#3441, 23 August 2011
Interrogating Security Expansionism in India
email: firdyahmed@yahoo.com
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/interrogating-security-expansionism-in-india-3441.html
The head of a think-tank writing in The Tribune (http://bit.ly/o0qXbO) lists military capabilities that India requires up to fifteen years. In strategic circles, ever since remarks of the former army chief were possibly deliberately leaked, the ‘threat’ has been magnified to becoming a ‘twinned’ threat from Pakistan and China combined.
The capabilities deemed desirable are to include a mountain strike corps both in the Northeast and in J&K. It is possible that with time that would mean two for J&K; one for each front. Offensive capabilities for defensive formations are to be created in imitation of those done in the plains prompted by ‘Cold Start’. The three strike corps in the plains are to continue for conventional deterrence purposes. Firepower resources, in particular precision guided munitions, are to be augmented for stand-off degradation, since territory may not be as relevant as an objective. Two rapid reaction-cum-air assault divisions (with an amphibious brigade each) are suggested.
It may be recalled that elsewhere the former Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee had required a wide-ranging intercontinental ballistic missile capability. The DRDO is keen on working on technology for a BMD system, despite its known shortcomings to deliver on more mundane equipment. Further, the Army has requested for placing of the ITBP under its command on the China border. The budget for internal security, handled by the MHA, has gone up three times over the past decade.
This article makes two observations on the foregoing threat-mongering. One is that this indicates expansionism in the security sector, with the consequences that amount to militarization. The second is on possible social consequences, generally neglected in strategic discussions.
The NSA in his Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture asked for moderation in the criticisms mounted by think-tanks, stating, "This also requires that some of our media and commentators, whose unquestioned brilliance is regularly on display lambasting other countries for their politics and policies, learn the virtues of moderation." His take was, "why create self-fulfilling prophesies of conflict with powerful neighbours like China?"
Our goal must be defence, not offense, unless offense is necessary for deterrence or to protect India's ability to continue its own transformation. The think-tank recommendations, in their own words, go well beyond this: “Genuine deterrence can come only from the ability to take the fight deep into the adversary’s territory through the launching of major offensive operations.”
Clearly, there is a case for debate within the national security system on this divergence, with the NSA persuading the army that their recipe - ‘the defence of porous borders requires us to learn new rules for the use and combination of force, persuasion and deterrence, alongside other more benign means’ - holds water.
The second neglected dimension of the social impact of militarization requires acknowledging firstly that recruiting patterns in the security forces have a built in bias towards the ‘Hindi heartland’. In theory this is based on the recruitable male population of a state. Those traditionally contributing to military numbers stand to gain.
There are two implications. One is in the channelling of revenue expenditure of the government in terms of VI pay commission enhanced salaries and perks into certain areas. It is symptomatic of hidden affirmative action. The second is in the diversity of the country not finding reflection in the composition of security forces. A narrower concept of nationalism, emanating from the Hindi heartland, finds sway. This may be at odds with ethnically and culturally diverse host communities, where the deployment takes place. In areas of insurgency, it accentuates the cultural gap.
A result of increased deployment, particularly in thinly populated borderlands, is on the social landscape. For instance, Gautam Naulakha records that the move to provide the Rashtriya Rifles with cantonment accommodation in Kashmir has elicited a negative response from the people and the state administration since it involves land allocation. Likewise, the increase by two divisions in the Northeast and the recommendation of a strike corps there, implies that there would be a larger visibility and imprint on the consciousness of the people of a different ethnic stock. This remains an understudied dimension.
Also, an over-developed security sector draws discourse, policy direction and resources away from a development to a defence template. Higher returns in the defence sector will draw human resources into it. This has qualitative implications for the competing sectors. A fallout is advantaged groups developing a stake in India’s identity as a ‘garrison state’, at the expense of groups on the territorial and economic margins.
While economic growth has released the monies, this has alternative uses overlooked in threat induced expansion. Sole reliance on strategic considerations amounts to strategic determinism. This could prove particularly hurtful if the strategic calculus is misinformed and, worse, possibly motivated by parochial concerns.
The NSA is right in his warning on the dangers of India as a ‘premature superpower’ (Martin Wolf): “Their rise, as that of Wilhelmine Germany or militarist Japan, was cut short prematurely.”
Tuesday, August 23, 2011
Saturday, August 13, 2011
http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/aug/fah-control.htm
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Whose command? Whose control?
14 August 2011 - The significance of the strategic nuclear complex was brought out in the controversy over remarks of the retiring Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that India's response to nuclear attack would be 'very heavy'. The remarks reportedly did not amuse his boss, the defence minister, as they were made when the India-Pakistan foreign ministers talks were ongoing.
To what extent is the Chairman COSC the custodian of the nuclear baton? The current juncture provides an opportunity to reflect on the wider issue of command and control of the nuclear complex, both in peace-time and during wars.
The Saxena task force will reportedly work on a national security doctrine. The idea is that once the national security survey is done, then the structures necessary to keep the country secure would be thought through. The task force's composition and parameters have not been officially released yet; the time is yet ripe to influence its terms of reference to include the nuclear complex.
Command and control of the nuclear complex takes place at different levels. The upper - political - level is of democratic control by the political leadership, which is in turn accountable to the parliament. The second, grand strategic level, is through the national security council system integrating national security experts, the military and technologists. The third one, the strategic level, is the operational one of the Strategic Forces Command.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org
There are problems at the all three levels. Relatively lesser known are those existing at the strategic level, since the work of the SFC is necessarily shrouded in secrecy. At this level, integrating the technologist into the chain of command is possibly a challenge since the military holds the delivery systems, the atomic energy technologist is entrusted with the weapons core and the DRDO representative is in charge of the weapons assembly.
At the second level, it is well known that the COSC is 'double hatted'. He is not only the chief of his service but 'first among equals' among the three chiefs. He is by the latter responsibility also to oversee the SFC. The relationship between the military man in charge of the SFC, the COSC and the NSA is also somewhat nebulous. This results in inadequate attention to the working of the SFC by either the NSA, who presumably would expect the COSC to do the supervisory role, or the COSC, who cannot possibly have the time.
The creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff would presumably resolve this considerably. But the relationship with the NSA would require working out. The SFC cannot be left to serve to two bosses. Unity of command is a universally hallowed command principle in the services. It must be the CDS who is unambiguously in charge. The NSA heads the Executive Council of which the COSC is currently is part. But with the CDS available, the Political Council needs a military adviser to complement the advice of the NSA.
The belief that such advice will be overly militaristic may not be warranted. After all, civilian militarism is also not unknown. The advantage of having clear lines of command and responsibilities is that it would enable accountability. Keeping the nuclear decision making mechanism and process diffuse may make the weapons appear more usable. Pinpointing responsibility will help with self-deterrence, since post bellum accountability will be easier to exact.
Since the nuclear complex, including the Atomic Energy Commission is partially outside of the defence ministry, the defence reforms would be complete if they included the nuclear complex also. This is the opportunity to domesticate it. Presently, it is overseen by the prime minister, but is notably scientist-bureaucrat driven. As a result, institutional interests have a wider play in the way the complex works than is warranted. The place of nuclear weapons in national security needs spelling out and the reforms could emplace the system that will provision it.
As suggested by a noted nuclear watcher, WPS Sidhu, this can be done by having either a new parliamentary committee serve as check or increase the powers of the standing committee on defence to do the same, 'in camera' if necessary. India's nuclear trajectory is now at a juncture that this can be done with maturity and relative openness, as any democratic state should.
Why are these steps necessary?
A discussion on the upward delegation of nuclear-related decision making is needed now, even if some of it were to take place secretly. India's idea that nuclear weapons are political weapons is right, and India has rightly forsworn being the first to introduce them into conflict. Still, the country's proactive conventional doctrine is out of step with its nuclear doctrine, as is evident from India continuing to think of 'heavy' response. With Pakistan's unveiling its tactical nuclear weapon, Nasr, as noted by Manoj Joshi in his columns, the nuclear factor is far more in the foreground than is being acknowledged.
The defence sector cannot be reformed in isolation of its place in national security - that could cause an imbalance in governance. The 'defence versus development' debate is not yet a settled one, either; this is all the more reason to have Parliament more involved in the oversight of the nuclear complex. Ultimately, the elected representatives are the ones who have responsibility for ensuring the security of the nation, and also for delivering economic and social development. The legislature's role as check on the executive can be fulfilled as well, with parliamentary oversight.
The right step to take now is to broaden the Saxena task force's terms of reference. While it is likely to take a deep look at the CDS issue, this is insufficient. The task force must look beyond the defence ministry into the relationship between the legislature and the executive. The legislature should, on its own, bring this on to its agenda, since the executive is unlikely to think of widening the remit of the task force on its own
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Whose command? Whose control?
14 August 2011 - The significance of the strategic nuclear complex was brought out in the controversy over remarks of the retiring Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that India's response to nuclear attack would be 'very heavy'. The remarks reportedly did not amuse his boss, the defence minister, as they were made when the India-Pakistan foreign ministers talks were ongoing.
To what extent is the Chairman COSC the custodian of the nuclear baton? The current juncture provides an opportunity to reflect on the wider issue of command and control of the nuclear complex, both in peace-time and during wars.
The Saxena task force will reportedly work on a national security doctrine. The idea is that once the national security survey is done, then the structures necessary to keep the country secure would be thought through. The task force's composition and parameters have not been officially released yet; the time is yet ripe to influence its terms of reference to include the nuclear complex.
Command and control of the nuclear complex takes place at different levels. The upper - political - level is of democratic control by the political leadership, which is in turn accountable to the parliament. The second, grand strategic level, is through the national security council system integrating national security experts, the military and technologists. The third one, the strategic level, is the operational one of the Strategic Forces Command.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org
There are problems at the all three levels. Relatively lesser known are those existing at the strategic level, since the work of the SFC is necessarily shrouded in secrecy. At this level, integrating the technologist into the chain of command is possibly a challenge since the military holds the delivery systems, the atomic energy technologist is entrusted with the weapons core and the DRDO representative is in charge of the weapons assembly.
At the second level, it is well known that the COSC is 'double hatted'. He is not only the chief of his service but 'first among equals' among the three chiefs. He is by the latter responsibility also to oversee the SFC. The relationship between the military man in charge of the SFC, the COSC and the NSA is also somewhat nebulous. This results in inadequate attention to the working of the SFC by either the NSA, who presumably would expect the COSC to do the supervisory role, or the COSC, who cannot possibly have the time.
The creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff would presumably resolve this considerably. But the relationship with the NSA would require working out. The SFC cannot be left to serve to two bosses. Unity of command is a universally hallowed command principle in the services. It must be the CDS who is unambiguously in charge. The NSA heads the Executive Council of which the COSC is currently is part. But with the CDS available, the Political Council needs a military adviser to complement the advice of the NSA.
The belief that such advice will be overly militaristic may not be warranted. After all, civilian militarism is also not unknown. The advantage of having clear lines of command and responsibilities is that it would enable accountability. Keeping the nuclear decision making mechanism and process diffuse may make the weapons appear more usable. Pinpointing responsibility will help with self-deterrence, since post bellum accountability will be easier to exact.
Since the nuclear complex, including the Atomic Energy Commission is partially outside of the defence ministry, the defence reforms would be complete if they included the nuclear complex also. This is the opportunity to domesticate it. Presently, it is overseen by the prime minister, but is notably scientist-bureaucrat driven. As a result, institutional interests have a wider play in the way the complex works than is warranted. The place of nuclear weapons in national security needs spelling out and the reforms could emplace the system that will provision it.
As suggested by a noted nuclear watcher, WPS Sidhu, this can be done by having either a new parliamentary committee serve as check or increase the powers of the standing committee on defence to do the same, 'in camera' if necessary. India's nuclear trajectory is now at a juncture that this can be done with maturity and relative openness, as any democratic state should.
Why are these steps necessary?
A discussion on the upward delegation of nuclear-related decision making is needed now, even if some of it were to take place secretly. India's idea that nuclear weapons are political weapons is right, and India has rightly forsworn being the first to introduce them into conflict. Still, the country's proactive conventional doctrine is out of step with its nuclear doctrine, as is evident from India continuing to think of 'heavy' response. With Pakistan's unveiling its tactical nuclear weapon, Nasr, as noted by Manoj Joshi in his columns, the nuclear factor is far more in the foreground than is being acknowledged.
The defence sector cannot be reformed in isolation of its place in national security - that could cause an imbalance in governance. The 'defence versus development' debate is not yet a settled one, either; this is all the more reason to have Parliament more involved in the oversight of the nuclear complex. Ultimately, the elected representatives are the ones who have responsibility for ensuring the security of the nation, and also for delivering economic and social development. The legislature's role as check on the executive can be fulfilled as well, with parliamentary oversight.
The right step to take now is to broaden the Saxena task force's terms of reference. While it is likely to take a deep look at the CDS issue, this is insufficient. The task force must look beyond the defence ministry into the relationship between the legislature and the executive. The legislature should, on its own, bring this on to its agenda, since the executive is unlikely to think of widening the remit of the task force on its own
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/jul/fah-negotiate.htm
INDO-PAK TALKS
Negotiate in good faith
19 July 2011 - It is quite clear that the intractable conflict between India and Pakistan cannot be solved by military means. Pakistan cannot hope to defeat India and India cannot, in light of the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, hope to control Pakistan; leave alone defeat a nuclear-armed Pakistan. That leaves only the route of peace negotiations open.
Negotiations can be of two types - one is through exercising power in a manner as to extract concessions on the negotiations table from a position of strength. This approach has been the preferred one for both states historically, and the ongoing round of negotiations is also in this vein. The second is to take to these discussions sincerely by not seeing these as yet another arena of power play. A mutually agreeable outcome is only possible by shifting to an accommodationist one.
The current approach is dominated by realism - putting national interest above all other considerations (moral, social), and acting on the belief that each side should focus on maximising its own gains from negotiations, no matter what the implications may be to the other side. This power politics has dominated the way the two sides have gone about their negotiations, and even among the populations of the two countries, a large number have come to see negotiations as a means to achieve dominance. This is simply untenable.
Trust has not resulted from the confidence building measures in place. This was predictable, since both sides have been insincere. They have used the peace negotiations for positional bargaining. Even as they talk, in the background their power contest continues, in the hope that they can deal from a 'position of strength'. Given these military, intelligence, diplomatic and political moves in the background, neither side is willing to concede ground. Both believe that the future may find them better placed to force the issue on their terms. Each takes its interests as non-negotiable, and sees negotiations as only being pursued to get the other side to concede.
The advent of nuclear weapons makes peace through negotiations as the only desirable way to bring their outstanding differences to closure. Their presence has led to a false belief that under their cover, there is little need to engage meaningfully with the other state. The two states appear to be holding out till when their strategic efforts place them in a better position. In India's case it is the military 'surge' brought about by a resurgent economy. In Pakistan's case, it would like to keep negotiations steady till it can come out of its current trough in national circumstance and morale.
Military backdrop
The India-Pakistan conflict ranks alongside the Israel-Palestinian conflict as the oldest in the 'Charter era' of the United Nations, qualifying it as a 'protracted' conflict. Such a conflict is defined as one that sees alternation between periods of peace and conflict over an issue that remains unresolved.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org
The military doctrines of both states are offensive, at both the conventional and nuclear levels. The state of peace is considerably precarious in South Asia, and conflict always appears inevitable and imminent. In the last 15 years alone - i.e. since South Asia went nuclear - there have been four periods of crisis: 1987, 1990, 2001-02 and 2008. Given this, why have the two states not invested in peace through negotiations to the extent as is necessary? Do they not sense, during the repeated negotiations and during the various crises that a different approach is necessary?
While the process of negotiations has been pursued, the approach of both states makes it impossible to obtain a mutually acceptable outcome. This is easier explained in respect of Pakistan since it is dominated by the military elite. Militaries typically think in realist terms. In India's case, it has a choice. Yet it too has approached its relations with Pakistan through a realist prism. This mirroring of perspectives between the two leads to negotiations being meaningless. The process itself becomes a site of power tryst. To make progress the two states must come to the table with a 'give and take' attitude, which is by definition necessary to negotiations.
Meandering negotiations
Negotiations have been as frequent as conflict between the two countries. The first war for Kashmir in 1947-48 resulted in a peace settlement and a ceasefire line. Under US pressure, the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian War resulted in the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks of 1963. The Tashkent Agreement succeeded the 1965 war. While the 1971 war was ostensibly fought over East Pakistan, the Kashmir issue figured more prominently in the Simla Agreement of July 1972. The two sides promised to take up the Kashmir issue bilaterally through peaceful means.
India believes that the Simla agreement had a 'secret' clause in which Bhutto agreed to give up Pakistani claims to Kashmir after he consolidated power and returned the military to barracks. However, lack of progress led to Pakistan's proxy war. This energized the peace process from the early nineties, with the two states agreeing to discuss all issues in a 'composite dialogue' in 1997. The Lahore process that took this up in February 1999 was interrupted by the Kargil War of July that year. The Agra Summit was arranged to break the deadlock in 2001. However, the 'twin peaks crisis', of 2001-02, caused disruption.
The peace process finally took off in 2004 along two lines: the composite dialogue and in the 'back channel'. Both made considerable progress till the Musharraf regime ran into internal problems, and were broken off after Mumbai 26/11. A parallel Track Two dialogue has been in progress for the past two decades. The current situation has the two reengaging once again, but only tentatively. As seen from the Mumbai blasts this month, the process is tenuous at best.
A new course needed
There are three reasons why India could change tack. One is that in facing the challenge of China as some foresee in the future, it needs to have Pakistan alongside. The second is that the power play it is current engaged in may witness Pakistan spiraling out of control. In such a case, India would end up at the 'frontline'. Pakistan's predicament as 'frontline' state twice should warn India against aspiring to such status. Third, the kind of power that India is harnessing in terms of military hardware is unusable in the nuclear circumstance. It can in any case continue amassing this with China as excuse.
Lastly, the power play approach privileges certain sections of the establishment such as arms merchants, right wings of both the majority and minority, and the military with a vested interest in fractured relations. Therefore, a changed stance on negotiations is necessary.
The triple blasts in Mumbai provide another opportunity for introspection. The two states continue to be too much closer to war than they need be. To avert nuclear dangers that could result, they need to refocus on negotiations as the only way out of their protracted conflict. This means a move away from their current approach of using the negotiations process for power play
INDO-PAK TALKS
Negotiate in good faith
19 July 2011 - It is quite clear that the intractable conflict between India and Pakistan cannot be solved by military means. Pakistan cannot hope to defeat India and India cannot, in light of the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, hope to control Pakistan; leave alone defeat a nuclear-armed Pakistan. That leaves only the route of peace negotiations open.
