Elections 2014: The Worst Case Scenario
http://www.milligazette.com/print/issue/16-31-july-2013
Milligazette, 16-31 July 2013

Narendra Modi’s campaign for prime-ministership has had an inauspicious start. But his mentor’s walkout in huff, early desertion by a key ally and the public relations disaster amidst a natural disaster will not faze him. His stewardship of the BJP’s campaign ahead can be expected to be energetic, innovative and less than mindful of norms, ethics and the law. As legal pincers close in on him in the Ishrat Jahan and the Gulberg Society cases, he will likely pull out the stops. Abandoning restraint, his campaign will get into stride with its cunning and subterfuge abandoned in favour of barefaced communalism.

Electoral arithmetic however is built by the common voter who has repeatedly proven wiser than politicians believe him to be. Modi’s campaign will therefore not have enough propulsion to get him to 7 Race Course Road. But then, NaMo is not in the race for being a leader of the opposition and waiting a term for the rulers to discredit themselves. This is his moment. His manner of seizing of it could frame the ‘worst case scenario’.

Par for the course will be the usual means that gladden a Hindutvavadi’s heart. Among these will figure a replay of the Sohrabuddin episode in which jihadis will be projected as gunning for his life. A few ‘encounters’ will embellish his case that his opposition is in league with minority extremists to finish off his challenge. These will be depicted as a fifth column, linking them with the proverbial ‘external hand’, set to come to fore with the coincident departure of the US from AfPak. A convenient rise in unexplained bomb blasts across the country will help push the minority onto the ropes. Strategic commentary, forever in search of a ‘strong man’ to expel the ‘soft state’ image of India, will latch on to this ‘externally abetted internal enemy’, to use a Chanakyan phrase. Security in peril, India will be asked to vote for the one answer: NaMo.

The ‘foreignness’ of the young princeling, the ruling party’s contender, will be underlined to suggest subversion of the rise of an authentic India. The closing in of the law on Mr. Modi will be depicted as misuse of the judiciary by the ruling Congress to keep him from power and an instance of minority appeasement. While dirty tricks will harden Modi’s power base among traditionally right wing voters, these may deepen scepticism among others. Yet, in the event, the election may prove a close call. It is here that the ‘worst case’ scenario kicks in.

This could be a ‘soft coup’ in the tradition of George Bush’s pipping of Al Gore at the post in Florida. Or it could be more blatant. Extremist political formations could take over the streets; while Modi acolytes, including one on bail for triple murder and restrained from entering Gujarat, energise a putsch. The narrative will be that the rightful winner is being deprived by a conspiracy of anti-Hindu and by extension anti-India forces; forcing them to act to save democracy and India.

The penetration of rightist ideology in security forces is well known. The Gujarat police’s showing in the 2002 carnage is an example of levels of subversion of constitutional and professional norms. This was in the early days of Mr. Modi at the helm. By 2004 the Gujarat police was masterminding ‘encounters’ designed to build Modi’s image as Lauh Purush II with which he could eventually make his bid for Delhi. Its link to the questionable spate of blasts in metropolitan cities in the run up to last elections is evident from the supposedly fortuitous manner of recovery of bombs in Surat. The record of Maharashtra’s ATS and Delhi’s Special Cell suggests the Gujarat police not an exception. Karnataka, AP and Rajasthan police have not acquitted themselves with any credit in investigating ‘terror’ cases. Exceptions in khaki are instead the likes of late Hemant Karkare.

Black propaganda, that such blasts are instances of, has an intelligence imprint. This is only now coming out into the open with the CBI dragnet closing in on the IB head in Gujarat. It is inconceivable that the then IB chief in Delhi, now ensconced in a right wing think tank in the national capital, did not know of the game-plan in Gujarat. It is clear that the objective was to implicate the minority with terror seemingly originating in Pakistan. The narrative was that terror was no longer confined to J&K but had spread its tentacles to the heartland. This helped with India attempting to corner Pakistan diplomatically, since post 9/11 Pakistan was supping with the US. The internal political dividend was intended to see continuation of NDA to power in 2004 and a return in 2008, which in the event were belied.

The paramilitary, exposed to operations against Kashmiri militants and to Maoists, are primed for lending muscle. Bureaucrats, privileging self-preservation, can be expected to go into a ‘wait and watch’ mode. Strategic commentators, largely of conservative-realist persuasion, will allow themselves to be manipulated into providing the narrative cover that ends justify the means. Hindutva champions and closet communalists embedded in the media will pitch in to help India recover from the shock.

That a scenario of a right wing take over is not far-fetched is evident from the inevitable contention between the ruling party and opposition over the nominations list to head India’s security forces and intelligence services. The very fact that the professionalism or competence of the candidates is not enough suggests that their political inclinations matter. The ruling party pitches for agency heads that can contain the ideological penetration of the opposition in their forces. The opposition would favour those who are willing to compromise on the apolitical feature of their force. That security forces universally are conservative in orientation makes the Congress more alert to dangers and ready to act to prevent them through the selection process. The recent bust ups over the Army, IB and CBI chiefs, all of whom would be having tenures that will see them through the elections, indicates a wariness making for plausibility of the worst case. 

From the controversy last year over the succession chain of the army it is clear that the key player in the scenario playing out or otherwise could well be the army chief. When the government ruled against giving the former chief an extension till his claimed age of retirement, it was partially with an eye that the current chief would likely thwart any political misadventure. The question is: Will the Indian Army, known for keeping clear of politics, step up? Such intrusion into politics is hardly useful over the long term, even if it is necessary to pre-empt a worse possibility. Given this, prevention is better than cure.

The cure would be in the government revealing the extent of right wing conspiracy over the past decade to malign the minority: a function of the success of the project of bombings and staged ‘encounters’. The current case in point, Ishrat Jahan’s, is merely the tip of the iceberg. It is also being progressed by the CBI with an eye on keeping Mr. Modi off balance. However, be that as it may, while further revelations may embarrass India, it would work right wing contamination out of the system once and for all and ensure that the conservative nationalists play by the rules in future: the first step being in dumping their current  vanguard.  

