional sphere can no longer be considered solely its own. The military may prefer a higher level of readiness, especially for conventional operations, but the politicians will be alert to the implications of even non-nuclear action on the nuclear aspect. Therefore, the figures on readiness need not necessarily be taken as alarming. The government it seems would prefer non-military means, such as diplomacy and intelligence, instead. These have worked to an extent in restricting Pakistani strategic space over the past half decade.
Military means also need to be seen in context of the state of the opponent. Pakistan is in considerable disarray. Its army is engaged on its western border. Even through it tries to upscale its conventional forces through diversion of US funds meant for operations against the Taliban, the equation is in India's favour, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Second, India's grand strategy calls for a sustained period of growth. It cannot be distracted by a conflict, howsoever localised or limited.
Third, its military preparedness is being undertaken with a long term eye on China. This explains developments and procurements of missiles, submarines, air craft carriers and multi role fighters. Whether these are sufficient to deal with future challenges from the Chinese or not, they would obviously help India militarily out-class Pakistan.
Lastly, in case the higher capability - to the extent the Army wants and Manoj Joshi seems to support - were made available, then the temptation to use that capability would surely be greater. At junctures such as 26/11, when resort to lower levels of military force such as through surgical strikes was thinkable, the very existence of the capability would weigh in favour of such action. Therefore, not having the capability for compellence is not such a bad thing after all. Even if hypothetically, resorting to it would have proved counter-productive in any case. Since it cannot be guaranteed that the conflict would not escalate, there is no reason to risk it in light of India's higher order aims and grand strategy. Therefore, India is better of without it.
See for full article -
http://www.indiatogether.org/2009/dec/fah-compel.htm
But more pertinently, there is a case for political direction of the military. It would be much better for the government to debate and indicate which posture it prefers - defensive deterrence, offensive deterrence or compellence - so that the military could work towards this, rather than define its scope on its own, as it currently does. ⊕
20 December 2009 - Manoj Joshi, an informed commentator on military affairs, has in his latest volley taken a crack at a Ministry of Defence claim that the armed forces "are fully prepared, battle-worthy and capable to counter any challenges at very short notice". The statement in question was MoD's response to a news item based on leaked information about a presentation made by the army to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence.
In its presentation, the army had voiced concerns about shortages in several key areas - 71 per cent in armour, 17 per cent in combat helicopters, 62 per cent in mechanised infantry and 52 per cent in artillery. Joshi opines that, "Even these figures don't tell the whole truth. They do not tell us, for example, that India only has 300 T-90 main battle tanks and that the 2000-strong T-72 fleet is yet to be modernised to fight at night ... it appears that what the army will achieve by 2027 is not a modern army circa 2027, but [instead it will] achieve the targets that it had set nearly 10 years ago."
The Army's readiness - or more correctly, the lack of it - would appear alarming, particularly if it is related to the requirements of the prevalent 'Cold Start' doctrine. This doctrine attempts to undercut the impunity enjoyed by Pakistan due to the proximity of its military formations to the border and its nuclear card. The idea is to have the capability for speedy launch of an attack in battle groups that would confound Pakistan's nuclear calculus. This would not only deter Pakistan from expanding the proxy war, but the military threat would force Pakistan to also roll back its terror infrastructure.
The doctrine can be seen as an attempt by the military to furnish the political leadership with an option for responding to the strategic problem of proxy war posed by Pakistan. As can be seen from recent history, political leaders have been selective in using the military option. Both during Operation Parakram and post 26/11, India refrained from using even the mildest military option. Also, it limited its military response to its own side of the Line of Control at Kargil. Going back to the 1990s and further back to Zia-ul Haq's provocations, a restrained approach to Pakistani adventurism has been the preferred yardstick at the political level.
Of course the military should be prepared for conflict. However, whether to engage in such conflict (and if so, how) is a decision for the civilian leadership. On this score, the military and the political leadership in India are not on the same page. The military's self-given program requires a higher level of capability and a political resolve and intention to use it than the civilian heads appear willing to support.
India's strategic posture - brought about by the overall effect of its grand strategy combining all elements of power such as economic, political, military, diplomatic, cultural etc. - has traditionally been of deterrence. The offensive content of this deterrence has of late increased, due to doctrinal innovation and budget expansion in India. Thus, it has shifted from defensive deterrence to offensive deterrence. The difference between the two is that in the former India would await an enemy offensive before responding, but of late with the movement to the latter, it would be proactive in the launch of its offensive - though only when provoked beyond a point. This ability is nevertheless to heighten deterrence, not for compellence.
It is arguable that the military has arbitrarily settled on a higher degree of offensive deterrence, bordering on compellence (i.e. forcing the other side to behave in a particular way). This stronger posture apparently does not have explicit government sanction. This is the military's answer to keeping conventional strength relevant to the strategic problem posed by Pakistan and into the nuclear era. The government on the other hand would be content instead to remain with defensive deterrence of the pre-Cold Start period, since it is more mindful of the possible implications and consequences of nuclearisation of offensive deterrence and compellence.
The impact of nuclearisation has been such that the military's traditional sphere can no longer be considered solely its own. The military may prefer a higher level of readiness, especially for conventional operations, but the politicians will be alert to the implications of even non-nuclear action on the nuclear aspect. Therefore, the figures on readiness need not necessarily be taken as alarming. The government it seems would prefer non-military means, such as diplomacy and intelligence, instead. These have worked to an extent in restricting Pakistani strategic space over the past half decade.
Military means also need to be seen in context of the state of the opponent. Pakistan is in considerable disarray. Its army is engaged on its western border. Even through it tries to upscale its conventional forces through diversion of US funds meant for operations against the Taliban, the equation is in India's favour, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Second, India's grand strategy calls for a sustained period of growth. It cannot be distracted by a conflict, howsoever localised or limited.
Third, its military preparedness is being undertaken with a long term eye on China. This explains developments and procurements of missiles, submarines, air craft carriers and multi role fighters. Whether these are sufficient to deal with future challenges from the Chinese or not, they would obviously help India militarily out-class Pakistan.
Lastly, in case the higher capability - to the extent the Army wants and Manoj Joshi seems to support - were made available, then the temptation to use that capability would surely be greater. At junctures such as 26/11, when resort to lower levels of military force such as through surgical strikes was thinkable, the very existence of the capability would weigh in favour of such action. Therefore, not having the capability for compellence is not such a bad thing after all. Even if hypothetically, resorting to it would have proved counter-productive in any case. Since it cannot be guaranteed that the conflict would not escalate, there is no reason to risk it in light of India's higher order aims and grand strategy. Therefore, India is better of without it.
See for full article -
http://www.indiatogether.org/2009/dec/fah-compel.htm
But more pertinently, there is a case for political direction of the military. It would be much better for the government to debate and indicate which posture it prefers - defensive deterrence, offensive deterrence or compellence - so that the military could work towards this, rather than define its scope on its own, as it currently does. ⊕
Saturday, December 05, 2009
MAKING OBAMA’S WAR ALSO INDIA’S
Leadership involves taking a call. Obama has placed himself in the firing line, not only on account of what he said at West Point but also for what he did not. His laying a deadline has already drawn fire; that of his defeated rival from the presidential polls, Senator McCain. What he left unsaid in terms of addressing the Taliban directly, has already drawn a response in the Taliban threatening heightened violence. In effect, in case the Taliban are not on board as the deadline approaches, then prospects of civil war loom. But by then it would no longer be Obama’s War since he has already announced, ‘Now, we must come together to end this war successfully.’
The exit strategy comprises another ‘surge’ of 30000 troops, supplemented by additional European contributions. This is intended to bring about a sense of security in which the civilian ‘surge’ and training of the ANA can be progressed. With the ANA suitably trained by additional trainers, it would progressively take on responsibility for security. This implies that the ANA has to be made battle ready in a year and half.
This is a tight time schedule for firstly imparting basic soldier training and then training the trained soldier into being a counter insurgent. Pitching the raw counter insurgent into action against the Taliban, that has been waging an insurgency for the last few years against the US-NATO combine, would be a tall order. Particularly when the ANA is known to suffer desertions and is prone to infiltration by Taliban sympathisers. The ANA would be able to take on the Taliban if foreign troops assist with superior technology, mobility and air assets. When they leave, the threat of a Taliban return heightens, even if Americans intend to ‘continue to assist and act as advisers’. This would be an unfortunate aftermath for a war that has seen so much investment of resources and blood.
What needs to be done to avoid this possibility? Clearly, if the past four years of a widening Afghan commitment have not worked, a year’s additional military effort will not. Obama did not spell out the answer. But in the deadline and his stating that, ‘it will be clear to the Afghan government - and, more importantly, to the Afghan people - that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country’, he has implied a political resolution needs to be worked towards. The advantage of the deadline is that it would focus minds.
A beginning has already probably been made. The suspicion of ISI connections with the Taliban has been virtually acknowledged by former Pakistani president Musharraf. In addition, Obama has wisely placated Afghan nationalism and sense of honour that under-grids the insurgency, stating, ‘We have no interest in occupying your country...And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect - to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.’ Thus, an approach on an equal footing has been made. The Taliban can be expected to eschew temptation to wait out the US. This understanding has perhaps already been arrived at, otherwise Obama would not have ventured to set so explicit a deadline.
What are the implications for India? India’s position has been anti-Taliban form the outset. In case of an attempt at accommodation with the Taliban, India is likely to view it adversely. This owes to it being seen as a vehicle of Pakistani interests and because of its involvement in Kashmir. It would be unwilling to make a constructive contribution since it has been locked in a zero-sum relationship with Pakistan since 26/11. It can play a negative role by promising aid to its friends standing up to the Taliban after US exit, along with other concerned regional states. Though hard-line strategists in India would encourage this line, the problems are firstly its practicability and second it would only lengthen the conflict and lastly it would re-hyphenate India with Pakistan. However, it would not like to place itself at odds with the US led international community’s effort.
Therefore, what should India do? Firstly, it should cauterise itself against the worst case outcome. It has rightly already reopened talks with the separatists in Kashmir. It needs to continue keeping social harmony - managed well over the preceding year - on even keel. Secondly, it would require reining in any intelligence activity that would set Indian interests up as a target in Afghanistan. In case of an action-reaction cycle getting set, there would be no escaping deepening Indian commitment to upset the Pakistani game plan. Thirdly, on a positive note, it needs rereading the last part of Obama’s speech in which he addresses the Pakistani state and nation. From this would emerge how India can modulate its foreign policy to supplement the Obama initiative. In doing so it can extract from Pakistan like reciprocation. It must resume that stalled peace process as a first step.
Leadership involves taking a call. Obama has placed himself in the firing line, not only on account of what he said at West Point but also for what he did not. His laying a deadline has already drawn fire; that of his defeated rival from the presidential polls, Senator McCain. What he left unsaid in terms of addressing the Taliban directly, has already drawn a response in the Taliban threatening heightened violence. In effect, in case the Taliban are not on board as the deadline approaches, then prospects of civil war loom. But by then it would no longer be Obama’s War since he has already announced, ‘Now, we must come together to end this war successfully.’