Negotiations can be of two types - one is through exercising power in a manner as to extract concessions on the negotiations table from a position of strength. This approach has been the preferred one for both states historically, and the ongoing round of negotiations is also in this vein. The second is to take to these discussions sincerely by not seeing these as yet another arena of power play. A mutually agreeable outcome is only possible by shifting to an accommodationist one.
The current approach is dominated by realism - putting national interest above all other considerations (moral, social), and acting on the belief that each side should focus on maximising its own gains from negotiations, no matter what the implications may be to the other side. This power politics has dominated the way the two sides have gone about their negotiations, and even among the populations of the two countries, a large number have come to see negotiations as a means to achieve dominance. This is simply untenable.
Trust has not resulted from the confidence building measures in place. This was predictable, since both sides have been insincere. They have used the peace negotiations for positional bargaining. Even as they talk, in the background their power contest continues, in the hope that they can deal from a 'position of strength'. Given these military, intelligence, diplomatic and political moves in the background, neither side is willing to concede ground. Both believe that the future may find them better placed to force the issue on their terms. Each takes its interests as non-negotiable, and sees negotiations as only being pursued to get the other side to concede.
The advent of nuclear weapons makes peace through negotiations as the only desirable way to bring their outstanding differences to closure. Their presence has led to a false belief that under their cover, there is little need to engage meaningfully with the other state. The two states appear to be holding out till when their strategic efforts place them in a better position. In India's case it is the military 'surge' brought about by a resurgent economy. In Pakistan's case, it would like to keep negotiations steady till it can come out of its current trough in national circumstance and morale.
Military backdrop
The India-Pakistan conflict ranks alongside the Israel-Palestinian conflict as the oldest in the 'Charter era' of the United Nations, qualifying it as a 'protracted' conflict. Such a conflict is defined as one that sees alternation between periods of peace and conflict over an issue that remains unresolved.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org
The military doctrines of both states are offensive, at both the conventional and nuclear levels. The state of peace is considerably precarious in South Asia, and conflict always appears inevitable and imminent. In the last 15 years alone - i.e. since South Asia went nuclear - there have been four periods of crisis: 1987, 1990, 2001-02 and 2008. Given this, why have the two states not invested in peace through negotiations to the extent as is necessary? Do they not sense, during the repeated negotiations and during the various crises that a different approach is necessary?
While the process of negotiations has been pursued, the approach of both states makes it impossible to obtain a mutually acceptable outcome. This is easier explained in respect of Pakistan since it is dominated by the military elite. Militaries typically think in realist terms. In India's case, it has a choice. Yet it too has approached its relations with Pakistan through a realist prism. This mirroring of perspectives between the two leads to negotiations being meaningless. The process itself becomes a site of power tryst. To make progress the two states must come to the table with a 'give and take' attitude, which is by definition necessary to negotiations.
Meandering negotiations
Negotiations have been as frequent as conflict between the two countries. The first war for Kashmir in 1947-48 resulted in a peace settlement and a ceasefire line. Under US pressure, the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian War resulted in the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks of 1963. The Tashkent Agreement succeeded the 1965 war. While the 1971 war was ostensibly fought over East Pakistan, the Kashmir issue figured more prominently in the Simla Agreement of July 1972. The two sides promised to take up the Kashmir issue bilaterally through peaceful means.
India believes that the Simla agreement had a 'secret' clause in which Bhutto agreed to give up Pakistani claims to Kashmir after he consolidated power and returned the military to barracks. However, lack of progress led to Pakistan's proxy war. This energized the peace process from the early nineties, with the two states agreeing to discuss all issues in a 'composite dialogue' in 1997. The Lahore process that took this up in February 1999 was interrupted by the Kargil War of July that year. The Agra Summit was arranged to break the deadlock in 2001. However, the 'twin peaks crisis', of 2001-02, caused disruption.
The peace process finally took off in 2004 along two lines: the composite dialogue and in the 'back channel'. Both made considerable progress till the Musharraf regime ran into internal problems, and were broken off after Mumbai 26/11. A parallel Track Two dialogue has been in progress for the past two decades. The current situation has the two reengaging once again, but only tentatively. As seen from the Mumbai blasts this month, the process is tenuous at best.
A new course needed
There are three reasons why India could change tack. One is that in facing the challenge of China as some foresee in the future, it needs to have Pakistan alongside. The second is that the power play it is current engaged in may witness Pakistan spiraling out of control. In such a case, India would end up at the 'frontline'. Pakistan's predicament as 'frontline' state twice should warn India against aspiring to such status. Third, the kind of power that India is harnessing in terms of military hardware is unusable in the nuclear circumstance. It can in any case continue amassing this with China as excuse.
Lastly, the power play approach privileges certain sections of the establishment such as arms merchants, right wings of both the majority and minority, and the military with a vested interest in fractured relations. Therefore, a changed stance on negotiations is necessary.
The triple blasts in Mumbai provide another opportunity for introspection. The two states continue to be too much closer to war than they need be. To avert nuclear dangers that could result, they need to refocus on negotiations as the only way out of their protracted conflict. This means a move away from their current approach of using the negotiations process for power play
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/compellence-deterrence-or-defence-saxena-task-force-and-indias-defence-3418.html
INDIA - ARTICLES
#3418, 27 June 2011
COMPELLENCE, DETERRENCE OR DEFENCE?: SAXENA TASK FORCE AND INDIA’S DEFENCE REFORMS
Firdaus Ahmed
Freelancer
email: firdyahmed@yahoo.com
Mr Naresh Saxena, former defence secretary, cabinet secretary and ambassador to the US, is to lead a task force on the next steps in defence sector reforms. His team comprising former chiefs, bureaucrats, military technologists and strategists is to begin work in mid-July and complete its report in six months.
Commentators will be undoubtedly rush to inform the deliberations, leading to strategic commentary that is likely to get both parochial and ugly as the monsoon proceeds. In particular, the face-off between the army and air force will be open to exploitation by status-quoist parties out to derail any substantial movement. The key issues anticipated to figure in the Saxena task force report are the appointment of the CDS, whether this figure would have command or staff responsibilities, integration of the service HQs with the ministry, integration of theatre commands; professionalization of the defence ministry bureaucrats; jointness and higher military education etc. The very constitution of the task force suggests its necessity; ten years since the last bout of post Kargil reforms.
Specifically, the Saxena committee would need to have a determined perspective on how the nation wishes to deploy its military instrument: for compellence, deterrence or defence. That would in turn be a function of what balance India envisages between the strategic choices: ‘sama, bheda, danda, dana’. Defining the latter could be suggested to the government, since the former cannot be done without this prior definition. Once the issue of strategic doctrine is settled, the restructuring necessary to operationalize the doctrine becomes easier. However, the consequences of the restructuring may be missing in the debate. This article, mindful of possible consequences in terms of the ‘security dilemma’, seeks to point out additional necessary measures even as the reforms are proceeded with.
That the reforms are intended to enhance India’s military capability is certain. The logic is that this is necessary to cope with India’s rising power indices, its perception of regional and global responsibilities and security threats. In this logic, the security situation has changed with the rise of China and the possibility of a ‘two front’ situation for India. India may be taking measures to enhance its security, but it must be noted that these measures would enhance the perception of threat of its neighbours, even though India, in its logic, is merely being responsive to prior moves of its neighbours. The upshot is an in-built interactive mutual threat spiral known in theory as the ‘security dilemma’.
India needs to be mindful of its neighbours’ reaction which would ratchet up the threat India itself perceives. India could choose to be complacent about this, believing that higher preparedness brought about by the reforms would enable it to cope better with higher threat levels. Despite this, the recommendation here is that even as India proceeds with the necessary and perhaps long overdue reforms, it needs simultaneously to put into place measures to mitigate the consequence in terms of security dilemmas for both its neighbours and in turn itself.
How can this be done? The expectation is that the reforms would place India in a better position to engage its neighbours, specifically China and Pakistan, from a position of strength. This would be useful for Indian self-assurance and help deter the neighbours. The resulting engagement, for instance, border negotiations with China and the dialogue with Pakistan, would be more outcome-oriented. Materializing this expectation would however require ensuring that the power play in the background does not get ugly and affect the engagement.
It is equally possible that increased capability may result in India believing that it can do without the ‘give and take’ necessary for amicable solutions to outstanding problems. India must therefore alongside keep up the engagement structures and processes that are already at work on both fronts. Yet, these are not enough in the new post-reform circumstance. Additionally, a joint forum for strategic dialogue can be forged with both separately, that would mutually arrive at and implement conflict avoidance measures, confidence-building measures and over time, when greater trust is available, create security architecture conducive for cooperative security.
The advantage of this innovation would be in mitigating the security dilemma. Each state can be expected to respond materially and physically as necessary, since in the realist logic, capabilities are of consequence, not intent. However, the psychological effects of security-related movements by one on the other are amenable to amelioration in case dialogue is in place where concerns can be ventilated. Essentially, the forum could serve to present and explain respective strategic doctrines as non-threatening to the other side. For instance, China’s infrastructural developments in Tibet, presence in POK and water-related initiatives in the east have perhaps instigated the defence reforms in India. The forum could serve to bring future such concerns to each other’s attention. The idea is not to substitute reforms but to complement them.
India is likely to settle for deterrence with an offensive bias. Ensuring that it is not mistaken for compellence is the challenge.
INDIA - ARTICLES
#3418, 27 June 2011
COMPELLENCE, DETERRENCE OR DEFENCE?: SAXENA TASK FORCE AND INDIA’S DEFENCE REFORMS
Firdaus Ahmed
Freelancer
email: firdyahmed@yahoo.com
Mr Naresh Saxena, former defence secretary, cabinet secretary and ambassador to the US, is to lead a task force on the next steps in defence sector reforms. His team comprising former chiefs, bureaucrats, military technologists and strategists is to begin work in mid-July and complete its report in six months.
Commentators will be undoubtedly rush to inform the deliberations, leading to strategic commentary that is likely to get both parochial and ugly as the monsoon proceeds. In particular, the face-off between the army and air force will be open to exploitation by status-quoist parties out to derail any substantial movement. The key issues anticipated to figure in the Saxena task force report are the appointment of the CDS, whether this figure would have command or staff responsibilities, integration of the service HQs with the ministry, integration of theatre commands; professionalization of the defence ministry bureaucrats; jointness and higher military education etc. The very constitution of the task force suggests its necessity; ten years since the last bout of post Kargil reforms.
Specifically, the Saxena committee would need to have a determined perspective on how the nation wishes to deploy its military instrument: for compellence, deterrence or defence. That would in turn be a function of what balance India envisages between the strategic choices: ‘sama, bheda, danda, dana’. Defining the latter could be suggested to the government, since the former cannot be done without this prior definition. Once the issue of strategic doctrine is settled, the restructuring necessary to operationalize the doctrine becomes easier. However, the consequences of the restructuring may be missing in the debate. This article, mindful of possible consequences in terms of the ‘security dilemma’, seeks to point out additional necessary measures even as the reforms are proceeded with.
That the reforms are intended to enhance India’s military capability is certain. The logic is that this is necessary to cope with India’s rising power indices, its perception of regional and global responsibilities and security threats. In this logic, the security situation has changed with the rise of China and the possibility of a ‘two front’ situation for India. India may be taking measures to enhance its security, but it must be noted that these measures would enhance the perception of threat of its neighbours, even though India, in its logic, is merely being responsive to prior moves of its neighbours. The upshot is an in-built interactive mutual threat spiral known in theory as the ‘security dilemma’.
India needs to be mindful of its neighbours’ reaction which would ratchet up the threat India itself perceives. India could choose to be complacent about this, believing that higher preparedness brought about by the reforms would enable it to cope better with higher threat levels. Despite this, the recommendation here is that even as India proceeds with the necessary and perhaps long overdue reforms, it needs simultaneously to put into place measures to mitigate the consequence in terms of security dilemmas for both its neighbours and in turn itself.
How can this be done? The expectation is that the reforms would place India in a better position to engage its neighbours, specifically China and Pakistan, from a position of strength. This would be useful for Indian self-assurance and help deter the neighbours. The resulting engagement, for instance, border negotiations with China and the dialogue with Pakistan, would be more outcome-oriented. Materializing this expectation would however require ensuring that the power play in the background does not get ugly and affect the engagement.
It is equally possible that increased capability may result in India believing that it can do without the ‘give and take’ necessary for amicable solutions to outstanding problems. India must therefore alongside keep up the engagement structures and processes that are already at work on both fronts. Yet, these are not enough in the new post-reform circumstance. Additionally, a joint forum for strategic dialogue can be forged with both separately, that would mutually arrive at and implement conflict avoidance measures, confidence-building measures and over time, when greater trust is available, create security architecture conducive for cooperative security.
The advantage of this innovation would be in mitigating the security dilemma. Each state can be expected to respond materially and physically as necessary, since in the realist logic, capabilities are of consequence, not intent. However, the psychological effects of security-related movements by one on the other are amenable to amelioration in case dialogue is in place where concerns can be ventilated. Essentially, the forum could serve to present and explain respective strategic doctrines as non-threatening to the other side. For instance, China’s infrastructural developments in Tibet, presence in POK and water-related initiatives in the east have perhaps instigated the defence reforms in India. The forum could serve to bring future such concerns to each other’s attention. The idea is not to substitute reforms but to complement them.
India is likely to settle for deterrence with an offensive bias. Ensuring that it is not mistaken for compellence is the challenge.
http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/jun/fah-saxena.htm
MILITARY
Defence reforms: The next phase
The proposed second round of defence reforms will make the armed forces more utilisable. Nonetheless, this should not blind us to the questionable impulse behind the reforms, writes Firdaus Ahmed.
24 June 2011 - A high-level task force has been set up under former bureaucrat Naresh Saxena to take defence sector reforms forward. The remit is to review progress since the last bout of reforms were carried out pursuant to the report of the Kargil Review Committee in 2001.
This second round of reforms is timely, in the sense of a decade having elapsed since the last deep look at the defence sector. India, and the regional security situation, has moved on considerably and the outlook for the next decade also promises similar change. China is now the principal security concern, necessitating a change-over in defence from being Pakistan-centric. A changed manner of conduct of war has been on display over the past decade in the US military practices, made possible by organisational changes in the face of changing technology.
The second round has been prompted by aspects that have remained undone since - specifically the creation of the position of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and integration of service headquarters into the ministry. Naresh Saxena is likely to encounter some debate around these two aspects.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org
Vast changes, turf battles
Politicians are not interested in seeing a concentration of military power in one office. The bureaucrats would prefer to play the role in its absence, since it helps play one service against the other. The services themselves have not evolved a consensus. The Air Force is against the idea. The Army appears to have distanced itself ever since General J J Singh, prior to retiring, said that even the Army could do without it.
While superficially the face-off is over turf, it is actually about deep doctrinal differences on how to fight wars. The Air Force sees a 'strategic' role for itself involving infrastructure busting, military attrition, etc. The Army thinks that the next war would require to be fought more jointly than the Air Force is willing to let on. The doctrinal dissonance requires adjudication that only an empowered CDS can provide. The way the Saxena task force inclines on this score will be critical to its recommendations.
That could also end up defining the remit of the CDS. Would his be an operational function or a staff function? The service chiefs currently combine the two roles in their person. They are loath to give up either and don't want their powers transferred upwards. Additionally, if the service chiefs are relegated to a staff function of creating, managing and provisioning respective services as part of an integrated ministry, the operational side would need to be handled by theatre commanders. This means that organisational restructuring would be very vast indeed.
The committee's role can only be recommendatory. Reforms of such a sweeping nature would require consensus in the political class as well. This may not be forthcoming. In India's evolutionary approach - as against a revolutionary one - grand sweeps are unlikely. Therefore, the task force faces a huge, possibly insurmountable challenge. Consequently, it may choose realistically to inch forward one step at a time.
As for the second task of integration into the ministry goes, this could be better done if and when the chiefs are willing to shed operational responsibilities. Currently, the command culture is so strong in the services that it would be impossible for an officer posted in an integrated ministry to sit in judgment on the service's case. This would be possible in case the chiefs become heads of staff, as their nomenclature suggests.
Anticipating the task force, the outline of reform that emerges then is an integration of service headquarters into the ministry in more than name. Service HQs are now called 'Integrated HQs' and several functions are now delegated to them, including financial. However, much of this is cosmetic, with bureaucrats sitting in judgment over service cases and - in the perception of the services - shutting them out of the policy loop.
Remedying this may require the chiefs to divest their operations function and become respective departmental heads. The operations function could be performed either by command headquarters reporting to an operationally empowered CDS, or by integrated theatre headquarters headed by a integrated Commander in Chief, for example C-in-C Western Front, or C-in-C Special Forces Command, etc. The current reforms may produce a half-way house, creating a CDS responsible for the nuclear dimension operationally and a staff function, so that the next step of integrating the sword arm in integrated commands can await the third bout of reform.
The moot question is: Would any of this make India more secure? This is the expectation. Military power would be made more usable and efficient. A rising power requires greater effort at self-protection and higher responsibilities to bear. The US $35 billion being set aside for defence purchases would be better utilised. A wieldy scalpel or scalable hammer means rationalising structures, doctrines and procedures. So upfront there is no problem with proceeding on course.
A colonial stance?
The problem is with the impulse behind the reform. In case self-defence was the sole motive, this would have been easy to concede. A case for dealing with a 'two-front' security threat would be persuasive, if the threat was manifest. It is debatable if this is so. Instead, the proposed 'reform', in this case, would make India more powerful, and in doing so it would make India appear a threat to its neighbours. If anything, it is this that would lead to the 'two-front' threat.
In other words, the effect of the reform would itself legitimise it. Since India would have the power and the reformed structures to use it, it would be seemingly secure; but assuredly at higher levels of threat. While what is needed now is to mend fences with alacrity, with more muscles there would be less need or inclination to do so.
Secondly, the reform would enable 'out-of-area' capability. A rising India has been asked to shoulder more global responsibility. This would be made possible by easily deployable capabilities, resulting from such reforms. The argument in favour of such a development is that India would need to protect its economy linked to resource bases elsewhere, and a stronger capability for projection of force is warranted, therefore. But this also implies lending its military to purposes that India itself would have in an earlier era labeled 'colonial'.