Opinion

Distancing from Cloak and Dagger By Firdaus Ahmed http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=20014 India is no stranger to intelligence operations. The founding director of its external intelligence agency, RAW, MK Kaw, is legendary. The RAW itself acquired its spurs in the run up to the 1971 War. While more is known of its work in raising, equipping and sustaining the Mukti Bahini, its contribution perhaps went way beyond that. If the start of the conflict is dated to the alleged hijacking of the Indian Airlines boeing to Lahore by Kashmiri separatists in February that year, then it can be credited with a shaping, stage setting role in the war. The incident enabled India to cut off air links overflying India between Pakistan's western and eastern wings. The indirect route via Sri Lanka led to the Pakistani military unable to fly in troops in response to the unrest; thereby leading to a heavy handed crackdown which in turn fed the Mukti Bahini with material and legitimacy. The success of 1971 elevated intelligence in the state repertoire. While the legacy of 1971 finally came to haunt India in Kashmir, the elevation has rebounded in an unexpected way in the rest of India.  This is despite knowing that that intelligence indulgences have a tendency to bite back. Its subsequent forays into the intelligence game have had mixed results: be it the support for Al Zulfiqar and the like being reciprocated by ISI's Khalistan connection and its LTTE link leading up eventually to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. This only underlines the well known fact that the intelligence instrument is double edged. The blowback from US and Pakistani support to the Mujahedeen is the best example. And yet, states seldom learn, condemned to repeating mistakes. However, in India's case the 'lesson' needs spelling out.  Currently, the CBI noose is closing round the neck of Rajendra Kumar, a Special Director in IB looking towards retirement, for his doings as the IB representative in Gujarat during the infamous episodes of killings of supposed 'terrorists' out to get the chief minister, Mr. Modi. The problem is not in an officer going rogue, but in the pattern that emerges from incidents like Ansal Plaza and Batla House. There is the similar Sadiq Jamal case. The military intelligence has had its own scandal with its members spearheading Abhinav Bharat in a right wing conspiracy to paint India's minority black. There are instances of the investigation agencies in league with intelligence agencies, such as Maharashtra's ATS and Delhi's Special Cell, pulling their punches in following up on leads, hoping that their fingers pointing at extremist members of the minority are adequate evidence of the minority's culpability for terror acts. Such instances are legion in Kashmir, most notable and egregious being the Chittisingpora-Pathribal case. But the one with more extensive consequence was the sustenance of the unspeakable Ikhwan. However, the one that takes the cake is the revelation by RVS Mani, a formerundersecretary in the home ministry, implying that a constituency exists on an alternative version on the origin of the terrorist attack on Parliament. There are reasons for the situation having come to such a pass. The ISI being a formidable opponent, perhaps required India to also allow the intelligence function greater autonomy than warranted in decent democracies. Second, India's association of late with the Americans and Israelis is also rubbing off on India, with India's capacity building being invested in by these states. Third, a government's misuse of the intelligence function leads the agencies in question to bid for greater impunity. Fourth, intelligence operations can help set the stage for pushing through other measures that would otherwise not be permissible. For instance, in the Parliament attack case, RVS Mani's revelations suggests that the attack may have been carried out to enable passing of 'draconian' laws. Lending credence to the theory is the timeliness of the attack in strategic terms to the launch India's largest military mobilisation, Op Parakram.  Last, India's strategic culture has been somewhat somnolent. To conservative-realist quarters that are in awe of Kautilyan thought, India requires goading to exercise power. Leaving the threat perception and a challenging security circumstance to Pakistan to create was not enough. Pakistan's efforts required supplementing by black operations implicating it. This had useful diplomatic dividend. Also, it would come in handy in case India was to need a justification for 'Cold Start'. Increasing the terror attacks that could be attributable to ISI and its alleged internal abettors could in the event justify Cold Start as self-defence against cumulative attacks amounting to an armed attack. However, these strategic reasons are less salient for intelligence agencies reaching levels of autonomy from accountability almost rivalling the ISI. The more significant reason has to do with internal politics. The conservatively inclined intelligence agencies have gravitated to the ideology of the right. This has compromised professionalism somewhat to the benefit of the right wing in polity that has taken care to penetrate the agencies as its first step in the take-over of the state. Therefore, if India lurched to the right over the nineties, the intelligence agencies went a step further, if not altogether overboard. The subsequent period of the NDA in government ensured that even if displaced from power, their residue would be firmly left behind on state institutions, in particular the agencies. State intelligence apparatuses under right wing governments in provinces were additionally available for black operations. Rogue elements with subterranean linkages to rightist political formations complete the picture.  This is the direction to look at when contemplating the terror attacks India has been subject to over the past half decade and more, not excluding the latest one in Bodh Gaya. Since intelligence agencies themselves need to look in this direction, there is little likelihood of them doing so. This makes the case being made out here a 'conspiracy theory' for lack of evidence. The shortfall does not owe to evidence being wanting, but that it is not being looked for in first place. To insist would be anti-national. Further, painting a false picture is an intelligence function. In the Bodh Gaya case, the readiness to lap up the theory that this is Muslim backlash for the Buddhist suppression of Rohingya and Sri Lankan Muslims owes to the success of the narrative of Muslim extremism. This completes the circle in which there is then no compulsion to look for evidence. To take another illustration, threat perceptions are manufactured to obfuscate the decline in terror instances in Kashmir since 2004, in order to keep justification for the military grip on Kashmir alive. They are plausible to begin with, such as Pakistan's refusal to dismantle the terror infrastructure and Kashmiri disaffection having potential to rekindle the fire. However, the narrative of threat is so pitched that the status quo represented by the AFSPA is frozen. Consequently, the several peace initiatives in Kashmir have been wrecked on the shoals of comments of intelligence czars on their practicability and consequences. The 'wait and watch' policy in place in Kashmir at least for half a decade now owes to the intelligence picture that come 2014, it would be back in business in Kashmir for Pakistan. Needless to add, such a self-fulfilling prophecy serves the interests of the security sector best.  The inescapable conclusion is that intelligence agencies have not only been a major instrument of policy, but that this has been through policy choice. The unintended affect has been in India arriving at the cusp of reversal between the means and the master. What needs doing is not merely exercising political control over intelligence, but interrogating the understanding that makes intelligence the instrument of choice. This is the first step to keeping India secular, democratic and free over the long duree.  (The author writes at www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in)

What if Modi makes it to Race Course road

http://www.milligazette.com/print/issue/1-15-july-2013

Mr. Modi has thrown his hat in the ring. His opponent, the Congress scion, nowhere to be seen, it is apparent that NaMo will be seen as a credible prime ministerial candidate. The BJP had to discard its geriatric mascot and get another in his image, another pretender to the title of Sardar Patel II. However, the Nitesh Kumar early rebuff has unmistakably brought home that NaMo’s ascendance to 7 Racecourse Road is not quite certain. The effect of this will be in an energised campaign by Modi, that can be expected to witness subterfuge and outright lies. The ends being taken by his lobby as justifying the means, low blows will be par for the course. Therefore, suffering through a Modi era must be prepared for, howsoever distasteful the prospects of such miscarriage of democracy. What can such an era entail?

Firstly, getting Modi into the chair would require some manouvering by the right wing combine. The propaganda machinery will be in full swing and will draw on the work of unsuspecting conservative-realist strategists. Modi will have access to corporate coffers and middle class talent, in the hope that his reign will unleash the long awaited second phase of economic reform seen as necessary to put India into the China league. However, to unite the majority as a vote bank, Modi will emulate his predecessor in reviving the Ayodhya campaign, perhaps with a promise to build the temple at the site of the demolished mosque. Modi will project himself as the ‘strong man’ who can rout the Maoists at the gates. A contrived linkage will be drawn between the Maoists and Muslim radicals, conveying the imminence of a threat where none exists. The unsubtle scape-goating of the minority for bomb blasts will come into high gear. Instance of Hubli, Dilshadnagar and Malleswaram will be oftener. The Pakistan front will see some rhetorical fireworks in order to try and project the minority as a fifth column. The draw-down of the US from Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban will be seen as a looming ‘Muslim fundamentalist’ threat to India.

