India-Pakistan: In a dialogue of sorts
http://epaper.kashmirtimes.in/index.aspx?page=7
The Uri
attack is being taken as one in a series of Pakistani outrages over the recent
past in J&K. The tally from the Pathankot airfield attack could have been
equally grave, with even aviation assets figuring in the toll. Likewise, had
the terrorists taken the other gate nearby, they might well have ended up in
married accommodation in police lines in the Gurdaspur attack. This time round the terrorists got luckier, with
fire doing most of the killing. Consequently, the calls for getting tough on
Pakistan appear unexceptionable.
However, what if the Uri attack
is seen as part of a sequence of attacks on each other that India and Pakistan
are engaged in over the past few years? This requires stretching the
imagination a bit in light of the persistent factoid that India clipped its
offensive and covert operations capability when IK Gujral was prime minister.
The constant refrain in the strategic discourse is that India is forever on the
receiving end, needs to upgrade its capabilities and shift gears into an
offensive mode.
Against such conditioning, to
imply that India has been giving-as-good-as-it-gets would require asking
Indians to suspend disbelief for a moment. Whereas Pakistan’s resort to
terrorism is more in-your-face, India’s using Afghanistan as spring-board is
much less so, making it difficult to comprehend. This involves giving some credence
to Pakistani allegations, and Pakistan is not exactly believable. Nevertheless,
it would be naïve to in face of the pattern of terrorism in Pakistan that we
have nothing to do with it.
Subject to the terrorism
inflicted on India, it would be delusive to believe that we have only fought
back with war rhetoric and diplomacy. India has not used its military despite
the military’s well-practiced ‘quick off the blocks’ routine of ‘Cold Start’.
It has also not activated the military along the Line of Control. Superficially,
it would appear that India is only relying on diplomacy and information war
strategies. It is trite to repeat that for effect, diplomacy and rhetoric need
to be backed by muscle. It begs credulity that India under the strongmen – Messrs.
Modi and Doval – is merely relying on the ‘rope-a-dope’ trick, taking the
punches and riding out the swings. Since it is not economic or military muscle
India is displaying, surely, such muscle must likely be through some other
instrument of national power. Clearly, there is more to India’s response lately
than meets the eye. So let’s get real.
Our very own intelligence
operatives - with Mr. Doval in the lead - are not second best, even if ISI has
greater notoriety. Our boys have much experience behind them, even if they have
not seen off a superpower and are about to see off another like the ISI. We
have Bangladesh to our credit. We created Frankenstein Prabhakaran. We had a
finger in the Sindhi and Mohajir pies. Kulbhushan Yadav, supposedly caught red-handed
at intelligence work, is Indian. Besides, if Indian liberals and radicals are
even half-right, we have at least some expertise in false-flag operations. And, finally, we own the copyright to Chanakyan thought.
Taking off our blinkers would
help with a realistic perspective. Doing so will enabe seeing the Uri attack
as one of a series of attacks indulged in by both intelligence establishments. Pakistan’s
persistence with terrorism implies that its intelligence agencies are in a
dialogue using terrorism with their Indian counterparts. Through this dialogic
violence the two national security establishments are communicating with each
other. The dialogue seeks out each other’s limits. While India is trying to
flush Pakistan down the failed state route through proxy war using what
Pakistan considers ‘bad terrorists’, Pakistan for its part is out to sensitise
India that the more successful India gets at this, the more Pakistan would
ensure that it drags India down with it too. This is diplomacy by dirtier
means. The tone of the two states in the recent UN General Assembly session is
played out more directly, through a bloodier and meaner instrument.
The Kashmir issue and the current
turmoil in Kashmir merely provide a setting. At one level, Pakistan would like
to keep the problem in and of Kashmir alive; particularly, in light of India’s spin
on the interpretation of the dispute to being retrieval of PoK and other areas
from Pakistan. This explains Pakistan’s dressing up its terror attacks as
attacks on legitimate military targets, plausibly attempting to lower their
‘terror’ quotient. Pushed on the back-foot by unrest in Kashmir, India is
attempting to divert attention with references to Balochistan, even though
doing so lets the cat out of the bag.
The Kashmir issue itself is
resolvable, with governments on both sides including the more nationalist ones
– NDA I and Musharraf respectively – coming close to agreeing on putting it on
a back burner. That none has succeeded owes to the issue being a symptom. At yet
another – higher - level, the game is much bigger than Kashmir.
For India it is to transcend
Pakistan. For sane strategists doing so will help India break out of the
regional box that consigns it at best as a regional power. But to closet
Hindutvavadi strategists it is to transcend a history perceived in the Hindu
nationalist narrative as one of subjugation. Those at the political helm and
with hands on the reins of the national security establishment believe that India
has had 1200 years of foreign domination that its seventy years of independence
era have not exorcised. Pakistan is the ‘thorn’ that India needs to rid itself
off for reconciling with itself, a necessary first step to regaining its millennia-old,
millennia-long, pre-Muslim-advent, glory.
This is music to Pakistani ears. For
Pakistan – or through the eyes of its military – this implies ensuring Pakistan
does not go under, into an Indian (read Hindu) cultural embrace. Kashmir helps
keep the military atop the Pakistani power structure. The military – aloft - keeps
Pakistan from losing its Islamic moorings. This reading of Pakistan’s
vulnerability to Indian colonization is shared by Islamists and terror minders
in Pakistan. Whereas the Pakistani military has to be mindful of not killing
the goose that lays the golden egg – Pakistan - the Islamists have no such
obligation; instead, they might like to profit from India and Pakistan coming
to blows. This makes the Pakistani military’s position difficult; not only must
it take on India so as to keep the jihadists from running away with the agenda,
but also to ensure that jihadists in their enthusiasm don’t burn the house
down.
This better explains the protracted
stand-off between the two, described by one long-time South Asia observer as a
hundred-year war. Kashmir is not the ‘root cause’. It cannot be solved since it
is symptom of a deeper – prior - ‘root cause’: religious extremism. Whereas in
Pakistan it is through the army – that de facto runs the country - and
Islamists being on the same page, in India religious nationalists are now in
control of the government itself. Whereas in Pakistan Islamism has only
subverted the state, in India religious nationalism now has – worse - captured
it. Whereas in Pakistan the extremist-terror link is rather visible, in India
it is much less so. This does not make India’s subscription to mirroring forces
any less significant. That Pakistan needs a reset is widely acknowledged; but
that India also needs a like prescription needs first acknowledging.
Thus far the Pakistani
establishment used terror for its ends. Hereon, India shall mirror it. The
dialogue though will likely continue, never mind that just as one between its
diplomats, it is the dialogue of the deaf. The upshot will be a mirroring in
India of what is already apparent in Pakistan. This, until some terror group
gets remarkably lucky, and when it does so get, lift the dialogue to a
crescendo: through nuclear blows. To paraphrase a wit’s view of the 1965 War as
a ‘communal riot with tanks’, the next is one with nukes. Finally, India would
have exorcised its Muslim demon and Pakistan its Hindu specter;
notwithstanding, ‘husha, busha, we all fall down’.