India-Pak talks cancellation

Indo-Pak talks: Getting past the eyewash

http://indiatogether.org/the-real-reason-behind-india-pakistan-talks-being-called-off-op-ed

21 August 2014 

India summarily cancelled the late-August foreign secretary level talks with Pakistan, which were scheduled consequent to Sharif’s visit to Delhi for Modi’s swearing-in ceremony. This has come as a surprise. Since the ostensible reason given is that the Pakistani envoy in Delhi met separatist elements of the Kashmiri leadership against the counsel of the Foreign Secretary, the reason given only adds to the surprise, since such meetings are usually unremarkable.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/the-real-reason-behind-india-pakistan-talks-being-called-off-op-ed

Power play

The foreign ministry can hardly be expected to be behind the move since it stood to gain by getting into the driver’s seat of the India-Pakistan process with resumption of talks. The resumption of talks earlier had also been led by the foreign secretaries. They had met in Thimpu in February 2011 after Manmohan Singh and Zardari had agreed to resume talks in a meeting on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in Thimpu in 2010.

That round of talks had been aborted in 2013 after the UPA government’s stupor in its second term was such that the political investment necessary to revive the process was rendered impossible in face of the border clash in January that year, in which an Indian soldier had been beheaded. This aborted precedent suggests the first explanation for the cancellation, namely, struggle between the two sides - those wanting talks and those against it.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/the-real-reason-behind-india-pakistan-talks-being-called-off-op-ed

Strategic shifts

There are two further explanations. One is based on strategic logic. India’s deterrence in place against Pakistan is not of the order as to preclude proxy war. Its conventional rearmament is not complete as yet. For instance, avid military watcher, Rahul Bedi informs that its artillery arm is woefully short even to enable the ‘manoeuvers by fire’ as part of ‘cold start’ doctrine.

Further, Pakistan in late 2013 tested the tactical nuclear missile system, Nasr. These embolden Pakistan to up the ante in Kashmir. This long-anticipated juncture is now at hand since the US is readying to pull up stakes from the region soon. Therefore, it is not the right time for India to turn to talks since Pakistan would get the impression that this is from a position of weakness.

India has under the new government launched into a new programme of military upgrading. 

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE - http://indiatogether.org/the-real-reason-behind-india-pakistan-talks-being-called-off-op-ed

These measures indicate that the pace of armament has increased. This is not only because the government is demonstrating more energy to distinguish itself from its predecessor, but also because it is shifting its strategic doctrine.

While Modi in his visit to Leh described India’s strategic doctrine as one of deterrence, India already has the ability to deter since in the same speech he also mentioned Pakistan’s movement to proxy war because of its inability to take Kashmir militarily. What India’s continued armament suggests is that India, unable to stop Pakistan’s proxy war, is determined to roll it back.

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE -  http://indiatogether.org/the-real-reason-behind-india-pakistan-talks-being-called-off-op-ed

However, even in such a grand strategic scheme, talks now would have bought India time to complete its rearmament since they would not have proceeded meaningfully in any case. For instance, even though India’s deterrence against China is falling into place slowly, with road building ongoing alongside raising of the mountain strike corps, India is engaging diplomatically with China. Its president is visiting New Delhi next month. Talks could have been a supplement on the Pakistan front too. The calling off of talks therefore does not have a strategic rationale.

The real reason: Man above the moment?

That brings one to the last possibility. It is in the person of the prime minister. Modi has been personalising governance. He was the face of Gujarat while he was at its helm. He is replicating that model of leadership in Delhi.

Not appointing a full time defence minister, Modi is himself keeping a keen eye on defence. He has already commissioned two naval ships, been to J&K twice over and visited BARC. He is to visit Siachen soon. His government has set aside money for the ‘one rank one pension’ scheme, which was approved but not implemented by the last government. He has given the go-ahead for the war memorial on India Gate lawns.

In this scheme of personalisation, there is no question of talks on Kashmir. India has already indicated it is an internal matter. Modi is looking at a culmination of his electoral victory in which the BJP gets within sight of Srinagar’s assembly in the coming polls.