Clearly, these gimmicks to get Modi to office will outlive his getting there. They will form the agenda of his regime. Not only will the business classes prosper but will do so at expense of the voting public. In order that the elite is not distanced from the masses and the latter do not devour the former through a left-ward lurch, elite-mass integration will take place by projecting the problems that will arise on the ‘Other’. The ‘Other’ in the form of the Muslim minority has been assiduously manufactured by the right wing over the past three decades. The public however will be fed the toxic cocktail of religion and nationalism, with the minority as an internal bogeyman that is externally abetted. Thus, Modi will inject insecurity into society in order to reap stability in a ‘rally round the flag’ strategy. Projecting himself as the messiah to deliver the much-put-upon majority from a thousand years of eclipse, he will seek to perpetuate his regime. His support infrastructure in the sangh parivar will use the opportunity for ideological expansion with the intent of celebrating the coming centenary of the RSS in style. In other words, Modi will not be a one-term wonder, but will spend his first term creating the conditions for the next since his ideological benefactors need that much time to reset India. This scenario and its prospects suggest that it is not merely an election that is ahead but an era.

There is no guarantee of this, after all the majority community is not imbecile. With five thousand years of civilisation behind it, assuming that they will be taken in by Modi’s campaign is to disrespect their good sense and culture. Besides India’s poor, who form India’s voting public, are not likely to be overwhelmed in numbers by the Chetan Bhagat reading middle classes so enamoured of NaMo. Modi’s supposed developmental miracle in Gujarat has an underside that will directly affect them: that the rate of poverty reduction has been below India’s average even if the growth rate has  been higher. The former is what will swing the electoral verdict. Besides, his challenger, Mr. Gandhi, may yet have an ace up his sleeve, being cooked up and delivered by his think tank in Jawahar Bhawan. Congress has a way to woo masses, the latest being the idea of undercutting middlemen by delivering social security cheques variously named right into bank accounts of prospective voters. With right minded politicians as Nitesh Kumar willing to stand up to the communal tide, pessimism is unwarranted.

However, the paradox is that these challenges will prompt the saffron dirty tricks department to work overtime. They will attempt create conditions in which common sense is rudely pushed aside. The theme will be a Bush-like: ‘if you are not with us, you are against us’. Identity politics shamefacedly practiced can prove fatal to secular exercise of votes. Also, Modi’s is a considered move. He is not growing any younger. Waiting for longer will make him lose out to his younger opponent. He is clearly not playing to lose. Gujarat can no longer contain his ambition. He has to move. So Delhi it is. Being divisive and authoritarian, he can hardly be expected to forge coalitions a’la Vajpayee. He has therefore to fight to win. This means his campaign will be ruthless and designed to showcase him as a winner out to gain a place in the sun for the greater glory of Hinduism rather than a secular democratic India.

This suggests that while it may be premature to be pessimistic, it would be realistic to prepare for a Modi victory. Once in office, Modi will have the state machinery feeding from his hands; as he has had in Gujarat. As in the Emergency, state minions will compromise with governance, obeying RSS and VHP hatchet-men elevated to state power as ministers and legislators. The minority having been pushed to a corner will have to will itself to survive and outlast the dark times. How it does so will be a test not only of its moral strength but also that of the good sense of the majority community. To be sure, there will be challenges posed to the rulers. This will be from the secular-liberal spectrum, but is liable to be easily ignored and if required crushed. The more substantial backlash to corporate led growth will likely be from the Maoists, expanding their influence due to the fallout on the common man of economic policies serving sectional interest. Increased violence and the retribution may be witnessed. Given this environment and one in which the minority is directly victim, what must guide its response?

There is no doubt that whatever suggestions there may be in this column, there would be minority extremists mirroring majority extremists. Their dialogue of violence cannot but continue since being hotheads they are predisposed to such action. This may be inescapable in order to dampen the ardour of the majority extremists for any notion of a ‘final solution’. In any case, self-defence is a birthright. However, for the common people abjuring social violence will be necessary lest any association with violence lead to justifying the stereotype and retribution. Instead using the opportunities that are available for concentrating on bettering ones condition may be one way out. Forging regional, social and class unity will help with building bonds to sustain. Plumbing the wellsprings of religion and culture for resources for resilience may be required. False leaders will have to be run out of town. Collaborators will need to be educated and weaned away. Where incorrigible due to economic or power incentives they must be forced away from contaminating social spaces. Building social transparency and ties with neighbours of the majority community will act as propaganda by deed to dispel the false propaganda that will fill prime time. These ties built will over time help eject the regime and the reject its ideology. India will then emerge cleansed into democratic light.

This is a scenario that might not come to a pass. Awareness of it can energise the bulwark against the NaMo campaign beginning to unfold. It can have a sobering effect on otherwise intelligent and graceful people liable to be deluded into believing that they need a saviour through manufactured insecurity. In case the great Indian democratic project is usurped, then outlasting Hindutva may require prior creation of the reserves and imagination in a valiant democratic counter over the coming year.

By Firdaus Ahmed http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=17842 Kashmir Times Implications of a NaMo foreign policy NaMo has spoken. Narendra Modi, in his bid for prime ministership has fired off a salvo on foreign policy while addressing the Gujarati diaspora in the US. Disallowed from going to the US due to his government's record against minorities, including tribal Christians, he had to rest content to discourse via a video-uplink. His main point was that India's is a 'soft' policy, the implication being that with a 'strong leader' at the helm (meaning 'himself'), India could stride the world stage as a regional power and global player.  He said that while it was alright for the Chinese to have withdrawn from Indian territory at Daulat Beg Oldi, why did Indian forces need to do likewise when the territory was deemed Indian. The second illustration he used for India's pusillanimity was in the positive vibes on ascendance of Nawaz Sharif in Islamabad. He wondered why India needs to sup with Sharif when Pakistan had only recently taken back severed heads of Indian soldiers at the Line of Control. These allusions to the government's alleged foreign policy missteps, suggest that his would be a different foreign policy; an assertive, if not aggressive, one. What would such a foreign policy imply for the state and nation?  That the government is watchful of its flanks occupied by NaMo is evident from its somewhat stand-offish approach to the change of governments in its two prominent neighbours, China and Pakistan. While China has gone out of its way to make India as the first foreign destination for its new leader, Li Keqiang, Nawaz Sharif has indicated the promise of a new beginning. Yet, India has been reticent in its reciprocation. The opportunity could have been used to make bolder strides, but instead a 'wait and watch' game has been preferred by the government, naturally circumspect in light of approaching elections and the threat of NaMo taking advantage of any 'soft' actions it may take. This indicates that the NaMo critique is a serious one, and on that account needs fleshing out in terms of its implications both internally and externally.  However, the NaMo position cannot be taken as the traditional conservative-realist position on foreign and security policy. The conservative-realist impetus in India's policy has always been strong. Sardar Patel epitomised it in the early years. Nehru was influenced by it and is consequently termed a 'liberal-realist' by revisionist foreign policy wonks. Indira Gandhi was once likened by an adversary, Vajpayee, as Durga. Rajiv Gandhi was at the helm when India made its first bid for regional dominance. The NDA government has to its credit the Bomb, a war (Kargil) and a near war (Op Parakram). Likewise this government has presided over the largest buildup of India's security forces since 1962: the CRPF for internal security and the Indian military's expansion for its China border. In effect, India's policy can be taken as already a conservative-realist one. Therefore, if NaMo is still unimpressed, then he obviously intends to take it further, impelled by a self-image as Sardar Patel II. Any further, the policy can only be extremist; conservative to reactionary. How will such an India look? It is a popular myth that foreign and security policies are about the external domain. The reality is that factors - threats and opportunities - in the external sphere are mustered for internal political purposes. Therefore, the more significant drivers of foreign policy lie within a polity. Since a NaMo regime in its first tenure will want to self-perpetuate in order to remake India in the image of Gujarat, it would be more than a reprise of NDA I. Imagine a NaMo hand at the rudder rather than that of a Vajpayee. Recall Vajpayee could not dismiss Modi for the Gujarat carnage that he otherwise viewed as travesty of 'Rajdharma'. The opportunity in saddle would be to reset not merely foreign policy alone, but to use it to reset India. Externally, India will have China and Pakistan arraigned against India. While this will help warm the US to Modi, NaMo's preference for an India under siege owes to it giving ample scope for raising nationalist, if not chauvinist, passions. Nothing can do this better than a 'clear and present' 'danger at the gates'. Such false consciousness has political utility. It will help with homogenisation of a diverse country, along the lines argued for about a century by the right wing political-cultural formation, the RSS, the ideological fount and institutional anchor for Modi. Pakistan can be expected to respond appropriately by in the very least opening up the Kashmir front. Adversarial relations will be used internally to bracket India's largest minority with the external foe. This will carry the 'fifth column' discourse that made an advent with the 'IM' thesis over last decade to its logical conclusion. If the earlier Murli Manohar Joshi tenure is any indication, the ideological forces unleashed under the benign watch of an NDA II will use the contrived external-internal linkage to gain control not only over the policy space but also the imagination. Replicating the Gujarat model on a national scale would be to revisit Emergency. While then institutions crawled when they were merely asked to bend, this time their reaction can only be encouraging of authoritarianism, the leadership model of Modi in Gujarat. The million mutinies that will be sparked by Modi's economic model, another import from Gujarat, will be subject to the 'jackboot'. This will further energise the 'one volk, one fuehrer' thesis of the far right.  Since NaMo has fired the first shot in the security debate that will attend the run up to elections over the coming year, his strike must be engaged with. To dismiss it as revealing a mufassil level understanding of national security would be to miss the internal implications, to which Modi, the politician, is better attuned than foreign policy pundits. The conservative-realists who dominate the discourse need to be apprised of the dangers of their intellectual wares being appropriated for purposes that they have little understanding of, leave alone any control.  (The author can be contacted at Think South Asia: http://www.subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in/)