The exit strategy comprises another ‘surge’ of 30000 troops, supplemented by additional European contributions. This is intended to bring about a sense of security in which the civilian ‘surge’ and training of the ANA can be progressed. With the ANA suitably trained by additional trainers, it would progressively take on responsibility for security. This implies that the ANA has to be made battle ready in a year and half.
This is a tight time schedule for firstly imparting basic soldier training and then training the trained soldier into being a counter insurgent. Pitching the raw counter insurgent into action against the Taliban, that has been waging an insurgency for the last few years against the US-NATO combine, would be a tall order. Particularly when the ANA is known to suffer desertions and is prone to infiltration by Taliban sympathisers. The ANA would be able to take on the Taliban if foreign troops assist with superior technology, mobility and air assets. When they leave, the threat of a Taliban return heightens, even if Americans intend to ‘continue to assist and act as advisers’. This would be an unfortunate aftermath for a war that has seen so much investment of resources and blood.
What needs to be done to avoid this possibility? Clearly, if the past four years of a widening Afghan commitment have not worked, a year’s additional military effort will not. Obama did not spell out the answer. But in the deadline and his stating that, ‘it will be clear to the Afghan government - and, more importantly, to the Afghan people - that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country’, he has implied a political resolution needs to be worked towards. The advantage of the deadline is that it would focus minds.
A beginning has already probably been made. The suspicion of ISI connections with the Taliban has been virtually acknowledged by former Pakistani president Musharraf. In addition, Obama has wisely placated Afghan nationalism and sense of honour that under-grids the insurgency, stating, ‘We have no interest in occupying your country...And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect - to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.’ Thus, an approach on an equal footing has been made. The Taliban can be expected to eschew temptation to wait out the US. This understanding has perhaps already been arrived at, otherwise Obama would not have ventured to set so explicit a deadline.
What are the implications for India? India’s position has been anti-Taliban form the outset. In case of an attempt at accommodation with the Taliban, India is likely to view it adversely. This owes to it being seen as a vehicle of Pakistani interests and because of its involvement in Kashmir. It would be unwilling to make a constructive contribution since it has been locked in a zero-sum relationship with Pakistan since 26/11. It can play a negative role by promising aid to its friends standing up to the Taliban after US exit, along with other concerned regional states. Though hard-line strategists in India would encourage this line, the problems are firstly its practicability and second it would only lengthen the conflict and lastly it would re-hyphenate India with Pakistan. However, it would not like to place itself at odds with the US led international community’s effort.
Therefore, what should India do? Firstly, it should cauterise itself against the worst case outcome. It has rightly already reopened talks with the separatists in Kashmir. It needs to continue keeping social harmony - managed well over the preceding year - on even keel. Secondly, it would require reining in any intelligence activity that would set Indian interests up as a target in Afghanistan. In case of an action-reaction cycle getting set, there would be no escaping deepening Indian commitment to upset the Pakistani game plan. Thirdly, on a positive note, it needs rereading the last part of Obama’s speech in which he addresses the Pakistani state and nation. From this would emerge how India can modulate its foreign policy to supplement the Obama initiative. In doing so it can extract from Pakistan like reciprocation. It must resume that stalled peace process as a first step.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Our view, their view, the world-view
23 November 2009 -
In the context of Pakistan, India has acted as a status quo-ist power, whereas Pakistan is well known for being the revisionist keen on upsetting the territorial status quo. It has resorted to military means in 1965, proxy war in the nineties and a border war at Kargil. India on the other hand has been defensive in the post-1971 War period, relying on Bhutto to deliver on the secret pact at Simla. Through the eighties and nineties it has relied on deterrence.
And lately, its exasperation is evident in its movement to quasi-compellence of Pakistan, insisting that the state should roll back its anti-India terror infrastructure. All this popular reading of the strategic equation points to a uniform fact - India prefers to keep the status quo.But this view is not shared by the Pakistani Establishment - the informal clique of decision makers and influential personalities, historically centered on the Pakistan Army chief, and the formal conference of corps commanders that runs the Pakistan Army and underwrites the state.
To them, Kashmir is the most salient issue on the table between the two nations. And, as they see it, India committed to resolving the Kashmir issue at Simla, Lahore and Islamabad, but did not follow through with enough despatch with the progress made in the back channel during the Musharraf years. They accuse India of engaging in talks for the sake of talks, and has reneged on its commitment to resolving Kashmir. In other words, they see India as reivisionist, reneging from the mutually agreed position that Kashmir is an issue that needs resolving in favour of ensuring that only the Indian view prevails - i.e. that the Line of Control be turned into an international border, if necessary by exertion of compellence!
The fact is that the infiltration and terror activity in Kashmir has steadily gone down since 2002. The interpretations as to why this has happened differ. We in India believe that this is due to action by Indian security forces, and the creation of the fence separating the territories controlled by India and Pakistan. The Pakistani security establishment would argue, since they cannot own up to terrorism in the first place, that the lessened terrorist activity in Kashmir is due to movement promised by India, particularly so at the Islamabad joint statement.
See http://www.indiatogether.org/2009/nov/fah-usvisit.htm for full article
Whether Pakistan is exercising restraint can never be proven to Indian satisfaction. There are too many periodic reminders of the terrorist threat and its links to Pakistan, for India to believe that its neighbour is doing much to rein in its agents. 26/11 particularly reinforced this view, with India threatening immediate and strong action. Any quietening-down by Pakistan over the last year is attributed to this new Indian anger, and not to any self-restraint by the Pakistanis themselves.
Pakistan's support of terrorist actions, albeit patently illegitimate, can be interpreted as means to goad India to seek a resolution of the Kashmir issue through talks. India has indicated its willingness to engage in talks, but it has been reluctant to arrive at an understanding with Pakistan at the point of a gun. Internally, no government would be able to sell its case of accommodation if seen to have been forced into talks and their outcome by terrorist action. Therefore, India maintains that it would talk to Pakistan only when terror ceases to be its instrument.
By this yardstick, Pakistan would have to defang itself, at a time when India's power credentials are growing and have placed it further out of Pakistan's league. Pakistan is thus being required to make a leap of faith twice over - first to take at face value that India still believes in talks even while it strengthens itself militarily, and second to accept that India would engage in talks in case Pakistan complies with the demand to stop arming the terrorists first. But, says the Pakistani establishment, if Pakistans lowers the militaristic tone of its engagement, India would have no incentive to talk and there would be no 'issue' left to talk about. This, the Pakistani Army is unlikely to bite.
It can be expected that President Obama will try to prevail on the Indian Prime Minister during his visit to White House. The silver lining internally has been that in the run up to the visit India has opened up a long delayed line to Kashmiri separatists. Externally, the least that will come about could be a declaration to resume the 'paused' dialogue process.
But this may not be very significant. Pakistan has virtually dropped out of the Kashmir question, no doubt due to its own counter productive strategy. Moreover, India would not know who to engage with in Pakistan - the longevity of the civilian government is questionable, and the Army there is scrambling to outlast the current adverse turn in the Global War of Terror, before it returns to the traditional and familiar Indo-Pak game of 'balance of power'.
All of this is made complicated by the fact that each side - India as well as Pakistan - would not like to be seen as acting under compulsion. Thus any new moves proposed during the PM's visit would have to be seen as emanating from the self-interest of all the parties, rather than merely responding to the expectations of others. Just to prove internally that action is not being taken at others' behest, no meaningful moves will be taken. Unless more is done to change the perceptions of each other as 'revisionist', fingers will continue to remain crossed. ⊕
23 November 2009 -
In the context of Pakistan, India has acted as a status quo-ist power, whereas Pakistan is well known for being the revisionist keen on upsetting the territorial status quo. It has resorted to military means in 1965, proxy war in the nineties and a border war at Kargil. India on the other hand has been defensive in the post-1971 War period, relying on Bhutto to deliver on the secret pact at Simla. Through the eighties and nineties it has relied on deterrence.
And lately, its exasperation is evident in its movement to quasi-compellence of Pakistan, insisting that the state should roll back its anti-India terror infrastructure. All this popular reading of the strategic equation points to a uniform fact - India prefers to keep the status quo.But this view is not shared by the Pakistani Establishment - the informal clique of decision makers and influential personalities, historically centered on the Pakistan Army chief, and the formal conference of corps commanders that runs the Pakistan Army and underwrites the state.
To them, Kashmir is the most salient issue on the table between the two nations. And, as they see it, India committed to resolving the Kashmir issue at Simla, Lahore and Islamabad, but did not follow through with enough despatch with the progress made in the back channel during the Musharraf years. They accuse India of engaging in talks for the sake of talks, and has reneged on its commitment to resolving Kashmir. In other words, they see India as reivisionist, reneging from the mutually agreed position that Kashmir is an issue that needs resolving in favour of ensuring that only the Indian view prevails - i.e. that the Line of Control be turned into an international border, if necessary by exertion of compellence!
The fact is that the infiltration and terror activity in Kashmir has steadily gone down since 2002. The interpretations as to why this has happened differ. We in India believe that this is due to action by Indian security forces, and the creation of the fence separating the territories controlled by India and Pakistan. The Pakistani security establishment would argue, since they cannot own up to terrorism in the first place, that the lessened terrorist activity in Kashmir is due to movement promised by India, particularly so at the Islamabad joint statement.
See http://www.indiatogether.org/2009/nov/fah-usvisit.htm for full article
Whether Pakistan is exercising restraint can never be proven to Indian satisfaction. There are too many periodic reminders of the terrorist threat and its links to Pakistan, for India to believe that its neighbour is doing much to rein in its agents. 26/11 particularly reinforced this view, with India threatening immediate and strong action. Any quietening-down by Pakistan over the last year is attributed to this new Indian anger, and not to any self-restraint by the Pakistanis themselves.
Pakistan's support of terrorist actions, albeit patently illegitimate, can be interpreted as means to goad India to seek a resolution of the Kashmir issue through talks. India has indicated its willingness to engage in talks, but it has been reluctant to arrive at an understanding with Pakistan at the point of a gun. Internally, no government would be able to sell its case of accommodation if seen to have been forced into talks and their outcome by terrorist action. Therefore, India maintains that it would talk to Pakistan only when terror ceases to be its instrument.
By this yardstick, Pakistan would have to defang itself, at a time when India's power credentials are growing and have placed it further out of Pakistan's league. Pakistan is thus being required to make a leap of faith twice over - first to take at face value that India still believes in talks even while it strengthens itself militarily, and second to accept that India would engage in talks in case Pakistan complies with the demand to stop arming the terrorists first. But, says the Pakistani establishment, if Pakistans lowers the militaristic tone of its engagement, India would have no incentive to talk and there would be no 'issue' left to talk about. This, the Pakistani Army is unlikely to bite.
It can be expected that President Obama will try to prevail on the Indian Prime Minister during his visit to White House. The silver lining internally has been that in the run up to the visit India has opened up a long delayed line to Kashmiri separatists. Externally, the least that will come about could be a declaration to resume the 'paused' dialogue process.