The government, being of a center-right orientation, has been open to accusations of being 'soft' on defence, particularly after persisting with the strategy of restraint in face of 26/11. Arraigned on multiple fronts, it has also suffered the indignity of witnessing its service chiefs' inapt interventions in the public debate on several occasions over recent past. Compensating for this, and admittedly sensibly also wanting to integrate the services into policymaking, it has perhaps embarked on the next generation of defence reform.
Such reforms being politically useful, the government would find it hard to side-step the recommendations once they are received. Going along would make India more nimble and able no doubt, but also place the country in greater harm's way. Political inability to be responsive to the vast reforms likely to be suggested would place the government once again in the awkward position of seeming 'weak' on defence: a case of doomed if you do and dead if you don't. Watch this space six months from now, when the call is due.
⊕
MILITARY
Defence reforms: The next phase
The proposed second round of defence reforms will make the armed forces more utilisable. Nonetheless, this should not blind us to the questionable impulse behind the reforms, writes Firdaus Ahmed.
24 June 2011 - A high-level task force has been set up under former bureaucrat Naresh Saxena to take defence sector reforms forward. The remit is to review progress since the last bout of reforms were carried out pursuant to the report of the Kargil Review Committee in 2001.
This second round of reforms is timely, in the sense of a decade having elapsed since the last deep look at the defence sector. India, and the regional security situation, has moved on considerably and the outlook for the next decade also promises similar change. China is now the principal security concern, necessitating a change-over in defence from being Pakistan-centric. A changed manner of conduct of war has been on display over the past decade in the US military practices, made possible by organisational changes in the face of changing technology.
The second round has been prompted by aspects that have remained undone since - specifically the creation of the position of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and integration of service headquarters into the ministry. Naresh Saxena is likely to encounter some debate around these two aspects.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org
Vast changes, turf battles
Politicians are not interested in seeing a concentration of military power in one office. The bureaucrats would prefer to play the role in its absence, since it helps play one service against the other. The services themselves have not evolved a consensus. The Air Force is against the idea. The Army appears to have distanced itself ever since General J J Singh, prior to retiring, said that even the Army could do without it.
While superficially the face-off is over turf, it is actually about deep doctrinal differences on how to fight wars. The Air Force sees a 'strategic' role for itself involving infrastructure busting, military attrition, etc. The Army thinks that the next war would require to be fought more jointly than the Air Force is willing to let on. The doctrinal dissonance requires adjudication that only an empowered CDS can provide. The way the Saxena task force inclines on this score will be critical to its recommendations.
That could also end up defining the remit of the CDS. Would his be an operational function or a staff function? The service chiefs currently combine the two roles in their person. They are loath to give up either and don't want their powers transferred upwards. Additionally, if the service chiefs are relegated to a staff function of creating, managing and provisioning respective services as part of an integrated ministry, the operational side would need to be handled by theatre commanders. This means that organisational restructuring would be very vast indeed.
The committee's role can only be recommendatory. Reforms of such a sweeping nature would require consensus in the political class as well. This may not be forthcoming. In India's evolutionary approach - as against a revolutionary one - grand sweeps are unlikely. Therefore, the task force faces a huge, possibly insurmountable challenge. Consequently, it may choose realistically to inch forward one step at a time.
As for the second task of integration into the ministry goes, this could be better done if and when the chiefs are willing to shed operational responsibilities. Currently, the command culture is so strong in the services that it would be impossible for an officer posted in an integrated ministry to sit in judgment on the service's case. This would be possible in case the chiefs become heads of staff, as their nomenclature suggests.
Anticipating the task force, the outline of reform that emerges then is an integration of service headquarters into the ministry in more than name. Service HQs are now called 'Integrated HQs' and several functions are now delegated to them, including financial. However, much of this is cosmetic, with bureaucrats sitting in judgment over service cases and - in the perception of the services - shutting them out of the policy loop.
Remedying this may require the chiefs to divest their operations function and become respective departmental heads. The operations function could be performed either by command headquarters reporting to an operationally empowered CDS, or by integrated theatre headquarters headed by a integrated Commander in Chief, for example C-in-C Western Front, or C-in-C Special Forces Command, etc. The current reforms may produce a half-way house, creating a CDS responsible for the nuclear dimension operationally and a staff function, so that the next step of integrating the sword arm in integrated commands can await the third bout of reform.
The moot question is: Would any of this make India more secure? This is the expectation. Military power would be made more usable and efficient. A rising power requires greater effort at self-protection and higher responsibilities to bear. The US $35 billion being set aside for defence purchases would be better utilised. A wieldy scalpel or scalable hammer means rationalising structures, doctrines and procedures. So upfront there is no problem with proceeding on course.
A colonial stance?
The problem is with the impulse behind the reform. In case self-defence was the sole motive, this would have been easy to concede. A case for dealing with a 'two-front' security threat would be persuasive, if the threat was manifest. It is debatable if this is so. Instead, the proposed 'reform', in this case, would make India more powerful, and in doing so it would make India appear a threat to its neighbours. If anything, it is this that would lead to the 'two-front' threat.
In other words, the effect of the reform would itself legitimise it. Since India would have the power and the reformed structures to use it, it would be seemingly secure; but assuredly at higher levels of threat. While what is needed now is to mend fences with alacrity, with more muscles there would be less need or inclination to do so.
Secondly, the reform would enable 'out-of-area' capability. A rising India has been asked to shoulder more global responsibility. This would be made possible by easily deployable capabilities, resulting from such reforms. The argument in favour of such a development is that India would need to protect its economy linked to resource bases elsewhere, and a stronger capability for projection of force is warranted, therefore. But this also implies lending its military to purposes that India itself would have in an earlier era labeled 'colonial'.
The government, being of a center-right orientation, has been open to accusations of being 'soft' on defence, particularly after persisting with the strategy of restraint in face of 26/11. Arraigned on multiple fronts, it has also suffered the indignity of witnessing its service chiefs' inapt interventions in the public debate on several occasions over recent past. Compensating for this, and admittedly sensibly also wanting to integrate the services into policymaking, it has perhaps embarked on the next generation of defence reform.
Such reforms being politically useful, the government would find it hard to side-step the recommendations once they are received. Going along would make India more nimble and able no doubt, but also place the country in greater harm's way. Political inability to be responsive to the vast reforms likely to be suggested would place the government once again in the awkward position of seeming 'weak' on defence: a case of doomed if you do and dead if you don't. Watch this space six months from now, when the call is due.
⊕
Friday, May 06, 2011
See for full article - indiatogether.org
http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/may/fah-pai.htm
Unity in militarism
The security establishment would like India to project its power more forcefully abroad. But to position this as an exercise in protecting the nation's internal unity stretches the imagination, writes Firdaus Ahmed.
Nitin Pai’s candour is revealing. In an article with an honest title ‘Projecting power to protect unity’, he argues that ‘India must project power abroad to stay united at home.’ For those not familiar with him or his work, Pai is editor of Pragati and fellow for geopolitics at the Takshashila Institution. His blog, The Acorn, reflects and furthers the conservative-realist perspective on security. That the article is an excerpt of his speech at a conference at the Army War College, Mhow, suggests that this perspective has a keen following where it matters. What does this mean for regional security?
India’s rising power is sold as a ‘benign’ development, particularly when it is contrasted adversely with China’s ‘hegemonic’ rise. Its democratic credentials, record as a non-expansionist state, military restraint and strategic prudence are taken as indicators that it is a non-threatening development. Besides, it is increasingly inclined towards the West and since the West holds the levers of the strategic discourse, India is easily projected as a useful balance to China in Asia. This article questions the thesis that India’s rise is of unqualified benefit for security.
SEE FOR FULL ARTICLE indiatogether.org
That India has been status quoist so far obscures the possibility that it may not always remain so. Nitin Pai argues for ‘reform’ using the logic that India’s internal unity demands an external orientation of its growing power. His thesis is that India’s strategic culture needs changing in light of its growing power credentials. This would enable Indian unity.
What he does not say, but is implicit, is that creating an external ‘Other’ would be a useful national enterprise since it would lend India cohesion and national identity. This means an adversarial equation with China and with Pakistan, seen as China’s proxy, would help India stay united internally, help it create and sustain power necessary to wrestle with these external challenges. This argument is as subtle as self-serving.
Conservative realists such as him who form the dominant strain in India’s strategic community use innovative logic for militarization of India. To them this would create power and the culture to use power appropriately. Power so created would be useful in warding of the ‘threats’ posed by the ‘Other’, even if the threat arose due to this very creation of power.
There are several problems with this. The more obvious ones are disposed off here first. There are other more revealing indices of national arrival, such as education, gender balance, poverty figures etc. There is nothing to suggest that a growing felicity in the creation and use of power would lead to a corresponding change in the socio-economic indices. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the power gained would be able to offset the combined power of the ‘Other’ so created, China and Pakistan. It may be hurtful in case the nuclear backdrop to the conflictual relations was to come to foreground for some reason later. Thirdly, the connection between external power projection and internal unity is not readily established. In the Indira-Rajiv period for instance, there was considerable Indian muscle flexing such as against Sri Lanka, with no obvious effect on internal unity as the outbreak of trouble in Punjab, Kashmir and in social harmony indicate.
Lastly, India’s power projection capability and intent needs to be seen in relation to its association with the US. The European allies of the US stand exhausted. It is seeking military partners for continuing its global stewardship, in particular with relation to controlling terrorism and access to oil. India is being prepared for this role as indicated in the statement of Condoleeza Rice when secretary of state that US intends to make India into a great power. Clearly, this was to serve a purpose of the US. India therefore, refutations of alliance notwithstanding, would lend itself to the US agenda. It would believe that this would be an exercise in its own interest. The distinction between strategic autonomy and external manipulation will be hard to discern. The implication for the region, such as in the short run in AfPak and in the long term for the neocolonial embrace of West Asia, is amply clear.
But more importantly, what realists fail to perceive, even if their logic is driven by a look at internal politics, is that Indian power can be harmful for itself and its region if in the wrong hands. They are unmindful of the possibility of the process of creating the ‘Other’ leading to the Indian identity formed in contradistinction to the ‘Other’. The emphasis on ‘unity’ would be to steam roll the diversity that defines India. The harmony imposed, that is itself necessarily selective in its basis, will lead to internal disruptions that will neither help the creation of power nor its external projection.
Of greater consequence is the possibility of dominance of majoritarian extremists over the power structure created. The conditions of external and internal strife created by the process of imposing ‘unity’ would be fertile for their ascent to power. Given that the power levers that they inherit would be stronger, India would cease to be the ‘benign’ power as is currently imagined. It would certainly not be ‘benign’ to those not of the persuasion of these forces within India. It would be equally problematic for the immediate neighbourhood.
Realists in their external focus can be forgiven two mistaken beliefs. One is that they take India’s democratic credentials as a given. Instead these need to be constantly recreated, worked on and preserved. Conditions that degrade these need being guarded against. The second is that even if Hindu nationalists were to come to power, this is not such a bad thing since it would only be democratic. The cultural trove of the religion would ensure that India stays benign. This is to miss the ugly face of cultural nationalism and neglect the fact that it would get uglier the closer it gets to unbridled power.
It is for these reasons, India’s growing power is not necessarily a blessing for India or its region. The extant thesis of India as a ‘benign’ power will prove very short lived indeed.
http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/may/fah-pai.htm
Unity in militarism
The security establishment would like India to project its power more forcefully abroad. But to position this as an exercise in protecting the nation's internal unity stretches the imagination, writes Firdaus Ahmed.
Nitin Pai’s candour is revealing. In an article with an honest title ‘Projecting power to protect unity’, he argues that ‘India must project power abroad to stay united at home.’ For those not familiar with him or his work, Pai is editor of Pragati and fellow for geopolitics at the Takshashila Institution. His blog, The Acorn, reflects and furthers the conservative-realist perspective on security. That the article is an excerpt of his speech at a conference at the Army War College, Mhow, suggests that this perspective has a keen following where it matters. What does this mean for regional security?
India’s rising power is sold as a ‘benign’ development, particularly when it is contrasted adversely with China’s ‘hegemonic’ rise. Its democratic credentials, record as a non-expansionist state, military restraint and strategic prudence are taken as indicators that it is a non-threatening development. Besides, it is increasingly inclined towards the West and since the West holds the levers of the strategic discourse, India is easily projected as a useful balance to China in Asia. This article questions the thesis that India’s rise is of unqualified benefit for security.
SEE FOR FULL ARTICLE indiatogether.org
That India has been status quoist so far obscures the possibility that it may not always remain so. Nitin Pai argues for ‘reform’ using the logic that India’s internal unity demands an external orientation of its growing power. His thesis is that India’s strategic culture needs changing in light of its growing power credentials. This would enable Indian unity.
What he does not say, but is implicit, is that creating an external ‘Other’ would be a useful national enterprise since it would lend India cohesion and national identity. This means an adversarial equation with China and with Pakistan, seen as China’s proxy, would help India stay united internally, help it create and sustain power necessary to wrestle with these external challenges. This argument is as subtle as self-serving.
Conservative realists such as him who form the dominant strain in India’s strategic community use innovative logic for militarization of India. To them this would create power and the culture to use power appropriately. Power so created would be useful in warding of the ‘threats’ posed by the ‘Other’, even if the threat arose due to this very creation of power.
There are several problems with this. The more obvious ones are disposed off here first. There are other more revealing indices of national arrival, such as education, gender balance, poverty figures etc. There is nothing to suggest that a growing felicity in the creation and use of power would lead to a corresponding change in the socio-economic indices. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the power gained would be able to offset the combined power of the ‘Other’ so created, China and Pakistan. It may be hurtful in case the nuclear backdrop to the conflictual relations was to come to foreground for some reason later. Thirdly, the connection between external power projection and internal unity is not readily established. In the Indira-Rajiv period for instance, there was considerable Indian muscle flexing such as against Sri Lanka, with no obvious effect on internal unity as the outbreak of trouble in Punjab, Kashmir and in social harmony indicate.
Lastly, India’s power projection capability and intent needs to be seen in relation to its association with the US. The European allies of the US stand exhausted. It is seeking military partners for continuing its global stewardship, in particular with relation to controlling terrorism and access to oil. India is being prepared for this role as indicated in the statement of Condoleeza Rice when secretary of state that US intends to make India into a great power. Clearly, this was to serve a purpose of the US. India therefore, refutations of alliance notwithstanding, would lend itself to the US agenda. It would believe that this would be an exercise in its own interest. The distinction between strategic autonomy and external manipulation will be hard to discern. The implication for the region, such as in the short run in AfPak and in the long term for the neocolonial embrace of West Asia, is amply clear.
But more importantly, what realists fail to perceive, even if their logic is driven by a look at internal politics, is that Indian power can be harmful for itself and its region if in the wrong hands. They are unmindful of the possibility of the process of creating the ‘Other’ leading to the Indian identity formed in contradistinction to the ‘Other’. The emphasis on ‘unity’ would be to steam roll the diversity that defines India. The harmony imposed, that is itself necessarily selective in its basis, will lead to internal disruptions that will neither help the creation of power nor its external projection.
Of greater consequence is the possibility of dominance of majoritarian extremists over the power structure created. The conditions of external and internal strife created by the process of imposing ‘unity’ would be fertile for their ascent to power. Given that the power levers that they inherit would be stronger, India would cease to be the ‘benign’ power as is currently imagined. It would certainly not be ‘benign’ to those not of the persuasion of these forces within India. It would be equally problematic for the immediate neighbourhood.
Realists in their external focus can be forgiven two mistaken beliefs. One is that they take India’s democratic credentials as a given. Instead these need to be constantly recreated, worked on and preserved. Conditions that degrade these need being guarded against. The second is that even if Hindu nationalists were to come to power, this is not such a bad thing since it would only be democratic. The cultural trove of the religion would ensure that India stays benign. This is to miss the ugly face of cultural nationalism and neglect the fact that it would get uglier the closer it gets to unbridled power.
It is for these reasons, India’s growing power is not necessarily a blessing for India or its region. The extant thesis of India as a ‘benign’ power will prove very short lived indeed.
Thursday, May 05, 2011
ipcs.org
#3372, 5 May 2011
AFTER OSAMA - VII: SHOULD NEW DELHI ENGAGE PAKISTAN OR ‘WAIT AND WATCH’?
Firdaus Ahmed
email: firdyahmed@yahoo.com
In wake of the Osama killing, the hawks have carried the day in India. In pointing towards possible Pakistani complicity in harbouring Osama, they make the point that the Indian initiative of reaching out to Pakistan that is currently unfolding will fail. Their ‘I told you so’ discourse will likely result in a ‘wait and watch’ attitude by the government. This would lead to another year lost in South Asia.
This time around the initiative appeared more promising with the commerce secretaries agreeing on many encouraging measures ranging from petroleum products, electricity etc to the more important issue of MFN status for India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh appeared to be investing politically in his gut instincts. Reports were of the government having prepared its ground better by networking with the Pakistani army, later denied by both sides.
What will be the implications of Laden’s death? The major element forming the context is the end game in Af-Pak. The Obama plan of beginning pull out in July will gain momentum since the rationale for ‘hunting Osama’ does not exist any more. Ten years have considerably set back the al Qaeda. It has metamorphosed in a manner as to make Af-Pak irrelevant. The Taliban, the key player, has not suffered by Osama’s departure. Knowing the US may like a negotiated exit, they would drive a hard bargain. Pakistan would like to retrieve lost ground by backing them. This will ensure the dissipation of US triumphalism on the departure of Osama before the spring is out.
The point emerges that Pakistan has at best lost face. It will compensate by increasing its energy in protecting its interests. The US, with elections coming up and an economy that continues as a concern, cannot but placate it. The ‘wild card’ would be a terrorist reprisal in the US with Pakistani connections. This could disrupt the relationship, forcing the US to exit the region leaving behind chaos. That it could go this route is evident from its departure and the aftermath in Somalia.
What does this portend for India? In the Indian debate, the hardliners want to use this opportunity to pressure Pakistan. There is commentary on learning from the manner US conducts its business. They do not mind if the ‘wild card’ plays out to Pakistani detriment. It would leave India as the key regional power and in charge of containing the consequences. This holds appeal since it would give India a role in keeping with its stature.
If all else fails, this approach may be all that India has left. Currently, it may not be very useful since with US pressure found wanting it is hardly likely India’s would be more efficacious. Pressuring Pakistan through the intelligence game and heightening of military competition has not succeeded in conflict resolution. Instead, Pakistan has drawn down its nuclear cover more tightly with two quick missile tests, Hatf IX and Hatf VIII, over the last month. Debunking the realist prescription first is needed to eliminate it as an option. In any case, precedent of squandering India’s preeminence in the wake of 1971 does not inspire.