Indo-AfPak: Chanakya To The Rescue?

In becoming a strategic partner of Afghanistan, the message to Pakistan was that India could up the ante in case Pakistan took to its old ways in Kashmir

http://tehelka.com/indo-afpak-chanakya-to-the-rescue/

Close on the heels of Afghan President Karzai’s questioning of the Durand Line as border between Pakistan and his country and the defence minister of Afghanistan calling for military assistance from India, President Karzai arrived in Delhi for soliciting defence aid. Chanakya adherents in South Block, where the defence and foreign ministries vie for space, and Sardar Patel Bhawan, where the National Security Council is located, are no doubt delighted. Finally, they can work Kautilya’s theory that states ‘an enemy’s enemy is a friend’ and its Mandala corollary that concentric circles ring a state: the first circle of enemies followed by that of friends.

India can now look forward to making Pakistan face both ways, to its North and East. This can repay Pakistan for its participation along with China in creating a similar dilemma for India, the ‘two front’ problem. Incidentally, the latest reference to this perception in India was in the recently released Blue Book by China that discusses India. The proportion of India’s military might that is Pakistan centric automatically then is reduced, enabling partial redressing of the strategic balance by Pakistan. To proponents of Chanakya-niti, India by responding positively to Afghanistan can tip the scales in India’s favour.

Incidentally, this option has been India’s quiver now for over a decade. The National Democratic Alliance regime had in its initial phase attempted to take the ‘Gujral doctrine’ further. The doctrine was about reaching out asymmetrically to neighbours, though Pakistan had not been initially included. Even so, it was Gujral’s foreign secretary, Salman Haidar, who had set the frame that the BJP government could take forward. In the event, the Pakistan army sprung an ambush on Vajpayee’s Lahore initiative by ‘doing a Kargil’ on India.

Thereafter, with the aftermath of 9/11 providing a backdrop, India has contemplated getting even. The parliament attack provided justification while the Baluch uprising provided an opportunity. India’s presence as peace -building partner in Afghanistan provided India an access. The result was in Musharraf sending in over seven Pakistani brigades to pacify the Baluch. Pakistan has raised the issue of nexus that India has consistently denied. However, it is no coincidence that two chiefs of India’s intelligence of the period today run prominent conservative think tanks in Delhi.

After reminding Pakistan that it lived in a glass house and therefore must not throw stones at others, Vajpayee set the frame for the policy over the remainder of the decade. The result has been in a dialogue process carried forward by the successor UPA I regime that was derailed by 26/11. The liberal paradigm of economic interdependence soothing security concerns underlay relations in the period. In the event, the crisis revived the idea of keeping Pakistan unbalanced in order to defuse the tendency for strategic activism in its security establishment. This could be through using Afghanistan as a springboard.

The idea owes to the US intent to draw down beginning with Obama’s first term. The ‘boots on ground’ thesis made an appearance. It harked to the earlier soliciting of India’s troops by US for its Iraq misadventure, a request India narrowly managed to avoid. In Afghanistan, the US was more circumspect, aware that Pakistan was indispensible and would be riled were India to be more visible or militarily proactive. India therefore has played a discreet role in training the Afghan National Army, alongside its peace-building activities.

In becoming a strategic partner of Afghanistan, the message to Pakistan was that India could up the ante in case Pakistan took to its old ways in Kashmir. Pakistan has played with a straight bat in Kashmir. The Hizbul Mujahedeen chief, resident in Muzaffarabad, has indicated that he has pulled out his fighters from Kashmir. The hiatus however owes more to both states holding their breath on the way the dice will turn in 2014.

The first shot has already been fired by a leading candidate for the prime minister’s post, Narendra Modi, expressing his dissatisfaction with both India’s Pakistan and China policies in a video interaction with his supporters in the diaspora. This suggests that the Chanakyan idea will find ballast during the run up and possible traction thereafter in case of a conservative party victory at the polls. It will have the ‘strong leader’ – Modi’s term paraphrased – necessary to push it. It therefore merits dissection.

It supposedly has its advantages. The US would not mind a regional minder in the form of India stepping up, a role it has through its extensive military and strategic interface with India over the past decade assiduously prepared India for. To the US, it will prevent a vacuum developing that may otherwise get filled by China. Obliging the US will take India beyond the de-hyphenation with Pakistan. With China proving difficult, through its demonstration at DBO (Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh) recently, proximity with the US may be useful, if not indispensible. The downside may help keep Pakistan circumspect. The move will signal India’s arrival as a self-regarding regional power.

The pitfalls are apparent. Clearly, what the US could not do for Afghanistan despite of its ‘surge’, India cannot hope to: tame the Taliban. As for Pakistan being impressed, it would likely resort to reopening the Kashmir front. The Taliban will be only too willing to lend a hand. It will get India into a regional geopolitical contest with China. Surely, unsettled borders are an adequate headache between nuclear armed neighbours.