But this may not be very significant. Pakistan has virtually dropped out of the Kashmir question, no doubt due to its own counter productive strategy. Moreover, India would not know who to engage with in Pakistan - the longevity of the civilian government is questionable, and the Army there is scrambling to outlast the current adverse turn in the Global War of Terror, before it returns to the traditional and familiar Indo-Pak game of 'balance of power'.
All of this is made complicated by the fact that each side - India as well as Pakistan - would not like to be seen as acting under compulsion. Thus any new moves proposed during the PM's visit would have to be seen as emanating from the self-interest of all the parties, rather than merely responding to the expectations of others. Just to prove internally that action is not being taken at others' behest, no meaningful moves will be taken. Unless more is done to change the perceptions of each other as 'revisionist', fingers will continue to remain crossed. ⊕
Wednesday, November 04, 2009
AN ISSUE IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS?
The Army Chief has said, "US has not allowed a second 9/11 to happen. Indonesia has not allowed a second Bali bombing to happen. India has allowed people to get away after the Parliament attack, the Delhi blasts and finally the 26/11. It's time for all of us to say no more." In light of weightier civil-military relations issues in question, that both analogies are inappropriate is not worth a pause. But first a consideration of whether this is indeed a defining juncture in India’s civil-military relations.
The context is the forthcoming anniversary of 26/11, which India would like to traverse without incident. The urgency owes to the situation in Pakistan worsening. It is possible that the government is putting the pressure on Pakistan to rein in the jihadis to the extent it can. This explains the Home Minister’s earlier warning, “I'm warning Pakistan for the last time. If Pakistan attempts to send terrorists into India again, India will not only foil those attempts but also give them a crushing response.” Such a ‘good cop-bad cop’ routine helps balance the prime minister’s extending a ‘hand of friendship’ to Pakistan on his trip to the Valley late last month. The Chief said this in the presence of the Minister of State for Defence. News that the latest terror plan, bust by the FBI in the US, was to target the prestigious National Defence College, was perhaps the provocation. The statement of the present Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee is in keeping with precedent of policy influencing pronouncements set by the previous COSC Chairman, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, in his address at a National Maritime Foundation lecture recently – the statement in question then being on India’s China policy.
But is India capable of such finesse in signalling? Answering this question in the ‘affirmative’ would mean that treating the Chief’s statement as a departure in civil-military norms as an attempt at generating a conflict where there is none. Since whether there is a plan to the government’s moves cannot be known with any certainty, giving the benefit of doubt is warranted. The government is using the Chief’s broad shoulders to unmistakably convey to Pakistan that India is poised precariously on its proverbial ‘tolerance threshold’.
Nevertheless, even as an academic exercise, its worth probing what the juncture implies. Keeping civil-military relations under scrutiny periodically helps keep militarization in check and democracy in good health.
Firstly, the statement was at a CII-Army seminar. This indicates the vested interest corporate India, and external arms dealers, have in arming India. The Minister of Defence having indicated that India is likely to spend $ 50 billion over the middle term, this is not surprising. Of consequence is what this implies for policy choices. This can only be to facilitate military expenditure in pursuit of capabilities allowing India to prevail in case of exercise of the military option, an inevitability since the Chief has spoken.
Secondly, with the Home Minister and the Chief having in their utterances sealed India’s policy choice, whether it is the right one needs questioning. Higher end options, such as war, can be ruled out for the very reasons that have stayed India’s hand earlier. These are economy, US presence and the nuclear overhang. However, surgical strikes on any of the list of 5000 targets that the Air Force Western Command boss has said they have drawn up, is possible. This could perhaps be supplemented with Army action across the Line of Control, so that all services have a piece of the action. Would this make sense in a situation in which Pakistan finds itself in currently? The expectation that India can pull off a mini Israel style punishing strike is to mistake a nuclear armed state with Palestinian non state actors. Since madrasas can reasonably be expected to be part of jihadi training complexes, bloodied madrasa children on CNN would make for a avoidable political debacle.
Thirdly, in case India has not foreclosed its options, then credibility of the minister and the Chief, and in turn that of India, would suffer. With credibility at stake the pressures for the military option would increase. This would be in addition to right wing pressures that would be strident, in the hope of regaining the ground lost in recent electoral battles. Therefore, even if the option is open, it has been virtually foreclosed.
This brings to fore the most important implication. Can the military pronounce on policy choices? It can discuss and advise on options. Making choices in democratic systems are patently a political prerogative. Military positions on issues command credibility that a government would find hard to challenge. The leaking of the MacChrystal report is an example from civil-military relations in the US. In the current circumstance, were the government to choose the saner option once again, it would fall foul of the opinion, albeit inadvertently generated by the Chief’s remarks, in favour of an overtly militarised response.
While not over dramatising the juncture, any lessons it has can only serve deepen India’s democracy and military professionalism.
The Army Chief has said, "US has not allowed a second 9/11 to happen. Indonesia has not allowed a second Bali bombing to happen. India has allowed people to get away after the Parliament attack, the Delhi blasts and finally the 26/11. It's time for all of us to say no more." In light of weightier civil-military relations issues in question, that both analogies are inappropriate is not worth a pause. But first a consideration of whether this is indeed a defining juncture in India’s civil-military relations.
The context is the forthcoming anniversary of 26/11, which India would like to traverse without incident. The urgency owes to the situation in Pakistan worsening. It is possible that the government is putting the pressure on Pakistan to rein in the jihadis to the extent it can. This explains the Home Minister’s earlier warning, “I'm warning Pakistan for the last time. If Pakistan attempts to send terrorists into India again, India will not only foil those attempts but also give them a crushing response.” Such a ‘good cop-bad cop’ routine helps balance the prime minister’s extending a ‘hand of friendship’ to Pakistan on his trip to the Valley late last month. The Chief said this in the presence of the Minister of State for Defence. News that the latest terror plan, bust by the FBI in the US, was to target the prestigious National Defence College, was perhaps the provocation. The statement of the present Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee is in keeping with precedent of policy influencing pronouncements set by the previous COSC Chairman, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, in his address at a National Maritime Foundation lecture recently – the statement in question then being on India’s China policy.
But is India capable of such finesse in signalling? Answering this question in the ‘affirmative’ would mean that treating the Chief’s statement as a departure in civil-military norms as an attempt at generating a conflict where there is none. Since whether there is a plan to the government’s moves cannot be known with any certainty, giving the benefit of doubt is warranted. The government is using the Chief’s broad shoulders to unmistakably convey to Pakistan that India is poised precariously on its proverbial ‘tolerance threshold’.
Nevertheless, even as an academic exercise, its worth probing what the juncture implies. Keeping civil-military relations under scrutiny periodically helps keep militarization in check and democracy in good health.
Firstly, the statement was at a CII-Army seminar. This indicates the vested interest corporate India, and external arms dealers, have in arming India. The Minister of Defence having indicated that India is likely to spend $ 50 billion over the middle term, this is not surprising. Of consequence is what this implies for policy choices. This can only be to facilitate military expenditure in pursuit of capabilities allowing India to prevail in case of exercise of the military option, an inevitability since the Chief has spoken.
Secondly, with the Home Minister and the Chief having in their utterances sealed India’s policy choice, whether it is the right one needs questioning. Higher end options, such as war, can be ruled out for the very reasons that have stayed India’s hand earlier. These are economy, US presence and the nuclear overhang. However, surgical strikes on any of the list of 5000 targets that the Air Force Western Command boss has said they have drawn up, is possible. This could perhaps be supplemented with Army action across the Line of Control, so that all services have a piece of the action. Would this make sense in a situation in which Pakistan finds itself in currently? The expectation that India can pull off a mini Israel style punishing strike is to mistake a nuclear armed state with Palestinian non state actors. Since madrasas can reasonably be expected to be part of jihadi training complexes, bloodied madrasa children on CNN would make for a avoidable political debacle.
Thirdly, in case India has not foreclosed its options, then credibility of the minister and the Chief, and in turn that of India, would suffer. With credibility at stake the pressures for the military option would increase. This would be in addition to right wing pressures that would be strident, in the hope of regaining the ground lost in recent electoral battles. Therefore, even if the option is open, it has been virtually foreclosed.
This brings to fore the most important implication. Can the military pronounce on policy choices? It can discuss and advise on options. Making choices in democratic systems are patently a political prerogative. Military positions on issues command credibility that a government would find hard to challenge. The leaking of the MacChrystal report is an example from civil-military relations in the US. In the current circumstance, were the government to choose the saner option once again, it would fall foul of the opinion, albeit inadvertently generated by the Chief’s remarks, in favour of an overtly militarised response.
While not over dramatising the juncture, any lessons it has can only serve deepen India’s democracy and military professionalism.
Thursday, October 29, 2009
Pakistan Owes Much, But Not Suicide
By Firdaus Ahmed
29 October, 2009
Countercurrents.org
Pakistan is no stranger to being at the vortex of global conflict. With Operation Rah e Nijat it finds itself once again centre stage; not for so much for its army is doing in Waziristan but the counter the operation has incited elsewhere in the country. The death toll elsewhere has surpassed 300 in the run up to the operation and since its launch. This is as anticipated. Musharraf had walked the tight rope in his years in power hoping to avoid just such a predicament. But his tenure was on Bush’s watch in which US radar screens had Iraq written all over them. Kayani has been denied the option by a watchful Obama pursuing his ‘war of necessity’. Zardari had for his part ordered the army to expel the Taliban from Waziristan way back in the aftermath of the Swat operation. The Army had taken time to prepare, using the excuse that the civil administration was not prepared to cope with the human aftermath of conflict. It was right. Pakistan cannot cope; therefore its Army should rethink strategy.
Conflict has an inbuilt tendency to spiral. This inherent feature of war is tempered by political aims limiting conflict. This is the Clausewitzian principle. Applying conflict theory to Pakistan, the bloody contest has potential to harden positions through a cycle of vengeance. The resulting spiral or slippery slope would involve greater application of military force and a more violent and indiscriminating counter. This has been the precedent of such conflict both in Algeria through the early to mid nineties and in Iraq in mid decade. The bomb blasts of this month in Iraq are signs of reversion. Thus, there is no guarantee of success, even from using greater military force in pursuit of the elusive position of strength. Strategic prudence requires a revisit to the aspect of political ends.
Political ends alone determine the levels of military means to be applied. The Powell-Weinberger doctrine, thought up in the run up to Gulf War I, was to ensure that the ghost of Vietnam is exorcised through a successful military campaign. The test of war aims was through a set of questions, prominent amongst which was: Is victory at all possible? The answer to this in the context of Pakistan can be taken as negative. In case the assessment is that Pakistan cannot win against the insurgents, should it be entering into a conflict with them in first place? This begs the question: Why cannot it win?