It is a fallacy that foreign policy is based on external coordinates and strategic factors. It is, like most else, driven by internal politics, which in India’s case is currently entirely focused on the personality of the prime minister. Therefore, Pakistan’s attempt to foreground Kashmir in the talks needed to be repelled outright.

Modi through his war-leader act is relying on the army’s continued management of the status-quo in Kashmir. Hopefully, Pakistan’s inevitable challenge will not come as a surprise.

the silence on majoritarian groups

The Fear That Does Not Speak Its Name

http://www.countercurrents.org/ahmed200814.htm

20 August, 2014
Subcontinentalmusings.blogspot.in

NN Vohra, the current governor of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, who spent the better part of the eighties and nineties on Raisina Hill in New Delhi, moving from South to North Block in between, ought to on that account know much more than he lets on in the first Jasjit Singh memorial lecture delivered at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis last month. Listing non-state groups that threaten internal security, he said,

Another phenomenon, relatively more recent, relates to the emergence of certain radical counter-groups which have been organised with the primary objective of countering the Jihadi terror networks. It needs being noted that the activities of such counter groups have the potential of spreading disharmony and divisiveness which could generate wide spread communal violence and result in irreparably damaging the secular fabric of our democracy (http://www.idsa.in/resources/speech/FirstJasjitSinghMemorialLecture.html).

Among the groups he lists are proxy war groups in J&K, the Indian Mujahedeen, Left Wing extremists, North East insurgents and Sikh militants. Since these are spelt out, it is curious that the hon’ble Governor leaves out mentioning who is the one he is referring to in the extract above. Why does the governor not put a name to the group he is talking about? Can this be a mere oversight?

Not quite. The governor no doubt has learnt as has the rest of India that among the first things the new government did on assuming office was have his successor in North Block, the incumbent home secretary, make a polite call to at least six other governors showing them the door. It is evident that there was no such call made to Srinagar. The criteria for choosing which capital not to put a call through to was that the governor there should have only two years left to retire and therefore could be allowed to serve out his tenure. This is not the case with Mr. Vohra, and yet he was spared a call, though he was appointed and his tenure was extended by the previous government.

Is there a clue in this as to why Mr. Vohra did not mention who refers to in this extract from his speech? Mr. Vohra apparently knows which side his bread is buttered and he is not interested in receving a mid night call as have his peers in other Raj Bhawans. Afterall the BJP-RSS combine may yet have aging stalwarts who have either to be placed out of the way or rewarded with sinecures. Aware of who is in 7 Race Course road, he has, practical man that he is, censored himself even as he has ventured bold to list the group without naming it.

The groups with no name are majoritarian supremacists. Terming them in this way one can get round the use of ‘hindu’ such as enters into ‘hindutva group’ or hindu extremists. Dragging the word ‘hindu’ into describing them is injustice to the religion they answer to. (Appending ‘Islamic’ and ‘muslim’ to counterpart groups is however now par for the course.) Even such a value neutral term elided Shri Vohra. But then from the velvet gloves he treats these groups, it is apparent he was not trying hard either.
He says they are a ‘recent phenomenon’. As home secretary in the early nineties he is well aware that their existence is not ‘recent’. In his speech he talks about the problems in the federal arrangement of getting the UP government, then under the BJP, to respond to the crisis in Ayodhya. He courageously, but delicately, lays the blame for the fall of the mosque and the fallout on its foot dragging. He has also led the task force on the criminal-politician nexus after the Mumbai terror attacks post Ayodhya. Though the report is classified, it surely would not have glossed over counterpart groups to Dawood Ibrahim’s from the majority community. Therefore, Mr. Vohra’s reticence, if not mischaracterisation, is strange.

But his delicacy in tiptoeing round the mention of the group without naming it, does not end at that. He says their primary objective is to counter jihadi terror networks. As is well known the jihadi terror network thesis is, unlike the presence of the majoritarian extremists who date to the first quarter of last century, a relatively recent phenomenon. It is arguable if at all there is this ‘network’ given the evidence that the hype surrounding minority extremists is just that, hype, some of which is through ignorance, some through peer pressure, but much more due to motivated commentary.