More importantly, it would pitch India and the erstwhile Northern Alliance versus Pakistan and Taliban. This renewed regional brawl will have internal political implications for India in terms of the political utility for the right of cornering India’s minority. With elections round the corner and prospects of a right wing government reasonably high, setting such a stage would be suicidal for the Congress government.

Therefore, India would do well to keep the disciples of Chanakya confined to the television studios rather than allowing them entry into policy chambers.

Daulat Beg Oldi: More than a storm in a tea cup

By Firdaus Ahmed

Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO)has now entered the lexicon. It will, if strategic commentary critical of the government is anything to go by, in future define the pusillanimity of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government over its two terms. UPA I had its inaction in face of 26/11, while UPA II would be remembered for its dissembling over DBO. Its attempts to forestall such criticism by taking the defence budget to over two lakh crore rupees, positioning India as the leading importer of arms over a five year period, expanding its army by adding a mountain corps comprising two divisions, surreptitiously lining up with the US in global geopolitics, and opening up high altitude airfields, incidentally even at DBO itself, will find mention only in the footnotes. That it has successfully managed to have the Chinese revert to their side of the Line of Actual Control without much ado will be forgotten.  The UPA has created these conditions for itself and also the current face off. The 'grand old party' has been unable to depart from the Nehruvian paradigm of viewing borders: Indian territory is what it claims as its own. The maximalist interpretation of where India's borders lie is deemed to have penetrated Indian psyche, constraining India's diplomatic position. Consequently, its negotiations with China have not gone beyond aiming to manage the interim till a final settlement. It has been unable and unwilling to condition the Indian mindset away from seeing borders as lines that can be negotiated.  India feels it can step back from the Nehruvian border paradigm only at this final stage. By a timeline up to end decade, it hopes to have geared up militarily. Its nuclear triad in place, offensive capability on the border and sea control through the air craft carriers in the pipeline will give it the confidence not only to impress China but more importantly to sell the inevitable tradeoffs to its people. This is seen as necessary to enable the government to convey to Indians that concessions, such as on Aksai Chin, are not through fear or coercion but arrived at between equals.  Also the centre-right ruling party is wary of its flank occupied as it is by its conservative challenger, the BJP, not-so-covertly assisted by far right formations. The right, claiming monopoly of nationalism, would not have allowed the Congress any leeway in terms of 'concessions'. The Congress, tied down by dynastic compulsions, cannot fault the Nehruvian legacy. Thus, this binds the UPA and at one move India finds itself in.  The run up to end decade has imponderables: China's actions being one. While China could otherwise have waited till end-decade, it is uneasy with India's US tilt. India, impressed by rising Chinese power, has sought to balance against this through forging relations with the US, as also a defence relationship in terms of military exercises and arms deals. Watching India cosying up with the US, China is sending India a signal to stay out of US designs for containment of China by a ring of democracies. The intrusion could alternatively have a lesser aim of diverting India while its ally, Pakistan, goes to the polls.  China knows it has the upper hand at the moment, one set to dissipate as India gets its act together. This explains its choice of timing. Its point conveyed or, in the alternative explanation, with Pakistan going into elections without a crisis on its India border, the DBO intrusion, sensibly played down by it, has been retracted. The visit of the Chinese premier due soon will ensure that it is confined to history. However, such instances will likely recur in case the LAC is not converted into an IB soon.  It is noteworthy that China's borders with all states other than India and its ally, Bhutan, have been settled. Assuming that Indians cannot countenance the concessions negotiations necessarily imply, India has held back. Believing that China has a head start in its military and infrastructure development in Tibet, India is attempting to catch up with border roads, military deployments and airfield construction coming up simultaneously in a truncated timeframe. The strategic discourse has provided the cover in painting China as a threat and a future India-China clash over space in Asia. The UPA has so far been mindful of not being stampeded by strategist-manipulated and media-fanned public opinion, thanks to a China hand at the rudder, that of National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon. Over reacting to DBO, compelled by elections just over the horizon, can find India replicating the 'forward policy', adopted in the run up to 1962.  India has the option of reappraising the assumption. Studies ranging from the early one by Neville Maxwell to the more recent scholarly works by AG Noorani and Srinath Raghavan suggest that there is more to India's position on the border than the popular narrative of China stabbing India in the back in 1962. Political investment is needed in educating the Indian public that borders are never self-ordained but mutually arrived at.  This admittedly is easier said than done because DBO has wider connotations. What can be expected to figure in strategic discourse generated by a right tilting strategic community will be its showing up India as a 'soft state'. The corollary left unstated in sober commentary, but circulated uninhibitedly in middle class e-groups, will be that a different political order, if not a 'strong man', is needed lead endangered India to salvage national pride. The Congress, on the back-foot over at least half a decade, cannot hope to win the prime-time battle.  The two agreements on peace and tranquility on the Line of Actual Control could not prevent DBO. Neither party can guarantee that a future stand-off will not come to blows. There is even the argument that the agreements were to buy India time to get out of tight spot the nineties brought on by the budget squeeze and Kashmir. Having broken out now it can take on China. However, it overlooks China's advantages. The Kargil War in which small scale mountain warfare was witnessed made clear that the investment to offset these advantages is prohibitive in light of competing priorities. Besides, the ugly nationalism that such border incidents ignite hardly helps for sobriety in politics or in reacting. Therefore, the alternative option of public education must be worked towards, perhaps beginning with inclusion in a party's manifesto for the forthcoming elections. Since both leading parties have a sense of ownership of the policy as it is now two decades old, finding a promise for such a shift in theirs may be difficult, but not impossible. Both had bought into a policy that eventually envisages barter. Only, the timing of this needs being advanced by half a decade to the very next term of government, whichever party wins. They will be surprised to find that the public will unlikely begrudge either, enabling India to get out of the Nehruvian bind with bipartisan backing.  (The author is a blogger at Think South Asia http://kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=16664/)