Pakistan’s Army is better at controlling irregular wars, witness its proxy wars against the Soviet Union and in Kashmir. Its counter insurgency skills are not only wanting, but in its use of artillery and air power against insurgents are positively counter productive. The Swat operation yielded the largest displacement of people in the region in so compressed a time frame since Partition. The Pakistani Army does not have the luxury of numbers in comparison to its adversary, the Indian Army, for it to ‘clear and hold’ such a large area as the FATA. The Pushtun insurgents and their Islamist allies of the Al Qaeda are reputed to number 15000 and are spread into NWFP and northern Baluchistan. They have penetrated the Punjabi heartland and the Saraiki belt through the umbrella linkages with the Punjabi Taliban. This assortment of foes is battle hardened, reasonably led and equipped enough to keep the Army at bay. This implies that to whittle them down, greater levels of force of questionable effectiveness would require application. The insurgent counter, as demonstrated all through October, would be to expand the theatre of operation through terror attacks into Punjabi heartland, thereby destabilising Pakistan’s core areas.
Concerns cannot be limited to Pakistani territory alone. The ISAF has demonstrated like incompetence to the north. The commanding general there, General McChrystal, has stirred up the latest round of policy review in Washington. Obama is awaiting the outcome of the Waziristan operation, along with the results of the run off elections, to make up his mind on sending more troops. It is likely that Obama would honour the opinion of the military expert on ground, specifically since the report was solicited by Washington for just such a policy review. However, in case it is decided not to send troops, then the political aims would be suitably moderated depending on what is doable in the circumstance. The decision would be dependent on the assessment of whether its allies in Islamabad and Kabul are up to the task of taking on the Taliban on respective sides of the Durand line. The centre of gravity of the opposition being in Pakistan, it is consideration of whether Pakistan would be able to ‘take out’ the Taliban that will determine the outcome of the review. As assessed above, this is not possible without compromising the very stability of Pakistan. With stability risked, there is no guarantee the Pakistani state can survive.
Therefore, it is unlikely the US would press Pakistan harder, knowing that regional stability and US purposes in the region require a coherent Pakistan. This could imply a political opening up to the Taliban, even as additional troops, not amounting to the 40000 asked for, are made available. This is not impossible to visualise in light of increasing public distaste for the war and the necessity for Obama to be responsive, particularly in glow of the Nobel Peace prize. Consequently, there is no reason for Pakistan to inconvenience itself in operations that threaten its very stability.
The US would prefer to see at a minimum the Al Qaeda remnants wrapped up. The Al Qaeda has been considerably degraded over the past eight years. The current operations in Waziristan are to cause attrition in particular to the Uzbeks there. The operation’s aims met, the Pakistan would be wise to likewise switch to a political mode; one equally democratically responsive to the anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. No nation can be compelled to commit suicide even for the sake of supposed best interests of the international community.
By Firdaus Ahmed
29 October, 2009
Countercurrents.org
Pakistan is no stranger to being at the vortex of global conflict. With Operation Rah e Nijat it finds itself once again centre stage; not for so much for its army is doing in Waziristan but the counter the operation has incited elsewhere in the country. The death toll elsewhere has surpassed 300 in the run up to the operation and since its launch. This is as anticipated. Musharraf had walked the tight rope in his years in power hoping to avoid just such a predicament. But his tenure was on Bush’s watch in which US radar screens had Iraq written all over them. Kayani has been denied the option by a watchful Obama pursuing his ‘war of necessity’. Zardari had for his part ordered the army to expel the Taliban from Waziristan way back in the aftermath of the Swat operation. The Army had taken time to prepare, using the excuse that the civil administration was not prepared to cope with the human aftermath of conflict. It was right. Pakistan cannot cope; therefore its Army should rethink strategy.
Conflict has an inbuilt tendency to spiral. This inherent feature of war is tempered by political aims limiting conflict. This is the Clausewitzian principle. Applying conflict theory to Pakistan, the bloody contest has potential to harden positions through a cycle of vengeance. The resulting spiral or slippery slope would involve greater application of military force and a more violent and indiscriminating counter. This has been the precedent of such conflict both in Algeria through the early to mid nineties and in Iraq in mid decade. The bomb blasts of this month in Iraq are signs of reversion. Thus, there is no guarantee of success, even from using greater military force in pursuit of the elusive position of strength. Strategic prudence requires a revisit to the aspect of political ends.
Political ends alone determine the levels of military means to be applied. The Powell-Weinberger doctrine, thought up in the run up to Gulf War I, was to ensure that the ghost of Vietnam is exorcised through a successful military campaign. The test of war aims was through a set of questions, prominent amongst which was: Is victory at all possible? The answer to this in the context of Pakistan can be taken as negative. In case the assessment is that Pakistan cannot win against the insurgents, should it be entering into a conflict with them in first place? This begs the question: Why cannot it win?
Pakistan’s Army is better at controlling irregular wars, witness its proxy wars against the Soviet Union and in Kashmir. Its counter insurgency skills are not only wanting, but in its use of artillery and air power against insurgents are positively counter productive. The Swat operation yielded the largest displacement of people in the region in so compressed a time frame since Partition. The Pakistani Army does not have the luxury of numbers in comparison to its adversary, the Indian Army, for it to ‘clear and hold’ such a large area as the FATA. The Pushtun insurgents and their Islamist allies of the Al Qaeda are reputed to number 15000 and are spread into NWFP and northern Baluchistan. They have penetrated the Punjabi heartland and the Saraiki belt through the umbrella linkages with the Punjabi Taliban. This assortment of foes is battle hardened, reasonably led and equipped enough to keep the Army at bay. This implies that to whittle them down, greater levels of force of questionable effectiveness would require application. The insurgent counter, as demonstrated all through October, would be to expand the theatre of operation through terror attacks into Punjabi heartland, thereby destabilising Pakistan’s core areas.
Concerns cannot be limited to Pakistani territory alone. The ISAF has demonstrated like incompetence to the north. The commanding general there, General McChrystal, has stirred up the latest round of policy review in Washington. Obama is awaiting the outcome of the Waziristan operation, along with the results of the run off elections, to make up his mind on sending more troops. It is likely that Obama would honour the opinion of the military expert on ground, specifically since the report was solicited by Washington for just such a policy review. However, in case it is decided not to send troops, then the political aims would be suitably moderated depending on what is doable in the circumstance. The decision would be dependent on the assessment of whether its allies in Islamabad and Kabul are up to the task of taking on the Taliban on respective sides of the Durand line. The centre of gravity of the opposition being in Pakistan, it is consideration of whether Pakistan would be able to ‘take out’ the Taliban that will determine the outcome of the review. As assessed above, this is not possible without compromising the very stability of Pakistan. With stability risked, there is no guarantee the Pakistani state can survive.
Therefore, it is unlikely the US would press Pakistan harder, knowing that regional stability and US purposes in the region require a coherent Pakistan. This could imply a political opening up to the Taliban, even as additional troops, not amounting to the 40000 asked for, are made available. This is not impossible to visualise in light of increasing public distaste for the war and the necessity for Obama to be responsive, particularly in glow of the Nobel Peace prize. Consequently, there is no reason for Pakistan to inconvenience itself in operations that threaten its very stability.
The US would prefer to see at a minimum the Al Qaeda remnants wrapped up. The Al Qaeda has been considerably degraded over the past eight years. The current operations in Waziristan are to cause attrition in particular to the Uzbeks there. The operation’s aims met, the Pakistan would be wise to likewise switch to a political mode; one equally democratically responsive to the anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. No nation can be compelled to commit suicide even for the sake of supposed best interests of the international community.
Sunday, October 11, 2009
ON DISARMAMENT PROSPECTS IN SOUTH ASIA
President Obama chaired the UN Security Council meeting that resulted in Resolution 1887 calling on states to abide by obligations under NPT. This presumably includes those under Article VI regarding ‘negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. This is in keeping with his agenda outlined at Prague of ‘America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’.
In conveying India’s position on the Resolution its Permanent Representative endorsed Obama’s aspiration on ‘prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and providing for their complete elimination within a specified timeframe’. However, that the onus was on the US was evident from the twist in the tail: ‘It is clear that the international community would look to the countries with substantial nuclear arsenals represented on the Council for meaningful steps towards nuclear disarmament.’ India’s position is quite clear. The bottom line is that India is agreed with Obama’s most quoted sentiment from his Prague address: ‘This goal will not be reached quickly - perhaps not in my lifetime.’
The global disarmament initiative can be expected to progress with India’s tacit support at least till the Non-proliferation Review Conference in May next year. Any prospects of progress on a regional level are linked with those on the global level due to presence of China as a player in southern Asia. Given that India seeks notional parity with China and China, in turn, would look towards movement on the US-Russia nuclear front, the regional nuclear situation cannot be expected to change. However, the worsening regional security environment, with India figuring in both conflict dyads possible, suggests a South Asian track needs be progressed irrespective of the global agenda. In respect of China, while a war has been predicted as early as 2012, the difficulties of late
A consideration of the position of those with stakes involved would indicate whether this can happen. Some scientists of the ‘strategic enclave’ have already staked out their position for more tests. The strategic community would busy watching the global scene and writing ‘I told you so’ editorials. Maximalists would lead the drive for maximising fissile material stocks before the window closes. Academics would add a chapter to the disarmament syllabus. The military is content with the ‘triad’ that has something for all three. The politician is not likely to go out on a limb. The government is yet to recover from its Sharm es Sheikh revealed limitations. The NSA is reduced to cautioning the media against foreign policy determining levels of ‘hype’.
A disarmament agenda is not likely to come about on its own. Redirecting the energies of these institutions would be required. The scientists would require to be held accountable for delivering in the power sector, now that the nuclear deal has opened up vistas. The military would be happier with conventional armament made possible by a speedier acquisitions process. The strategic community should be challenged to divine contours of a peace dividend that it had visualised in the run up to nuclearisation. With these three sectors quiesant, the less pressured the political class can permit a reaching out to neighbours. The government, not requiring watching its back, can proceed more firmly. The media will then catch the fresh wind in its sails. A self-reinforcing loop can then bring a regional disarmament track alive.
Such an agenda can be set in case nuclear dangers in South Asia are openly discussed. Presently, reliance on the good health of deterrence is such that military strikes are discussed as response options to another 26/11. With no ongoing talks to act as buffer, such a response may be inevitable. The expectation that Pakistan is a rational state – one repeatedly proven false earlier - may not withstand the test of conflict. With respect to China, the mutual NFU is taken for granted. Three chiefs have in the recent past hinted at the redefinition of China in Indian perceptions. China for its part, either to take pressure off Pakistan; in reaction; or cognisant of the subtext of the Indo-US strategic partnership, is making the moves that serve to justify Indian apprehensions. Given the ‘face’ staked in any future conflict, rescinding of the NFU in a crunch situation by either side would be small price.
Proximity of nuclear dangers should be used to energise a peace and disarmament movement. It can originate only in India. Pakistan, given the feisty media and middle class, would likely catch it thereafter. China would then have no recourse but revert to the bonhomie of ‘peace and tranquillity’. For this to happen, the peace discourse requires going mainstream. Operating out of the margins only enables its marginalisation as ‘radical’ or ‘out of the box’. The key argument for breaking out would be that it would otherwise take a break in the nuclear taboo in South Asia to usher disarmament; now a distinct probability.