India must instead be attuned to the counter-intuitive likelihood of increased US reliance on Pakistan to bring about a face-saving exit from Af-Pak. In comparison, India’s cards in Afghanistan are not strong enough to impress. Its utility in reconstruction can be substituted by China. Its reach in the intelligence game and the strength of its proxies is comparatively weaker than that of Pakistan and is well short of its heyday in the Massoud years. Therefore, India must realistically appraise the relative power positions, and determine that it needs to work with Pakistan than against it.
This could help save Pakistan. Rhetorically India has accepted that this is in Indian interest. But its inability and unwillingness to see the peace process through indicates that it has not done enough to put its money where its mouth is. The realist expectation that they can handle the aftermath of a radicalized state in Pakistan is self-serving. A Pakistan in chaos is only good for majoritarian radicals and hyper-nationalists in India. India must tune into what its interests are.
Its aim is to get Pakistan to disengage with finality from Kashmir. The possibility of offering Pakistan political space in Af-Pak resolution in return for a quid pro quo on Kashmir is past. When the Af-Pak deal is through, Pakistan can turn its attention to Kashmir once again. Precluding such an outcome should impel Indian efforts.
On the internal front, India must instead proactively tackle Kashmir. In case it is unable to do so by networking with Pakistan due to internal political weaknesses, it must at the very least dispel the environment in Kashmir that enables Pakistani interference.
The analysis here that Pakistan has lost only face and not its position; which indicates that a ‘wait and watch’ policy spells inertia. Strategy, sensitive to evolving equations, calls for capitalizing on the stake of ongoing talks that India currently has in the fire.
#3372, 5 May 2011
AFTER OSAMA - VII: SHOULD NEW DELHI ENGAGE PAKISTAN OR ‘WAIT AND WATCH’?
Firdaus Ahmed
email: firdyahmed@yahoo.com
In wake of the Osama killing, the hawks have carried the day in India. In pointing towards possible Pakistani complicity in harbouring Osama, they make the point that the Indian initiative of reaching out to Pakistan that is currently unfolding will fail. Their ‘I told you so’ discourse will likely result in a ‘wait and watch’ attitude by the government. This would lead to another year lost in South Asia.
This time around the initiative appeared more promising with the commerce secretaries agreeing on many encouraging measures ranging from petroleum products, electricity etc to the more important issue of MFN status for India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh appeared to be investing politically in his gut instincts. Reports were of the government having prepared its ground better by networking with the Pakistani army, later denied by both sides.
What will be the implications of Laden’s death? The major element forming the context is the end game in Af-Pak. The Obama plan of beginning pull out in July will gain momentum since the rationale for ‘hunting Osama’ does not exist any more. Ten years have considerably set back the al Qaeda. It has metamorphosed in a manner as to make Af-Pak irrelevant. The Taliban, the key player, has not suffered by Osama’s departure. Knowing the US may like a negotiated exit, they would drive a hard bargain. Pakistan would like to retrieve lost ground by backing them. This will ensure the dissipation of US triumphalism on the departure of Osama before the spring is out.
The point emerges that Pakistan has at best lost face. It will compensate by increasing its energy in protecting its interests. The US, with elections coming up and an economy that continues as a concern, cannot but placate it. The ‘wild card’ would be a terrorist reprisal in the US with Pakistani connections. This could disrupt the relationship, forcing the US to exit the region leaving behind chaos. That it could go this route is evident from its departure and the aftermath in Somalia.
What does this portend for India? In the Indian debate, the hardliners want to use this opportunity to pressure Pakistan. There is commentary on learning from the manner US conducts its business. They do not mind if the ‘wild card’ plays out to Pakistani detriment. It would leave India as the key regional power and in charge of containing the consequences. This holds appeal since it would give India a role in keeping with its stature.
If all else fails, this approach may be all that India has left. Currently, it may not be very useful since with US pressure found wanting it is hardly likely India’s would be more efficacious. Pressuring Pakistan through the intelligence game and heightening of military competition has not succeeded in conflict resolution. Instead, Pakistan has drawn down its nuclear cover more tightly with two quick missile tests, Hatf IX and Hatf VIII, over the last month. Debunking the realist prescription first is needed to eliminate it as an option. In any case, precedent of squandering India’s preeminence in the wake of 1971 does not inspire.
India must instead be attuned to the counter-intuitive likelihood of increased US reliance on Pakistan to bring about a face-saving exit from Af-Pak. In comparison, India’s cards in Afghanistan are not strong enough to impress. Its utility in reconstruction can be substituted by China. Its reach in the intelligence game and the strength of its proxies is comparatively weaker than that of Pakistan and is well short of its heyday in the Massoud years. Therefore, India must realistically appraise the relative power positions, and determine that it needs to work with Pakistan than against it.
This could help save Pakistan. Rhetorically India has accepted that this is in Indian interest. But its inability and unwillingness to see the peace process through indicates that it has not done enough to put its money where its mouth is. The realist expectation that they can handle the aftermath of a radicalized state in Pakistan is self-serving. A Pakistan in chaos is only good for majoritarian radicals and hyper-nationalists in India. India must tune into what its interests are.
Its aim is to get Pakistan to disengage with finality from Kashmir. The possibility of offering Pakistan political space in Af-Pak resolution in return for a quid pro quo on Kashmir is past. When the Af-Pak deal is through, Pakistan can turn its attention to Kashmir once again. Precluding such an outcome should impel Indian efforts.
On the internal front, India must instead proactively tackle Kashmir. In case it is unable to do so by networking with Pakistan due to internal political weaknesses, it must at the very least dispel the environment in Kashmir that enables Pakistani interference.
The analysis here that Pakistan has lost only face and not its position; which indicates that a ‘wait and watch’ policy spells inertia. Strategy, sensitive to evolving equations, calls for capitalizing on the stake of ongoing talks that India currently has in the fire.
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
indiatogether.org
China in the strategic debate
Firdaus Ahmed.
27 April 2011 - China intruded unambiguously into Indian consciousness with its attack of 1962. Its nuclear test of 1964 further consolidated it as a reckonable threat. Its headstart in economic reforms by about a decade, finds India today playing catch up. It is uninspiring that the only significant aspect in which India expects to surpass China is population. Realising this, it appears that India's grand strategy choice is to be more circumspect in its balancing behaviour.
Whether this circumspection is evident in the details, however, is not very certain, given the tensions recently made visible in India's China strategy. The general in command of India's Northern Command has had to ventilate his apprehensions on the presence of Chinese across the Line of Control as being 'part of the string of pearls strategy. This formulation, around for long on the maritime front, has for the first time found mention on the continental front. In reaction, the Foreign Secretary indicated that details of the Army's concerns have been asked for.
This exchange was in the run-up to the meeting of the prime minister with his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of the BRICS summit at Beijing.
. There are two possibilities. One is that there is an element of design behind the commander going public with the Army's position. This could be as part of India's signaling strategy, in which it uses the Army to make a point without queering the negotiating pitch with the Chinese overly. From the Foreign Secretary's reaction, however, this does not seem to have been the case. Strategic finesse, of employing its instruments to make subtle points, is not characteristic of India's establishment.
Premature strategic assertion or muscular posturing is not in grand strategic interest since India needs more than a decade to consolidate its agenda of growth with equity.
The other possibility arises from a feature of the national security system - in which the Army, feeling left out, needs to make its presence felt if necessary, indirectly. In this case, a charitable view could be that the timing of the Army commander's comment indicates that he was not aware of the Prime Minister's then impending trip. Or that the timing of the remarks was to send the message to the establishment that the Army would like its concerns discussed at the meeting.
What this does indicate is that there are two schools in the ring, when it comes to India's China strategy and its follow-up actions. The first is a more nuanced policy in which India gains time to get its power indices in order. This involves building economic ties, deepening relations with the US and Asian democracies, and getting its triad into place over the decade. The ongoing reaching-out to Pakistan can also be counted in this school's guidance. A subtle distancing from the US is also underway lest India get caught up prematurely in the balancing game between the global hegemon and the challenger.
The second school advocates a more muscular approach to deter China over the interim. This involves military rejuvenation on the China front through force positioning and infrastructure buildup. It seeks a greater interface with the US, including military contacts. It plays up the 'two front' threat mentioned by the former Army chief and taken forward by the army commander, since the northern army quite naturally finds Chinese presence 'too close for comfort'. It does seem that the military is bucking the diplomacy-predominant and economy-centered China strategy.
It is at this juncture that grand strategy needs to kick in. While there is nothing wrong in the military maintaining its position in a democratic system characterised by bureaucratic pulling and hauling, for the military to have a voice within the confines of the system is better. Its understanding that it does not have adequate leverage is what results in its going to the media and the public. The advantage of an in-house discussion, even if no-holds-barred, is in the opposition being carried along once a decision, not necessarily one arrived at by consensus, is reached.
SEE FOR FULL ARTICLE indiatogether.org
This also caters for the possibility of preventive war that casts a shadow over the medium term. The expectation in realist circles is that the contention with China will only reach a culmination over markets, resources, political prestige and strategic space over the long haul. They therefore advocate an Indian build up over the interim as insurance.
Could China launch a preventive war in the interim to set India back in this race? Realists argue this is not possible in the current circumstances since China would also likely suffer a set back in relation not so much with India, but in terms of its project of parity with the US. Therefore, India is safe from a 'balance of power' point of view in case it were to arm in the shadow of the US, as it is proceeding to do currently.
The problem with such strategic advocacy is that it sets India up as a target for China in the strategic competition with the US. China would use Pakistan to keep India tied down over the near term. This will not amount to forging a nexus with Pakistan, since this can potentially also singe China. Therefore, the twin-front problem is myth making, more to justify the US tilt and for arms expenditure.
In case India were to be assertive, as realists think is necessary for deterrence sake, then the possibility of preventive war by China becomes a probability. The relative gains from such a contest would be in China's favour since it would enter into the conflict better placed than India in terms of military power. It is unlikely that the US could bail India out since it is already battling declining power and economic indices. Chinese confidence in preventive war can only increase as the two power graphs tend to converge over the medium term. Therefore, Chinese strategy would be to let Pakistan box in India in the short term and keep the preventive war option open for the medium term.
What does this imply for India's grand strategy in first place and at one remove its China strategy? Premature strategic assertion or muscular posturing is not in grand strategic interest since India needs more than a decade to consolidate its agenda of growth with equity. It follows that it needs a China policy that cannot stampede it into a premature confrontation with that putative superpower. The military needs to be brought on board both through appropriate organisational measures giving it a voice within the system as also persuading it of the preferred strategic direction.
Apparently this is already the case, with India Today describing the defence minister as 'lone dissenter' in his turning down the idea of Indian military representation in the headquarters of US theatre commands, among other measures to maintain military distance from the US. This indicates sensible balancing behaviour. The gains made in the meeting between the PM and Mr. Hu, that included agreement over a visit by a delegation of the Northern Army to China, is further evidence of successful unfolding of a strategy that can do without the unnecessary buffeting of bureaucratic politics.
⊕
China in the strategic debate
Firdaus Ahmed.
27 April 2011 - China intruded unambiguously into Indian consciousness with its attack of 1962. Its nuclear test of 1964 further consolidated it as a reckonable threat. Its headstart in economic reforms by about a decade, finds India today playing catch up. It is uninspiring that the only significant aspect in which India expects to surpass China is population. Realising this, it appears that India's grand strategy choice is to be more circumspect in its balancing behaviour.
Whether this circumspection is evident in the details, however, is not very certain, given the tensions recently made visible in India's China strategy. The general in command of India's Northern Command has had to ventilate his apprehensions on the presence of Chinese across the Line of Control as being 'part of the string of pearls strategy. This formulation, around for long on the maritime front, has for the first time found mention on the continental front. In reaction, the Foreign Secretary indicated that details of the Army's concerns have been asked for.
This exchange was in the run-up to the meeting of the prime minister with his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of the BRICS summit at Beijing.
. There are two possibilities. One is that there is an element of design behind the commander going public with the Army's position. This could be as part of India's signaling strategy, in which it uses the Army to make a point without queering the negotiating pitch with the Chinese overly. From the Foreign Secretary's reaction, however, this does not seem to have been the case. Strategic finesse, of employing its instruments to make subtle points, is not characteristic of India's establishment.
Premature strategic assertion or muscular posturing is not in grand strategic interest since India needs more than a decade to consolidate its agenda of growth with equity.
The other possibility arises from a feature of the national security system - in which the Army, feeling left out, needs to make its presence felt if necessary, indirectly. In this case, a charitable view could be that the timing of the Army commander's comment indicates that he was not aware of the Prime Minister's then impending trip. Or that the timing of the remarks was to send the message to the establishment that the Army would like its concerns discussed at the meeting.
What this does indicate is that there are two schools in the ring, when it comes to India's China strategy and its follow-up actions. The first is a more nuanced policy in which India gains time to get its power indices in order. This involves building economic ties, deepening relations with the US and Asian democracies, and getting its triad into place over the decade. The ongoing reaching-out to Pakistan can also be counted in this school's guidance. A subtle distancing from the US is also underway lest India get caught up prematurely in the balancing game between the global hegemon and the challenger.
The second school advocates a more muscular approach to deter China over the interim. This involves military rejuvenation on the China front through force positioning and infrastructure buildup. It seeks a greater interface with the US, including military contacts. It plays up the 'two front' threat mentioned by the former Army chief and taken forward by the army commander, since the northern army quite naturally finds Chinese presence 'too close for comfort'. It does seem that the military is bucking the diplomacy-predominant and economy-centered China strategy.
It is at this juncture that grand strategy needs to kick in. While there is nothing wrong in the military maintaining its position in a democratic system characterised by bureaucratic pulling and hauling, for the military to have a voice within the confines of the system is better. Its understanding that it does not have adequate leverage is what results in its going to the media and the public. The advantage of an in-house discussion, even if no-holds-barred, is in the opposition being carried along once a decision, not necessarily one arrived at by consensus, is reached.
SEE FOR FULL ARTICLE indiatogether.org
This also caters for the possibility of preventive war that casts a shadow over the medium term. The expectation in realist circles is that the contention with China will only reach a culmination over markets, resources, political prestige and strategic space over the long haul. They therefore advocate an Indian build up over the interim as insurance.
Could China launch a preventive war in the interim to set India back in this race? Realists argue this is not possible in the current circumstances since China would also likely suffer a set back in relation not so much with India, but in terms of its project of parity with the US. Therefore, India is safe from a 'balance of power' point of view in case it were to arm in the shadow of the US, as it is proceeding to do currently.
The problem with such strategic advocacy is that it sets India up as a target for China in the strategic competition with the US. China would use Pakistan to keep India tied down over the near term. This will not amount to forging a nexus with Pakistan, since this can potentially also singe China. Therefore, the twin-front problem is myth making, more to justify the US tilt and for arms expenditure.
In case India were to be assertive, as realists think is necessary for deterrence sake, then the possibility of preventive war by China becomes a probability. The relative gains from such a contest would be in China's favour since it would enter into the conflict better placed than India in terms of military power. It is unlikely that the US could bail India out since it is already battling declining power and economic indices. Chinese confidence in preventive war can only increase as the two power graphs tend to converge over the medium term. Therefore, Chinese strategy would be to let Pakistan box in India in the short term and keep the preventive war option open for the medium term.
What does this imply for India's grand strategy in first place and at one remove its China strategy? Premature strategic assertion or muscular posturing is not in grand strategic interest since India needs more than a decade to consolidate its agenda of growth with equity. It follows that it needs a China policy that cannot stampede it into a premature confrontation with that putative superpower. The military needs to be brought on board both through appropriate organisational measures giving it a voice within the system as also persuading it of the preferred strategic direction.
Apparently this is already the case, with India Today describing the defence minister as 'lone dissenter' in his turning down the idea of Indian military representation in the headquarters of US theatre commands, among other measures to maintain military distance from the US. This indicates sensible balancing behaviour. The gains made in the meeting between the PM and Mr. Hu, that included agreement over a visit by a delegation of the Northern Army to China, is further evidence of successful unfolding of a strategy that can do without the unnecessary buffeting of bureaucratic politics.
⊕
Monday, April 25, 2011
Milli Gazette
THE GUJARAT REVELATIONS
By Firdaus Ahmed
According to an affidavit in the Supreme Court by a senior police official, he was witness to the chief minister in Gujarat requiring the police to stay out of violence that he expected Hindus to inflict on Muslims in wake of the burning of the train bogie at Godhra. This was intended to ‘teach the Muslims a lesson’. The police had been somewhat even handed earlier, as a result the Muslims had apparently been emboldened. The lesson would help put a stop to communal violence they indulged in.
The chief minister has since been reelected and has acquired a reputation for being strong on development. There is also the claim that Gujarat has since been communal violence free. A Muslim educationist heading a leading seminary has been under cloud for acknowledging that Muslims do not face discrimination in Gujarat. A leading industrial tycoon is seen in an advertisement praising the Gujarat administration for speedily granting his corporation land for completion of a car project. India’s top actor is a state ambassador for Gujarat. The cop in question has gone on record accusing the Special Investigation Team probing the cases of violence on behalf of the Supreme Court of being partial to the chief minister.
Clearly, the chief minister has done well since for himself and evidently for his state. The question is can the subsequent record help over-shadow the previous record. This is consequential since the chief minister may have ambitions for ruling from Delhi, particularly since his political party is short on leadership with an impressive record.
The answer is equally clearly in the negative. Justice has not only to be done, but seen to be done. The chief minister would have to pay for his acts of omission and commission. But only in case these are proven in court. The problem is that close to a decade has elapsed since.
This means ample time has been available for records to be set right, assuming there is truth to the charge in first place. That the police officer did not blow the whistle earlier indicates the atmosphere of fear in the state bureaucracies. That his own senior has contested his claim brings out the atmosphere of connivance prevalent. This environment of fear is perhaps that gets the bureaucracy working and in its working bringing compliments, if controversial, for development for the state. There is also the possibility, given that the people have reelected the party that within the state apparatus exists a considerable constituency subverted to the ideology of the political party.
In the immediate aftermath of the carnage, the prime minister, of the same political party, could not follow through on his preference of asking the chief minister to go for violation of what he termed as the ‘raj dharma’. The chief minister in the event was saved by the union home minister accepting his narrative of the events in Gujarat. This ability to handle Delhi, no doubt, sent the message to people and officials in Gujarat of the power of the chief minister.
The climate of fear has been extended over time by the earlier killing of the home minister during the carnage, Hiren Pandya. There have been periodic reports of killings of some Muslims in encounters, now being increasingly challenged as fake encounters. These cumulatively have possibly lent the chief minister an aura of invincibility. This perhaps explains the higher indices on development reportedly been notched up by Gujarat. No one in the administration would want to fall afoul of such a ruthless man. It is said of the Emergency that the trains ran on time.