Countering insurgency and sexual violence

By Firdaus Ahmed

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=16237 The Indian Army's powers under Armed Forces Special Powers Act have rightly figured in the debate surrounding sexual violence particularly since the barbaric rape in New Delhi early this year. To the pro-army side, the army is self-regulating and any incidents that do take place are 'aberrations'. To the activists, the army is high on testosterone all the while in counterinsurgency and therefore requires its powers clipped. The army's own position when faced with allegations of sexual transgressions in operational areas by its members is that it takes action where warranted but notes that most accusations are propaganda of anti-national forces. The truth is, as is usually the case, somewhere in between. The debate understandably was taken on board by the Justice Verma Committee and the outcome has figured in its speedily arrived at recommendations. Justice JS Verma requires that the infamous provision of the AFSPA that calls for sanction by the central government for initiating prosecution against armed forces personnel be removed where a sexual offence is alleged. This has something for both supporters of the army and its critics. It does not degrade the powers the military thinks it needs in such areas. But it does remove the cover of impunity that critics of the military argue allows the military to get away. However, the army's view that it would open the army up to false allegations needs to be taken on board. The counter insurgency environment is considerably complex. The insurgents have an active body of over ground workers who can be deployed as a dirty tricks department. Once in the dragnet of the Indian court system, particularly one subject to militant intimidation, well meaning soldiers acting in good faith could find themselves on the firing line. Truth will be the first casualty and morale the second. Vindication, after the better part of youth has been expended fighting off the allegation, is hardly the fate a nation would want for those who have signed up to defend it to the peril of their lives. If soldiers are sent into such environments by a government, all they ask is a fair cover. Such cover from military excesses no doubt must be afforded citizens in the affected areas also. Justice Verma's second point on 'command responsibility', a senior's duty to prevent and take action in such cases, is pertinent here. If the senior leadership sets a command climate that encourages juniors to take an unfair advantage of additional powers, the central government must demand of the military hierarchy the reason why it has not proceeded with prosecution on its own under the Army Act. Tactical level commanders such as the infamous Major Avatar Singh are as much a product of the command climate set by their seniors as they are subject to their inner psychological pathologies. Where explanation offered by the army is found wanting, it must be entered into confidential records of culpable commanders under supervision of the ministry and where necessary administrative, and depending on the gravity, criminal proceedings be launched against erring commanders. Merely shifting them out to other assignments as was the case with the division commander in the Pathribal incident is not enough. That this was done in the case suggests that the state had much to hide and could not risk having its officials prosecuted, lest they spill the beans. Command climate, the degree of permissiveness (or otherwise) of violations in conducting counter insurgency operations, is perhaps the most significant variable that either promotes or deters violations. A command climate is permissive when it allows greater leeway to tactical commanders in pursuit of quantifiable 'results' such as militants killed. The tacit bargain is in the commander overlooking cutting of corners in such pursuit so long as 'results' in terms of statistics of militants killed keep rolling in. Such commanders end up having to look the other way in cases of transgressions since they would be implicated for abetting short cuts in means and methods in case they quarrel with their tools. The infamous Manorama Devi case is apt example. Why did the army defend the indefensible? The popular narrative of the case holds water. Believing Manorama Devi to be an explosives expert, the army had ordered her elimination in custody, lest she be let off by the courts. Obviously, those the army ordered to carry out the killing took advantage of the situation. Fearing that the officer would spill the beans if tried for rape and custodial death, the hierarchy had to protect him and the troops involved. The logic in higher command echelons was perhaps that the image of the army was more important than justice. The government for its part, equally privy to the facts of the case, and unwilling to face down the army or face uproar in the North East, played for time by ordering a committee on AFSPA, the BP Jeevan Reddy Committee, and having outlasted the agitations, dispensed with the committee's recommendations. Even where the command climate is strictly professional, as was the case in Kashmir in the early nineties, a Kunan Poshpora can yet occur. At the time the commanding general in the Valley was MA Zaki, described by Manoj Joshi in his book Lost Rebellion as: 'fortunately for India the man commanding the Indian Army's 15th Corps was a cool professional soldier, a Hyderabadi Muslim who had served the Army with distinction. The courageous and deeply religious officer was fated to play a major role in the affairs of the state.' MA Zaki later led Jamia Millia Islamia out of troubled times in the late nineties. That Kunan Poshpora dates to his tenure suggests that there is more to the case than the cult status the case has through its retelling become as one of a mass rape. Reputed bureaucrat, Wajahat Habibullah, divisional commissioner in the Valley when the incident occurred, refers to it in his book on Kashmir, Kashmir: The Dying of the Light, informing that he had recommended an inquiry in his preliminary inquiry report. The government instead had the then chairperson of the Press Trust of India, BG Verghese, look into the incident as part of his remit that had wider terms of reference. That the press was exploited by the over ground militants to replicate their narrative of Kunan Poshpora was one reason why BG Verghese headed to Kashmir. In his autobiography, First Draft, Verghese recounts that he was provided with the fullest access by Zaki to all relevant actors including officers and soldiers of the offending infantry unit. He was unable to find evidence either of the act or of an attempted cover up. In the event, the brigade commander had ordered search operations at night against explicit orders in the corps zone, thereby creating conditions in which sexual assault could occur. The opportunity was seized on by the militant sympathisers irrespective of the facts of the case and the long term implications for the lives of the women of the village. Blowing the case out of proportion in an information war campaign, truth was lost and so was justice. Had Wajahat Habibullah been more assertive then or not moved out of the Valley to a post in Delhi, a separate inquiry could have established the truth. The army was open to this. Tavleen Singh in her book, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, recounts how Zaki reacted to her critical questioning of an incident of army high handedness in early 1990 resulting in civilian deaths. Zaki had admitted to it being 'unfortunate'. There was no attempt to underplay or avoid it. This indicates that an incident of the proportions of Kunan Poshpora could not have escaped Zaki's professional eye, particularly due to his renown as a commander leading from the front. Incidentally, he suffered a graze to his head in a fire fight with militants in one such encounter as head of the army in the Valley. Given such a record of integrity and grit, insinuations as attend the Kunan Poshpora now need revisiting. Stridency does not alone make for truth. It instead has the effect of the army's case becoming more plausible in their pointing out the perils of ambush by litigation. Siddharth Varadarajan has suggested an improvement to deter the government from sitting on decisions or denying clearances altogether, while preserving the provision of prior governmental permission. The government must be required, by an amendment to the Act, to furnish reasons for refusal for prosecution. Its reason must also be subject to judicial review. In case the court decides that the evidence outweighs the reason given, it can either override the government or, where reasons of national security and state are furnished, it could order the army to exercise military justice. This has precedence in the Pathribal killings case in which the army has been asked by the court to proceed with the court martial of those who killed innocent civilians to pass off the killings as those of militants involved in the Chittisingpora incident. That in its judgment the court has upheld the cover from prosecution in the Act implies that the provision is here to stay. Therefore, ensuring accountability of the ministry in its power to withhold or grant sanctions for prosecution must be built into the Act through amendment. Justice Verma's third point on review of the AFSPA in areas where it is applicable adds to the weighty voices against AFSPA. Yet, despite the solid case against the law and the credentials of those, such as late Justice Verma, arrayed against is, it appears set to stay on. Clearly, India is not out of the woods yet in terms of armed challenges to the state that require an armed response. What Justice Verma's report succeeds in doing is to push the argument past the tipping point that the law must be amended. Even then the law by itself is not enough. The command climate in the theatre of operations must - and can be - such as to make the law's existence irrelevant.

Afzal Guru: The Man Who Knew Too Much

Milligazette 1-15 March 13

http://www.milligazette.com/print/issue/1-15-march-2013

A wit’s answer to the question that is set to become an eternal one: ‘Why did they hang Afzal Guru?’, reads: ‘Afzal Guru was hanged because the Indian law doesn't allow electric chair, lethal injection, stoning to death, guillotine or any other form of execution.’ However, there is another straight answer: He knew too much. He had already exposed the Indian state’s behavior in Kashmir in his pleadings for justice over the years. But the true face of the state is unremarkable. He knew more. He was the exposed link into a chain of subterfuge leading into the STF (Special Task Force), a unit of Kashmiri rebels who turned coat.