President Obama chaired the UN Security Council meeting that resulted in Resolution 1887 calling on states to abide by obligations under NPT. This presumably includes those under Article VI regarding ‘negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. This is in keeping with his agenda outlined at Prague of ‘America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’.
In conveying India’s position on the Resolution its Permanent Representative endorsed Obama’s aspiration on ‘prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and providing for their complete elimination within a specified timeframe’. However, that the onus was on the US was evident from the twist in the tail: ‘It is clear that the international community would look to the countries with substantial nuclear arsenals represented on the Council for meaningful steps towards nuclear disarmament.’ India’s position is quite clear. The bottom line is that India is agreed with Obama’s most quoted sentiment from his Prague address: ‘This goal will not be reached quickly - perhaps not in my lifetime.’
The global disarmament initiative can be expected to progress with India’s tacit support at least till the Non-proliferation Review Conference in May next year. Any prospects of progress on a regional level are linked with those on the global level due to presence of China as a player in southern Asia. Given that India seeks notional parity with China and China, in turn, would look towards movement on the US-Russia nuclear front, the regional nuclear situation cannot be expected to change. However, the worsening regional security environment, with India figuring in both conflict dyads possible, suggests a South Asian track needs be progressed irrespective of the global agenda. In respect of China, while a war has been predicted as early as 2012, the difficulties of late
A consideration of the position of those with stakes involved would indicate whether this can happen. Some scientists of the ‘strategic enclave’ have already staked out their position for more tests. The strategic community would busy watching the global scene and writing ‘I told you so’ editorials. Maximalists would lead the drive for maximising fissile material stocks before the window closes. Academics would add a chapter to the disarmament syllabus. The military is content with the ‘triad’ that has something for all three. The politician is not likely to go out on a limb. The government is yet to recover from its Sharm es Sheikh revealed limitations. The NSA is reduced to cautioning the media against foreign policy determining levels of ‘hype’.
A disarmament agenda is not likely to come about on its own. Redirecting the energies of these institutions would be required. The scientists would require to be held accountable for delivering in the power sector, now that the nuclear deal has opened up vistas. The military would be happier with conventional armament made possible by a speedier acquisitions process. The strategic community should be challenged to divine contours of a peace dividend that it had visualised in the run up to nuclearisation. With these three sectors quiesant, the less pressured the political class can permit a reaching out to neighbours. The government, not requiring watching its back, can proceed more firmly. The media will then catch the fresh wind in its sails. A self-reinforcing loop can then bring a regional disarmament track alive.
Such an agenda can be set in case nuclear dangers in South Asia are openly discussed. Presently, reliance on the good health of deterrence is such that military strikes are discussed as response options to another 26/11. With no ongoing talks to act as buffer, such a response may be inevitable. The expectation that Pakistan is a rational state – one repeatedly proven false earlier - may not withstand the test of conflict. With respect to China, the mutual NFU is taken for granted. Three chiefs have in the recent past hinted at the redefinition of China in Indian perceptions. China for its part, either to take pressure off Pakistan; in reaction; or cognisant of the subtext of the Indo-US strategic partnership, is making the moves that serve to justify Indian apprehensions. Given the ‘face’ staked in any future conflict, rescinding of the NFU in a crunch situation by either side would be small price.
Proximity of nuclear dangers should be used to energise a peace and disarmament movement. It can originate only in India. Pakistan, given the feisty media and middle class, would likely catch it thereafter. China would then have no recourse but revert to the bonhomie of ‘peace and tranquillity’. For this to happen, the peace discourse requires going mainstream. Operating out of the margins only enables its marginalisation as ‘radical’ or ‘out of the box’. The key argument for breaking out would be that it would otherwise take a break in the nuclear taboo in South Asia to usher disarmament; now a distinct probability.
WAR CLOUDS GATHERING
Kissinger gets it wrong again. He got it wrong earlier in his extension of the bombing campaign into Cambodia during the Vietnam war; in bullying India during its humanitarian intervention in East Pakistan; and in bad mouthing Mrs Gandhi along with his boss, Nixon. He has got it completely wrong this time in believing that accommodation of the Taliban in Kabul threatens India because in his words: ‘India (is threatened) by general jihadism and specific terror groups’. He was in the midst of advising Obama against a policy of accommodation with the Taliban by asking for help from the threatened neighbours in his Newsweek article, ‘Deployment and Diplomacy’.
Arguing against a former National Security Advisor to two Presidents, Nixon and Ford, is not easy. Especially since his views find echo in the ‘boots on ground’ school of the strategic community. The assumption of this school of thought is that a return of the Taliban to Kabul would witness a reversion to the pre 26/11 era. While its allies in the Northern Alliance would be scattered, India would be particularly vulnerable on two counts. They believe that Taliban expansion into Kashmir would revive the insurgency there. Also that a Taliban ‘victory’ could lead to creeping Talibanisation in India’s susceptible minority. It follows therefore that the foe should be fought away from the home turf. Thus far the US was doing a considerable job keeping the Taliban occupied in the Af-Pak region. They fear that the outcome of the current rethink in the US and the public hand wringing there may prove to be beneficial for the Taliban. Kissinger, for his part, weighing in against such a possibility, required that tackling the Taliban be outsourced to the neighbours. This school would be most happy to oblige being amenable to the idea of Indian troops containing Pakistan by keeping the Taliban at bay in Afghanistan.
Firstly, the return of the Taliban would be a mediated one. Those being courted are referred to as the ‘moderate’ Taliban, implying they are purchasable and non-ideological. The surge, reportedly of up to 40000 troops that General MacChrystal has requested in his report leaked to the Washington Post, is to suitably contain the hard-core Taliban and grind down Al Qaeda remnants. In effect, military action will continue, to suitably incentivise the Taliban to come for talks. This implies that the Taliban at the negotiating table would be those willing to accede to the demands made by the west. These would necessarily include a reconciliation with those of the erstwhile Northern Alliance who sided with the west in the toppling the Taliban. These terms would include a promise of good behaviour by the Taliban in return for a share of power. This means neighbours need not worry about triumphalism-driven expansionism.
Secondly, the US would unlikely leave in a hurry. Their exit would be stage-managed over perhaps half a decade. They would likely be confined initially to bases from where they would be free to operate against the Al Qaeda and their continuing supporters among the Taliban. This way the present day counter insurgency, gaining in unpopularity in the populations of the west and in host societies, would be discontinued, being no longer required. The emphasis would shift to anti-terrorism operations relying on technology and stand off weapons. Therefore, the fear of the Taliban turning against their neighbours would not arise, even if the capability to do so exists.
Thirdly, while the Taliban have earned their reactionary image by their revolting ideology and actions, a proportion of this can be attributed to the pressure-cooker of war. It is believed that the Taliban are so backward looking that they would not like to see development. Therefore, any promise of assistance with reconstruction is unlikely to work with the Taliban. Attributing this to them is to disregard history. Ever since their advent in power late last decade, they did try and reach out for recognition and assistance. However, this led partially to their association with the Al Qaeda, further ensuring that they were denied engagement by the international community. Two, poppy cultivation had been curtailed when they were in power last. It has resurfaced not only because of rule by warlords, but also as a result of the war. Therefore, the expectation that those coming over ground can be controlled through assistance in reconstruction is not unfounded.
Lastly, it is important to interrogate the degree of Taliban influence in both Kashmir and of their ideology among Muslims in rest of India. In Kashmir, there has been little evidence of direct Afghan Taliban participation as fighters. Though there have been reports of Afghan war veterans in the insurgency there, these are exaggerated since those involved are colourful and projected as larger than life. Further, statistics from Kashmir are unreliable on this count since any unidentified body is usually passed off for Afghan by security forces outfits competing for glory. That Kashmiri militants died in missile hit Taliban camps owes to the Taliban lending their services as trainers. This is a common phenomenon on the insurgent network. For instance, the LTTE were linked with the Maoists and the Kerens with North East groups.
With respect to rest of India, Muslim perpetrated terror has been over-hyped by the media. This has led to an eclipse of the terror perpetrated by right wing extremists passed off as Muslim perpetrated. In case suspicious instances, such as the recovery of the bombs in Surat after the Ahmedabad bomb blasts of last year, are subtracted, and those organised by Pakistani groups, then a more accurate picture of the terror originating in the minority emerges. The image of a minority vulnerable to terror inducement from the Taliban can then be safely discarded. The fear of ideological penetration - of Talibansiation - is also questionable. The minority in light of the Sachar Committee report revelations appears more concerned with existential and secular issues of bread, education and jobs. The expectation that Afghans could serve as a role model for them is to underestimate the ‘idea of India’, to ignore the syncretic fount of Indian culture and to do injustice to the draw of India’s economic miracle. Any angst that still exists has local causes, with the linkage to radical Islam being tenuous at best or a self-serving canard at worst.
Therefore, the case for India to fall in line with the Kissinger formulation - that all but asks for troops deployment - is wanting. Debunking it is important, for over the coming period commentary from the hawks can be expected to dominate the air waves and hog inches of print columns. This will create the ground for politicians to look more approvingly at military involvement that currently appears far-fetched. As it is, India is creating the capability for intervention through exercises in interoperability with the US military. It would lead to India backing the military dominant option against the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine.
The US is contemplating pushing Pakistan to ‘do more’, the Kerry-Lugar bill being the sweetner. This option is fraught with dangers of destabilisation of Pakistan with its knock on effects on India. Engaging Pakistan in talks could help extract a promise of Pakistani control over any anti India stance of the Taliban and also a cessation of India directed terror by Pakistani groups. In exchange India can offer to let up its containment of Pakistan in Baluchistan and Afghanistan and collaborate in reconstruction. Such ‘win-win’ options can only emerge once blinkers are forced off. Else the war announced by the bombing yet again of the Indian embassy in Kabul is set to escalate.
Words 1268
Kissinger gets it wrong again. He got it wrong earlier in his extension of the bombing campaign into Cambodia during the Vietnam war; in bullying India during its humanitarian intervention in East Pakistan; and in bad mouthing Mrs Gandhi along with his boss, Nixon. He has got it completely wrong this time in believing that accommodation of the Taliban in Kabul threatens India because in his words: ‘India (is threatened) by general jihadism and specific terror groups’. He was in the midst of advising Obama against a policy of accommodation with the Taliban by asking for help from the threatened neighbours in his Newsweek article, ‘Deployment and Diplomacy’.
Arguing against a former National Security Advisor to two Presidents, Nixon and Ford, is not easy. Especially since his views find echo in the ‘boots on ground’ school of the strategic community. The assumption of this school of thought is that a return of the Taliban to Kabul would witness a reversion to the pre 26/11 era. While its allies in the Northern Alliance would be scattered, India would be particularly vulnerable on two counts. They believe that Taliban expansion into Kashmir would revive the insurgency there. Also that a Taliban ‘victory’ could lead to creeping Talibanisation in India’s susceptible minority. It follows therefore that the foe should be fought away from the home turf. Thus far the US was doing a considerable job keeping the Taliban occupied in the Af-Pak region. They fear that the outcome of the current rethink in the US and the public hand wringing there may prove to be beneficial for the Taliban. Kissinger, for his part, weighing in against such a possibility, required that tackling the Taliban be outsourced to the neighbours. This school would be most happy to oblige being amenable to the idea of Indian troops containing Pakistan by keeping the Taliban at bay in Afghanistan.