The latter owes also to planted intelligence briefings by officials who should know better, but were either ideologically inclined or doing a non-governmental ‘cultural’ organisation’s bidding. That apart, the so-called ‘sleeper cells’ that form this ‘jihadi network’ can be at best be dated to the Gujarat carnage. It is only after that the ‘network’ emerged as an internal threat. Though how that was manufactured is also known from the manner the Sohrabuddin and Ishrat Jahan cases have turned out. What emerges then is that in case this so-called ‘network’ exists, it is the recent anti-supremacist phenomenon, rather than the other way round as Shri Vohra puts it.

That said, it is to Mr. Vohra’s credit that he spells out that the groups he leaves unnamed, in his words,

have the potential of spreading disharmony and divisiveness which could generate wide spread communal violence and result in irreparably damaging the secular fabric of our democracy.

This echoes the wikileaks revealed take of Rahul Gandhi on these groups. Now that Mr. Gandhi is in the political doghouse, he is no longer fashionable to quote. Nevertheless, it is clear from this clear sightedness that Shri Vohra deserves his Padma Vibhushan, awarded by the last government in 2007 for his admirable body of work in national security dating back to his days in the military and later as an administrator coping with the Khalistani militancy.

This reticence on Mr. Vohra’s part, and his equally prescient observation, together tell of the new era that India has transited into. And remember India is not quite two months into the tunnel yet.

Modi's commitment trap

Modi forges a commitment trap http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=35885