In other words, the ‘development’ that is attributed to Gujarat is not through means that are worth replicating. If these are good enough for the Gujarati people and their state officials, these are not necessarily replicable across the diverse land of India. In any case the controversy that greeted even the revered Anna Hazare’s references to the chief minister’s record on development indicates that the record on rural development is not quite what it is made out to be.
There are three indicators to the contrary about the state of affairs in Gujarat. Firstly, the persecution of Christians in the tribal Dangs district indicates that all is not well in rural Gujarat. Swami Aseemananda, the mastermind who has confessed to his involvement in the right wing conspiracy to malign Muslims through terrorist bomb attacks, had his ashram there in Gujarat. Second is that there has been little done for justice and resettlement of Muslims effected by the violence. This means impunity for the perpetrators and by extension accretion in the aura of ruthlessness of the chief minister.
Lastly, there has been the case of bomb blasts in Ahmedabad as part of the series of blasts in cities across India in 2008. The curious part of this case has been that the only place these were detected and reportedly ‘defused’ was in Surat. The obvious implication is that these have been planted there to implicate Muslims yet again. The less obvious but more significant implication is that this may well have been to take the scent off the elements who had actually planted these. No wonder that the Center has had to create a fresh agency, the NIA, to look at the blasts of questionable origin. The fear is that the intelligence apparatus is so penetrated by subverted ideology if not elements that a fresh agency is required to pursue the ends of justice.
It is therefore important to restrict the chief minister’s shadow to his home state. It is for the people there to realize who they have as their elected head. As for the rest of the people of India there is no way their sense of justice and propriety will allow them to countenance such a person as their political leader. Ensuring that this does not come to pass due to democratic miscarriage requires that the truth in Gujarat be pursued to its logical ends. More need to follow the example of the brave hearts as Hemant Karkare and the whistle blower, Sanjiv Bhatt.
If truth was to prove elusive still, then regretfully it must be acknowledged that this nation needs no better a leader than the chief minister as prime minister.
THE GUJARAT REVELATIONS
By Firdaus Ahmed
According to an affidavit in the Supreme Court by a senior police official, he was witness to the chief minister in Gujarat requiring the police to stay out of violence that he expected Hindus to inflict on Muslims in wake of the burning of the train bogie at Godhra. This was intended to ‘teach the Muslims a lesson’. The police had been somewhat even handed earlier, as a result the Muslims had apparently been emboldened. The lesson would help put a stop to communal violence they indulged in.
The chief minister has since been reelected and has acquired a reputation for being strong on development. There is also the claim that Gujarat has since been communal violence free. A Muslim educationist heading a leading seminary has been under cloud for acknowledging that Muslims do not face discrimination in Gujarat. A leading industrial tycoon is seen in an advertisement praising the Gujarat administration for speedily granting his corporation land for completion of a car project. India’s top actor is a state ambassador for Gujarat. The cop in question has gone on record accusing the Special Investigation Team probing the cases of violence on behalf of the Supreme Court of being partial to the chief minister.
Clearly, the chief minister has done well since for himself and evidently for his state. The question is can the subsequent record help over-shadow the previous record. This is consequential since the chief minister may have ambitions for ruling from Delhi, particularly since his political party is short on leadership with an impressive record.
The answer is equally clearly in the negative. Justice has not only to be done, but seen to be done. The chief minister would have to pay for his acts of omission and commission. But only in case these are proven in court. The problem is that close to a decade has elapsed since.
This means ample time has been available for records to be set right, assuming there is truth to the charge in first place. That the police officer did not blow the whistle earlier indicates the atmosphere of fear in the state bureaucracies. That his own senior has contested his claim brings out the atmosphere of connivance prevalent. This environment of fear is perhaps that gets the bureaucracy working and in its working bringing compliments, if controversial, for development for the state. There is also the possibility, given that the people have reelected the party that within the state apparatus exists a considerable constituency subverted to the ideology of the political party.
In the immediate aftermath of the carnage, the prime minister, of the same political party, could not follow through on his preference of asking the chief minister to go for violation of what he termed as the ‘raj dharma’. The chief minister in the event was saved by the union home minister accepting his narrative of the events in Gujarat. This ability to handle Delhi, no doubt, sent the message to people and officials in Gujarat of the power of the chief minister.
The climate of fear has been extended over time by the earlier killing of the home minister during the carnage, Hiren Pandya. There have been periodic reports of killings of some Muslims in encounters, now being increasingly challenged as fake encounters. These cumulatively have possibly lent the chief minister an aura of invincibility. This perhaps explains the higher indices on development reportedly been notched up by Gujarat. No one in the administration would want to fall afoul of such a ruthless man. It is said of the Emergency that the trains ran on time.
In other words, the ‘development’ that is attributed to Gujarat is not through means that are worth replicating. If these are good enough for the Gujarati people and their state officials, these are not necessarily replicable across the diverse land of India. In any case the controversy that greeted even the revered Anna Hazare’s references to the chief minister’s record on development indicates that the record on rural development is not quite what it is made out to be.
There are three indicators to the contrary about the state of affairs in Gujarat. Firstly, the persecution of Christians in the tribal Dangs district indicates that all is not well in rural Gujarat. Swami Aseemananda, the mastermind who has confessed to his involvement in the right wing conspiracy to malign Muslims through terrorist bomb attacks, had his ashram there in Gujarat. Second is that there has been little done for justice and resettlement of Muslims effected by the violence. This means impunity for the perpetrators and by extension accretion in the aura of ruthlessness of the chief minister.
Lastly, there has been the case of bomb blasts in Ahmedabad as part of the series of blasts in cities across India in 2008. The curious part of this case has been that the only place these were detected and reportedly ‘defused’ was in Surat. The obvious implication is that these have been planted there to implicate Muslims yet again. The less obvious but more significant implication is that this may well have been to take the scent off the elements who had actually planted these. No wonder that the Center has had to create a fresh agency, the NIA, to look at the blasts of questionable origin. The fear is that the intelligence apparatus is so penetrated by subverted ideology if not elements that a fresh agency is required to pursue the ends of justice.
It is therefore important to restrict the chief minister’s shadow to his home state. It is for the people there to realize who they have as their elected head. As for the rest of the people of India there is no way their sense of justice and propriety will allow them to countenance such a person as their political leader. Ensuring that this does not come to pass due to democratic miscarriage requires that the truth in Gujarat be pursued to its logical ends. More need to follow the example of the brave hearts as Hemant Karkare and the whistle blower, Sanjiv Bhatt.
If truth was to prove elusive still, then regretfully it must be acknowledged that this nation needs no better a leader than the chief minister as prime minister.
Thursday, March 31, 2011
indiatogether.org
Long road still ahead
by Firdaus Ahmed
India and Pakistan are talking and playing. This is enough to make expectations rise, only to be disappointed once the realities catch up. A strand of reality that seldom finds mention is the reservations many in India have of rapprochement. Unless these are squarely met, reaching out done by well meaning prime ministers are not likely to get anywhere.
These reservations include, firstly, that Pakistan is not interested in repairing its relations with India. The Army in control there stands to lose and therefore would not like such an outcome. Secondly, business as usual cannot be conducted with those sending terrorists across. Thirdly, Pakistan is a stooge of China and consequently it will not be allowed to mend fences. There are more such arguments, all externally directed. These reservations can be taken on board and a strategy made to coopt, negate or prevail over these. That this does not happen, tells us that there is something more to reality.
An important part of this reality has been India's need to have an external 'other' out there - in the form of a hostile Pakistan. This holds up India.
There are several sectors, lobbies and forces that profit from the adversarial status quo. The Wikileaks being brought to attention by The Hindu, provide evidence. M K Narayanan's dismissal of the prime minister's soft corner for Pakistan is clinching on the good health of retarding lobbies in India.
Since the former National Security Adviser spent his working life in his own description to his American interlocutor who spilled the beans unintentionally as a 'spook', it can be inferred that the intelligence community stands arraigned against Pakistan. This appears understandable since they are conversant with the shady goings within their counterpart, the ISI. What is unsaid is the extent the ISI is reactive and between the two the extent to which the conflict ridden reality is firstly manufactured and secondly perceived.
Given the perception of reality fed by a motivated intelligence, it is apparently explicable that the military-industrial complex comprising the military, ministry and the technologists would prefer a tough stance. The justification of the defence budget is now not so much Pakistan, as China. However, as trotted out in late 2009, the 'two front' threat as the worse case scenario guides acquisitions.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE WEBSITE indiatogether.org
Stalwarts of the strategic community have made their names and their visages nationally recognised in Pakistan-bashing. Former foreign service and intelligence officers, easily recognised even when they are not named, have set the discourse. Finding a voice after retirement they are paying back Pakistan for perceived wrongs, such as the surprise at Kargil and Kandahar, that have blemished their careers. At least a few are senior denizens in the capital-based think tanks setting the agenda, and one operates from the deep south.
Finally, there is the tribe of cultural nationalists. Arun Jaitly's views on opportunistic use of the ideology imply that Pakistan and its actions are politically useful. Also in the same news report is reference to terrorism raising the conservatives' stock. This perhaps explains the need felt in certain extremist circles for 'black operations' implicating Muslims in terrorism perpetrated by majoritarian nationalists.
Until this dimension of the internal reality is understood and accepted, there is little prospect of movement in India's Pakistan policy. Clearly, there is no chance of taking these forces on. Efforts to do so would get the conservative formations and realists into a quasi alliance. Their counter attack would be to appropriate nationalism and claim that a sell out on defence of the nation is underway. The government weakened by corruption scandals since the run up to the Commonwealth Games can hardly be expected to take the plunge.
Pakistan on its part is unlikely to oblige with a game changing gesture, such as locking up Hafeez Sayeed, sending its ISI chief on an intelligence exchange visit to India or the Pakistan Army chief pulling back of his army for operations to the west. Consequently, the procedural track of talks will at best be on course. Nothing significant can be expected to emerge, leaving South Asia open to the next jihadi assault and its nationalist aftermath.
Even so the steps taken at the home secretaries meeting in New Delhi and that of the prime ministers in Mohali must be welcomed. But the meet of the foreign ministers due in mid year must be viewed realistically.
What is needed?
This can only be an academic exercise in light of forces stacked against the possibility of improvement in relations between the countries. Many peace strategies have been suggested and partially explored. These include revitalising institutions, opening up commerce and people-to-people contacts. As witnessed, these are either stillborn (e.g. SAARC), stymied (the Lahore bus diplomacy), or undercut such as by the paperwork involved in gaining a place on the Uri-Muzaffarabad bus. In any case, each of this is subject to rewinding at the inevitable crack of the Kalashnikov. Even the promise of generational change was belied in the Rajiv-Benazir bonhomie having fizzled out with the outbreak of violence in Kashmir. So the impending Rahul era is also without promise.
Hardliners self-interestedly offer two strategies. One is to resort to fisticuffs to bring Pakistan to heel. The second is to create such an asymmetry with Pakistan by outspending it militarily that it will drop out of the race, if not bandwagon. The problem with the first is that there is no guarantee that Pakistan will lose in light of its response options on the subconventional and nuclear planes. The latter neglects the Chinese interest in keeping Pakistan afloat. In short, both options not only have little prospect of success but more dangerously keep South Asia on nuclear tenterhooks.
Pessimistic but realistically, the only way out appears to be to be brought up face-to-face with the nuclear reality. The Japanese experience, twice over, will be sobering in such a circumstance. This implies waiting for things to get worse. Then they will get better with the peace strategies that are already present in the discourse applied in the aftermath. Peace mongers must keep their powder dry to strike at that opportune hour.
The key question is how to restrict the nuclear face-off to a flirtation rather than the real thing. It is strange that such a question needs answering even as the two states are seemingly set to pick up the pieces once again from where they left off at Mumbai 26/11.
⊕
Long road still ahead
by Firdaus Ahmed
India and Pakistan are talking and playing. This is enough to make expectations rise, only to be disappointed once the realities catch up. A strand of reality that seldom finds mention is the reservations many in India have of rapprochement. Unless these are squarely met, reaching out done by well meaning prime ministers are not likely to get anywhere.
These reservations include, firstly, that Pakistan is not interested in repairing its relations with India. The Army in control there stands to lose and therefore would not like such an outcome. Secondly, business as usual cannot be conducted with those sending terrorists across. Thirdly, Pakistan is a stooge of China and consequently it will not be allowed to mend fences. There are more such arguments, all externally directed. These reservations can be taken on board and a strategy made to coopt, negate or prevail over these. That this does not happen, tells us that there is something more to reality.
An important part of this reality has been India's need to have an external 'other' out there - in the form of a hostile Pakistan. This holds up India.
There are several sectors, lobbies and forces that profit from the adversarial status quo. The Wikileaks being brought to attention by The Hindu, provide evidence. M K Narayanan's dismissal of the prime minister's soft corner for Pakistan is clinching on the good health of retarding lobbies in India.
Since the former National Security Adviser spent his working life in his own description to his American interlocutor who spilled the beans unintentionally as a 'spook', it can be inferred that the intelligence community stands arraigned against Pakistan. This appears understandable since they are conversant with the shady goings within their counterpart, the ISI. What is unsaid is the extent the ISI is reactive and between the two the extent to which the conflict ridden reality is firstly manufactured and secondly perceived.
Given the perception of reality fed by a motivated intelligence, it is apparently explicable that the military-industrial complex comprising the military, ministry and the technologists would prefer a tough stance. The justification of the defence budget is now not so much Pakistan, as China. However, as trotted out in late 2009, the 'two front' threat as the worse case scenario guides acquisitions.
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Stalwarts of the strategic community have made their names and their visages nationally recognised in Pakistan-bashing. Former foreign service and intelligence officers, easily recognised even when they are not named, have set the discourse. Finding a voice after retirement they are paying back Pakistan for perceived wrongs, such as the surprise at Kargil and Kandahar, that have blemished their careers. At least a few are senior denizens in the capital-based think tanks setting the agenda, and one operates from the deep south.
Finally, there is the tribe of cultural nationalists. Arun Jaitly's views on opportunistic use of the ideology imply that Pakistan and its actions are politically useful. Also in the same news report is reference to terrorism raising the conservatives' stock. This perhaps explains the need felt in certain extremist circles for 'black operations' implicating Muslims in terrorism perpetrated by majoritarian nationalists.
Until this dimension of the internal reality is understood and accepted, there is little prospect of movement in India's Pakistan policy. Clearly, there is no chance of taking these forces on. Efforts to do so would get the conservative formations and realists into a quasi alliance. Their counter attack would be to appropriate nationalism and claim that a sell out on defence of the nation is underway. The government weakened by corruption scandals since the run up to the Commonwealth Games can hardly be expected to take the plunge.
Pakistan on its part is unlikely to oblige with a game changing gesture, such as locking up Hafeez Sayeed, sending its ISI chief on an intelligence exchange visit to India or the Pakistan Army chief pulling back of his army for operations to the west. Consequently, the procedural track of talks will at best be on course. Nothing significant can be expected to emerge, leaving South Asia open to the next jihadi assault and its nationalist aftermath.
Even so the steps taken at the home secretaries meeting in New Delhi and that of the prime ministers in Mohali must be welcomed. But the meet of the foreign ministers due in mid year must be viewed realistically.
What is needed?
This can only be an academic exercise in light of forces stacked against the possibility of improvement in relations between the countries. Many peace strategies have been suggested and partially explored. These include revitalising institutions, opening up commerce and people-to-people contacts. As witnessed, these are either stillborn (e.g. SAARC), stymied (the Lahore bus diplomacy), or undercut such as by the paperwork involved in gaining a place on the Uri-Muzaffarabad bus. In any case, each of this is subject to rewinding at the inevitable crack of the Kalashnikov. Even the promise of generational change was belied in the Rajiv-Benazir bonhomie having fizzled out with the outbreak of violence in Kashmir. So the impending Rahul era is also without promise.
Hardliners self-interestedly offer two strategies. One is to resort to fisticuffs to bring Pakistan to heel. The second is to create such an asymmetry with Pakistan by outspending it militarily that it will drop out of the race, if not bandwagon. The problem with the first is that there is no guarantee that Pakistan will lose in light of its response options on the subconventional and nuclear planes. The latter neglects the Chinese interest in keeping Pakistan afloat. In short, both options not only have little prospect of success but more dangerously keep South Asia on nuclear tenterhooks.
Pessimistic but realistically, the only way out appears to be to be brought up face-to-face with the nuclear reality. The Japanese experience, twice over, will be sobering in such a circumstance. This implies waiting for things to get worse. Then they will get better with the peace strategies that are already present in the discourse applied in the aftermath. Peace mongers must keep their powder dry to strike at that opportune hour.
The key question is how to restrict the nuclear face-off to a flirtation rather than the real thing. It is strange that such a question needs answering even as the two states are seemingly set to pick up the pieces once again from where they left off at Mumbai 26/11.
⊕
Saturday, March 19, 2011
Getting A Peace Movement Going
by Firdaus Ahmed March 18, 2011 23:03
The unfortunate happenings in Japan can have a useful purpose in case the fledgling peace movement can acquire momentum. This is the time to move from an activist-centered program to a mass based one.
The events of Japan have had a catalyzing effect elsewhere. The PM has already ordered a nuclear safety recheck. Those opposed to nuclear power expansion in India, such as the CNDP (Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace) have used the opportunity to drive home their arguments against such expansion. The Disaster Management Authority is no doubt studying the aftermath, even as it keeps relief teams on standby for deployment. Nuclear lobbies interested in the nuclear renaissance have been at work dispelling any aspersions on their stewardship of the nuclear program.
Missing in action is the peace lobby. Currently, they are double-hatted, also busy with fending of nuclear power expansion, particularly the Jaitapur plant. The unfortunate happenings in Japan can have a useful purpose in case the fledgling peace movement can acquire momentum. This is the time to move from an activist-centered program to a mass based one.
The back-to-back nuclear tests were the spark but there was no tinder. As a result there was little societal opposition. Instead the nationalist narrative took over, fanned later by the Kargil War. The nuclearists were sensible in blostering their doctrinal releases with due genuflection to disarmament, even as they shifted the goal posts from ‘minimum deterrence’ to ‘credible minimum deterrence’. Their dominance of the discourse since, relying on official power, has kept the peace movement in the realm of possibility and not quite a ‘happening’ field.