Firstly, the return of the Taliban would be a mediated one. Those being courted are referred to as the ‘moderate’ Taliban, implying they are purchasable and non-ideological. The surge, reportedly of up to 40000 troops that General MacChrystal has requested in his report leaked to the Washington Post, is to suitably contain the hard-core Taliban and grind down Al Qaeda remnants. In effect, military action will continue, to suitably incentivise the Taliban to come for talks. This implies that the Taliban at the negotiating table would be those willing to accede to the demands made by the west. These would necessarily include a reconciliation with those of the erstwhile Northern Alliance who sided with the west in the toppling the Taliban. These terms would include a promise of good behaviour by the Taliban in return for a share of power. This means neighbours need not worry about triumphalism-driven expansionism.
Secondly, the US would unlikely leave in a hurry. Their exit would be stage-managed over perhaps half a decade. They would likely be confined initially to bases from where they would be free to operate against the Al Qaeda and their continuing supporters among the Taliban. This way the present day counter insurgency, gaining in unpopularity in the populations of the west and in host societies, would be discontinued, being no longer required. The emphasis would shift to anti-terrorism operations relying on technology and stand off weapons. Therefore, the fear of the Taliban turning against their neighbours would not arise, even if the capability to do so exists.
Thirdly, while the Taliban have earned their reactionary image by their revolting ideology and actions, a proportion of this can be attributed to the pressure-cooker of war. It is believed that the Taliban are so backward looking that they would not like to see development. Therefore, any promise of assistance with reconstruction is unlikely to work with the Taliban. Attributing this to them is to disregard history. Ever since their advent in power late last decade, they did try and reach out for recognition and assistance. However, this led partially to their association with the Al Qaeda, further ensuring that they were denied engagement by the international community. Two, poppy cultivation had been curtailed when they were in power last. It has resurfaced not only because of rule by warlords, but also as a result of the war. Therefore, the expectation that those coming over ground can be controlled through assistance in reconstruction is not unfounded.
Lastly, it is important to interrogate the degree of Taliban influence in both Kashmir and of their ideology among Muslims in rest of India. In Kashmir, there has been little evidence of direct Afghan Taliban participation as fighters. Though there have been reports of Afghan war veterans in the insurgency there, these are exaggerated since those involved are colourful and projected as larger than life. Further, statistics from Kashmir are unreliable on this count since any unidentified body is usually passed off for Afghan by security forces outfits competing for glory. That Kashmiri militants died in missile hit Taliban camps owes to the Taliban lending their services as trainers. This is a common phenomenon on the insurgent network. For instance, the LTTE were linked with the Maoists and the Kerens with North East groups.
With respect to rest of India, Muslim perpetrated terror has been over-hyped by the media. This has led to an eclipse of the terror perpetrated by right wing extremists passed off as Muslim perpetrated. In case suspicious instances, such as the recovery of the bombs in Surat after the Ahmedabad bomb blasts of last year, are subtracted, and those organised by Pakistani groups, then a more accurate picture of the terror originating in the minority emerges. The image of a minority vulnerable to terror inducement from the Taliban can then be safely discarded. The fear of ideological penetration - of Talibansiation - is also questionable. The minority in light of the Sachar Committee report revelations appears more concerned with existential and secular issues of bread, education and jobs. The expectation that Afghans could serve as a role model for them is to underestimate the ‘idea of India’, to ignore the syncretic fount of Indian culture and to do injustice to the draw of India’s economic miracle. Any angst that still exists has local causes, with the linkage to radical Islam being tenuous at best or a self-serving canard at worst.
Therefore, the case for India to fall in line with the Kissinger formulation - that all but asks for troops deployment - is wanting. Debunking it is important, for over the coming period commentary from the hawks can be expected to dominate the air waves and hog inches of print columns. This will create the ground for politicians to look more approvingly at military involvement that currently appears far-fetched. As it is, India is creating the capability for intervention through exercises in interoperability with the US military. It would lead to India backing the military dominant option against the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine.
The US is contemplating pushing Pakistan to ‘do more’, the Kerry-Lugar bill being the sweetner. This option is fraught with dangers of destabilisation of Pakistan with its knock on effects on India. Engaging Pakistan in talks could help extract a promise of Pakistani control over any anti India stance of the Taliban and also a cessation of India directed terror by Pakistani groups. In exchange India can offer to let up its containment of Pakistan in Baluchistan and Afghanistan and collaborate in reconstruction. Such ‘win-win’ options can only emerge once blinkers are forced off. Else the war announced by the bombing yet again of the Indian embassy in Kabul is set to escalate.
Words 1268
Thursday, September 17, 2009
CALL OUT THE NIA!
Ishrat Jahan died in an ‘encounter’, her life claimed by encounter specialist DG Vanzara, a DIG of the Gujarat Police now in jail for the killing in yet another ‘encounter’ of Sohrabuddin Sheikh and his wife Kausarbi. In the Sohrabuddin case, a superintendent of police of the intelligence bureau and an officer of the Rajasthan cadre were also involved. The Ishrat Jahan case recently hit the headlines because of the courageous report of Metropolitan Magistrate, SP Tamang. Of consequence is the supposed motive of the police officers involved, that of seeking promotions based on their performance against ‘terrorists’. This apparently understandable motive anchored in human greed serves only to paper over a grimmer reality.
Those killed were billed as members of the terror outfit Lashkar e Tayyaba out to assassinate the chief minister of Gujarat. This is a plausible construct in light of the strained communal relations in Gujarat post the carnage of 2002 and sustained propaganda on the suspect nationalist credentials of the minority. The terror connection serves to justify ‘encounters’ in the public mind, creating heroes of ‘specialists’. However, this serves to eclipse a divergent construct. Such encounters, and media hype surrounding them, have instead served to create and project an image of a minority with external linkages. When seen in the light of the various bombings of questionable origin across the country culminating in 2008, the political project appears to have been for creating and sustaining an image of a ‘fifth column’ in India’s midst. The hoped for fallout was likely as not to influence perceptions and craft an electoral majority nationally out of denominational majority. It’s a political project that has deeper roots not only in compromised state structures, which by now describes the state of the Gujarat police accurately, but also in formations that claim a cultural rather than political agenda.
While the RK Raghavan led Supreme Court appointed Special Investigation Team would likely throw up more light on this angle as it culminates by end this year, the National Investigation Agency, set up with considerable fanfare in wake of 26/11, should be put to work on this case. What requires probing is the manner the intelligence bureau advisory on terror has been taken by the Gujarat police as rationale for the killings of Ishrat Jahan and three others. Filed by an under secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs on August 6 before the Gujarat High Court, the affidavit confirms that Ishrat Jahan, Pranesh Pillai alias Javed Shaikh, Amjad Ali Rana and Zeeshan Johar as terrorists linked with Lashkar-e-Taiba. The affidavit was filed on a plea by Ishrat’s mother for a CBI probe. The Times of India reports that an IPS officer, Rajinder Kumar, of the Gujarat cadre, once the state IB chief between 2002 and 2005 and now an Intelligence Bureau joint director, was responsible for most of the intelligence inputs on Gujarat encounters. Thus emerges a questionable connection stretching from Maharashtra, from where the abductions for the fake encounters took place, through Gujarat where these were executed to New Delhi where the rationale was apparently manufactured. This is a fit case for the NIA to earn its credentials, set a precedent and lay out its own standards for itself.
The NIA was created in December last through the NIA Act. It was meant to enable the Center to act in cased of national import through the inclusion of a schedule of central acts covering offences against the state, terrorism, atomic energy, anti-hijacking, weapons of mass destruction etc. Since ‘terrorism’, of which the ‘encounters’ and bombings are part, acquired a nation wide footprint, it requires a central agency to probe. With revelations of Hindu terror groups, such as an army intelligence officer led Abhinav Bharat involved in terror, and linkages in right wing subverted police and intelligence apparatus in concerned states, there is a case for central intervention for investigation and outing of the truth. Some states having rightly raised objections based on constitutional issues as center-state relations and the lack of consultations prior to the NIA Act being rushed through has led to the Home Minister promising a revisit to the Act. However, objections could have suspect motives such as restricting scope for additional scrutiny of the center so as to constrict the possibility of unpalatable revelations. The increases the immediacy with which New Delhi must take the checks and balances introduced to their logical conclusion.
Another long pending measure is warranted to be progressed using this juncture as opportunity, that of police reforms. It appears from the pattern discerned here that sections of the police stand compromised through infiltration of majoritarian sympathisers. Their placement in key positions and unprofessional actions now constitute a threat to the secular character of the state. Core values being threatened thereby, they are an existential security threat. Underway is virtually an ongoing coup in slow motion from within, one that can be speeded up in case the political constellation at Delhi is right once again in future. Police reforms, mandated by the Supreme Court in response to the PIL of former DGP, Shri Prakash Singh, require progressing and monitoring by the MHA. A professionalisaton of the police could set back this agenda, to the extent it exists, besides being a project worth pursuing on its own merits.
India is a veritable conglomeration of minorities along differing axes as ethnicity, persuasion etc. The difficulty of creating a majority based on shared primordial affinities has not dissuaded its activists. Their project requires creation of an ‘Other’ to succeed. They have managed partially to control the discourse through ‘black propaganda’, by succeeding in attribution of all terrorist incidents as minority perpetrated. This has political utility for such forces in marginalising the minority even while elevating their political agenda as the only way a culturally-defined nation can safeguard and cope with the externally-inspired internally-abetted aggression. Therefore, the Ishrat Jahan case has wider ramifications. Clearly, attribution of comparatively innocent self-interest of the involved police officers in these killings would be to obfuscate the political connection and context of these crimes.
Ishrat Jahan died in an ‘encounter’, her life claimed by encounter specialist DG Vanzara, a DIG of the Gujarat Police now in jail for the killing in yet another ‘encounter’ of Sohrabuddin Sheikh and his wife Kausarbi. In the Sohrabuddin case, a superintendent of police of the intelligence bureau and an officer of the Rajasthan cadre were also involved. The Ishrat Jahan case recently hit the headlines because of the courageous report of Metropolitan Magistrate, SP Tamang. Of consequence is the supposed motive of the police officers involved, that of seeking promotions based on their performance against ‘terrorists’. This apparently understandable motive anchored in human greed serves only to paper over a grimmer reality.