" Party manifestos are useful but not the best start point for looking for a government's strategic perspective. Manifestos are somewhat tarred by the likelihood of being populist, intended as they are to garner votes. They understandably end up being 'all things to all people'. In India's case, as its strategic doctrine has not been articulated, it can instead be better gleaned instead by following national security related speeches. In the case of the previous government, in which the prime minister was famously silent, the government's strategic perspective was visible in the speeches of his National Security Adviser, Mr. Shivshankar Menon. His successor being silent so far, in case of the current government, the prime minister's speeches can be a useful start point. The last speech at Badami Bagh threw up some interesting highlights on what Mr. Modi's security outlook was shaping up to be. This time round, on his second visit to J&K since taking over his chair, his speech to the uniformed fraternity in Ladakh has already provided rich fare for primetime commentary. While prime time commentators have no doubt moved on to more immediate and pressing subjects, such as the sudden cancellation of India-Pakistan talks, it may be worthwhile to pause at the speech for a little while longer to see if it provides any clues as to why the cancellation. Even though it did create quite a stir at the 9-o'clock slot on TV, the prime minister did not quite say anything new. His website reports him as saying that a neighbouring country  (Pakistan was not named), having exhausted its ability to wage war, is instead resorting to proxy war and terrorism. This has taken more lives than war itself. India is committed to mobilize 'humanitarian forces' against the menace of terrorism. The fact is that Pakistan has exhausted the potential to change the status quo in Kashmir by military means. Cut to size in 1971, it went nuclear covertly. This by the early eighties provided it cover for proxy war, first in Punjab, and then, by end-decade in Kashmir. This is in keeping with the concept known in strategic theory as 'Stability/Instability paradox'. The concept has it that threat of escalation to the nuclear level, ensures stability at the conventional level. This opens up the sub-conventional space for proxy war. For tackling proxy war, in particular, its manifestation in a mega terror attack, Mr. Modi mentions two strategies: one is mobilizing 'humanitarian forces' and the second is military preparedness. The reference to 'humanitarian forces' is either poor drafting of his speech or translation of his words. It is unclear who these forces are. Maybe he means international players against terrorism, such as the US. So, this can be taken as reference to the diplomatic prong of strategy: isolate and compel Pakistan to change its strategy of proxy war. This is perhaps feasible in light of the US departure from the region. In exiting Afghanistan substantially by 2016, US reliance on Pakistan will be negligible. This reliance had ensured  that it intervened in 2002 to preserve Pakistan from conventional retribution by India after the parliament attack. Now, with little US interest at stake, Pakistan would be relatively vulnerable. However, the reverse is also true. With US pressure on it, Pakistan did clamp down on proxy war since 2004. Without US pressure, this could well escalate once again. And US will have little reason to clamp down again, leave alone the pressure points for this. Pakistan has taken care with plausible deniability measures to be able to distance itself from mega terror attacks. Its civilian government could truthfully say it had nothing to do with it. The military may point to rogue elements it cannot control, which has an element of truth. The international community may baulk at sanctioning Pakistan lest the extremists gain in power, as they would be better placed to profit from any downturn. The international community may look at the 'pull' factors such as unresolved territorial disputes, human rights violations etc. There may be those within the international community less inclined to sanction Pakistan, such as for instance the Gulf states for geopolitical reasons. China may not want