He had pointed this out while alive referring to a certain ‘Tariq’ in the shadowy world of the renegade rebels who set the stage for India to prevail in Kashmir by systematically killing their former comrades and their supporters using fair means and foul. The outfit called Ikhwan was inducted into the police to regularize them. Their notoriety was such that one campaign promise of a political party that won in the polls in 2002 was that they would be disbanded. They were rechristened instead, regularized and hopefully more disciplined since. That Pakistani trained jihadis were degenerate and their terror acts reprehensible, the cliché ‘fight fire with fire’ provided legitimacy to such paramilitary outfits. In that troubled era in their heyday they served to undertake the ‘dirty war’ on behalf of the state.

The ‘conspiracy theory’ needs airing at this juncture. Was the STF used, and did it, in turn, use Afzal Guru for nefarious purpose? Spelling out the conspiracy theory is necessary. This has been done competently elsewhere by the likes of Arundhati Roy and Nirmalangshu Mukherjee. It is with reason they have titled the volume in which their case appears: 13 December, a Reader: The Strange Case of the Attack on the Indian Parliament(Penguin India, pp. 233, Rs. 200, 2006). The very term ‘conspiracy’ is a way to marginalize what could well be the truth. The fact that no inquiry has gone into the parliamentary attack, the truth has not been plumbed. With Afzal gone, it is now also probably beyond reach.

As with any ‘strange case’, it is best to begin with the motives. Parliament attack led up to the Indian military mobilization. That the mobilization stopped at the border and did not cross it suggests more than just statesmanship on Prime Minister Vajpayee’s part. It indicates a strategy, one premeditated and not one thought up at the spur of the moment in the crisis brought on by the dastardly attack. Crisis environments do not lend themselves to cool heads. Stopping at the border was  cool headed decision. That can only have been induced by a predetermined plan of action. In effect, the conspiracy theory has it that the parliament attack was a doing of the intelligence agency put to it by the national security apparatus at the apex level. The one who could have more information on this, the then national security adviser and principal secretary, Mr. Brajeah Mishra, is now no more to confirm this. That in his absence his denial can be anticipated makes the theory a ‘conspiracy theory’.

The diplomatic coercion - coercive diplomacy in strategic terms –mounted thereafter also needed a trigger. Pakistan had crept back into American good books with 9/11. India that had begun courting the US ever since it burst its way into the nuclear club, felt left out in the cold. It needed to embarrass Pakistan, snap America out of its Musharraf infatuation. India needed a trigger. A trigger could not have waited for a bunch of obliging terrorists to come round and timelystorm the parliament. India required instead manufacturing a trigger. This is where the STF comes in.

Given the nature of the violent conflict on in Kashmir at the time, the existence of detention centers is well known. That these would have had inmates with very little chance of seeing freedom once again can also be conceded. Consider that in case a few of these inmates – who were incarcerated since they wanted to harm India – were given a choice of dying a death they had always imagined for themselves, one of a jihadi, how many would have agreed to the proposal. It is obvious that there would be at least some wanting a crack at India, dying in a blaze of imagined glory rather than blindfolded in front of a death squad.  It can be surmised that there would have been no shortage of recruits from those dark chambers. All it needed now was to put together the supporting cast and the equipment, and have a cover story. It is here that unfortunate Afzal figures in the story. The rest as they say is history; but most of it unwritten, deliberately kept unknown, and now, unknowable.

Afzal therefore had to go. The shortcomings in his trial are now well known. The unacceptable reason for his hanging – the demand of the ‘collective conscience’ – is reversion to the bygone days of human sacrifice. He would have gone earlier had the ruling formation and its lead party of the period of the parliament attack returned to power in 2004. They had much to hide. The Congress that has been around since needed him alive to keep the pressure on that party, now in opposition. However, the tide having turned against the Congress to the extent the writing is on the wall, a human sacrifice was decreed for its revival. This explains the timing of Afzal’s departure. As for the Congress, it will prove an insincere act equivalent to the opening of the locks of Babri Masjid the last time it was under siege.

Perhaps dark clouds overhead in that era – nuclear tests, Kandahar hijack, fidayeen attacks, Kargil War, Chittisingpora massacre, Srinagar assembly bombing, right wing rule, 9/11, military rule in the neighbor etc – made the intelligence games necessary. These are games nations play since Chanakyan times. Machivelli testifies that these are indulgences of princes. When elephants fight, grass suffers. Afzal Guru was but another blade of grass.

India’s security under Modi

countercurrents.org, Kashmir Times
http://www.countercurrents.org/ahmed140413.htm
http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=15163



That Mr. Modi is attempting to get to Delhi is by now no secret. It is also apparent that the Congress will find it hard to stay on at the Centre for another term. Finally, the third front alternative has yet to emerge. Given this configuration, it is well nigh possible that hopes of Mr. Modi’s not inconsiderable constituency of support, that includes big business, cultural nationalists, well-heeled Gujaratis, traditional conservatives, Chetan Bhagat inspired youth brigade etc, can yet come about.  

His supporters point to Modi’s record in Gujarat to make their case that this will be good for India’s continuing rise as a power. Their argument is anchored in Modi’s personality. To them he has the economic credentials to push through the pending reforms that the Congress has been at the cusp of for all of its second term but has been unable to deliver. He has also kept his state largely terrorism free through resolute leadership and can therefore be relied on to take on security challenges, unlike the pusillanimity of politicians in general and the Congress in particular in face of crises such as 26/11.

While Modi’s supporters rely on his leadership persona to suggest he is the right choice; his detractors point in the same direction to arrive at a conclusion to the contrary. To them, Modi, seen as a divisive and authoritarian figure, is the problem. To Modi baiters, his ‘record’ in Gujarat includes the carnage of 2002 and his culpability. To them it is not a case of inaction but active complicity that condemns Modi.

One question that has not figured so far is: What will be the security consequences of Modi’s elevation to PM? To most prosperity begets security. With prosperity, resources are made available for security. With a firm Modi hand on the security rudder, India’s redoubtable security agencies will keep India secure.  Unfortunately, the prosperity-security link is seldom so easy.

The internal security consequences of ‘Modi as PM’ seem self-evident. A consequence of Modi’s economic policies will likely spur the leftist challenge. In replicating the Gujarat model for rest of India, Modi will create ‘have nots’ that will with time form a constituency for Maoist penetration of the rest of India from their heartland currently confined to Central India.

Modi’s ascent could also see the resurfacing of minority perpetrated terror. In the short term, extremist elements will challenge the triumphalism of majoritarian extremists. In the broader social context, India’s minority has been wary of the rise of cultural nationalists in Indian polity. This suspicion of the majoritarian project will heighten its minority complex. The spread of Hindutva that was interrupted by the Congress interregnum will have a redoubled impetus since this time at the helm will be without the restraining hand of a Vajpayee. A defensive reaction from geographic and societal periphery may instigate violence.

Such internal security scenarios will provoke a ‘proactive’ steps, reminiscent of LK Advani, ‘iron man’ aspirant as home minister in the NDA regime. But if Modi’s association with his home ministers in his state is any guide Modi’s methods will not be merely suppressive, as is the wont of a state. It bears recall that one home minister was assassinated in unexplained circumstance and another was in jail temporarily for his role in custodial killings. What can be expected is that a permissive atmosphere for security forces to be less mindful for citizens’ rights will emerge. Intelligence agencies, that have little accountability at the best of times, will be much more innovative in cutting corners. The information war theme for legitimising such action will be painting of a threat from the coalescing of ‘red’ and ‘green’ terror. In short, a vicious circle can be predicted on the internal security front.  