Those killed were billed as members of the terror outfit Lashkar e Tayyaba out to assassinate the chief minister of Gujarat. This is a plausible construct in light of the strained communal relations in Gujarat post the carnage of 2002 and sustained propaganda on the suspect nationalist credentials of the minority. The terror connection serves to justify ‘encounters’ in the public mind, creating heroes of ‘specialists’. However, this serves to eclipse a divergent construct. Such encounters, and media hype surrounding them, have instead served to create and project an image of a minority with external linkages. When seen in the light of the various bombings of questionable origin across the country culminating in 2008, the political project appears to have been for creating and sustaining an image of a ‘fifth column’ in India’s midst. The hoped for fallout was likely as not to influence perceptions and craft an electoral majority nationally out of denominational majority. It’s a political project that has deeper roots not only in compromised state structures, which by now describes the state of the Gujarat police accurately, but also in formations that claim a cultural rather than political agenda.
While the RK Raghavan led Supreme Court appointed Special Investigation Team would likely throw up more light on this angle as it culminates by end this year, the National Investigation Agency, set up with considerable fanfare in wake of 26/11, should be put to work on this case. What requires probing is the manner the intelligence bureau advisory on terror has been taken by the Gujarat police as rationale for the killings of Ishrat Jahan and three others. Filed by an under secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs on August 6 before the Gujarat High Court, the affidavit confirms that Ishrat Jahan, Pranesh Pillai alias Javed Shaikh, Amjad Ali Rana and Zeeshan Johar as terrorists linked with Lashkar-e-Taiba. The affidavit was filed on a plea by Ishrat’s mother for a CBI probe. The Times of India reports that an IPS officer, Rajinder Kumar, of the Gujarat cadre, once the state IB chief between 2002 and 2005 and now an Intelligence Bureau joint director, was responsible for most of the intelligence inputs on Gujarat encounters. Thus emerges a questionable connection stretching from Maharashtra, from where the abductions for the fake encounters took place, through Gujarat where these were executed to New Delhi where the rationale was apparently manufactured. This is a fit case for the NIA to earn its credentials, set a precedent and lay out its own standards for itself.
The NIA was created in December last through the NIA Act. It was meant to enable the Center to act in cased of national import through the inclusion of a schedule of central acts covering offences against the state, terrorism, atomic energy, anti-hijacking, weapons of mass destruction etc. Since ‘terrorism’, of which the ‘encounters’ and bombings are part, acquired a nation wide footprint, it requires a central agency to probe. With revelations of Hindu terror groups, such as an army intelligence officer led Abhinav Bharat involved in terror, and linkages in right wing subverted police and intelligence apparatus in concerned states, there is a case for central intervention for investigation and outing of the truth. Some states having rightly raised objections based on constitutional issues as center-state relations and the lack of consultations prior to the NIA Act being rushed through has led to the Home Minister promising a revisit to the Act. However, objections could have suspect motives such as restricting scope for additional scrutiny of the center so as to constrict the possibility of unpalatable revelations. The increases the immediacy with which New Delhi must take the checks and balances introduced to their logical conclusion.
Another long pending measure is warranted to be progressed using this juncture as opportunity, that of police reforms. It appears from the pattern discerned here that sections of the police stand compromised through infiltration of majoritarian sympathisers. Their placement in key positions and unprofessional actions now constitute a threat to the secular character of the state. Core values being threatened thereby, they are an existential security threat. Underway is virtually an ongoing coup in slow motion from within, one that can be speeded up in case the political constellation at Delhi is right once again in future. Police reforms, mandated by the Supreme Court in response to the PIL of former DGP, Shri Prakash Singh, require progressing and monitoring by the MHA. A professionalisaton of the police could set back this agenda, to the extent it exists, besides being a project worth pursuing on its own merits.
India is a veritable conglomeration of minorities along differing axes as ethnicity, persuasion etc. The difficulty of creating a majority based on shared primordial affinities has not dissuaded its activists. Their project requires creation of an ‘Other’ to succeed. They have managed partially to control the discourse through ‘black propaganda’, by succeeding in attribution of all terrorist incidents as minority perpetrated. This has political utility for such forces in marginalising the minority even while elevating their political agenda as the only way a culturally-defined nation can safeguard and cope with the externally-inspired internally-abetted aggression. Therefore, the Ishrat Jahan case has wider ramifications. Clearly, attribution of comparatively innocent self-interest of the involved police officers in these killings would be to obfuscate the political connection and context of these crimes.
Saturday, September 12, 2009
Emulating the US
The proceedings of the CCS are appropriately not in the open domain. Only its decisions, where required, are made known to the public, as was done in case of its endorsement of India’s nuclear doctrine in January 2003. However, the recent washing of dirty linen in public by those in the CCS during the NDA’s first term over the Kandahar hijack episode bespeaks of lack of institutionalisation of national security decision making at the apex level. This is of a piece with India’s amorphous strategic culture. While matters are likely to have improved in the decade since owing to the National Security Council and its secretariat having firmed in, there is a case for bringing greater formality into the proceedings of bodies such as the CCS, the NSC and the Political Council of the NCA.
These three bodies, having virtually identical membership, are vested with decision making responsibility in the national security sphere. Since the system has not let India down so far, there is no cause for unwarranted alarm. However, this is no reason not to constantly improve it. It would then be able to cope with the demands it may be faced with in future. Two scenarios buttress this point. In the first, there could be difficulty in case there is a weak minority government in power, as was being apprehended in the run up to the elections only a hundred days ago. Representatives of various fractious parties without a national profile could in such a circumstance be taking decisions that, while within their responsibility, could be outside of their ken. The second is in formulation of India’s response in case of breakdown in deterrence. Whatever the decision arrived it, in the aftermath of the resulting nuclear exchange India would require an explanation of the rationale. Since life would not be the same again, accountability would require to be apportioned. For doing this adequately there is need to institute procedures now.
Learning from the US experience is in order. Three aspects stand out. One is that those charged with policy and decision making can be held directly responsible. Replication would do away with the proverbial ‘kitchen cabinets’ that have characterised the Indian system, at least till the late eighties. So much so that such informal bodies virtually crafted India’s nuclear trajectory till the Shakti tests. Reforms would minimise the baleful influence of unaccountable lobbies, such as that exercised by parent ideological formations on political parties. The recent stewardship by the RSS of a troubled BJP indicates that there is more to exercise of constitutional authority than meets the eye.
Second, is the manner the US maintains records. Not only is the historical record is enriched by perspectives of players, for instance Nixon’s take on Indira Gandhi in 1971; but, more importantly, they can be held accountable. The latter may not be required so much in case of wrong decisions, but more so in case of mal-intent. Perversely, it is taken as an ‘achievement’ that there are no written records of India’s transition to becoming a nuclear power!
And lastly, the release of these records into public domain. This would help not so much with building the sense of history that Indians reputedly sorely lack, but with keeping a check on leaders. For instance, prospective Prime Minister’s would not be emboldened with impunity into fudging their role in national decision making that’s gone wrong for some reason! While such deliberations are understandably kept out of the remit of the Right to Information Act, perhaps thirty years on these could be made public as done elsewhere. This would help researchers understand the compulsions and analysts to recommend improvements in the approach to security. Presently, relying on whistle blowing, such as happened recently over the hydrogen bomb ‘fizzle’, bespeaks of much ground yet to be traversed for India to acquire a credible, functional and accountable system.
It is interesting to speculate on why India’s national security system is both impervious and underdeveloped. Answering the question, ‘Who benefits?’ could provide the clue. One answer this question would not throw up is the legislative. Legislative accountability of the executive could do with emulating the US, even though theirs is a Presidential system. While parliamentary committees do perform, US style congressional hearings help. This would lend balance in a system which otherwise lends itself to competing constituencies pulling in wilful ways. A recent example is the manner a section of scientists have expressed an interest in further nuclear tests. Taking a call on whether India needs a thermonuclear based deterrent is not within their ambit; yet the controversy.
The recent remarks of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee on the developments in Pakistani nuclear deterrent underlines that India is in a dangerous neighbourhood. It is also an aspiring great power. Both require continuous evolution of its national security system. The gravamen of the otherwise discrete controversies over this month, is that the Indian system is still a work in progress.
Words - 831
The proceedings of the CCS are appropriately not in the open domain. Only its decisions, where required, are made known to the public, as was done in case of its endorsement of India’s nuclear doctrine in January 2003. However, the recent washing of dirty linen in public by those in the CCS during the NDA’s first term over the Kandahar hijack episode bespeaks of lack of institutionalisation of national security decision making at the apex level. This is of a piece with India’s amorphous strategic culture. While matters are likely to have improved in the decade since owing to the National Security Council and its secretariat having firmed in, there is a case for bringing greater formality into the proceedings of bodies such as the CCS, the NSC and the Political Council of the NCA.
These three bodies, having virtually identical membership, are vested with decision making responsibility in the national security sphere. Since the system has not let India down so far, there is no cause for unwarranted alarm. However, this is no reason not to constantly improve it. It would then be able to cope with the demands it may be faced with in future. Two scenarios buttress this point. In the first, there could be difficulty in case there is a weak minority government in power, as was being apprehended in the run up to the elections only a hundred days ago. Representatives of various fractious parties without a national profile could in such a circumstance be taking decisions that, while within their responsibility, could be outside of their ken. The second is in formulation of India’s response in case of breakdown in deterrence. Whatever the decision arrived it, in the aftermath of the resulting nuclear exchange India would require an explanation of the rationale. Since life would not be the same again, accountability would require to be apportioned. For doing this adequately there is need to institute procedures now.
Learning from the US experience is in order. Three aspects stand out. One is that those charged with policy and decision making can be held directly responsible. Replication would do away with the proverbial ‘kitchen cabinets’ that have characterised the Indian system, at least till the late eighties. So much so that such informal bodies virtually crafted India’s nuclear trajectory till the Shakti tests. Reforms would minimise the baleful influence of unaccountable lobbies, such as that exercised by parent ideological formations on political parties. The recent stewardship by the RSS of a troubled BJP indicates that there is more to exercise of constitutional authority than meets the eye.
Second, is the manner the US maintains records. Not only is the historical record is enriched by perspectives of players, for instance Nixon’s take on Indira Gandhi in 1971; but, more importantly, they can be held accountable. The latter may not be required so much in case of wrong decisions, but more so in case of mal-intent. Perversely, it is taken as an ‘achievement’ that there are no written records of India’s transition to becoming a nuclear power!
And lastly, the release of these records into public domain. This would help not so much with building the sense of history that Indians reputedly sorely lack, but with keeping a check on leaders. For instance, prospective Prime Minister’s would not be emboldened with impunity into fudging their role in national decision making that’s gone wrong for some reason! While such deliberations are understandably kept out of the remit of the Right to Information Act, perhaps thirty years on these could be made public as done elsewhere. This would help researchers understand the compulsions and analysts to recommend improvements in the approach to security. Presently, relying on whistle blowing, such as happened recently over the hydrogen bomb ‘fizzle’, bespeaks of much ground yet to be traversed for India to acquire a credible, functional and accountable system.
It is interesting to speculate on why India’s national security system is both impervious and underdeveloped. Answering the question, ‘Who benefits?’ could provide the clue. One answer this question would not throw up is the legislative. Legislative accountability of the executive could do with emulating the US, even though theirs is a Presidential system. While parliamentary committees do perform, US style congressional hearings help. This would lend balance in a system which otherwise lends itself to competing constituencies pulling in wilful ways. A recent example is the manner a section of scientists have expressed an interest in further nuclear tests. Taking a call on whether India needs a thermonuclear based deterrent is not within their ambit; yet the controversy.