This is despite South Asia having undergone a near war and a crisis after Kargil. The nuclear race, if not an arms race, is one being run neck in neck, with a news report having it that Pakistan has ‘edged’ past India in numbers. In a variegated program, India remains ahead, having a nuclear powered submarine under trials and ballistic missile defence system retested recently.
The somnolence in the peace counter offensive owes to the movement lacking in escape velocity. The current juncture of the third blast in Japan’s atomic power station and Tokyo being downwind is an opportunity that must be suitably leveraged. Directly confronted with the sad images, people can imagine what they are in for in case the false god, deterrence, were to fail.
Japan has evacuated a 20 km radius around the plant. Since it was on the sea the displacement has been up to tens of thousands, others having left due to the tsunami. The Japanese being traditionally disciplined the images are of oriental calm in face of tragedy and challenge. Transferring the disaster template onto the Indo-Gangetic plain would be surely focus minds, given South Asian densities of population, levels of preparedness and suspect social cohesion.
While rightly the current focus of activists is on nuclear plants safety and the shortcomings in the Indian system, such as absence of an independent over-watch and safety audit body, there is a need to go beyond. The counter attack must move into terrain hitherto-fore considered settled due to hegemony of nuclearists.
Anticipating their arguments would be instructive. Foremost would be that India and Pakistan have always waged limited, virtually ‘gentlemanly’ wars that were at best, ‘communal riots with tanks’. Both states have an agreement not to attack each others nuclear assets, an agreement that has withstood the test of all the crises over the past two decades. Limited War entails avoiding targeting of possible nuclear infrastructure, lest it trigger a ‘use them lose them’ paranoia. In case of inadvertent conventional strikes on nuclear weapons, the weapons are unlikely to go off in sympathetic detonations due to safety features. What would result would at best be akin to a dirty bomb, limited to the danger zone of the chemical explosive. Besides, India has the NDMA in place etc etc.
The shortcomings of this position need to be brought out. Firstly, the wars were in an era when the shared heritage and memories were still fresh in memory. Ever since respective religion based nationalisms have made advent in mainstream political imagination and the consequences are yet unfolding in both societies. Secondly, while the treaty exists, its robustness in war is not known. The level of credence given to the treaty, particularly in the classified air force doctrine, is not known. As it is the list that is exchanged yearly of facilities is not in the open domain. Thirdly, the emphasis on firepower is evident from the number of FICCI and CII seminars on the theme and developments in missile field, particularly cruise missiles. Nuclear hideouts can figure either explicitly or inadvertently in such fire assaults. This could lead to radiation leakage from damaged weapons or worse, trigger nuclearised responses.
The leisurely pace of the peace process that could dispel such concerns stands explained in the Wikileaks releases made accessible by The Hindu. The lobby against normalization, in which, incidentally, also figures an erstwhile NSA, is capable of stymieing the PM’s best intentions. That many sections gain from such a status quo, including the nuclear lobby, accounts for its strength.
In light of this asymmetry, positional war needs being launched by getting not only masses but the middle classes, who stand to lose the most, on board. The counter needs to move from an anti-nuclear ‘coalition’ to a ‘movement’. It cannot be in isolation of such action in neighbouring states. In fact, only together can the counter prevail. The Japanese experience is the second, and possibly last, for learning.
by Firdaus Ahmed March 18, 2011 23:03
The unfortunate happenings in Japan can have a useful purpose in case the fledgling peace movement can acquire momentum. This is the time to move from an activist-centered program to a mass based one.
The events of Japan have had a catalyzing effect elsewhere. The PM has already ordered a nuclear safety recheck. Those opposed to nuclear power expansion in India, such as the CNDP (Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace) have used the opportunity to drive home their arguments against such expansion. The Disaster Management Authority is no doubt studying the aftermath, even as it keeps relief teams on standby for deployment. Nuclear lobbies interested in the nuclear renaissance have been at work dispelling any aspersions on their stewardship of the nuclear program.
Missing in action is the peace lobby. Currently, they are double-hatted, also busy with fending of nuclear power expansion, particularly the Jaitapur plant. The unfortunate happenings in Japan can have a useful purpose in case the fledgling peace movement can acquire momentum. This is the time to move from an activist-centered program to a mass based one.
The back-to-back nuclear tests were the spark but there was no tinder. As a result there was little societal opposition. Instead the nationalist narrative took over, fanned later by the Kargil War. The nuclearists were sensible in blostering their doctrinal releases with due genuflection to disarmament, even as they shifted the goal posts from ‘minimum deterrence’ to ‘credible minimum deterrence’. Their dominance of the discourse since, relying on official power, has kept the peace movement in the realm of possibility and not quite a ‘happening’ field.
This is despite South Asia having undergone a near war and a crisis after Kargil. The nuclear race, if not an arms race, is one being run neck in neck, with a news report having it that Pakistan has ‘edged’ past India in numbers. In a variegated program, India remains ahead, having a nuclear powered submarine under trials and ballistic missile defence system retested recently.
The somnolence in the peace counter offensive owes to the movement lacking in escape velocity. The current juncture of the third blast in Japan’s atomic power station and Tokyo being downwind is an opportunity that must be suitably leveraged. Directly confronted with the sad images, people can imagine what they are in for in case the false god, deterrence, were to fail.
Japan has evacuated a 20 km radius around the plant. Since it was on the sea the displacement has been up to tens of thousands, others having left due to the tsunami. The Japanese being traditionally disciplined the images are of oriental calm in face of tragedy and challenge. Transferring the disaster template onto the Indo-Gangetic plain would be surely focus minds, given South Asian densities of population, levels of preparedness and suspect social cohesion.
While rightly the current focus of activists is on nuclear plants safety and the shortcomings in the Indian system, such as absence of an independent over-watch and safety audit body, there is a need to go beyond. The counter attack must move into terrain hitherto-fore considered settled due to hegemony of nuclearists.
Anticipating their arguments would be instructive. Foremost would be that India and Pakistan have always waged limited, virtually ‘gentlemanly’ wars that were at best, ‘communal riots with tanks’. Both states have an agreement not to attack each others nuclear assets, an agreement that has withstood the test of all the crises over the past two decades. Limited War entails avoiding targeting of possible nuclear infrastructure, lest it trigger a ‘use them lose them’ paranoia. In case of inadvertent conventional strikes on nuclear weapons, the weapons are unlikely to go off in sympathetic detonations due to safety features. What would result would at best be akin to a dirty bomb, limited to the danger zone of the chemical explosive. Besides, India has the NDMA in place etc etc.
The shortcomings of this position need to be brought out. Firstly, the wars were in an era when the shared heritage and memories were still fresh in memory. Ever since respective religion based nationalisms have made advent in mainstream political imagination and the consequences are yet unfolding in both societies. Secondly, while the treaty exists, its robustness in war is not known. The level of credence given to the treaty, particularly in the classified air force doctrine, is not known. As it is the list that is exchanged yearly of facilities is not in the open domain. Thirdly, the emphasis on firepower is evident from the number of FICCI and CII seminars on the theme and developments in missile field, particularly cruise missiles. Nuclear hideouts can figure either explicitly or inadvertently in such fire assaults. This could lead to radiation leakage from damaged weapons or worse, trigger nuclearised responses.
The leisurely pace of the peace process that could dispel such concerns stands explained in the Wikileaks releases made accessible by The Hindu. The lobby against normalization, in which, incidentally, also figures an erstwhile NSA, is capable of stymieing the PM’s best intentions. That many sections gain from such a status quo, including the nuclear lobby, accounts for its strength.
In light of this asymmetry, positional war needs being launched by getting not only masses but the middle classes, who stand to lose the most, on board. The counter needs to move from an anti-nuclear ‘coalition’ to a ‘movement’. It cannot be in isolation of such action in neighbouring states. In fact, only together can the counter prevail. The Japanese experience is the second, and possibly last, for learning.
Friday, March 04, 2011
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/revisiting-intelligence-reform-3338.html
REVISITING INTELLIGENCE REFORM
The Outlook informs that a report on intelligence reforms is in the offing. The review is being done by a government think-tank, taking cue from the speech of the Vice President, Hamid Ansari. It has been ten years since the Kargil Review Committee instigated the ‘Gary’ Saxena task force report to the Group of Ministers, and the new report is timely and welcome.
The Rajya Sabha chairman had said at the annual RN Kao Memorial Lecture a year ago that “there is no reason why a democratic system like ours should not have a Standing Committee of Parliament on intelligence.” His speech then had come close on the heels of Mr. Chidambaram’s talk, ‘A New Architecture for India’s Intelligence’ at the Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture. Thus, political India made its intent clear that changes in both the internal and external dimensions of intelligence were impending. This was understandable since Mumbai 26/11 had indeed shaken up the security system. With reforms elsewhere in place, such as coastal security, it is the turn of intelligence agencies that seem to have failed yet again, after Kargil.
It is being authored by an intelligence ‘insider’, Rana Banerji. He made the news a few years ago as a leading contender for the top job in the external intelligence agency. The ideas he may have entertained and could not oversee may come up in the report, making it one worth looking forward to. Saikat Dutta (‘Ghosts who walk’, Outlook, 28 February 2011) writes that the whole gamut of intelligence function is being reviewed including recruitment, training, covert operations, the operations-analyses balance, financial accountability, ethics etc. Though no report can possibly recommend against opening up the intelligence domain to legislative oversight, the manner and extent of this recommendation would be its highlight, given the reservations about reform that may be in existence.
This article suggests the inclusion of a recommendation on ethnic, regional and community profile balancing within these organizations. The idea can be considered irrespective of whether the Equal Opportunity Bill under debate sees the light of day. Since no data exists on account of secrecy that understandably attends the intelligence function, that this aspect is less than optimal cannot be said outright. However, the possibility of certain subgroups not being represented adequately, such as Muslims and other groups from certain regions, cannot be discounted. The figures, albeit contested, provided by late Omar Khalidi, in his book Khaki and Ethnic Violence in India are representative. The remainder of this article argues why a greater representation of Muslims would be beneficial to the organizations in question and to national security.
There is a perception of Muslim under-representation to the extent of their numbers being negligible to minimal, particularly so in officer ranks, as revealed by Outlook in 2006. That there is no policy to this effect can be conceded, though the article had suggested that it was outcome of an ‘unwritten code’. It possibly owes instead to a lack of qualification and dearth of volunteers. The latter is also due to the self-reinforcing cycle of Muslims not applying under the impression that they would not in any case make the grade. Given this, there is a case for remedial action. While positive discrimination is not the answer, an open recruiting policy may help. Targeting Muslims through an outreach to the community, through its leaders, may be useful. The figures for police and paramilitary have registered an upward trend since the Sachar committee made this suggestion. At officer level initially, Muslims can be asked for as deputationists from other organizations, such as police and the military. That deserving Muslims would likely seize the opportunity can be seen from a Muslim topping the IAS last year and the Indian Forest Service exam this year. The Vastanvi episode indicates the focus on education and jobs in the multiple communities that together form India and the world’s largest minority.
Why is this necessary? Take for instance intelligence on the terror bombings which reveal the handiwork of majoritarian extremists. The refrain in intelligence input, magnified through the media, was that these were perpetrated by Muslims. However, the discourse in the Urdu press and in drawing rooms of Muslim households was to the contrary. It could thus have proved to be a timely line of investigation. At a higher level of abstraction, the domestication of the intelligence function is important for the plural, secular and democratic underpinnings of the republic. In case the character of the state is to be changed, it is the closed intelligence apparatus that would be the first target. Without checks and balances that pervade the system, these organizations lend themselves to such takeover. While democratic control of the military has witnessed much theorizing, the democracy-intelligence relationship has been neglected.
REVISITING INTELLIGENCE REFORM
The Outlook informs that a report on intelligence reforms is in the offing. The review is being done by a government think-tank, taking cue from the speech of the Vice President, Hamid Ansari. It has been ten years since the Kargil Review Committee instigated the ‘Gary’ Saxena task force report to the Group of Ministers, and the new report is timely and welcome.
The Rajya Sabha chairman had said at the annual RN Kao Memorial Lecture a year ago that “there is no reason why a democratic system like ours should not have a Standing Committee of Parliament on intelligence.” His speech then had come close on the heels of Mr. Chidambaram’s talk, ‘A New Architecture for India’s Intelligence’ at the Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture. Thus, political India made its intent clear that changes in both the internal and external dimensions of intelligence were impending. This was understandable since Mumbai 26/11 had indeed shaken up the security system. With reforms elsewhere in place, such as coastal security, it is the turn of intelligence agencies that seem to have failed yet again, after Kargil.
It is being authored by an intelligence ‘insider’, Rana Banerji. He made the news a few years ago as a leading contender for the top job in the external intelligence agency. The ideas he may have entertained and could not oversee may come up in the report, making it one worth looking forward to. Saikat Dutta (‘Ghosts who walk’, Outlook, 28 February 2011) writes that the whole gamut of intelligence function is being reviewed including recruitment, training, covert operations, the operations-analyses balance, financial accountability, ethics etc. Though no report can possibly recommend against opening up the intelligence domain to legislative oversight, the manner and extent of this recommendation would be its highlight, given the reservations about reform that may be in existence.
This article suggests the inclusion of a recommendation on ethnic, regional and community profile balancing within these organizations. The idea can be considered irrespective of whether the Equal Opportunity Bill under debate sees the light of day. Since no data exists on account of secrecy that understandably attends the intelligence function, that this aspect is less than optimal cannot be said outright. However, the possibility of certain subgroups not being represented adequately, such as Muslims and other groups from certain regions, cannot be discounted. The figures, albeit contested, provided by late Omar Khalidi, in his book Khaki and Ethnic Violence in India are representative. The remainder of this article argues why a greater representation of Muslims would be beneficial to the organizations in question and to national security.
There is a perception of Muslim under-representation to the extent of their numbers being negligible to minimal, particularly so in officer ranks, as revealed by Outlook in 2006. That there is no policy to this effect can be conceded, though the article had suggested that it was outcome of an ‘unwritten code’. It possibly owes instead to a lack of qualification and dearth of volunteers. The latter is also due to the self-reinforcing cycle of Muslims not applying under the impression that they would not in any case make the grade. Given this, there is a case for remedial action. While positive discrimination is not the answer, an open recruiting policy may help. Targeting Muslims through an outreach to the community, through its leaders, may be useful. The figures for police and paramilitary have registered an upward trend since the Sachar committee made this suggestion. At officer level initially, Muslims can be asked for as deputationists from other organizations, such as police and the military. That deserving Muslims would likely seize the opportunity can be seen from a Muslim topping the IAS last year and the Indian Forest Service exam this year. The Vastanvi episode indicates the focus on education and jobs in the multiple communities that together form India and the world’s largest minority.
Why is this necessary? Take for instance intelligence on the terror bombings which reveal the handiwork of majoritarian extremists. The refrain in intelligence input, magnified through the media, was that these were perpetrated by Muslims. However, the discourse in the Urdu press and in drawing rooms of Muslim households was to the contrary. It could thus have proved to be a timely line of investigation. At a higher level of abstraction, the domestication of the intelligence function is important for the plural, secular and democratic underpinnings of the republic. In case the character of the state is to be changed, it is the closed intelligence apparatus that would be the first target. Without checks and balances that pervade the system, these organizations lend themselves to such takeover. While democratic control of the military has witnessed much theorizing, the democracy-intelligence relationship has been neglected.
Tuesday, March 01, 2011
chowk.com
What Holds India Up?
by Firdaus Ahmed March 01, 2011 17:34
India has a pretty good rationale for not engaging with Pakistan. It can always refer to 26/11, the dastardly attack on Mumbai. It can follow up with reference to the slovenly prosecution of the terrorist handlers and that the chief mastermind, Hafeez Sayeed, walks free. It can draw up a list of such attacks ranging from Mumbai train blasts through the parliament attack in Delhi to the bombing of the Srinagar legislative assembly. That Pakistan has not rolled back terror infrastructure intending to reuse it when the time is ripe on the departure of the US from AfPak makes Delhi less inclined to follow up purposefully on its professed preference of seeing a friend in Pakistan. India’s position appears justifiable and owing to this there is little interrogation separating what it professes with what are its actual motivations.
There are at least two pieces of evidence as to what holds India up. The first appeared in the Wikileaks trove on US embassy officials writing up their information. A joint secretary in the external affairs ministry is stated as saying, "call me a cynic, but even if India were to lop off Kashmir and hand it on a platter to Pakistan, they would still find a reason to make trouble for us". In the official's assessment a deep historical and civilisational faultline divides the two states and could at a certain level make their differences irreconcilable.
The second is in the recall of Musharraf of the Agra summit in which he alleges that the two political leaderships were closing in on a formulation, but clinching of the deal was scuttled by a foreign service officer handling the Pakistan desk in attendance. In his words, "There was someone from the foreign ministry sitting there named Katju. He may still be there, he created a lot of hurdles." Interestingly, he added, "I told Vajpayee saheb before leaving Agra, today you and I have been both humiliated because there is someone above us, sitting above us who can veto what we decide." It is no wonder that Musharraf did not receive the visa for his speaking engagement in Delhi late last year in the immediate aftermath of this interview.
The two instances indicate that there is a section in India’s deep state that is not overly inclined towards Pakistan. The section that is possibly less hostile to Pakistan is less vocal. They have certainly be silenced after the gaffe in the wording of the Sharm es Sheikh joint declaration of 2009. The most vocal proponent, Mani Shankar Aiyar, is unlikely to gain any position of consequence, unsurprisingly because of his being an Indusphile.
In the two illustrations, hardline views of diplomats have been referred to. Diplomats are the least extreme. What the views of those in the intelligence agency are can only be imagined. These views have been formed no doubt after observing Pakistani ISI in action and therefore they are understandable. Nevertheless, that they would constitute a speed breaker if not a hurdle can be imagined.
Likewise, the Army can be expected to be averse to Pakistan. While it may not have an issue with engaging Pakistan, it would be concerned were there to be any semblance of concession as part of such reaching out. Its position on eminently negotiable issues as Siachen has been described by notable Indian civil-military relations specialists as a case of exercise of veto over otherwise eminently political decision terrain.
Within the strategic community are the vociferous Pakistan bashers, Indian equivalent of the combative Shireen Mazari. Ever on television and through opinion pieces they deepen suspicion. The government with limited political capital to begin with can then hardly invest in rolling back the tide as prelude to clinching a deal. It is no wonder then that India remains without a policy of conciliation.
It however has a policy of coercion under preparation. While all elements are not in place at the moment due to the military make over that coercion requires, it is slowly building up through acquisitions to the capability. That coercion will be offset by Pakistan relying on China, on nuclear weapons and on irregular fighters is a problem that will be contended with in due course. Presently, a strategy of restraint caters to tide over the interim when India will be able to follow through where it left off in Operation Parakram. This means that the future is an uninviting one.