to its cats-paw in the region go under. Therefore, India may end up going it alone, with much mealy-mouthed support from 'humanitarian forces'. In fact, for India's pains, it may end up putting the Kashmir problem, now on the back burner, back into the frame. That leaves India with the military prong of strategy. It is apparently girding this up as its fallback position. In case the diplomatic prong confronts Pakistani skepticism or obstruction, the conventional prong of strategy can kick-in. Firstly, this can bolster the diplomatic prong in that India's military preparations in the background will lend urgency to crisis diplomacy attending the aftermath of a mega terror attack. The international community, aware that India cannot end up once again only doing coercive diplomacy as in 2003; this may be the real thing. Therefore, it will feel pressured into reacting in real time with pressure on Pakistan to make the necessary noises as a first step and to take some placatory steps, even if not back track all the way. This would be good strategy, but one that can at best yield limited results. It can only be productive if India agrees to talk meaningfully. This is unthinkable since India's longstanding position has been that it will not negotiate at the point of a gun. A nationalist government such as Mr. Modi's is unlikely to go down this track. Therefore, diplomatic moves will be only enough to contain the crisis and set the stage for the next one, but not to roll back the problem. Secondly, the military prong can be deployed to administer conventional punishment. The air force has indicated a readiness, having drawn up a 5000 targets long list. The integrated battle groups of the army are ready, though it may use these selectively, perhaps launching only a few initially. The intention will be to convey a message that there is more to come unless Pakistan changes tack. The problem is that if this is a limited foray and even if there is more forming-up in the wake for delivering greater punishment, military-led Pakistan may up-the-ante itself. It may be pressured from its right wing not to play ball. This would prove escalatory. Even if India believes it has 'escalation dominance', meaning it can punish Pakistan militarily at both levels conventional and nuclear, the fact is that in the end, escalation cannot be ruled out. The strategic logic of the situation, that India would rely on to convince Pakistan to back down, is just as likely as not to be overtaken by the political logic within Pakistan. What emerges is that Mr. Modi's twin-track crisis strategy - diplomacy and military - is unlikely to yield result at the crunch. Pakistan's 'deep state', even without the strategic logic outlined here, would for ideological reasons fail to be impressed. This implies that sooner or later Mr. Modi will have to rely on his twin-track policy, found here to hold less water than Mr. Modi suspects. It is possible that the offer being made to Pakistan is simple: take it or leave it. The army in the chair there, the answer is predictable. Pakistan has already rejected the accusation as 'baseless rhetoric'. Taking cue, India has called off the talks. Perhaps, the speech was to manufacture a rationale for just such a juncture. The commitment trap Mr. Modi has dug up is certainty of trouble ahead. In this game of 'chicken', knowing Mr. Modi and his adviser, Mr. Dovel, won't, let's hope Pakistan's army blinks first!

The resounding silence on majoritarian extremism

Majoritarian terrorism: The resounding silence

Milligazette: 16-31 August 2014, p. 5

Shri NN Vohra delivered the first Jasjit Singh memorial lecture last month. Listing non-state groups that threaten internal security, he said,

Another phenomenon, relatively more recent, relates to the emergence of certain radical counter-groups which have been organised with the primary objective of countering the Jihadi terror networks. It needs being noted that the activities of such counter groups have the potential of spreading disharmony and divisiveness which could generate wide spread communal violence and result in irreparably damaging the secular fabric of our democracy (http://www.idsa.in/resources/speech/FirstJasjitSinghMemorialLecture.html).