The recent remarks of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee on the developments in Pakistani nuclear deterrent underlines that India is in a dangerous neighbourhood. It is also an aspiring great power. Both require continuous evolution of its national security system. The gravamen of the otherwise discrete controversies over this month, is that the Indian system is still a work in progress.
Words - 831
Yet another nuclear controversy
Earlier in end May at the end of a book release function, India’s Army chief, when quizzed on developments in Pakistan’s nuclear capability recounted in the US Congressional Research Service report, remarked, "They require a certain minimum amount (nuclear capability), but ... Pakistan's attempts to increase the number of its nuclear weapons is a matter of serious concern." Yet again when accosted by the press, this time during his visit to the army's Artificial Limb Centre in Pune, for his opinion on the Federation of Atomic Scientists reporting on Pakistan increasing its warhead haul to 70-90, he said, "There is a difference between having a degree deterrence, which is required for protection, and going beyond that. If the news reports of (Pakistan) having 70 to 90 atomic bombs are correct, then I think they are going well beyond the requirement of deterrence."
A report comments that ‘Kapoor's implied suggestion that India could have to revisit its no-first use policy’. Quoting the hyper-realist duo of the think tank, Center for Policy Research, it gives out Brahma Chellaney’s take that there is need to review India’s “deterrence posture”; while the other analyst, Bharat Karnad, is reported as saying ‘no-first-use is not a substantive declaration’.
The report revisits the recent controversy over the thermonuclear test in the Shakti series having turned out a ‘fizzle’ maintaining ‘that the Indian nuclear arsenal needs refurbishing, if not the need to carry out more tests, to maintain its nuclear programme’s cutting edge.’ Thus we can see that favourite hobby horses of players in the nuclear field have been hitched to the Chief’s remarks, though the Chief himself has not implied anything of the sort.
Since this time round he was speaking in his new capacity as Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, his remarks acquire a greater degree of significance. The Chairman in the Indian system oversees its Strategic Forces Command, responsible for the nuclear arsenal. Understanding the General is necessary in order to dispel the spin self-interested forces with a nuclear agenda are using the media for.
On both occasions, the Chief was engaged in a function unrelated to the nuclear issue. The earlier remark can be taken as his preliminary observation. Charged with safe-custody of India’s national security, he cannot be expected to say that nuclear developments in India’s neighbourhood are not of concern! However, the second time round, he would be voicing India’s considered take.
Firstly, India cannot second guess Pakistan. Since the numbers India possesses is not known, Pakistan would require making an educated guess and reacting accordingly. Therefore, its figure need not necessarily coincide with India’s expectation. Both countries consider the ‘minimum’ of their ‘credible minimum deterrence’ to be a dynamic, security situation related, number. Secondly, this perhaps brings out India’s purpose. The Chief had earlier said, "I think the world community should put the kind of pressure which is required on Pakistan to cap the enhancement of their nuclear capability.” The context this time is that Pakistan has in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, that is considering introducing the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, stalled talks by citing national security. Which means there is an incipient arms race on in the region.
This can be attributed to India pegging its numbers by clubbing Pakistan and China together as a twin front problem. The resulting numbers can be perceived by Pakistan as conferring on India an ability for a disarming first strike. Thus the movement upwards in Pakistan’s stocks has rightly been taken as an attempt to gain a stabilising second strike capability. Given that India is buttressing its second strike capability by the recent launch of the INS Arihant, there could be no objections to Pakistan doing likewise, particularly since on both occasions the higher end was pegged at 90 warhead. Doing so, as the Chief has done, only serves to hyphenate India to Pakistan yet again, and secondly allows the forces wishing India to proceed down the arms race route to take advantage of his voiced concern.
The suggestion that increase in Pakistan’s arsenal requires reconsideration of India’s NFU pledge is untenable. Since by reaching 90 warheads or thereabouts, Pakistan still does not gain first strike capability, there is no cause to revisit the pledge. Rescinding it carries the danger of what Schelling called ‘the reciprocal fear of a surprise attack’ or an avoidable tendency toward pre-emption. This is not a theoretical possibility in the India-Pakistan dyad given the mutual vulnerabilities and fears they harbour. While India wishes to use the conventional plane to react to Pakistan’s proxy war, even if in a limited way, Pakistan, feels a need to use the nuclear card to stall the same. This reliance on the nuclear capability is heightened in the situation as obtains at present in which its Army is contending with the Taliban, if reluctantly, even while the threat exists of India reacting conventionally in face of another 26/11.
The timing of the other controversy over whether India needs to test again is suggestive. India had earlier been prepared to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the event the treaty had been stalled by the US Senate not ratifying it. With the possibility of the US championing it once again after a decade long hiatus, forces in India preferring that India maintain its option to test are exerting themselves. Their scientific position is that India does not have the requisite computing power to go ahead with arsenal development without testing. Even if this is true with respect to the hydrogen bomb, deterrence is not necessarily a function of a thermonuclear capability when merely a fission or boosted fission based arsenal can serve the same purpose adequately. H Bombs on the other hand lend themselves to city-busting, a prospect best avoided if deterrence were ever to break down. Thermonuclear weapons have other advantages, such as ‘more bang for the buck’ and being lighter payloads easier to deliver. This technological advance led to the doctrines that eventuated in the MAD arsenals of the superpowers. There is no call to replicate the cold war experience in Southern Asia.
Thus, while every development in the nuclear plane is indeed a cause for concern, the manner such concerns are appropriated by interested constituencies and the way these manipulate the media, has been starkly witnessed in the latest nuclear episode. Their inner motives require to be revealed so that public opinion exercises a check over politicians, who neither know nor care enough to ward off such pressures.
Words - 1081
Earlier in end May at the end of a book release function, India’s Army chief, when quizzed on developments in Pakistan’s nuclear capability recounted in the US Congressional Research Service report, remarked, "They require a certain minimum amount (nuclear capability), but ... Pakistan's attempts to increase the number of its nuclear weapons is a matter of serious concern." Yet again when accosted by the press, this time during his visit to the army's Artificial Limb Centre in Pune, for his opinion on the Federation of Atomic Scientists reporting on Pakistan increasing its warhead haul to 70-90, he said, "There is a difference between having a degree deterrence, which is required for protection, and going beyond that. If the news reports of (Pakistan) having 70 to 90 atomic bombs are correct, then I think they are going well beyond the requirement of deterrence."
A report comments that ‘Kapoor's implied suggestion that India could have to revisit its no-first use policy’. Quoting the hyper-realist duo of the think tank, Center for Policy Research, it gives out Brahma Chellaney’s take that there is need to review India’s “deterrence posture”; while the other analyst, Bharat Karnad, is reported as saying ‘no-first-use is not a substantive declaration’.
The report revisits the recent controversy over the thermonuclear test in the Shakti series having turned out a ‘fizzle’ maintaining ‘that the Indian nuclear arsenal needs refurbishing, if not the need to carry out more tests, to maintain its nuclear programme’s cutting edge.’ Thus we can see that favourite hobby horses of players in the nuclear field have been hitched to the Chief’s remarks, though the Chief himself has not implied anything of the sort.
Since this time round he was speaking in his new capacity as Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, his remarks acquire a greater degree of significance. The Chairman in the Indian system oversees its Strategic Forces Command, responsible for the nuclear arsenal. Understanding the General is necessary in order to dispel the spin self-interested forces with a nuclear agenda are using the media for.
On both occasions, the Chief was engaged in a function unrelated to the nuclear issue. The earlier remark can be taken as his preliminary observation. Charged with safe-custody of India’s national security, he cannot be expected to say that nuclear developments in India’s neighbourhood are not of concern! However, the second time round, he would be voicing India’s considered take.
Firstly, India cannot second guess Pakistan. Since the numbers India possesses is not known, Pakistan would require making an educated guess and reacting accordingly. Therefore, its figure need not necessarily coincide with India’s expectation. Both countries consider the ‘minimum’ of their ‘credible minimum deterrence’ to be a dynamic, security situation related, number. Secondly, this perhaps brings out India’s purpose. The Chief had earlier said, "I think the world community should put the kind of pressure which is required on Pakistan to cap the enhancement of their nuclear capability.” The context this time is that Pakistan has in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, that is considering introducing the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, stalled talks by citing national security. Which means there is an incipient arms race on in the region.
This can be attributed to India pegging its numbers by clubbing Pakistan and China together as a twin front problem. The resulting numbers can be perceived by Pakistan as conferring on India an ability for a disarming first strike. Thus the movement upwards in Pakistan’s stocks has rightly been taken as an attempt to gain a stabilising second strike capability. Given that India is buttressing its second strike capability by the recent launch of the INS Arihant, there could be no objections to Pakistan doing likewise, particularly since on both occasions the higher end was pegged at 90 warhead. Doing so, as the Chief has done, only serves to hyphenate India to Pakistan yet again, and secondly allows the forces wishing India to proceed down the arms race route to take advantage of his voiced concern.
The suggestion that increase in Pakistan’s arsenal requires reconsideration of India’s NFU pledge is untenable. Since by reaching 90 warheads or thereabouts, Pakistan still does not gain first strike capability, there is no cause to revisit the pledge. Rescinding it carries the danger of what Schelling called ‘the reciprocal fear of a surprise attack’ or an avoidable tendency toward pre-emption. This is not a theoretical possibility in the India-Pakistan dyad given the mutual vulnerabilities and fears they harbour. While India wishes to use the conventional plane to react to Pakistan’s proxy war, even if in a limited way, Pakistan, feels a need to use the nuclear card to stall the same. This reliance on the nuclear capability is heightened in the situation as obtains at present in which its Army is contending with the Taliban, if reluctantly, even while the threat exists of India reacting conventionally in face of another 26/11.
The timing of the other controversy over whether India needs to test again is suggestive. India had earlier been prepared to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the event the treaty had been stalled by the US Senate not ratifying it. With the possibility of the US championing it once again after a decade long hiatus, forces in India preferring that India maintain its option to test are exerting themselves. Their scientific position is that India does not have the requisite computing power to go ahead with arsenal development without testing. Even if this is true with respect to the hydrogen bomb, deterrence is not necessarily a function of a thermonuclear capability when merely a fission or boosted fission based arsenal can serve the same purpose adequately. H Bombs on the other hand lend themselves to city-busting, a prospect best avoided if deterrence were ever to break down. Thermonuclear weapons have other advantages, such as ‘more bang for the buck’ and being lighter payloads easier to deliver. This technological advance led to the doctrines that eventuated in the MAD arsenals of the superpowers. There is no call to replicate the cold war experience in Southern Asia.
Thus, while every development in the nuclear plane is indeed a cause for concern, the manner such concerns are appropriated by interested constituencies and the way these manipulate the media, has been starkly witnessed in the latest nuclear episode. Their inner motives require to be revealed so that public opinion exercises a check over politicians, who neither know nor care enough to ward off such pressures.
Words - 1081
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