If changes are to be made, then understanding India’s internal hold up is equally required. Forever attributing the road block to the self-interested Pakistan Army and its notorious ISI is limiting. The Pakistani deep state has its reflection in an Indian deep state. Indian policy makers, its politicians, are not in a position to overrule the veto this exercises on its Pakistan policy.
Pakistan needs to change for India to be more accommodative is an acceptable proposition. However, for India to have to wait it out till then makes it a reactive state and is unbecoming of its power credentials. India needs instead to bring about the change. This it can only do if it can internally bring about a triumph of the liberals.
This will require political investment, attention and staking of political reputations. The over-focus on relations with the US, the economy and now with corruption are keeping India from engaging with the substantive issue of poor relations with its foremost neighbour. It needs to refocus on the core issue. Just as Gulliver, India cannot expect to get anywhere if its neighbourhood ties it down.
Recognising that the problem is not entirely in Pakistan but lies within is the first step.
What Holds India Up?
by Firdaus Ahmed March 01, 2011 17:34
India has a pretty good rationale for not engaging with Pakistan. It can always refer to 26/11, the dastardly attack on Mumbai. It can follow up with reference to the slovenly prosecution of the terrorist handlers and that the chief mastermind, Hafeez Sayeed, walks free. It can draw up a list of such attacks ranging from Mumbai train blasts through the parliament attack in Delhi to the bombing of the Srinagar legislative assembly. That Pakistan has not rolled back terror infrastructure intending to reuse it when the time is ripe on the departure of the US from AfPak makes Delhi less inclined to follow up purposefully on its professed preference of seeing a friend in Pakistan. India’s position appears justifiable and owing to this there is little interrogation separating what it professes with what are its actual motivations.
There are at least two pieces of evidence as to what holds India up. The first appeared in the Wikileaks trove on US embassy officials writing up their information. A joint secretary in the external affairs ministry is stated as saying, "call me a cynic, but even if India were to lop off Kashmir and hand it on a platter to Pakistan, they would still find a reason to make trouble for us". In the official's assessment a deep historical and civilisational faultline divides the two states and could at a certain level make their differences irreconcilable.
The second is in the recall of Musharraf of the Agra summit in which he alleges that the two political leaderships were closing in on a formulation, but clinching of the deal was scuttled by a foreign service officer handling the Pakistan desk in attendance. In his words, "There was someone from the foreign ministry sitting there named Katju. He may still be there, he created a lot of hurdles." Interestingly, he added, "I told Vajpayee saheb before leaving Agra, today you and I have been both humiliated because there is someone above us, sitting above us who can veto what we decide." It is no wonder that Musharraf did not receive the visa for his speaking engagement in Delhi late last year in the immediate aftermath of this interview.
The two instances indicate that there is a section in India’s deep state that is not overly inclined towards Pakistan. The section that is possibly less hostile to Pakistan is less vocal. They have certainly be silenced after the gaffe in the wording of the Sharm es Sheikh joint declaration of 2009. The most vocal proponent, Mani Shankar Aiyar, is unlikely to gain any position of consequence, unsurprisingly because of his being an Indusphile.
In the two illustrations, hardline views of diplomats have been referred to. Diplomats are the least extreme. What the views of those in the intelligence agency are can only be imagined. These views have been formed no doubt after observing Pakistani ISI in action and therefore they are understandable. Nevertheless, that they would constitute a speed breaker if not a hurdle can be imagined.
Likewise, the Army can be expected to be averse to Pakistan. While it may not have an issue with engaging Pakistan, it would be concerned were there to be any semblance of concession as part of such reaching out. Its position on eminently negotiable issues as Siachen has been described by notable Indian civil-military relations specialists as a case of exercise of veto over otherwise eminently political decision terrain.
Within the strategic community are the vociferous Pakistan bashers, Indian equivalent of the combative Shireen Mazari. Ever on television and through opinion pieces they deepen suspicion. The government with limited political capital to begin with can then hardly invest in rolling back the tide as prelude to clinching a deal. It is no wonder then that India remains without a policy of conciliation.
It however has a policy of coercion under preparation. While all elements are not in place at the moment due to the military make over that coercion requires, it is slowly building up through acquisitions to the capability. That coercion will be offset by Pakistan relying on China, on nuclear weapons and on irregular fighters is a problem that will be contended with in due course. Presently, a strategy of restraint caters to tide over the interim when India will be able to follow through where it left off in Operation Parakram. This means that the future is an uninviting one.
If changes are to be made, then understanding India’s internal hold up is equally required. Forever attributing the road block to the self-interested Pakistan Army and its notorious ISI is limiting. The Pakistani deep state has its reflection in an Indian deep state. Indian policy makers, its politicians, are not in a position to overrule the veto this exercises on its Pakistan policy.
Pakistan needs to change for India to be more accommodative is an acceptable proposition. However, for India to have to wait it out till then makes it a reactive state and is unbecoming of its power credentials. India needs instead to bring about the change. This it can only do if it can internally bring about a triumph of the liberals.
This will require political investment, attention and staking of political reputations. The over-focus on relations with the US, the economy and now with corruption are keeping India from engaging with the substantive issue of poor relations with its foremost neighbour. It needs to refocus on the core issue. Just as Gulliver, India cannot expect to get anywhere if its neighbourhood ties it down.
Recognising that the problem is not entirely in Pakistan but lies within is the first step.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
What if Pakistan implodes?
India would do well to consider its options in light of its national interests. Loose nukes are certainly a concern, but talk of taking them out is cavalier, and we must put the brakes on that.
28 February 2011 - Nuclear safety and security in the subcontinent have been among India's concerns. Recently, the National Security Adviser had this to say: "there is an increasing danger of terrorism spreading from those parts of Asia, like Pakistan and Afghanistan ... The security of nuclear materials and weapons in those same parts of Asia is another example of the sort of problems that we face." (Indian Express, "Towards a New Asian Order"). These fears have been around ever since the United States commenced military action in the region against terrorists and their supporters.
In international fora, the spectre of a 'failed' Pakistan, and the resulting threats to nuclear safety have been played down, generally, but they cannot be ignored altogether. The answer so far has been to pressure Pakistan to maintain vigilance, with the US providing more substantial material and technical support. With the assassination of Salman Taseer, the personnel reliability program has come under cloud. Various scenarios of Pakistan going under finally, although still far-fetched, have also gained life in light of uprisings in Arab lands.
Take out the nuclear weapons?
A government-funded think tank believes it has the answer to the development of such a threat. In its view, "in case there is ever a successful coup led by radical extremists with the support of disgruntled elements in the Pakistan army, nuclear warhead storage sites will need to be bombed so as to render the warheads ineffective. For this contingency, India must consider providing military and logistics support to the US and its allies" (see this link).
We only need to remind ourselves of Chernobyl, while mulling over this advice. Of the population of about six million in the affected area stretching from Ukraine to Belarus, an estimated 5000 died of radiation effects according to WHO figures. In a country of 175 million people with another 100 million or so Indians in close vicinity, the possible casualty figures are mind-boggling. In case this advocacy was part of internet cacophony, it could have been easily ignored. But coming from a military-linked think tank, it calls for closer scrutiny.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org
The risks of intervention
It is readily accepted that India needs to intervene in some manner on the side of the besieged rational-secular element in Pakistan, in case the challenge of radicals goes beyond limits. But the scenarios for such intervention are also dismissed too quickly, since, as a noted Pakistan watcher Sumit Ganguly put it, "Pakistan is not Egypt". Nevertheless, this alternative is something we must discuss, lest the advocacy for intervention assume dominance by default.
In a country of 175 million people with another 100 million or so Indians in close vicinity, the possible casualty figures from an attack on nuclear sites are mind-boggling.
Assuming Pakistan slides into its oft-predicted but perpetually eluded 'failed state' status through a civil war, the Indian interest would be to ensure that the secularists in that country prevail. Towards this end India may choose to be supportive. However, the opposition can be expected to cash in on the backlash of that group associating with India. In case this backlash is more powerful than Indian exertions, the secularists are unlikely to be saved. It would be best, therefore, for India to keep any support it provides covert.
As for allowing other countries to use its national territory for more proactive uses, India must be prepared to end up as a 'frontline state' if it makes this choice. Given the dubious benefits of this distinction for Pakistan over two periods in the eighties and last decade, the price India would have to pay can be easily imagined. Those desiring a closer engagement with the US and Israel may not mind such a development, but the historical record is quite clear - countries have not benefited from an overly close asymmetric relationship with the United States.
A secular soft-landing
If the secularists find support within Pakistan itself, they could hold out for long against the Islamists, but in that case the civil war would be both brutal and prolonged. To some that is not such a bad thing - since keeping the instability restricted to Pakistan would be better than permitting its spread to the region in case of an Islamist victory. However, there is no guarantee of a secularist victory. That the secularists have themselves brought on such a catastrophe through policies such as ignoring land reforms, education etc. implies they are not necessarily the better side.
But staying out of Pakistan's affairs would have one benefit, in case the secularists are displaced. India would be better positioned to engage with the opposition, even if Islamist, in power. Engagement can help socialise the new regime, whereas efforts at containment are likely to make it expansionist in reaction. Reassurance may be a better strategy towards normalising the regime. This would serve the larger Indian interest in regional stability.
What does this imply for the crown jewels - the nuclear weapons? Taking them out of circulation may prove possible with the help of secularists guarding the facilities and assets. However, firstly such action can be expected to instigate fighting over their possession, endangering them further. It is better instead that the victor be allowed the spoils without turning the sites into dangerous battlefields. This way there would be greater hope of central and local authorities continuing control. Secondly, there is no guarantee of taking out the complete inventory. The threat from those remaining in the wrong hands would be considerably more. India, being closest at hand, would be in the line of fire, more so than the US or Israel.
India would therefore do well to consider its options in light of its national interests. That the US is threatened by loose nukes is certainly an international concern. The response to this threat is not necessarily through intervention, but by defusing the 'pull factors' that cause the threat, such as the violence of the Islamist opposition. American support for authoritarian regimes is as much to blame for this as anything else. If there is a message from the Arab revolt, it is that democracy is the best safeguard against radicalism. Preventing a collapsed Pakistan and ensuring its soft landing in secular hands is therefore a better strategy.
It is important to refute the irresponsible advocacy not only so that taxpayers' money is not ill-spent, but to prevent the group-think that may result from such ideas being posted as the 'only option'. There are always other options, if we choose to think first.
India would do well to consider its options in light of its national interests. Loose nukes are certainly a concern, but talk of taking them out is cavalier, and we must put the brakes on that.
28 February 2011 - Nuclear safety and security in the subcontinent have been among India's concerns. Recently, the National Security Adviser had this to say: "there is an increasing danger of terrorism spreading from those parts of Asia, like Pakistan and Afghanistan ... The security of nuclear materials and weapons in those same parts of Asia is another example of the sort of problems that we face." (Indian Express, "Towards a New Asian Order"). These fears have been around ever since the United States commenced military action in the region against terrorists and their supporters.
In international fora, the spectre of a 'failed' Pakistan, and the resulting threats to nuclear safety have been played down, generally, but they cannot be ignored altogether. The answer so far has been to pressure Pakistan to maintain vigilance, with the US providing more substantial material and technical support. With the assassination of Salman Taseer, the personnel reliability program has come under cloud. Various scenarios of Pakistan going under finally, although still far-fetched, have also gained life in light of uprisings in Arab lands.
Take out the nuclear weapons?
A government-funded think tank believes it has the answer to the development of such a threat. In its view, "in case there is ever a successful coup led by radical extremists with the support of disgruntled elements in the Pakistan army, nuclear warhead storage sites will need to be bombed so as to render the warheads ineffective. For this contingency, India must consider providing military and logistics support to the US and its allies" (see this link).
We only need to remind ourselves of Chernobyl, while mulling over this advice. Of the population of about six million in the affected area stretching from Ukraine to Belarus, an estimated 5000 died of radiation effects according to WHO figures. In a country of 175 million people with another 100 million or so Indians in close vicinity, the possible casualty figures are mind-boggling. In case this advocacy was part of internet cacophony, it could have been easily ignored. But coming from a military-linked think tank, it calls for closer scrutiny.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org
The risks of intervention
It is readily accepted that India needs to intervene in some manner on the side of the besieged rational-secular element in Pakistan, in case the challenge of radicals goes beyond limits. But the scenarios for such intervention are also dismissed too quickly, since, as a noted Pakistan watcher Sumit Ganguly put it, "Pakistan is not Egypt". Nevertheless, this alternative is something we must discuss, lest the advocacy for intervention assume dominance by default.
In a country of 175 million people with another 100 million or so Indians in close vicinity, the possible casualty figures from an attack on nuclear sites are mind-boggling.
Assuming Pakistan slides into its oft-predicted but perpetually eluded 'failed state' status through a civil war, the Indian interest would be to ensure that the secularists in that country prevail. Towards this end India may choose to be supportive. However, the opposition can be expected to cash in on the backlash of that group associating with India. In case this backlash is more powerful than Indian exertions, the secularists are unlikely to be saved. It would be best, therefore, for India to keep any support it provides covert.
As for allowing other countries to use its national territory for more proactive uses, India must be prepared to end up as a 'frontline state' if it makes this choice. Given the dubious benefits of this distinction for Pakistan over two periods in the eighties and last decade, the price India would have to pay can be easily imagined. Those desiring a closer engagement with the US and Israel may not mind such a development, but the historical record is quite clear - countries have not benefited from an overly close asymmetric relationship with the United States.
A secular soft-landing
If the secularists find support within Pakistan itself, they could hold out for long against the Islamists, but in that case the civil war would be both brutal and prolonged. To some that is not such a bad thing - since keeping the instability restricted to Pakistan would be better than permitting its spread to the region in case of an Islamist victory. However, there is no guarantee of a secularist victory. That the secularists have themselves brought on such a catastrophe through policies such as ignoring land reforms, education etc. implies they are not necessarily the better side.
But staying out of Pakistan's affairs would have one benefit, in case the secularists are displaced. India would be better positioned to engage with the opposition, even if Islamist, in power. Engagement can help socialise the new regime, whereas efforts at containment are likely to make it expansionist in reaction. Reassurance may be a better strategy towards normalising the regime. This would serve the larger Indian interest in regional stability.
What does this imply for the crown jewels - the nuclear weapons? Taking them out of circulation may prove possible with the help of secularists guarding the facilities and assets. However, firstly such action can be expected to instigate fighting over their possession, endangering them further. It is better instead that the victor be allowed the spoils without turning the sites into dangerous battlefields. This way there would be greater hope of central and local authorities continuing control. Secondly, there is no guarantee of taking out the complete inventory. The threat from those remaining in the wrong hands would be considerably more. India, being closest at hand, would be in the line of fire, more so than the US or Israel.
India would therefore do well to consider its options in light of its national interests. That the US is threatened by loose nukes is certainly an international concern. The response to this threat is not necessarily through intervention, but by defusing the 'pull factors' that cause the threat, such as the violence of the Islamist opposition. American support for authoritarian regimes is as much to blame for this as anything else. If there is a message from the Arab revolt, it is that democracy is the best safeguard against radicalism. Preventing a collapsed Pakistan and ensuring its soft landing in secular hands is therefore a better strategy.
It is important to refute the irresponsible advocacy not only so that taxpayers' money is not ill-spent, but to prevent the group-think that may result from such ideas being posted as the 'only option'. There are always other options, if we choose to think first.
Tuesday, February 01, 2011
http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/jan/fah-partner.htm
Manufacture of a partner
31 January 2011 - With the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was fairly clear that Washington's covert operations in Afghanistan had inflicted a mortal blow on the Soviet Union. This arrival of the unipolar moment served as background to India's grand strategic shift, brought on by coincidence of the foreign exchange crisis and the era of coalition governments.
India's consequent availability as a potential partner attracted the strategic attention of the United States. In the two decades since, India has moved to a position of that country's strategic partner, serving as a counter-weight to China's growing influence in Asia. Also, in case Pakistan were to collapse from the ripples to its west, India may emerge as a 'frontline' state in various wars of the West's making. In part, this story of strategic convergence has been a collaborative effort between strategists in both states.
Prior to the 1990s, there was only the dependable Stephen Cohen as a credible South Asia watcher. His work on the Indian Army served not only those abroad, but also Indians, to understand themselves better. Thereafter, George Tanham, a longtime RAND policy analyst came to study Indian strategic culture, a study incidentally intended for the US Air Force. After speaking to several members of the strategic community - which was much smaller back then - he echoed their view that India lacked a strategic culture and attributed this, possibly reflecting some of his interlocutors' opinions, to the pervasive cultural - read Hindu - beliefs.
Stephen Rosen, at about the same time, reinforced Tanham's finding on the cultural roots of lack of India will to power, alighting on the caste system and divisiveness for India's strategic incapacity.
Interaction between visiting scholars and the mainly Delhi-centered strategic community in interviews, conversations and on the seminar circuit, served as a feedback loop, with the ideas of the strategic community defining how India was viewed and viewed itself. The strategic community used the opportunity to press its descriptive and prescriptive agenda. This principally consisted of viewing India as less ill at ease with the use of force, and consequently lacking in the institutional edifice necessary to exercise it. Their aim was a departure from Nehruvian antecedents for an assertive India.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org
This had two consequences, both traceable to the tests quite easily. One was that under cover of the Chagai tests it conducted in response to India's nuclear bravado, Pakistan plotted and executed the Kargil intrusion. The after-burn of the operation to evict them from the snowy heights around the Line of Control led to landmark changes institutionally in India - in the direction that strategists had been demanding. The second was in the opening up of India to the US, and indeed, vice versa, of the US opening up to India - through the dozen meetings between Strobe Talbot, who had Clinton's ear, and Jaswant Singh, the leading strategic light of the BJP.
At about that time, echoes of the contest for shaping of India's nuclear capability can be witnessed in the writings of Ashley Tellis. His book on India's emerging arsenal was seemingly a reaction to India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine. The Draft, in balancing the input of nuclear-inclined members of the National Security Advisory Board, outlined an expansive nuclear agenda, if a wishful one back then. Tellis, by defining the emerging arsenal as a 'force-in-being', attempted to restrict it. His access to the nuclear establishment was not only because of his intrepidity but because using his work, the nuclear establishment attempted to shape India's policy to go further down the nuclearisation route.