Among the groups he lists are proxy war groups in J&K, the Indian Mujahedeen, Left Wing extremists, North East insurgents and Sikh militants. Since these are spelt out, it is curious that the hon’ble Governor leaves out mentioning who is the one he is referring to in the extract above.

The groups with no name are majoritarian supremacists. Terming them in this way one can get round the use of ‘hindu’ such as enters into ‘hindutva group’ or hindu extremists. Dragging the word ‘hindu’ into describing them is injustice to the religion they answer to. (Appending ‘Islamic’ and ‘muslim’ to counterpart groups is however now par for the course.) A value neutral term is better than one that defiles one of the great world religions, Hinduism. It is hoped that analysts would reciprocate in not using jihad and Islamic in describing extremist Muslims groups.  

Mr. Vohra says the unnamed extremists are a ‘recent phenomenon’. As home secretary in the early nineties he is well aware that their existence is not ‘recent’. He says their primary objective is to counter jihadi terror networks. The presence of the majoritarian extremists who date to the first quarter of last century with the formation of squads of ‘Khaki chaddis’ aping the brown shirts of the Nazis and Mussolini’s storm troopers, are a pheonomenon that outdates minority extremists by at least three quarters of a century. Further, it is arguable if at all there is this ‘network’ given the evidence that the hype surrounding minority extremists is just that, hype, some of which is through ignorance, some through peer pressure, but much more due to motivated commentary. At best, the so-called ‘sleeper cells’ that form this ‘jihadi network’ can be be dated to the Gujarat carnage. After all, if the state abandoned its responsibility of protection of all communities with such impunity as to send the chief minister to become prime minister, it would be very foolish indeed for any community to trust such a state without reservations. Self-defence is part of human life, and if mohallas have acquired a local body of youth to defend them in such extreme emergencies, they cannot be called sleeper cells. Quite clearly such groups must not substitute the state nor be vigilantes. But they are liable to be called up to serve the community in case the state is subverted and does not do its duty. There has to be some other term for such groups, formed in face of an emergency and for defensive purpose only. Therefore, this network is a recent anti-supremacist phenomenon such as it is, rather than the other way round.

Mr. Vohra clear-sightedly spells out that the threat from the unnamed groups thus:

‘(they) have the potential of spreading disharmony and divisiveness which could generate wide spread communal violence and result in irreparably damaging the secular fabric of our democracy.’

This echoes the wikileaks revealed take of Rahul Gandhi on these groups. Now that Mr. Gandhi is in the political doghouse, he is no longer fashionable to quote. However, if the princeling has one reasonable quote to his credit then it is this one. But Mr. Vohra’s silence can be taken of a piece with the otherwise resounding silence surrounding triumphalism of militant Hindutva groups in the wake of elections. The prime minister is under question for his silence, almost reminiscent of the Manmohan era. It is true that Mr. Modi’s silence is across the board and seemingly to do with his marshaling of his time for his developmentalist governance tasks. However, the fact is that since the right wing, believing that they own the space now that he is in power, require to be disabused of this notion. This is something only the PM can do. But then, non-recognition that a problem stares India in the face is what this article has been about. It’s about a problem that dare not speak its name.

The expectation is that the prime minister may with a diktat bring majoritarian extremists to heel. The expectation is that now that he has promised an inclusive developmentalist state, he would use the opportunity to tune down his support base and demonstrate he is PM of all-India. This would be good. However, there are draw backs. Firstly, it would be authoritarian and reinforce a wrong tendency in government. Secondly, it may lead to the government saying something and doing something else less overtly. So the majoritarian agenda may be progressed without the noise that is currently attending it and drawing it into question. This will then proceed surreptitiously, but surely, and, therefore, more dangerously.