On the external security front, the usual refrain has been that right wing governments are good for security. They are more mindful of security issues and have the tacit respect of security related institutions such as the military and intelligence services that traditionally lean conservative. Given their image and record, they have a wider berth for peace initiatives, a luxury that is not permitted to other parties such as for instance the Congress that have to be ever watchful of their flanks fearing criticism of ‘sell out’ for such initiatives.

Yet again the case for either side would be based on Modi’s leadership traits. His supporters would point to his decisiveness, claiming that India’s response to incidents like 26/11 would be firm and unmistakable. His detractors would say that decisiveness in the wrong direction can only be disastrous in crisis. The authoritarian streak in Modi will keep from diverse viewpoints necessary in strategic decision making being voiced. Silencing of dissent will make group think emerge with its associated consequences. In a nuclear neighbourhood, exhibiting political will – that nuclear deterrent theorists in India so breathlessly require of the political decision maker – is not necessarily the best or only recourse as strategists advocating political resolve portray.    

It is predicted that the India-Pakistan equations will return to square one with the departure of the west from Afghanistan in 2014. In Kashmir it is obvious that there is enough tinder awaiting the proverbial spark. In case Mr. Modi is tested with a crisis, he would be liable to fall victim to his image as worthy Gujarati descendant of the original ‘iron man’, Sardar Patel. To distance himself from the choices Congress has made in such crisis, he will be liable to privilege the military options over the diplomatic. In effect, decisions will be made not by strategic sense in the alternatives, but impulses rooted in character traits of the decision maker and in the nature of the group that such decision makers bring forth.

In respect of his prospective government’s approach to China, it would be reliant on the foundations being laid under the UPA: deterrence and external balancing by proximity to the west led democratic camp. The expectation that Modi will prove a liability for the relationship with the west in light of his human rights record is false since the west has never been known to privilege human rights considerations over its strategic objectives. In fact, UK’s actions of late suggest that Modi’s rehabilitation is well underway.

Modi for his part, not needing to wear his nationalism on his sleeve, will hardly be coy. In effect, India will overtly bid for frontline status in the anti-China front being forged by the US in its rebalancing towards Asia currently underway. The difference is that the Congress is getting to this position surreptitiously. The upshot will be that a ‘two front’ situation – a contingency assiduously being prepared for by the armed forces – will no longer be a ‘contingency’. It will be the strategic circumstance for India.

But security is not only physical. It is also about security of values and the kind of nation and state India wishes to be. The last time the BJP was in power it appointed a committee to recommend changes in the Constitution. Luckily for the country, the electorate denied it a second term. This time round there would be greater hurry in saffron ideologues to unfurl their ideological agenda. It is easier to push change in a climate vitiated by an adverse security condition as painted. Therefore, the security threat will not be from without as much from the government itself.   

While there are other good reasons for the voter to keep Mr. Modi out, security must hereon also figure among them.

A Good School For Maqbool

http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/feb/fah-schools.htm

11 February 2013 - A revealing, if unsurprising, observation brings out starkly how marginalised the Muslim community is, and is set to remain over the middle term. I happened to browse through the results of the Class V Aryabhatta Mathematics Inter-School Competition, posted on the website of one of the participating institutions. The competition is an annual event which tests the mathematical skills of students in middle school.

Eighty nine schools participated, including all the elite schools of Delhi. One school, Hamdard Public School, Sangam Vihar, fielded 10 Muslim student participants. Of the other 880 students from 88 schools (each school sending in 10 students of Class V), only eight had Muslim names, making a figure of less than one per cent. All told 13 children with Muslim names participated out of 880, making a total of two per cent. From the list of schools, it is evident that these are the elite public schools in the national capital.

The percentage of Muslims in Delhi is about 12 per cent. This implies that Muslim representation has been one sixth of what it could, and perhaps should, have been in a city-wide competition.

The refrain of late has been that a Muslim middle class is developing, implying that Muslims are beginning to do well in the country. This does not seem to be borne out by this stark statistic. It could have been expected that traces of the so-called Muslim middle class would show up in such data. However, the opposite seems to be true; the touted take off of the Muslim community has not quite begun. Muslims remain marginalized.

It seems that only Muslim-run schools now have Muslim students. That is a double disadvantage. For other schools, it is to deprive them of the diversity that reflects the national composition. For Muslims, it suggests two things. One is that their children do not manage to qualify for such schools. But more pertinently, it is possible that the lack of exposure to Muslims in general and Muslim children, due to underrepresentation, sets up a vicious circle in which schools are reluctant to give Muslim children the benefit of doubt. There could be a more sinister reason to this that regrettably must also be included here: such schools may have an unwritten policy that keeps Muslim children out.

What are the long term implications of this? In case the emerging Muslim middle class is kept out, as suggested by the statistics, Muslims will continue to be disadvantaged for some time to come. Not being represented in this cohort of young children means that they will be underrepresented in the work force in middle class-favoured occupations for at least a score years and more. This means the already existing gap between Muslims and forward communities will expand. In fact, since Muslims of the middle class are not normally covered by reservations, they will lose out to communities in other religions that are so favoured. Marginalisation will only deepen.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE www.indiatogether.org

What needs to be done? 

The administration needs looking at the figures of Muslim children in schools. A finding of 'Nil' would indicate clearly a policy that keeps them out. Such schools must be encouraged to reform, if not penalized. 'Naming and shaming' is one way, but unlikely to work since such schools can brazenly resort to a communal rationale, knowing that the times are such that they will get away.

Change is therefore easier said than done. At least one school in the middle class locality I live in is reputed to have no Muslim children in its rolls. This cannot be by default. It is by design, one in which the management, staff and education department officials are culpable. Parents from my neighbourhood are equally culpable in turning a blind eye at best and at worst condoning and insisting on the practice.

This is not a stand-alone feature. It is linked to the well-known nation-wide malady of Muslims not finding flats to buy or rent in 'respectable' neighbourhoods - note use of the apostrophes here! Not living in such locales, they don't get to send their children to either middle class or elite schools either. This personal aside is entirely unremarkable in terms of amounting almost to a defining feature of modern India.

The representative lists of Aryabhatta prize competitors can be perused for other clues such as the numbers of children with upper caste names or the absence of names that are usually found in lower castes. Allowance can be made for Sanskritisation by way of which the Hindu majority is being rapidly homogenized towards a telling political outcome. The picture could reveal much more than the backwardness of India's largest minority discussed here. It would tell about the warts on India's complexion that even as enlightened a document as the Constitution has been unable to erase over three score years and as many generations of Indians.

One way out could be to sensitise schools to include more children from the marginalised peoples, without compromising merit. This will be to the betterment in terms of well-rounded growth of their students. After all, much learning in school is from peers. Anecdotally, it is fairly evident that having friends and class fellows of other religious and ethnic backgrounds does make for a secular and tolerant outlook among children. This can be done by parents' bodies interfacing with schools and with the management to oversee the change in the best interests of their wards.

Middle class India is a reality that has surfaced unmistakably over this decade. Anti-corruption and a fair treatment of women have been causes that have seen national level assertiveness from this class. One area calling out for its attention is to make school-going a level playing field.
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http://www.milligazette.com/print/issue/16-31-december-2012