The advent of the Bush era, the challenge of Islamism, the beginnings of global multipolarity and the rise of China by the early 2000s resulted in the growing strategic significance of India for the US. India, by then itself experiencing the beginning of rapid economic growth, was transferring the economic benefits into usable military power. The decade ended with India spending three times the amount on defence that it did at its beginning. This was impelled by the perceived failure of its attempt at coercive diplomacy during Operation Parakram, its military response to the parliament attack.
The changes were noted in strategic literature in Steve Cohen's Emerging India and C Rajamohan's Crossing the Rubicon. The Indo-US relationship climaxed with the clinching of the nuclear deal, spawning a cottage industry of strategic writings both for and against it. The fresh entrants were Indian academics returning after acquiring familiarity with the jargon and cliches of non-traditional fields as international relations and strategic studies in academic institutions in the west. The refrain of this younger generation reflects that of the diaspora and middle class, for an Indian seat at the global high table, finally and at long last.
The latest in this opinion and policy shaping interaction is Steve Cohen's third book of consequence, Arming Without Aiming. That the book is co-written with Sunil Dasgupta, indicates the increased intimacy of collaboration in the manufacture of India's strategic image and self-understanding. The book, as in case of earlier books by George Perkovich, Tellis, Paul Kapur and Cohen himself, has the last chapter detailing policy recommendations for the administration. This exemplifies the cycle in which the strategic community, using the medium of the US academic, prods Indian security policy in a direction that is conveniently advantageous for the US.
What is the wider implication of this observation?
Casting about for fresh foes and allies, the US alighted on India for the latter role. The exercise of soft power, through the academic conditioning described above, has helped ease India's movement from a position of skepticism of the US to one of an easy familiarity with it.
The ends of the strategic community in the creation of an India at home with power and its instrumentality have in the process been partially met. While Indian strategists exerted to make India a strategic actor worthy of its potential and weight, the US, for its part, needed a player aligned with its aims in the region. The convergence of interests and ensuing interaction nudged India on to the status of an 'emerged power' in Obama's complimentary words, in sync with the US and its allies.
Two candidate explanations present themselves for this development. The first is that it was an inadvertent convergence, with structural causes. This is the rationalisation. The second one, deserving of investigation, is that India's emergence was the superpower's project. Condoleeza Rice admitted as much in the US promising to make India in its own image. Cadences of Edward Said's Orientalism, discerned in the institutional and intellectual structures and processes of the engagement over the past two decades suggest this. Strategic India was first imagined and its imagination captured, with the help of those Said would term as 'native informants'.
The implications for security of India and its people are still to play themselves out, and if the unraveling of US allies in the Arab world is any guide, it may not be benign.
⊕
Manufacture of a partner
31 January 2011 - With the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was fairly clear that Washington's covert operations in Afghanistan had inflicted a mortal blow on the Soviet Union. This arrival of the unipolar moment served as background to India's grand strategic shift, brought on by coincidence of the foreign exchange crisis and the era of coalition governments.
India's consequent availability as a potential partner attracted the strategic attention of the United States. In the two decades since, India has moved to a position of that country's strategic partner, serving as a counter-weight to China's growing influence in Asia. Also, in case Pakistan were to collapse from the ripples to its west, India may emerge as a 'frontline' state in various wars of the West's making. In part, this story of strategic convergence has been a collaborative effort between strategists in both states.
Prior to the 1990s, there was only the dependable Stephen Cohen as a credible South Asia watcher. His work on the Indian Army served not only those abroad, but also Indians, to understand themselves better. Thereafter, George Tanham, a longtime RAND policy analyst came to study Indian strategic culture, a study incidentally intended for the US Air Force. After speaking to several members of the strategic community - which was much smaller back then - he echoed their view that India lacked a strategic culture and attributed this, possibly reflecting some of his interlocutors' opinions, to the pervasive cultural - read Hindu - beliefs.
Stephen Rosen, at about the same time, reinforced Tanham's finding on the cultural roots of lack of India will to power, alighting on the caste system and divisiveness for India's strategic incapacity.
Interaction between visiting scholars and the mainly Delhi-centered strategic community in interviews, conversations and on the seminar circuit, served as a feedback loop, with the ideas of the strategic community defining how India was viewed and viewed itself. The strategic community used the opportunity to press its descriptive and prescriptive agenda. This principally consisted of viewing India as less ill at ease with the use of force, and consequently lacking in the institutional edifice necessary to exercise it. Their aim was a departure from Nehruvian antecedents for an assertive India.
FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE indiatogether.org
This had two consequences, both traceable to the tests quite easily. One was that under cover of the Chagai tests it conducted in response to India's nuclear bravado, Pakistan plotted and executed the Kargil intrusion. The after-burn of the operation to evict them from the snowy heights around the Line of Control led to landmark changes institutionally in India - in the direction that strategists had been demanding. The second was in the opening up of India to the US, and indeed, vice versa, of the US opening up to India - through the dozen meetings between Strobe Talbot, who had Clinton's ear, and Jaswant Singh, the leading strategic light of the BJP.
At about that time, echoes of the contest for shaping of India's nuclear capability can be witnessed in the writings of Ashley Tellis. His book on India's emerging arsenal was seemingly a reaction to India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine. The Draft, in balancing the input of nuclear-inclined members of the National Security Advisory Board, outlined an expansive nuclear agenda, if a wishful one back then. Tellis, by defining the emerging arsenal as a 'force-in-being', attempted to restrict it. His access to the nuclear establishment was not only because of his intrepidity but because using his work, the nuclear establishment attempted to shape India's policy to go further down the nuclearisation route.
The advent of the Bush era, the challenge of Islamism, the beginnings of global multipolarity and the rise of China by the early 2000s resulted in the growing strategic significance of India for the US. India, by then itself experiencing the beginning of rapid economic growth, was transferring the economic benefits into usable military power. The decade ended with India spending three times the amount on defence that it did at its beginning. This was impelled by the perceived failure of its attempt at coercive diplomacy during Operation Parakram, its military response to the parliament attack.
The changes were noted in strategic literature in Steve Cohen's Emerging India and C Rajamohan's Crossing the Rubicon. The Indo-US relationship climaxed with the clinching of the nuclear deal, spawning a cottage industry of strategic writings both for and against it. The fresh entrants were Indian academics returning after acquiring familiarity with the jargon and cliches of non-traditional fields as international relations and strategic studies in academic institutions in the west. The refrain of this younger generation reflects that of the diaspora and middle class, for an Indian seat at the global high table, finally and at long last.
The latest in this opinion and policy shaping interaction is Steve Cohen's third book of consequence, Arming Without Aiming. That the book is co-written with Sunil Dasgupta, indicates the increased intimacy of collaboration in the manufacture of India's strategic image and self-understanding. The book, as in case of earlier books by George Perkovich, Tellis, Paul Kapur and Cohen himself, has the last chapter detailing policy recommendations for the administration. This exemplifies the cycle in which the strategic community, using the medium of the US academic, prods Indian security policy in a direction that is conveniently advantageous for the US.
What is the wider implication of this observation?
Casting about for fresh foes and allies, the US alighted on India for the latter role. The exercise of soft power, through the academic conditioning described above, has helped ease India's movement from a position of skepticism of the US to one of an easy familiarity with it.
The ends of the strategic community in the creation of an India at home with power and its instrumentality have in the process been partially met. While Indian strategists exerted to make India a strategic actor worthy of its potential and weight, the US, for its part, needed a player aligned with its aims in the region. The convergence of interests and ensuing interaction nudged India on to the status of an 'emerged power' in Obama's complimentary words, in sync with the US and its allies.
Two candidate explanations present themselves for this development. The first is that it was an inadvertent convergence, with structural causes. This is the rationalisation. The second one, deserving of investigation, is that India's emergence was the superpower's project. Condoleeza Rice admitted as much in the US promising to make India in its own image. Cadences of Edward Said's Orientalism, discerned in the institutional and intellectual structures and processes of the engagement over the past two decades suggest this. Strategic India was first imagined and its imagination captured, with the help of those Said would term as 'native informants'.
The implications for security of India and its people are still to play themselves out, and if the unraveling of US allies in the Arab world is any guide, it may not be benign.
⊕
Saturday, January 29, 2011
chowk.com
Pakistan: Divining a Way
By Firdaus Ahmed
Washington Post staff writers, Karin Brulliard and Karen DeYoung, inform ‘U.S. efforts fail to convince Pakistan's top general to target Taliban’ (31 Dec 2010). They write that, ‘In October, administration officials choreographed a White House meeting for Kayani at which Obama could directly deliver his message of urgency. The army chief heard him out, then provided a 13-page document updating Pakistan's strategic perspective and noting the gap between short-term U.S. concerns and Pakistan's long-term interests, according to U.S. officials.’ Since the document’s contents are privileged information, they can at best be surmised. The article attempts this and suggests what is unlikely to have figured in that document.
Strategy is usually thought of as being externally focused. However, there is a considerable role of internal factors, particularly in regimes politically beset. Strategy or prioritization of ‘ends, ways, means’ choices is not necessarily a rational exercise to meet external and internal ‘threats’. Strategic theory has it that strategic elites deploy strategy to also preserve their dominance in internal power structures. In the process, and secondarily, if external strategic ends are met then that would be ‘successful’ strategy. In short, strategy’s external dimension is at best a rationalization, utilizing the dominant understanding of strategy for plausibility. This is the case with regimes of uncertain legitimacy. Pakistan provides the best case study for this.
It is very likely the strategy paper Kayani handed Obama has the rationalization. The paper perhaps reflects Kayani’s earlier utterances on the India-centricity of Pakistan and its Army. It may explicate why Pakistan cannot act against the Taliban due to reasons of lack of public support and of troops. Troops are apparently required to dissuade India from ‘Cold Start’. Pakistan’s internal security and political stability being uncertain, Pakistan cannot open another front and hope to win. While US support would be behind Pakistan in any such action, the support itself could prove a liability by making the Islamist counter more potent.
The mysterious strategy paper, equally likely, is unlikely to have dwelt on the internal political angle. The strategy document, meant for US eyes, can be expected to present Pakistan’s Army as the ‘last bastion’. This way continuing largesse can be ensured, even if it comes with greater strictures and supervision of its use. Pakistan Army can then remain at the apex. This would be unacknowledged, not for reasons of deception, as much as Kayani himself being unconscious to the internal compulsions behind strategy.
Understanding Pakistan is seemingly easy. The Pakistan Army wants to remain atop the power structure and therefore has manufacture the Indian ‘bogey’ and is milking the threat of an Islamist take over of a nuclear armed state for its corporate purposes. This explanation hides a more disturbing reality, brought to foreground by two assassinations – one of Mohtarma Bhutto earlier and of Punjab’s Governor, Salman Taseer, now.
The less visible but more significant dimension of internal politics in Pakistan is dominance of an elite with a narrow feudal base. It has in its ranks the higher echelons of bureaucracy and the industrial elite. It has, through the medium of promotions into the elite nucleus of the Pakistan Army, coopted the brass. The privileges that this brings generals, makes the Pakistan Army protective of the power structure. The discourse on Pakistan, in its concentration on praetorianism of its Army, misses the fact that this is consequence of the very social structure of Pakistan. The assassinations have done more to reveal the elite-mass divide than social science.
The assumption that changing the Army’s hold on power would be adequate may prove wrong. The deeper social structure, rather than merely the ‘deep state’, requires change. The elite, both unwilling to forego its advantages and, equally, not knowing how to do so without upheaval, has only the security template as answer to the Islamist challenge.
This has reluctant support of apprehensive allies, interested more in stability than uncertainties of social transformation. They prefer the route of democratization, of expanding middle classes through increased education and economic opportunity. The program, being long term, amounts to slow suicide for the elites. It is no wonder then that it has not found any takers, with elites manipulating external support for own ends. The result is that masses are left with little political recourse than weigh on the side of a political opposition carrying the ‘Islamic’ mantle.
Since elites will not, and if past record is guide, cannot, be the vehicle of change, a ‘strong man’ could prove useful. The problem is with the Musharraf episode proving that there is no guarantee of a Kemal Pasha. External (read ‘Western’) support can only be provocative, mistaken for self-interested manipulation, making for a more energetic backlash. From Tunisia through Egypt to Central Asia, authoritarian regimes are in place, leaving little chance for a democratic opposition to substitute for the Islamist opposition. The Algerian case of the early nineties and Palestinian experiment last decade indicate that democracy will in the short term at least yield up Islamist parties. However, not accommodating to the change leaves the authoritarian regime in place and an armed Islamist opposition. It is arguable that the regime of Ayatullahs has not necessarily been worse than that of the Shah.
While Pakistan is not an authoritarian state in the same mould as the others to its west and north, it is poised on the cross hairs of Islamism. In case it succumbs to its ‘internal contradictions’, engagement rather than counter-revolution or containment is the answer.
However, at a minimum, Pakistan must persist along the long, hard route. And its supporters must not push it into a civil war. Prospects of this are not entirely dim. The US is supporting long term change in terms of funding civilian side, as the Kerry-Lugar bill suggests. General Petraeus is not insisting that Pakistan army carry out operations that could lead to destabilization through a vertical divide in the society and the military. He is instead relying on drone attacks in Pakistan and special forces operations in Afghanistan. What Pakistan needs is to remain on even keel. The Kayani strategy, handed over to Obama, seems to suggest that Pakistan may yet pull through. If its record on the precipice of ‘failed state’ status is any indicator, it may yet manage to evade the status.
Pakistan: Divining a Way
By Firdaus Ahmed
Washington Post staff writers, Karin Brulliard and Karen DeYoung, inform ‘U.S. efforts fail to convince Pakistan's top general to target Taliban’ (31 Dec 2010). They write that, ‘In October, administration officials choreographed a White House meeting for Kayani at which Obama could directly deliver his message of urgency. The army chief heard him out, then provided a 13-page document updating Pakistan's strategic perspective and noting the gap between short-term U.S. concerns and Pakistan's long-term interests, according to U.S. officials.’ Since the document’s contents are privileged information, they can at best be surmised. The article attempts this and suggests what is unlikely to have figured in that document.
Strategy is usually thought of as being externally focused. However, there is a considerable role of internal factors, particularly in regimes politically beset. Strategy or prioritization of ‘ends, ways, means’ choices is not necessarily a rational exercise to meet external and internal ‘threats’. Strategic theory has it that strategic elites deploy strategy to also preserve their dominance in internal power structures. In the process, and secondarily, if external strategic ends are met then that would be ‘successful’ strategy. In short, strategy’s external dimension is at best a rationalization, utilizing the dominant understanding of strategy for plausibility. This is the case with regimes of uncertain legitimacy. Pakistan provides the best case study for this.
It is very likely the strategy paper Kayani handed Obama has the rationalization. The paper perhaps reflects Kayani’s earlier utterances on the India-centricity of Pakistan and its Army. It may explicate why Pakistan cannot act against the Taliban due to reasons of lack of public support and of troops. Troops are apparently required to dissuade India from ‘Cold Start’. Pakistan’s internal security and political stability being uncertain, Pakistan cannot open another front and hope to win. While US support would be behind Pakistan in any such action, the support itself could prove a liability by making the Islamist counter more potent.
The mysterious strategy paper, equally likely, is unlikely to have dwelt on the internal political angle. The strategy document, meant for US eyes, can be expected to present Pakistan’s Army as the ‘last bastion’. This way continuing largesse can be ensured, even if it comes with greater strictures and supervision of its use. Pakistan Army can then remain at the apex. This would be unacknowledged, not for reasons of deception, as much as Kayani himself being unconscious to the internal compulsions behind strategy.
Understanding Pakistan is seemingly easy. The Pakistan Army wants to remain atop the power structure and therefore has manufacture the Indian ‘bogey’ and is milking the threat of an Islamist take over of a nuclear armed state for its corporate purposes. This explanation hides a more disturbing reality, brought to foreground by two assassinations – one of Mohtarma Bhutto earlier and of Punjab’s Governor, Salman Taseer, now.
The less visible but more significant dimension of internal politics in Pakistan is dominance of an elite with a narrow feudal base. It has in its ranks the higher echelons of bureaucracy and the industrial elite. It has, through the medium of promotions into the elite nucleus of the Pakistan Army, coopted the brass. The privileges that this brings generals, makes the Pakistan Army protective of the power structure. The discourse on Pakistan, in its concentration on praetorianism of its Army, misses the fact that this is consequence of the very social structure of Pakistan. The assassinations have done more to reveal the elite-mass divide than social science.
The assumption that changing the Army’s hold on power would be adequate may prove wrong. The deeper social structure, rather than merely the ‘deep state’, requires change. The elite, both unwilling to forego its advantages and, equally, not knowing how to do so without upheaval, has only the security template as answer to the Islamist challenge.
This has reluctant support of apprehensive allies, interested more in stability than uncertainties of social transformation. They prefer the route of democratization, of expanding middle classes through increased education and economic opportunity. The program, being long term, amounts to slow suicide for the elites. It is no wonder then that it has not found any takers, with elites manipulating external support for own ends. The result is that masses are left with little political recourse than weigh on the side of a political opposition carrying the ‘Islamic’ mantle.
Since elites will not, and if past record is guide, cannot, be the vehicle of change, a ‘strong man’ could prove useful. The problem is with the Musharraf episode proving that there is no guarantee of a Kemal Pasha. External (read ‘Western’) support can only be provocative, mistaken for self-interested manipulation, making for a more energetic backlash. From Tunisia through Egypt to Central Asia, authoritarian regimes are in place, leaving little chance for a democratic opposition to substitute for the Islamist opposition. The Algerian case of the early nineties and Palestinian experiment last decade indicate that democracy will in the short term at least yield up Islamist parties. However, not accommodating to the change leaves the authoritarian regime in place and an armed Islamist opposition. It is arguable that the regime of Ayatullahs has not necessarily been worse than that of the Shah.
While Pakistan is not an authoritarian state in the same mould as the others to its west and north, it is poised on the cross hairs of Islamism. In case it succumbs to its ‘internal contradictions’, engagement rather than counter-revolution or containment is the answer.
However, at a minimum, Pakistan must persist along the long, hard route. And its supporters must not push it into a civil war. Prospects of this are not entirely dim. The US is supporting long term change in terms of funding civilian side, as the Kerry-Lugar bill suggests. General Petraeus is not insisting that Pakistan army carry out operations that could lead to destabilization through a vertical divide in the society and the military. He is instead relying on drone attacks in Pakistan and special forces operations in Afghanistan. What Pakistan needs is to remain on even keel. The Kayani strategy, handed over to Obama, seems to suggest that Pakistan may yet pull through. If its record on the precipice of ‘failed state’ status is any indicator, it may yet manage to evade the status.
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