Clearly, there is a case for giving Mr. Modi his honey-moon period, a period he claims he has been denied. He can yet be taken seriously on his development agenda. However, his resounding silence that now echoes in the words of the likes of no less than Mr. Vohra recounted above is not helping his agenda any.

Finally, a word on Mr. Vohra’s recommendation, that has found mention in the many reports that he is credited with, namely of a core national security cadre in the bureaucracy. This is to control the home and defence ministries with bureaucrats who would know something about national security. As with any good idea, this too has an underside. If such a core cadre was to be captured by an ideology or a political formation, then it would be capable of controlling the state. For instance, the right wing has had a problem taking over the Indian state owing to India’s diversity. However, it may try to gain control over such a core bureaucracy and thereby achieve what is denied to it democratically. Take for instance the manner certain elements in India’s intelligence apparatus have been suborned by right wing ideology. Consider the manner the Gujarat police and its home ministry bureaucrats have been subverted. This means that it is better to have India’s diversity inform its administrative system rather than create conditions for short sighted reasons for a takeover of the system from within by extremist forces.

Therefore, Mr. Vohra’s speech has unintendedly served a useful purpose of enabling the discussion here. It was a speech befitting the first memorial lecture in memory of an eminent security analyst but not in the manner Mr. Vohra imagined.   

Normalisation of the terror narrative: The response

Normalisation of the terror narrative: The response

Milligazette: 1-15 August 2014, p. 5
http://www.milligazette.com/print/issue/1-15-august-2014

The great Indian soap opera, popular across the board in India and indeed counter-intutively also in Afghanistan, is not without its critics. It projects a pretty reactionary image of society, social and family relationships as good and desirable. It concerns itself with the rich and paints the poor out of the screen. If at all the poor find representation, it is as household workers low down in the food chain. Intended as platform for the advertising industry capturing attention of bored housewives, soap operas however cannot be left alone. Their largely regressive portrayal of the social sphere is being scrutinised by social scientists. Therefore, any comment on the Muslim community that these episodes make needs to be watched.
Take for instance the serial Uttaran (http://youtu.be/EYe59R2O-XQ). In an episode in which the heroine is seen as running away from home, her travels are depicted in a railway compartment. In this scene, there are two devout Muslims, a man and a woman, shown as fellow travellers. Their devoutness is depicted by the man’s attire and beard and the lady at prayer. The long and shot of it is that the woman eventually turns out a suicide bomber with the man guiding her into terror.
Could this digression of the soap in question into this scene have been unwitting? This is possible in that the terror narrative in the media in which Muslims are shown as villains has been on now for over a decade. The script writer has obviously internalized the narrative, as has been intended all along by the master script writers behind this terror narrative. They have evidently reaped the gains of their decades-long effort in the installation of the new regime in Delhi. With the new regime in place, prejudices, supposedly dating back centuries, can be expected to get full play. By this yardstick this can be attributed to script writer, director and the producer
However it is equally perhaps no co-incidence that the scene was aired soon as the new regime has stepped in. It cannot be negated that the scene was not thought up and inserted at the bidding of political players outside of the soap industry. We can expect more such innovative depictions of India’s largest minority as India proceeds further into the tunnel. This is but a trailer of the political project that is already unfolding. The normalization of viewing the minority as terrorists has drawn blood already, that of a young breadwinner walking down a Pune road one night recently.  Wearing the markers of the minority is now to invite threatening attention, if not danger. Being conservative is to be linked in the minds’ eye to radicals, needing to be disciplined by violence.
What must the response be? Clearly, it has to be considered and with the long term in view. A knee jerk reaction to the episode in question is not consequential and will lead to dissipation of energy. The wider aspect of getting India out of the tunnel it has just got into needs to inform any action. In this the community is not alone. Liberal Hindus are alongside. Most Hindus who may have voted this regime to power for reasons relating to economy rather than cultural nationalist convictions would also likely have their blinkers fall away as the regime emerges in its true colours. In effect, the minority, though currently under siege, is not alone and will progressively cease standing apart. In short, the response must emerge not from a sense of victimhood or haplessness, but from a sense of eventual triumph. However, the interim would still need being negotiated. The quest for the other end of the tunnel would need being within the darkness of the deepening tunnel. Therefore, realism will have to inform the community’s response, in sync with that of the liberals in the majority community.
The first and most obvious direction is that the narrative must not be allowed to be reinforced by illegal acts or violence on part of the hot-headed element normally found in all communities. These acts are liable to be used to reinforce the false image created. This will alienate liberals among the majority, of whom an alliance is to be forged. Secondly, there has to be a constant scrutiny of such depictions, recording and appropriate criticism and counter in the media, in order that the counter point is at a minimum registered if not accepted. This will require hands-on engagement by professionals in the academia and media, and not be left to the politically inclined few. Thirdly, a reaching out and openness to the majority community in every forum and network, from business to sports, must be deployed to dispel the image being foisted. This will cause the necessary dissonance in minds of interlocutors, eventually leading up to the project of demonisation of the minority being received with incredulity since it does not measure up to their lived experience and interaction with the minority. This will eventually lead to displacement of the hold of rightists over the minds of people and in turn from the power.
Innovative strategies can be expected from the backers of the regime to further the political project of majoritarian supremacy, now that they believe they have a favourable government in power. This will entail equally imaginative and robust strategies for countering and displacing by the other side. This may not emerge from political parties, particularly since the Congress stands routed, as was the Left earlier. Traditional Muslim centric parties have their limitations in that they are restricted to their constituencies and mandates. They would require reinventing themselves to do justice to their image of themselves as representing the community. The response would require including the advantaged and the middle classes, who can no longer comfortably occupy their cocoons disengaged from the wider community. Ultimately, it is fight that the liberals among the majority would need fighting on behalf of all, including minorities. In this India’s largest minority can be the firmest ally.  

kashmir and gaza

The echo of Gaza closer home http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=34991 http://caravandaily.com/portal/echoes-of-gaza-closer-home/

" By no means is providing the oxygen of publicity to motivated columnists a palatable task. Even the satisfaction of refuting them does not compensate for the gains they make in having their argument aired, albeit only to be debunked. Identifying them as owners of the argument, howsoever flawed, is useful for them, in this age of visibility passing for wisdom. Here one's reservations on this score are given a go-bye to make a passing mention to the article dean of the Jindal School of International Relations in the Asian Age, a paper once presided over by MJ Akbar (http://www.asianage.com/columnists/children-conflict-773). The worthy writes of Kashmiris agitating over a far off war. He notes that one of them got killed in the bargain. He rues this loss of life for an unknown cause, informing of the manner these agitators are paid to go out on the street. To him this is best explained by figures of unemployment of youth close to 50 per cent. It is only natural for him to alight on the stipend as somehow delegitimising the protests since it makes for a cadre of professional agitators, described by one forgettable army general in Badami Bagh as participating in 'agitational terrorism'. The neo-liberal in the intellectual comes forth in this unidimensional economic analysis. Understandably, he goes on to articulate that if these youth had a job, they would not be on the streets. So QED: open up the space to private capital, retire the state administration, and look and behold! Kashmir will be transformed into the secular crown of India. It is also only natural for him to miss that point that a quarter century after the Indian state has faced up to crowds in Kashmir, it has not mastered the art of non-lethal crowd control. This is so despite a defence budget tripling over this century. If it is the paramilitary that is at the spear tip in Kashmir, then a greater proportion of this should rightly have gone to outfitting them. Such a thought may not occur to busy bodies of international affairs and strategic studies faculties. They barter access for their intellectual capacities. For instance, the good dean was enroute back from Gurez, where he was most unlikely to have been hosted by either a local or an NGO. To think the government has declared its intent to dole out more for strategic studies departments and increase their numbers across the country. This can only expand the tribe of those insensitive to such questions. No such largesse is for peace studies departments, such as the one in Awantipore, that could lend some balance to the discourse. The question as to why the Indian state does not care to resort to non-lethal means is easy to answer. It is because it does not need to since there is the AFSPA and the Disturbed Areas Act in force. Next, punitive action such as this helps deter more vigorous demonstrations. It conveys the resolve of the state not to tolerate a repeat of 2009 and 2010. It helps nip a problem in the bud  in that the situation is stabilised before it spirals out of control resulting in more deaths. Also, just as it silenced its parliament from expressing disapproval of Israel, it is not interested in having this disapproval shown on the streets instead. Remember, it is Israel that has given the technology, not a little hardware and perhaps even the tactical ideas on anti-infiltration along the line of control. However, other than commercial reasons, and the fact that India serves as the 'rest and recuperation' base for the Israeli conscripts between their tenures on West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon, there are other good reasons. India too may require to 'mow the lawn' in the neighbourhood as Israel does time and again in Gaza and Lebanon. The expectation of a spill over from AfPak when the US departs informs India's Kashmir strategy. It explains the inaction over the past decade in which violence levels were low enough to justify political resolution efforts. That these remained frozen instead suggests Indian strategy of wait and watch. Now that the wait is over, the 'mow the lawn' strategy may be on the cards. It does not want to have the rationale for this challenged even before it gets to operationalise it. Finally, the state is aware that even if the situation in Gaza does boil the blood of the faithful, particularly as the good dean reminds us after a session in the mosque with the bearded haranguer, the succeeding agitations are less directed at Israel than the state itself. The stone is not intended for Israel. Given the pent up angst and each succeeding Kashmiri generation, rightly termed by the good dean as 'children of conflict', wanting to prove itself against the Indian state, the situation can turn nasty. Magnification of this in the mind of the poor paramilitary soldier peering out of his bunker through the concertina coils at advancing crowds, leads to lethal use of force. It escapes the academic that such demonstrations cannot be for the money that no doubt is also doled out. Facing possible death and certainty of loss of avenues to earn, particularly with the Kashmir police charging agitators so as to make their record untenable for government and other jobs, is certainly not due to the stipend they may receive for their pains. Instead, they pocket the money since they need it and take their chances on the street, again since they need to but for different reasons. It is with good reason that India has ordered the UN mission in Kashmir, the UNMOGIP, out of its building in Delhi. UNMOGIP has been focus of agitations in Kashmir in the early nineties in which crowds would petition the UN. Telling the visiting Ladsous, head of UN peacekeeping, off, is to keep the UN on the defensive. When the time comes for India to 'mow the lawn', it would like the same impunity as Israel, since it would be giving the same rationale: self defence. While political inaction has attended Kashmir, by no means has India been inactive on other fronts. It has topped the table of arms imports, importing more than three times the amount of the next two states - China and Pakistan - combined. Unlike in November 2008, it is better prepared. It is engaged in demonstrating its resolve in, to quote the military, giving a 'befitting reply' to the spate of infiltration attempts this summer, some as the army commander reminds owing to the fallout from the Pakistani operation Zarb e Azb in North Waziristan. It is only hoped that India has not borrowed another leaf out of Israel's book, that of keeping the surroundings unstable. So long as enemies are fighting each other, they remain busy at each other's throats. This strategy no doubt explains the extent to which the nasty turn of the 'Arab spring' has left Israel as seemingly the only stable place in the region, its Iron Dome notwithstanding. By this yardstick, India could pull the plug on Pakistan and allow it to go down the tube. From press hagiographies, its NSA appears easily capable of divining the way. This way it can more easily ward off fallout of implosion in Pakistan, rather than have a stable Pakistan divert its jihadi energy India's way. Kashmir having busted the Fukuyama thesis at its very conception in the early nineties, it is clear that history has not ended yet. The state's preparedness has reduced any incentive for it to resolve the problem. The two foreign secretaries will meet no doubt to arrive at an excuse for further bloodletting: 'Look we tried'. Israel has provided the precedence. Proximity to the US is set to increase with the ongoing Kerry visit and follow up Hegel visit, in the run up to the Modi's US yatra. India will have the cover to proceed to cauterise the restive Islamic crescent at the Neelam, Jhelum, Ravi and Sutlej. More visits of the learned professor can be expected and some gratis advice.